

Volume I



American Air Lines Flight 11 | WTC1

This is an extensive reference work on the very first aircraft that began a series of events in September 2001, being the first of four volumes that will include aircraft passengers, the Air Line employees, the U.S. Military staff, the “hijackers” onboard, the Cabin/Flight Crew onboard, and also a summary of the targets, which for this volume would be the North World Trade Center Tower otherwise referred to as WTC 1, and distinguished by its antenna mast (360 feet tall) for television and radio transmission. [NIST NCSTAR 1, SEPT. 2005.]

The material compiled here was collated upon the 9/11 Commissions’ released documents chronicling the events of Tuesday, September 11th in the year 2001. It was not possible to add material that was either closed by statute and/or not released by the Commission, since only an approximate 35% of the Commission archived textual records are publicly available ¹ at the time of writing this volume. The remaining 65% is unavailable in the public domain. As a consequence, this is not a complete reference; but it manages, amongst other data, to report on:-

¹ Government Archives.
<http://www.archives.gov/research/9-11/>

- Released Air Traffic Control (ATC) transcripts from four Air Traffic Control Towers (ATCC): Boston, Cleveland, New York, and Indianapolis.
- Commission Staff notes and memorandum.
- Released Department of Defense (DoD) chronicles.
- U.S. Air Force/Military released reports.
- The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) released logs and timelines.
- American Air Line (AAL) public reports.
- The Department of Transportation (DoT) reports.
- The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) declassified reports.

For the section on the World Trade Center, released documents and reports were delved into to bring forth substantial data of the towers' demise, including health issues as a consequence of. This material includes amongst other:-

- The National Institute of Standards & Technology (NIST) reports.
- The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) reports.
- Civilian footage and/or captured images.
- FEMA employees' footage and/or captured images.
- The Mineta Transportation Institute Report (MTI Report 02-06).
- New York's biggest landowner developers' interviews.
- The TenantWise reports.
- The 2000 Merritt & Harris, Inc., reports
- New York Fire Department (NYFD) reports and interviews.
- New York Police Department (NYPD) reports and interviews.

All documents referenced in this work are primarily sourced to the “Scrbd” account [911 Document Archive](#) managed by Erik Larson and Kevin Fenton, who are also contributors to the “Complete 9/11 Timeline” at the Website [History Commons](#). Additional information has been used from the Website [9-11 Revisted](#) created by a former professional staff member of the Congressional Joint Inquiry and the 9/11 Commission. Another source, with Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) documents, was used from [Government’s Attic](#) and from [911 Dataset Project](#) including [911Myths](#). Other sources have been referenced accordingly from the [9/11 Commission Memoranda for the Record \(MFRs\)](#).

Links to documents used, wherever possible, is given in [underlined blue text](#); however, due to the dynamic nature of the Internet, some links may not be available at the time of reading this work. Should this occur, these termed “dead links” can mostly be uncovered at the [Wayback Machine](#).

COORDINATED UNIVERSAL TIME (UTC)

THE AVIATION USES THE 24 HOUR CLOCK SYSTEM



›Sonalee Sarkar’s Radio Comm: A-Z of Air Traffic Control, May 27, 2013 ²

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All times in this work are referenced to New York time (Eastern) unless otherwise stated.

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² Radio Communication: A-Z of Air Traffic Control (ATC). Accessed 2010.
<http://lurnq.com/mobile/lesson/Radio-Communication-A-Z-of-Air-Traffic-Control/>

DEFINITIONS

1. The term, “terrorism” has yet to be given a universally accepted definition. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines terrorism as: ...the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, *TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES*, WASHINGTON, D.C.: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 1990), p. 25.]

2. The U.S. Department of State (DoS) defines terrorism in a slightly different way: ...“terrorism” [is] premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational [sic] groups or clandestine state agents, usually intended to influence an audience. “International terrorism” is terrorism involving the citizens or territory of more than one country. [U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, *PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM*, 1989 (WASHINGTON D.C.: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 1990), p. v.]

3. The following definition is used by the Department of Defense (DoD): The calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or try to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. [DoD DIRECTIVE O-2000.12 (REFERENCE (A))]

4. The definitions of terrorism used by U.S. Government Departments and Agencies are applicable to all forms of political violence. [DAVID E. LONG. *ANATOMY OF TERRORISM* (NEW YORK: FREE PRESS, 1990), pp. 3-5.]

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WTC Hanger #17
Slipper of an American Air Line Flight Attendant


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Hurricane ERIN

*Peak intensity of Category 3 forming on September 1st;
dissipating on September 11th in 2001*

“Apparently the NWS [National Weather Service] is pretty concerned about this since they also spent the day calling all the local Ocean Rescue depts., and warning them firsthand.”

[National Weather Service \(2001\)](#)



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Two hurricanes raced towards the United States on September 11th in 2001. According to the [National Hurricane Center](#), one was [ERIN](#) that was being traced towards New York, and the other was [GABRIELLE](#) ready to dominate over Florida where President Bush was staying at the time.

Elaboration of FBI Information: Employees at Boston-Logan International Airport were concerned. Gate Operator Mary Herbert working on Monday, September 10, 2001, reported weather conditions was a serious factor due to ERIN, which was nearing its way to New York full swing for September 11th. [FBI INTERVIEW: GATE OPERATOR HERBERT, BOSTON-LOGAN AIRPORT, SEPT. 14, 2001.]

Elaboration of Scientific Information: ERIN, with a peak intensity of Category 3 forming on September 1st and dissipating on September 11th in 2001, was analyzed during the 4th Convection & Moisture Experiment otherwise known as CAMEX-4, which took place from August 16th till September 24th of the same year. CAMEX-4 is a series of field research investigations to study tropical cyclones and storms commonly known as hurricanes.

The experiment originated from the Naval Air Station in Jacksonville, Florida, that united researchers from ten universities, five N.A.S.A. centers, and participants from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. [\[N.A.S.A. LOOKING AT EARTH\]](#)

An article on the subject was published in *ScienceDaily* on October 11, 2005, and follows.

ScienceDaily

NASA Makes A Heated 3-D Look Into Hurricane Erin's Eye October 11, 2005.

NASA Makes A Heated 3-D Look Into Hurricane Erin's Eye

ScienceDaily (Oct. 11, 2005)

Hurricane Erin raced across the North Atlantic and along the eastern seaboard in September 2001. She was used as an experiment for a study to improve hurricane tracking and intensity predictions, allowing meteorologists to provide more accurate and timely warnings to the public. Studies show that temperatures measured at an extremely high altitude collected from a hurricane's center or eye can provide improved understanding of how hurricanes change intensity.

See Also:

Matter & Energy

- [Construction](#)
- [Civil Engineering](#)
- [Aviation](#)

Computers & Math

- [Artificial Intelligence](#)
- [Computer Graphics](#)
- [Math Puzzles](#)

Reference

- [Hurricane proof building](#)
- [Levee failures in Greater New Orleans, 2005](#)
- [Altimeter](#)
- [Global climate model](#)


Hurricane Erin was analyzed during the fourth Convection And Moisture EXperiment (CAMEX-4), which took place from August 16 through September 24, 2001. The mission originated from the Naval Air Station in Jacksonville, Fla. The mission united researchers from 10 universities, five NASA centers and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. CAMEX-4 is a series of field research investigations to study tropical cyclones — storms commonly known as hurricanes.

Twenty instrumented packages, called dropsondes, were dropped into Erin's eye by two NASA research aircraft (the ER-2 and DC-8). The special packages included instruments that mapped temperature patterns.

For the first time, researchers were able to reconstruct the structure of the eye in three dimensions from as high as 70,000 feet, down to the ocean surface, in great detail. The dropsondes showed Erin's warm core decreasing while it was rapidly

weakening, making the storm more vulnerable to wind shear, a change in horizontal winds, which led to the storm falling apart.

Hurricane Erin's rainfall pattern adjusted quickly to surprisingly small changes in wind speed patterns in the surrounding atmosphere. Weak horizontal winds rearrange rain and wind structure, which create uneven weather conditions around the hurricane's core.



This 3D rendition of hurricane Erin shows elements of the hurricane engine inside the clouds (white): Rainfall (green), as revealed by TRMM, and warmth of the upper level eye (red), as revealed by the dropsondes released from the NASA ER-2 aircraft. (Credit: NASA)

Observations from the study show the relationship between warm air from the eye of the storm is linked to reduction in sea surface pressure, which is the basic process that drives the hurricane's destructive winds.

Although little is known about the birth of a hurricane and what causes it to strengthen or weaken, scientists have made substantial steps toward improving predictions of where a hurricane will move or make landfall. The ability to forecast intensity change, however, has always been a challenge for meteorologists.

The research done on Hurricane Erin was important because it could help forecasters understand factors that control rain intensity and distribution for hurricanes landing along the Eastern Seaboard.


Freshwater flooding is the number one killer from hurricanes in the Western Hemisphere and the study of a hurricane's rainfall pattern could better prepare us for the next big storm.

This research paper, titled "Warm Core Structure of Hurricane Erin Diagnosed from High Altitude Dropsondes During CAMEX-4" by J. Halverson et al., is going to be published in an upcoming issue of the American Meteorological Society's Journal of Atmospheric Science, CAMEX Special Issue, at the end of 2005.

Email or share this story: | [More](#)

Story Source:

The above story is reprinted (with editorial adaptations by ScienceDaily staff) from materials provided by [NASA/Goddard Space Flight Center](#).

 Hurricane forecasters will test a new technique this summer that provides a detailed 3-D view of an approaching storm every six minutes and shows whether the storm is gathering strength as it nears ... [> read more](#)

 **Doppler On Wheels Deployed At Hurricane Ike** (Sep. 18, 2008) The only scientific team to successfully brave Hurricane Ike's knock-down winds and swells in Galveston was the DOW, the Doppler on Wheels mobile weather radar operated by the Center for Severe ... [> read more](#)

 **Global Warming Will Do Little To Change Hurricane Activity, According To New Model** (Aug. 13, 2008) Scientists have described a new method for evaluating the frequency of hurricane formation in present and future tropical climates. Compared to other global models currently in use, the new approach ... [> read more](#)

 **Global Warming Increases Wind Shear, Reduces Hurricanes, Climate Model Shows** (Apr. 18, 2007) Climate model simulations for the 21st century indicate a robust increase in wind shear in the tropical Atlantic due to global warming, which may inhibit hurricane development and intensification. ... [> read more](#)

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N.A.S.A. Research Aircraft DC-8

[N.A.S.A. AIRBORNE SCIENCE](#)



N.A.S.A. Research Aircraft ER-2

[N.A.S.A.: CARLA THOMAS](#)



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A small white plane was witnessed around the Pentagon area on the morning of, by residents, and referred by FAA officials describing it with a “red Nike type” symbol on its tail. This description is very similar to the N.A.S.A. research aircraft ER-2 that was used during CAMEX-4.

JSH CALLED TO CONFIRM THE FLTS INVOLVED TO THIS POINT AND SAID THE INFO THEY HAD ABOUT THE ACFT THAT SUPPOSEDLY CRASHED INTO THE PENTAGON WAS AN ALL-WHITE SMALL PLANE WITH "RED NIKE TYPE" SYMBOL ON THE TAIL. ASKED WATCH TO CONSULT OAG TO FIND ANY POSSIBLE MATCHES. MTK CALLED MAIN WATCH TO HAVE THEM RESEARCH IT.

ADA-30 Operations Center Activity Report
September 13, 2001.



► N.A.S.A. research aircraft ER-2 tail symbol vs Niki symbol.

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Hurricane

GABRIELLE

*Peak intensity Category 1 formed on September 11th;
dissipated on September 19th in 2001*

“The insured loss total of \$115,000,000 in Florida from wind and rain was reported by the Property Claim Services of the American Insurance Services Group. The total damage estimate is \$230,000,000, pending additional information on flood damage.”

Miles Lawrence & Eric Blake


December 18, 2001.

Hurricane Gabrielle Tropical Cyclone Report.

[National Hurricane Center](#)

Former Governor of Florida, Jeb Bush, incorporated an [Executive Order Number 01-261](#) with the Great Seal of the State of Florida affixed at Tallahassee, the Capitol, four days prior GABRIELLE hit.

►Table statistics courtesy of [The National Hurricane Center](#)



Helpful Definitions

*Definitions mostly talked of due to the events of
September 11th in 2001*

“The personnel [at Dulles TRACON] we [Commission Staff] talked with were unaware of any actions taken to check the grounded airplanes for terrorists once they were grounded by the order to clear the skies.”

COMMISSION MEMORANDUM: MFR04017327

Teams 7+8, July 22, 2003.

Visit to the FAA Air Traffic Control System Command Center in Herndon, Virginia & Dulles Airport Control Tower.

Description of definitions, mostly used when dealing with September 11 of 2001, have been inserted below and are courtesy/copyright of the following establishments/Websites; material is used in accordance of the [“fair use” Act](#):-

- U.S. Legal, Inc.
- Graduate Prospects Limited
- The Princeton Review
- How Stuff Works
- Wikipedia

Conspiracy as a Crime [[©U.S. Legal, Inc.](#)]: Conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons to engage jointly in an unlawful or criminal act. It can also be an act that is innocent in nature, but becomes unlawful when accomplished by the combination of actors.

Conspiracy occurs if two or more individuals act together to commit a crime or to commit a lawful act by unlawful means even if they are not aware of each other's participation or role in the conspiracy.

Architects | Typical Work Activities [[©Graduate Prospects Ltd](#)]: Architects are involved from the earliest stages of a building project, which can start with developing ideas with the client, establishing budgets, assessing the needs of the building and its users, and its impact within the local environment. They assist with site selection and work closely with contractors on site, ensuring that works are carried out to specific standards and that, above all, the building is sustainable, functional and aesthetically pleasing. They also need to have an awareness of commercial and financial considerations.

Architectural Engineering [[©The Princeton Review](#)]: Architectural engineers deal with the planning, design, construction, and operation of engineered systems for all different kinds of buildings including electrical systems, lighting, heating, ventilating, air conditioning, fire protection, plumbing, and structural systems.

Passenger Aircraft Cabin Crew [[©How Stuff Works](#)]: A pilot of a civilian aircraft typically arrives at the airport at least an hour before departure (two hours for international flights). Most Air Lines have a computerized check-in system in the pilot's lounge. This gives the pilots the details of the flight, including the

weather, the number of passengers onboard and the other crewmembers who will be working. In order to keep everything in one place, pilots generally keep their flight papers and any other information in a large briefcase.

In the time before take-off, a pilot reviews this information, works out the flight plan, files it with ATC and meets with the rest of the crew. Once the airplane has landed, the Captain (pilot) meets with the arriving flight crew to find out if they experienced any irregularities. The First Officer performs a general inspection of the plane to make sure everything is in good order. After this walk-through, the pilots meet in the cockpit and make sure all of the instruments and controls are working properly.

Before takeoff, the Captain must sign the flight release, a document attesting that the crew is fit and that the pilots have reviewed the flight information. While they're preparing for takeoff, the pilots will receive an up-to-date weather report and passenger count and a pre-departure clearance form. To make the paperwork easier, many cockpits are equipped with a built-in printer that receives information from the gate agents and the control tower. When the paperwork is finished, the attendants secure all the doors and the Captain gives the go-ahead for push back (pushing the plane back from the gate so it can move onto the runway). Then, the pilots simply wait their turn and follow the ATCs instructions for takeoff.

Passenger Aircraft Flight Crew [\[©How Stuff Works\]](#): On a commercial flight in the United States, there must be one flight attendant for every 50 passengers. These attendants have a variety of responsibilities in their work, which begins before the first passenger boards and continues through the entire flight. Before boarding, the whole crew meets, the Captain reviews the flight schedule

and any safety concerns, and the lead attendant assigns each attendant to a particular section of the plane.

A Purser is a flight Crew Member assigned as a Cabin Manager who “oversees the flight attendants by making sure airline passengers are safe and comfortable. A flight purser completes detailed reports and verifies all safety procedures are followed.” [Wikipedia article: "Purser"](#)

American 11

The first airliner that set off the events of September 2001

“Around 08:30 a.m., a Federal Aviation Administration Controller in Boston phoned the Control Tower at Otis [Air Force Base] with a serious request: American Airlines 11 had lost its identification signal and appeared headed toward Manhattan. It looked like a possible hijacking, and fighters were needed —fast.”

Leslie Filson

“Air War over America: Sept. 11 alters face of air defense mission.” (Florida: HQ 1st Air Force Public Affairs Office, Tyndall Air Force Base, 2003).

Going by the [Commission timeline](#) of each of the four aircrafts that were officially reported as being hijacked on September 11th in 2001, the following statistics show (a), how long it took the suspected hijackers to “overtake” the passenger aircrafts; (b) how long from “takeover” till impact time; and (c), how long it took to “overtake” each other.

The quickest “overtake” was by Egyptian National, Mohamed el-Amir Atta, officially stated to have piloted American 11. His was the shortest flying time. The longest “overtake” and flying time was by Lebanese National, Ziad Samir Jarrah, officially stated to have piloted United 93.

› Egyptian National **Mohamed el-Amir Atta** “hijack pilot” of American 11

Image in the [Creative Commons](#)



Wheels off: 07:59 a.m.
Takeover: 08:14 a.m.
Duration: 15 minutes until “takeover”
Impact WTC1: 08:46 a.m.
Flying time: 47 minutes

9/11 CR: “Given that the cockpit crew of American 11 had been acknowledging all previous instructions from air traffic control that morning within a matter of seconds, and that when the first reporting of the hijacking was received a short time later (the 8:19 call from Betty Ong) a number of actions had already been taken by the hijackers, it is most likely that the hijacking occurred at 8:14 A.M.” [9/11 CR, FOOTNOTE 24, NOTES TO CH. 1.]

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB): On December 21, 2001, the NTSB typed up an Air Traffic Control (ATC) recording from American 11’s cockpit area. The transcript in question begins at 11:59:02 a.m., (UTC) being 07:59:02 a.m., Eastern. ³ This is the time NTSB reports Boston Local East Controller (LCE) clears American 11 for takeoff.

³ Central time is 4 hours ahead of Eastern.

INTRA-COCKPIT COMMUNICATION		AIRCRAFT-TO-GROUND COMMUNICATION	
Time (UTC) SOURCE	CONTENT	Time (UTC) SOURCE	CONTENT
Start of recording			
Start of transcript			
		1159:02 LCE	American eleven heavy traffic's orbiting north of the field at thirty five hundred feet maintain three thousand runway four right, cleared for takeoff. [BOS 1152-1217 LCE]
		1159:11 AAL-11	maintain three cleared for takeoff on four right. what are the winds? [BOS 1152-1217 LCE]

›NTSB Report #DCA01SA060 Air Traffic Control
December 21, 2001.

The New York Times: The following Boston Ground Control transcript, with the cockpit crew of American 11, was printed in the [New York Times](#) on October 16, 2001. It details American 11's cabin crew request(s) prior to when the NTSB begins its official transcript. This early hour transcript was not released by the NTSB or by the FAA. The *New York Times* do not say how they acquired their version. For convenient reading, all written numbers have been replaced by digits.

07:45:48 - - Ground Control 1: American 11 heavy ⁴ [at] Boston ground Gate 32, you're going to wait for a Saab [flight] ⁵ to go by then push back.

07:45:58 - - AAL11: After the Saab [flight], [we're] cleared to push [back] and we're gonna need Runway 4 today. American 11 heavy.

⁴ A "heavy" aircraft corresponds to a large aircraft such as a 747, 757, and 767.

⁵ SAAB Air Lines have been amongst the skies of the world since 1937.

<http://www.saabgroup.com/en/About-Saab/Saab-History/>

07:46:09 - - Ground Control 1: American 11 heavy, uh, understand you need A. Roger. ⁶ Push back after the Saab [flight] is approved.

07:46:15 - - AAL11: O.K. Yeah what I said was we're going to need Runway 4 [toward the] right today. American 11 heavy.

07:46:21 - - Ground Control 1: American 11 heavy. Roger. Plan on Runway 4 [toward the] right.

07:49:20 - - AAL11: American 11 heavy, taxi november. ⁷

07:49:23 - - Ground Control 1: O.K. American 11 heavy, just hold right there I'll move you shortly.

07:50:00 - - Ground Control 1: American 11 heavy, you're going to give way to the Dornier and the regional jet on the opposite side. Taxi to the bravo [B] hold point, via kilo bravo. [KB.] Expect Runway 4 [toward the] right for departure.

07:50:11 - - AAL11: O.K., to the bravo [B] hold point after the regional jet and the Dornier. American 11 heavy.

07:53:23 - - Ground Control 1: And American 11 heavy, I'm gonna have to give you sierra [S] and then alpha [A] to the bravo [B] hold point so just hold short of sierra [S] for now.

⁶ "Roger" means the message is received and understood.

⁷ "November" specifies a U.S. registered aircraft.

07:53:31 - - AAL11: Holding short of sierra [S]. American 11 heavy.

07:53:59 - - Ground Control 1: American 11 heavy giving way to that Embraer off [to] your right; turn right on sierra alpha kilo one bravo [SAK1B] to the bravo [B] hold point for now. Expect [Runway] 4 [toward the] right.

07:54:09 - - AAL11: O.K. we copy all. Expect [Runway] 4 [to the] right. American 11 heavy.

07:55:14 - - Ground Control 1: American 11 heavy, taxi to the bravo [B] hold point. Continental's waiting for you. Monitor tower 128.8. Expect Runway 4 [to the] right, thanks.

07:55:21 - - AAL11: 28.8. We'll expect Runway 4 [toward the] right and bravo [B] hold point. American 11 heavy.

07:56:27 - - Local Control West: American 11 heavy, Boston Tower. Taxi to Runway 4 [toward the] right via bravo [B] and monitor the tower 119.1

07:56:34 - - AAL11: Taxi to Runway 4 [toward the] right via bravo [B] then 19.1. American 11 heavy.

07:57:31 - - Local Control East: American 11 heavy, Boston Tower. Good morning. Move right up to hold short of Runway 4 [toward the] right; after departure maintain 3,000 [feet].

07:57:40 - - AAL11: Holding short of Runway 4 [toward the] right, uh 3,000. American 11 heavy.

07:57:57 - - Local Control East: American 11 heavy Runway 4 [toward the] right taxi into position and hold traffic departing 9.

07:58:04 - - AAL11: Runway 4 [to the] right position and hold American 11 heavy.

07:59:02 - - Local Control East: American 11 heavy, traffic's orbiting north of the field at 35,000 feet. Maintain 3,000. Runway 4 [to the] right cleared for takeoff.

07:59:11 - - AAL11: Maintain 3 [3,000 ft]; cleared for takeoff on Runway 4 [to the] right. What are the winds?

07:59:14 - - Local Control East: Wind 330 at 9 [indicated velocity in knots-gust].

07:59:16 - - AAL11: Thank you.

We found no specific explanation why Captain John Ogonowski of American 11 requested to take-off from the right side of Boston-Logan's Runway No. 4. The pre-flight plan of American 11 has not been released in the public domain.

›United Arab Emirates (UAE) National **Marwan al-Shehhi** “hijack pilot” of United 175

Image courtesy of the FBI



Wheels off: 08:14 a.m.

Takeover: 08:42 a.m.

Duration: 28 minutes until “takeover”

13 minutes longer than American 11

Impact WTC2: 09:02 a.m.

Flying time: 48 minutes

1 minute longer than American 11

›United Arab Emirates (UAE) National **Hani Hanjour** “hijack pilot” on American 77

Image courtesy of the FBI



Wheels off: 08:20 a.m.

Take over: 08:51 a.m.

Duration: 31 minutes until “takeover”

16 minutes longer than American 11

3 minutes longer than United 175

Impact: 09:37 a.m.

Flying time: 1 hour and 7 minutes

20 minutes longer than American 11

19 minutes longer than United 175

›Lebanese National **Ziad Samir Jarrah** “hijack pilot” on United 93

Image in the [Creative Commons](#)



Wheels off: 08:42 a.m.

Take over: 09:28 a.m.

Duration: 46 minutes until “takeover”

31 minutes longer than American 11

32 minutes longer than United 175

45 minutes longer than American 77

Impact: 10:03 a.m.

Flying time: 1 hour and 21 minutes

34 minutes longer than American 11

35 minutes longer than United 175

14 minutes longer than American 77

Takeoff Times: Various takeoff times for American 11 out of Boston-Logan International Airport exist from various official sources. The following table depicts the actual American Air Line data, which was used by the Commission to substantiate the actual time:-

11 1155 000000				
NO-AAA				
LOAD PLANNING QUALITY CONTROL RECORD	11			
0011 11 BOS	ACFT334	CRY	GMT	LOCAL
ACTUAL OUT TIME		--	1140	0740
PLANNED OFF TIME - REVISED		--	1156	0756
FINAL PSOR COUNT - RES		--	1156	0756
FINAL CONTAINER UPD - CREW CHIEF	BOSX		1147	0747
RADIO CLOSEOUT - AUTO		--	1147	0747

American Air Line Load Planning Quality Control Record
American Air Line Flight 11, September 11, 2001.

Analysis of above chart

07:36 a.m.	Final reserved passenger count
07:40 a.m.	Actual time American 11 pushed back from Gate 32
07:47 a.m.	Final loading of containers
07:56 a.m.	Actual time American 11 should have taken off; it was revised

The American Air Line Load Planning Quality Control Record shows the aircraft should have pushed back from Gate 32 at 07:40 a.m.; it also depicts a final loading of containers done 7 minutes later, at 07:47 a.m. In addition, there is no actual takeoff time recorded. No official explanation was found to explain the times in this chart, except for the Commission references as follows: “The flight was scheduled to depart at 7:45.” (p.2); “Flight 11 pushed back from Gate 32 in Terminal B at 7:40.” (Footnote 4/p.451); “The plane took off at 7:59.” (p.4).

Aviation Reports	9/11 CR
07:40 - Aircraft pushed back [American Air Line: Load Planning Quality Control Record]	07:40 - Aircraft pushed back [p.451]
07:56 - Scheduled to depart <i>Time was “revised;” there is no actual time recorded for its takeoff</i> [American Air Line: Load Planning Quality Control Record]	07:45 - Scheduled to depart [p.2]
07:56 - Boston Airport Traffic Control Tower (BOS-ATCT) issued taxi instructions [FAA Summary Report: Sept. 17, 2001.]	
07:56:27 - Flight taxied to Runway 4 (Local Control West)	

[*New York Times*: Oct. 16, 2001.]

07:59:02 - Flight cleared for takeoff
(Boston Local East Controller)
[NTSB Report #DCA01SA060: Dec. 21,
2001.
New York Times: Oct. 16, 2001.]

07:59:16 - Wheels-off
[NTSB Report #DCA01SA060: Dec. 21,
2001.
New York Times: Oct. 16, 2001.]

08:00 - Wheels-off
[ATC System Assessment Shutdown &
Restoration: Mar. 21, 2002.]

American AAL11 Cancelled to fly
[Bureau of Transportation (BTS)]

07:59 - Wheels-off
[p.4]

Impact Times: Minor differences in times occur from official reports and civilian captures of when American 11 struck the WTC 1. These irregularities are \pm a few seconds/minutes of each other, with the exception of the U.S. Secret Service Report dated September 12, 2001, and filed as 602.010. This particular report states the impact occurred at 09:00 a.m., Eastern. The report was declassified on October 5, 2008, and released on April 23, 2010, through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) with filed numbers 20080330 and 20080331. The report was compiled by the Technical Security Division.

0900 hrs	Plane crashed into World Trade Center.
0910 hrs	Second plane crashed into other tower at World Trade Center.

Extract: U.S. Secret Service Report (Sept. 12, 2001-filed 602.010.)
Declassified: Oct. 5, 2008. - FOIA 20080330/20080331 April 23, 2010.

08:46 a.m. The [Federal Aviation Administration \(FAA\)](#), the [North American Aerospace Defense Command \(NORAD\)](#), and the [Air Traffic Control transcripts](#) all coincide with the time American 11 impacted into the WTC 1 at 08:46 a.m.

In addition, on September 11, 2001, two French filmmakers, Jules and Gédéon Naudet, were filming a documentary about a rookie firefighter in New York's Engine 7, Ladder 1 firehouse, seven blocks from the World Trade Center. The documentary was filmed using a Sony PD150, which was later donated to the Smithsonian for the exhibition, "September 11: Bearing Witness to History," that opened September 11, 2002, and closed in January 2006.

"Sometime about 8.15 or so," Fire Chief Pfeifer claimed, a gas leak call came in at the firehouse. By 08:30 a.m., Engine 7, Ladder 1 firehouse crew were at Duane Street and stayed "there for a while." [FIRE DEPARTMENT (WTC TASK FORCE) INTERVIEW: OCT. 23, 2001.]

It is extremely rare for someone to manage and record an actual plane crash; natural human reflexes and variables are against it. But, the Naudets managed to defy this, when fifteen minutes after arriving for a false alarm gas leak, American 11 is captured crashing into the WTC 1 at 08:46 a.m. The Naudet footage was broadcasted by the U.S. media 13 hours later, released by "Gamma Agency" as the known distributor. In 2009, "Gamma Agency" filed for bankruptcy. [BLOOMBERG: "GAMMA PHOTO AGENCY 'NOT DEAD,' TO CUT WORKFORCE, CHIEF SAYS," BY HELENE FOUQUET, JULY 31, 2009.]

08:46:26 a.m. Two official bodies, the Seismograph readings from [Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory \(Columbia University\)](#) and the [Federal Emergency Management Agency \(FEMA\)](#) coincide with the time American 11 impacted into the WTC 1 at 08:46:26 a.m.

08:46:28 a.m. Mr. Pavel Hlava, a 40-year-old Czech from Ostrava (originally from Brno) who came to the United States in 1999, and his 45-year-old brother Josef, were in a Ford Explorer SUV driven by Pavel's employer, Russian-born Mike Cohen, about to enter the Brooklyn-Battery Tunnel. ⁸ Mr. Hlava captured footage of American 11 hitting the WTC 1.

The footage was first aired on *ABC Good Morning America*, on September 11, 2003. Professional photographer and instructor at the New York Institute of Photography, Walter Karling, is known to have distributed the footage to ABC. [YOUTUBE: [THEMKMONARCH](#). UPLOADED TITLE: *NIST FOIA: PAVEL HLAVA, CLIP 01 (WTC 1 AIRPLANE IMPACT, 8:46AM)*, SEPT. 25, 2011.]

08:46:35 a.m. An [FAA Summary](#) of September 17, 2001, depict American 11 impacted the WTC 1 at 08:46:35 a.m.

08:46:40 a.m. The NTSB, on February 15, 2002, released American 11's flight path study via the FAA Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC). The aircraft's impact was reported to have been at 08:46:40 a.m.

08:46:54 a.m. Born in 1950 in Stuttgart, Germany, photographer Wolfgang Staehle had setup a web cam at an art exhibit in Brooklyn to take images of Lower Manhattan every 4 seconds. Mr. Staehle's web cam captured American 11 (top right corner of image #1) as it speeded towards its target, with actual impact time shown in image #2 at 08:46:54 a.m.

⁸ <http://newsmine.org/content.php?ol=9-11/rare-tape-of-wtc-attacks-surfaces.txt>



›Image #1 [©Wolfgang Staehle](#)
Used under the [“fair use” Act](#)



›Image #2 [©Wolfgang Staehle](#)
Used under the [“fair use” Act](#)

08:49 a.m. Craig Marquis, an American Air Line Manager on duty at Operations Center in Fort Worth, Texas, “figured” the impact of American 11 was when the Flight Attendant’s call ended, which was according to his account at 08:49 a.m. The Flight Attendant in question was Betty Ong. [SEE AIRCRAFT CALLS]

Aircraft Calls: The FBI created and released an array of information in a flash-style presentation on each of the four “hijacked” airliners. Each presentation depicts passenger names and their flight seats, including Cabin/Flight Crew, and all the calls that were reported to have been made from each aircraft. This presentation, which we use in this work, can be found in the following link, entitled: [United States v. Zacarias Moussaoui Criminal No. 01-455-A. Prosecution Trial Exhibits.](#)

AT&T made available all data calls from American 11 and forwarded them to the General Counsel of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on April 26, 2004. These raw data files, which we use in this work, can be seen [here](#).

Betty Ann Ong - Flight Attendant

The FBI report only one (1) call was successfully made from Flight Attendant Betty Ann Ong beginning at 08:18:47 a.m., and ending at 08:45:47 a.m., lasting 1,620 seconds (27 minutes).

Madeleine Sweeney - Flight Attendant

The FBI report five (5) calls were made by Flight Attendant Madeleine Sweeney that either made contact or tried to, since two (2) calls were unsuccessful to connect:-

08:22:24 a.m. Unconnected call lasting 0 seconds
08:24:00 a.m. Unconnected call lasting 0 seconds
08:25:20 a.m. Lasting 107 seconds (1 minute, 7 seconds)
08:29:25 a.m. Lasting 43 seconds
08:32:39 a.m. Lasting 793 seconds (13 minutes, 21 seconds)

“Unknown caller”

The FBI report four (4) attempted calls were made by an “unknown caller;” the on button was pressed, but no call connection was made:-

08:16:50 a.m. ON button pressed; no call connection made
08:20:11 a.m. ON button pressed; no call connection made
08:25:31 a.m. ON button pressed; no call connection made
08:28:33 a.m. ON button pressed; no call connection made

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) - Reported Calls

American Air Line Flight 11 | September 11, 2001.

08:13:30	<u>Version #1</u> : Transponder turns off [Air Traffic Operations Manager Terry Biggio at Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center-Regional Operations]
GAP 3 minutes, 20 seconds	Gap from when transponder turns off till “unknown caller” attempts to call from AA11
08:16:50 - 0 seconds	“Unknown caller” (failed call)
08:18:47 - 08:45:47	Betty Ong’s call
08:20:00	<u>Version #2</u> : Transponder “seen” turn off [Boston ATC Pete Zalewski-Radar Sector 46]
GAP 11 seconds	Gap from when transponder turns off till “unknown caller” attempts to call from flight
08:20:11 - 0 seconds	“Unknown caller” (failed call)
08:22:24 - 0 seconds	Madeleine Sweeney’s call (failed call)
08:24:00 - 0 seconds	Madeleine Sweeney’s call (failed call)
08:25:20 - 08:26:27	Madeleine Sweeney’s call
08:25:31 - 0 seconds	“Unknown caller” (failed call)
08:28:33 - 0 seconds	“Unknown caller” (failed call)
08:29:25 - 08:30:08	Madeleine Sweeney’s call
08:32:39 - 08:46:00	Madeleine Sweeney’s call
08:46 IMPACT - Official time	

Elaboration of calls

The raw air phone data files from AT&T show some differences on the total of calls made and their duration. Beginning with 45-year-old Flight Attendant Betty Ann Ong, who was born in San Francisco, California, and lived in Andover,

Massachusetts,⁹ just 4 minutes and 47 seconds after the “hijacking began at 8:14 or shortly thereafter”¹⁰ (the Commission are not exact) Betty’s call transmits to American Air Lines Raleigh Reservation Center in Cary, North Carolina.



›Betty Ann Ong

Courtesy of [The Betty Ong Foundation](http://www.bettyongfoundation.org/)

The FBI flash-card presentation places Betty’s particular call at 08:18:47 a.m., lasting 1,620 seconds, an average of 27 minutes, ending at 08:45:47 a.m. But, American Air Lines puts the duration of the call at 20 minutes, having it end at 08:38:47 a.m. There is no explanation as to why this 7-minute difference occurs; neither is explained why the Secret Service Report depicts the impact into the WTC 1 at 09:00 a.m., which is a 14-minute difference from the Commission account.

Nydia Gonzalez, Manager of American Air Lines at Raleigh Reservation Center, had a phone interview with Larry Wansley the Director of Security for American Air Lines at Ft. Worth, Texas, on the day of. [FBI CASE #265D-NY-280350. SEPT. 11, 2001.] Mrs. Gonzalez told Larry Wansley that Betty’s flight call was received by one of their employees “at approximately 08:20 a.m.” Give or take 1 or 2 minutes, Betty’s call is made.

According to Mrs. Gonzalez, the information relayed by Betty, amongst other things, was the condition of two other colleagues who had been “stabbed.” They were Flight Attendants (Position 1) Karen Martin, and (Position 5) Barbara

⁹ 911 Memorial Guide Website. Accessed 2014.

http://names.911memorial.org/#lang=en_US&page=person&id=4383

¹⁰ 9/11 Commission Report released in the Summer of 2004.

<http://www.9-11commission.gov/>

Arestegui. [ALSO SEE AIR FLIGHT CREW] Betty also said “two gentlemen” had “gotten into the cockpit.” Mrs. Gonzalez at this point played the recorded call, which was unintelligible and quite short in duration.

Before Mrs. Gonzalez ended her conversation with Larry Wansley, she informed him how Betty also said a First Class passenger named “Daniel Lord” had been fatally injured. The Air Line manifests depict no such name as “Daniel Lord” listed as a passenger on the flight, neither is such a subject mentioned in the transcribed call that Mrs. Gonzalez played for Mr. Wansley. If this subject was discussed during when the call was not taped, is not clear.

Larry Wansley: “Okay NYDIA. Uh, it is my understanding that that conversation is recorded. Is that correct?”

Nydia Gonzalez: “I have it recorded; do you want it?”

Larry Wansley: “Yes. If you will proceed and play it.”

The American Air Line Agent’s name in the following transcript is redacted; the Commission later released the name as being Mr. Winston Sadler. [NYDIA GONZALEZ’S RECORDING VIA PHONE SEPT. 11, 2001. FBI CASE #265D-NY-280350.]

NYDIA GONZALEZ - LARRY WANSLEY

VERSION of Betty Ong's call

Date of transcription: September 12, 2001.

UI: Unintelligible

FLIGHT ATTENDANT

(BETTY ONG):

(UI) This is ah ONG. We can't breathe (UI). He's got mace or something.

[REDACTED]

Can you describe the person that you said went into the flight deck or (UI)?

ONG:

I'm, I'm sitting in the back coming back from business. Can you hold on for one second, he's coming back?

Unintelligible noise in background.

ONG:

On, on number one. He stood upstairs (UI). Ah, nobody knows what he's going to do. (UI) Ah, I'm (UI) is his (UI) right now. (UI) Ah, we can't get to the cockpit, the door won't open. Hello?

[REDACTED]

Can you (UI) information relative to ah, you know, force, force that. Uhm, at this point? What operation, what flight are we talking about, Flight 12?

ONG:

Right now? Okay. We're on Flight 11 right now. Flight 11.

[REDACTED]

Flight 11, okay.

ONG:

(UI) we are working on

[REDACTED]

Yeah.

ONG:

One of the flight attendants (UI) has been stabbed.

[REDACTED]

Can anybody get up to the cockpit? Can anybody get up to the cockpit?

ONG:

We can't even get a manager to the cockpit. We don't know what's going on up there.

[REDACTED]

(UI) keep the door closed and

ONG:

Okay.

[] (UI) Did you seen the girl who got stabbed?

ONG: I think the guys are up there. They might have gone, they are on their way up there or, or something. Nobody can call the cockpit to see if we can get inside. Hey, is anybody still there?

[] Yes, I'm still here.

ONG: Okay, I'm staying on the line as well.

[] Okay.

[] (UI), who is calling reservations? Is it a flight attendant, or who? (UI)

[] We need for (UI) call.

ONG: I'm number three. I'm number three on this flight. (UI) on this flight and (UI) Flight 11 (UI). Have you guys called anyone else? You know, ah somebody's calling medical and we can't get them.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE
(UM): (UI) Is anybody there? Is anybody there?

[] What, what seat are you in? What seat are you in?

ONG: We've just left Boston and we're up in the air. We're suppose to go to LA and (UI).

[] But what seat? What's the number of your seat?

ONG: Okay. I'm in the jump seat right now. 3R

[] Okay, are you the flight attendant? I'm sorry, did you say you're the flight attendant?

ONG: Hello?

[] Hello, what is your name?

ONG: Uhm, you'll have to speak up. I can't hear you.

[] What is your name?

ONG: Okay, my name is BETTY ONG. I'm number three on Flight 11.

Okay.

ONG: The cockpit is not answering their calls and there's somebody back in business class and there, we can't breathe in business class. Somebody's got mace or something.

Can you describe the person that you said, someone is flying business class?

ONG: I'm, I'm sitting in the back, he's coming back from business. If you can hold on for one second, he's coming back.

Unintelligible in background.

ONG: Our, our number one who (UI) stabbed. Or, something stabbed. Ah, nobody knows who stabbed who and we can't even get up to business class because nobody can breathe. Our number one in (UI) stabbed right now. In number five. The first class passenger that, ah first ah class galley flight attendant and our passenger is stabbed. We can't get to the cockpit, the door won't open. Hello?

Yeah, we're getting all the information. We're also, you know, of course, recording this. Uhm, at this point?

This is operations. What flight number are we talking about?

Flight 12.

Flight 12, okay.

ONG: Okay, we are Flight 11 right now. This is Flight 11.

This is Flight 11, okay.

ONG: Boston to Los Angeles.

[] Yeah.

ONG: And the one that has been stabbed and our flight attendant has been stabbed.

[] Can anybody get up to the cockpit? Can anybody get up to the cockpit?

ONG: We can't even get into the cockpit. We don't know who's up there.

[] (UI) keep the door closed and

ONG: I'm sorry?

[] Can they not see the girls get upset?

ONG: I think the guys are up there. They might have gone or they are on their way up there or, or something. Somebody can call the cockpit. We can't even get inside. Is anybody still there?

[] Yes, we're still here.

ONG: Okay, I'll stay on the line as well.

[] Okay.

VANESSA: (UI) who is calling reservations? Is it a flight attendant or who?

[] I believe her name is BETTY ONG.

VANESSA: BETTY.

ONG: I'm number three, I'm number three on this flight. (UI) on this flight.

[] Yeah.

ONG: I'm Flight 11.

[] From where to where? Have you guys called anyone else?

ONG: No, we're just calling medical and we can't get

Recording concluded.

END OF NYDIA GONZALEZ - LARRY WANSLEY VERSION

Date of transcription: September 12, 2001.

“VANESSA” who intervened before the recording concluded depicts Mrs. Vanessa Minter, an American Air Line Reservation Agent on duty that morning. In Mrs. Minter’s interview with WRAL, she stated that five minutes into the call with Betty, the FBI arrived and “pulled” her off the call. [WRAL, CAPITOL BROADCASTING COMPANY, INC.: INTERVIEW WITH VANESSA MINTER, SEPT 10, 2011.] ¹¹ This would mean that by 08:30 a.m., the latest, the FBI was aware of American 11’s hijacking situation.

It is unclear from Mrs. Gonzalez if she was playing a short version of the entire call that either lasted 20 or 27 minutes; but when the recording ended, she gave a clear enough picture of what was heard:-

Nydia Gonzalez: “That’s as far as it goes.”

Larry Wansley: “Okay. The conversation lasted another five or ten minutes but that’s all the recording we have?”


Nydia Gonzalez: “Right.”

Going by Mrs. Gonzalez’s information, including the transcript given above, the FBI flash-card presentation, that archives this particular 4-minute call, should coincide, since this was the complete and only recording. But, it doesn’t. Here is how the FBI transcribes this 4-minute call as presented in their flash presentation:-

¹¹ <http://www.wral.com/news/local/video/10111135/>


FBI FLASH PRESENTATION of Betty Ong's call
Date of transcription: Unknown



UI: Unintelligible

**American Airlines Flight #11**
BOEING 767

SEAT
Crew

PASSENGER
Ong, Betty

**Betty Ong**
Flight Attendant **Betty Ong** calls American Airlines and speaks with AA Agent Winston Sadler and Operations Agent Nydia E. Gonzalez.
8:18 AM
DURATION: 00:04:00



CALL PLACED FROM REAR

BETTY ONG FLIGHT ATTENDANT

...Number 3 in the back, um, the cockpit's not answering, somebody's stabbed in business class...


WINSTON SADLER / VANESSA MINTER AA AGENTS



NYDIA E. GONZALEZ OPERATIONS AGENT

**American Airlines Flight #11**
BOEING 767

SEAT
Crew

PASSENGER
Ong, Betty

**Betty Ong**
Flight Attendant **Betty Ong** calls American Airlines and speaks with AA Agent Winston Sadler and Operations Agent Nydia E. Gonzalez.
8:18 AM
DURATION: 00:04:00



CALL PLACED FROM REAR

BETTY ONG FLIGHT ATTENDANT

...and um, I think there's mace that we can't breathe. I, I don't know. I think we're getting hijacked.

WINSTON SADLER / VANESSA MINTER AA AGENTS

NYDIA E. GONZALEZ OPERATIONS AGENT

WINSTON SADLER/VANESSA MINTER AA AGENTS: Which flight are you on?

American Airlines Flight #11
 BOEING 767

SEAT
Crew

PASSENGER
Ong, Betty

Betty Ong

Flight Attendant **Betty Ong** calls American Airlines and speaks with AA Agent Winston Sadler and Operations Agent Nydia E. Gonzalez.

8:18 AM

DURATION: 00:04:00

BETTY ONG FLIGHT ATTENDANT

Flight 12.

WINSTON SADLER / VANESSA MINTER AA AGENTS

NYDIA E. GONZALEZ OPERATIONS AGENT

CALL PLACED FROM REAR

BALANCE

VOLUME

WINSTON SADLER/VANESSA MINTER AA AGENTS: And what seat are you in?

SILENCE

WINSTON SADLER/VANESSA MINTER AA AGENTS: Ma'am, are you there?

American Airlines Flight #11
 BOEING 767

SEAT
Crew

PASSENGER
Ong, Betty

Betty Ong

Flight Attendant **Betty Ong** calls American Airlines and speaks with AA Agent Winston Sadler and Operations Agent Nydia E. Gonzalez.

8:18 AM

DURATION: 00:04:00

BETTY ONG FLIGHT ATTENDANT

Yes.

WINSTON SADLER / VANESSA MINTER AA AGENTS

NYDIA E. GONZALEZ OPERATIONS AGENT

CALL PLACED FROM REAR

BALANCE

VOLUME

WINSTON SADLER/VANESSA MINTER AA AGENTS: What, what seat are you in?

American Airlines

American Airlines Flight #11

BOEING 767

SEAT
Crew

PASSENGER
Ong, Betty

Betty Ong

Flight Attendant **Betty Ong** calls American Airlines and speaks with AA Agent Winston Sadler and Operations Agent Nydia E. Gonzalez.

8:18 AM

DURATION: 00:04:00

BETTY ONG, FLIGHT ATTENDANT

We're in flight, we just left Boston. We're up in the air.

WINSTON SADLER / VANESSA MINTER AA AGENTS

NYDIA E. GONZALEZ, OPERATIONS AGENT

CALL PLACED FROM REAR

BALANCE

VOLUME

WINSTON SADLER/VANESSA MINTER AA AGENTS: I know, what. . .

American Airlines

American Airlines Flight #11

BOEING 767

SEAT
Crew

PASSENGER
Ong, Betty

Betty Ong

Flight Attendant **Betty Ong** calls American Airlines and speaks with AA Agent Winston Sadler and Operations Agent Nydia E. Gonzalez.

8:18 AM

DURATION: 00:04:00

BETTY ONG, FLIGHT ATTENDANT

We're supposed to go to L.A. and the cockpit's not answering their phone... (UNINTELLIGIBLE)

WINSTON SADLER / VANESSA MINTER AA AGENTS


Okay, but what seat are you sitting in?

NYDIA E. GONZALEZ, OPERATIONS AGENT

CALL PLACED FROM REAR

BALANCE

VOLUME



WINSTON SADLER/VANESSA MINTER AA AGENTS: Okay.

WINSTON SADLER/VANESSA MINTER AA AGENTS: Okay, you're the flight attendant?

WINSTON SADLER/VANESSA MINTER AA AGENTS: I'm sorry, did you say you're the flight attendant?

BETTY ONG: Hello.

WINSTON SADLER/VANESSA MINTER AA AGENT; Can't. . .

BETTY ONG: Hello.

WINSTON SADLER/VANESSA MINTER AA AGENTS: What, what is your name?

BETTY ONG: You'll have to speak up. I can't hear you.

WINSTON SADLER/VANESSA MINTER AA AGENT: Sure, what is your name?

American Airlines Flight #11
 BOEING 767

SEAT
Crew

PASSENGER
Ong, Betty

Betty Ong
 Flight Attendant **Betty Ong** calls American Airlines and speaks with AA Agent Winston Sadler and Operations Agent Nydia E. Gonzalez.

8:18 AM
 DURATION: 00:04:00

CALL PLACED FROM REAR

BETTY ONG FLIGHT ATTENDANT
 Okay, my name is Betty Ong. I'm Number 3 on Flight 11.

WINSTON SADLER / VANESSA MINTER AA AGENTS

NYDIA E. GONZALEZ OPERATIONS AGENT

WINSTON SADLER/VANESSA MINTER AA AGENT: Okay.

American Airlines Flight #11
 BOEING 767

SEAT
Crew

PASSENGER
Ong, Betty

Betty Ong
 Flight Attendant **Betty Ong** calls American Airlines and speaks with AA Agent Winston Sadler and Operations Agent Nydia E. Gonzalez.

8:18 AM
 DURATION: 00:04:00

CALL PLACED FROM REAR

BETTY ONG FLIGHT ATTENDANT
 And the cockpit is not answering their phone.

WINSTON SADLER / VANESSA MINTER AA AGENTS

NYDIA E. GONZALEZ OPERATIONS AGENT

BETTY ONG (CONT'D): And there is somebody stabbed in business class and there is, we can't breathe in business class, so somebody's got mace or something.

WINSTON SADLER/VANESSA MINTER AA AGENT: Can you describe the person that you said, someone is in business class.



BETTY ONG (CONT'D): If you can hold on for one second.

WINSTON SADLER/VANESSA MINTER AA AGENT: Certainly.

BETTY ONG: *In background:* They want to know who's. . . I don't know but Karen and Bobbie got stabbed. *Lots of talking with other individuals at this point.* Our number 1 got stabbed. A person is stabbed, nobody knows who stabbed who and we, we can't even get up to business class right now, 'cause nobody can breathe. Ah, our number 1 is stabbed right now.

WINSTON SADLER/VANESSA MINTER AA AGENT: Okay.

BETTY ONG: Our number 5, our first class passengers are, our first class, our galley flight attendant and our purser has been stabbed. And we can't get into the cockpit. The door won't open. Hello?

WINSTON SADLER/VANESSA MINTER AA AGENT: Yeah, I'm taking it down, all the information, we're also ah, you know of course recording this, ah, at this point.

OPERATIONS AGENT NYDIA GONZALES: This is Operations. What flight number we talking about?

WINSTON SADLER/VANESSA MINTER AA AGENT: Flight 12

OPERATIONS AGENT NYDIA GONZALES: Flight 12. Okay.

BETTY ONG: We're on flight 11 right now. This is flight 11.

WINSTON SADLER/VANESSA MINTER AA AGENT: It is flight 11. I'm sorry NYDIA.

FA ONG: Boston to Los Angeles

AA Agent: Yes

FA ONG: Our number 1 has been stabbed and our 5 has been stabbed. Can anybody get up to the cockpit? Can anybody get up to the cockpit? We can't even get into the cockpit. We don't know who's up there.

AA Agent: Well if they were shrewd they would keep the door closed and..

FA ONG: I'm sorry?

AA Agent: Would they not maintain a sterile cockpit?

FA ONG: I think the guys are up there, they might have gone or jammed their way up there or something, nobody can call the cockpit, we can't even get inside. Is anybody still there?

AA Agent: Yes, we'll still here.

FA ONG: Okay, I'm staying on the line as well.

AA Agent: Okay.

OP Agent: Hi, who is calling reservations? Is this one of the flight attendants or who, who are you, hon?

AA Agent: She gave her name as BETTY ONG.

OP Agent: Betty

FA ONG: I'm number 3, I'm number 3 on this flight

OP Agent: You're the number 3 on the flight.

FA ONG: Yes

OPERATIONS AGENT NYDIA GONZALES: And this is flight 11. From where to where?

BETTY ONG: Flight 11. . .

OPERATIONS AGENT NYDIA GONZALES: Have you guys called anyone else?

BETTY ONG: No. Somebody is calling medical and we can't get. . .

END OF TAPE

END OF FBI FLASH PRESENTATION TAPE of Betty Ong's call

The FBI received the above transcript on September 12th from American Air Lines; the conversation turned out to have detailed information quite different than what Mrs. Gonzalez had played to Larry Wansley the previous day. The former was clear when she reported to Mr. Wansley that what she was playing was the entire 4-minute conversation recording of Betty's call.

On the FBI report, the lead control numbers show "DL267 and CE66." DL pertains to a Delta Flight and CE pertains to Flight Center. There is no explanation on the FBI report as to why the transcript lead control numbers show Delta Air Lines Flight 267 instead of American Air Lines Flight 11 where Betty Ong was supposed to be calling from.

The following extract depicts the Bureau of Transportation (BTS) statistics for Delta Air Lines Flight 267 that departed from Dallas Fort Worth International Airport on September 11th in 2001 with a scheduled time of takeoff at 11:00 a.m., (local time) being noon in New York (Eastern). The flight arrived 2 hours and 14 minutes later in Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport.

No information exists that American Air Lines held a code-share agreement with Delta Air Lines in 2001, though Qantas and Air New Zealand did confirm

“the flights used in the wave of terrorist attacks in the U.S. overnight were involved with code-share arrangements with the local carriers.” ¹²

Airline: Delta Air Lines (DL)

Flight Number: 0267

Time Period: September 11, 2001 to September 11, 2001

On-Time Flights:

DFW-ATL

0.00%

NOTE: Late, cancelled and diverted flights are subtracted from total flights to determine on-time percent.

A complete listing of [airline](#) and [airport](#) abbreviations is available. Times are reported in local time using a 24 hour clock.

Excel | CSV

Flight Number	Carriers	Origin Airport	Dest Airport	All Flights											
				Total Number	Average Departure Delay (minutes)	Average Taxi-Out Time (minutes)	Average Scheduled Departure to Take-off (minutes)	Average Arrival Delay (minutes)	Average Airborne Time (minutes)	Average Taxi-In Time (minutes)	Total Number Cancelled	Percent Flights Cancelled	Total Number Diverted	Percent Flights Diverted	
0267	DL	DFW	ATL	1	-3.00	14.00	11.00	22.00	134.00	6.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	

Flight Number	Carriers	Origin Airport	Dest Airport	Late Flights							
				Total Number	Average Departure Delay (minutes)	Average Taxi-Out Time (minutes)	Average Scheduled Departure to Take-off (minutes)	Average Arrival Delay (minutes)	Average Airborne Time (minutes)	Average Taxi-In Time (minutes)	Percent Flights Late
0267	DL	DFW	ATL	1	-3.00	14.00	11.00	22.00	134.00	6.00	100.00

SOURCE: Bureau of Transportation Statistics

Bureau of Transportation (BTS) Statistics on Delta Air Lines Flight 267
September 11, 2001.

Specifically, American 11 was a Qantas code-share aircraft in 2001 taken over by Air New Zealand after the attacks. “Qantas also said one of its U.S.-based staff members was traveling on company business aboard American Airlines Flight 11 from Boston to Los Angeles, which crashed into the World Trade Centre (WTC) in New York.” [TRAVELBIZ ARTICLE: “QF [QUANTAS] AND NZ [AIR NEW ZEALAND] CONFIRM CODESHARE WITH HIJACKED US AIRLINERS.” FEB. 23, 2002.]

The Air Line Agents’ side of their conversation with Betty, which was not recorded and is supposed to have lasted “another five or ten minutes” always

¹² Travelbiz article: “QF [Qantas] and NZ [Air New Zealand] confirm codeshare with hijacked US airliners.” February 23, 2002.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20020223125031/http://www.travelbiz.com.au/articles/96/0c007296.asp>

according to Mrs. Gonzales' information as given to Larry Wansley, can be found [here](#).

A third and final transcript of Betty's 4-minute recorded call contains different information than what has already been given. This particular third transcript was also written out on September 12, 2001, in an FBI report and inserted in the same case number file (265D-NY-280350) as the previous transcript but with a slight difference: Above the case number is "DL-336" being Delta Air Lines Flight 336. Again, there is no official explanation why a Delta flight transcript was being perused/investigated as opposed to an American Air Line flight.

AMERICAN AIR LINE - FBI VERSION #2 of Betty Ong's call

FLIGHT ATTENDANT (BETTY ONG):	(UI) This is ah ONG. We can't breathe (UI). He's got mace or something.
WINSTON:	Can you describe the person that you said went into the flight deck or (UI)?
ONG:	I'm, I'm sitting in the back coming back from business. Can you hold on for one second, he's coming back?
Unintelligible noise in background.	
ONG:	On, on number one. He stood upstairs (UI). Ah, nobody knows what he's going to do. (UI) Ah, I'm (UI) is his (UI) right now. (UI) Ah, we can't get to the cockpit, the door won't open. Hello?
WINSTON:	Can you (UI) information relative to ah, you know, force, force that. Uhm, at this point? What operation, what flight are we talking about, Flight 12?
ONG:	Right now? Okay. We're on Flight 11 right now. Flight 11.
WINSTON:	Flight 11, okay.
ONG:	(UI) we are working on
WINSTON:	Yeah.
ONG:	One of the flight attendants (UI) has been stabbed.

VANESSA: Can anybody get up to the cockpit? Can anybody get up to the cockpit?

ONG: We can't even get a manager to the cockpit. We don't know what's going on up there.

WINSTON: (UI) keep the door closed and

ONG: Okay.

WINSTON: (UI) Did you see the girl who got stabbed?

ONG: I think the guys are up there. They might have gone, they are on their way up there or, or something. Nobody can call the cockpit to see if we can get inside. Hey, is anybody still there?

WINSTON: Yes, I'm still here.

ONG: Okay, I'm staying on the line as well.

WINSTON: Okay.

VANESSA: (UI), who is calling reservations? Is it a flight attendant, or who? (UI)

WINSTON: We need for (UI) call.

ONG: I'm number three. I'm number three on this flight. (UI) on this flight and (UI) Flight 11 (UI). Have you guys called anyone else? You know, ah somebody's calling medical and we can't get them.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE (UM): (UI) Is anybody there? Is anybody there?

WINSTON: What, what seat are you in? What seat are you in?

ONG: We've just left Boston and we're up in the air. We're suppose to go to LA and (UI).

WINSTON: But what seat? What's the number of your seat?

ONG: Okay. I'm in the jump seat right now. 3R

WINSTON: Okay, are you the flight attendant? I'm sorry, did you say you're the flight attendant?

ONG: Hello?

WINSTON: Hello, what is your name?

ONG: Uhm, you'll have to speak up. I can't hear you.

WINSTON: What is your name?

The remaining conversation is identical to the other transcripts

Mrs. Gonzalez, when interviewed by the FBI, said the conversation “lasted approximately 23 to 25 minutes,” but “only the first four minutes of the phone

call between Ong and the reservations center (Minter, Sadler, and Gonzalez) was recorded because of the time limit on the recently installed system." The unrecorded portion of the conversation between Betty and those on the ground, according to Mrs. Gonzalez, was:-

ONG advised that there appeared to be two passengers locked in the cockpit, one of which was assigned to seat 10B, business class, under the name of AL SUGAMI (phonetic). ONG was getting this information from other flight attendants. She did not see the two passengers, and could not provide any physical descriptions of them.

GONZALEZ asked ONG about the condition of all passengers and whether the flight crew made any announcements. ONG said that no announcements were made, and that the passengers in coach class suspect something was going on, but were not aware of the situation. ONG said that the First Class passengers were moved to Coach, and that the Business Class cabin was sprayed with possibly mace. ONG said that it was difficult to breathe, and it was difficult to see what was going on in the Business and First Class. ONG told GONZALEZ that she was informed by other FA's that a passenger by the name of DANIEL LEWIN may have been fatally wounded. GONZALEZ said that LEWIN may have been on sit 9B, but that information is not confirmed.

ONG kept GONZALEZ apprised of the flying condition of the airplane, and that from time to time the airplane was taking rapid descents and flying sideways, erratically. Throughout the call, GONZALEZ did not hear much commotion on the background. There were moments in the conversations where ONG asked for their prayers. GONZALEZ tried to keep the line open and kept

ONG talking. At one point, ONG started to cry and said "Oh God Oh God, what is going on!" and the call ended. GONZALEZ later saw what happened on the television news coverage of the destruction of the World Trade Center.

An American Airlines Raleigh Reservations Office Report was sent to the Commission and offers further details on this particular call. Before the call ended, the section which was not recorded, Betty is asked by Mrs. Gonzalez how many hijackers are onboard the flight; the response was "two guys."

[COMMISSION STAFF (TEAM 7) BOX 18 REPORT ALL CALLS FROM AMERICAN 11 WERE MADE THROUGH "CLARCOM" AIR PHONE SERVICE.]

3:00
3:06

NYDIA GONZALEZ:
(SIMULTANEOUS)

Hey Betty, this is Nydia.
You're saying that the guys that are doing the stabbing
they're in the cockpit? How many people are we talking
about?

Two guys? Do you have a description of ...

Excerpt from Betty Ong’s call with Nydia Gonzalez
Transcripts of 9/11 Telephone Calls | AA KEAN COMM 006327

Betty is then asked where these “two guys” were sitting on the aircraft; the response was they were seated in “2A and B.” The following extract from the FBI flash-card presentation depicts the occupants seated in “2A and B”.

SEAT	PASSENGER	SEAT
10B	Al Suqami, Satam	27
34C	Allison, Anna	10
8G	Alomari, Abdul	25
2A	Alshehri, Wail	27
2B	Alshehri, Waleed	23
8A	Angell, David	11
8B	Angell, Lynn Edwards	7

The Ticket Agent who checked in the al-Shehri brothers reported nothing suspicious about them. They “wore casual business attire, no ties, solid blue coats, and gray slacks.” [Commission Staff (Team7) Box17: “Screeners 9/11 & Check-In.”]

First Class 2A
Wail al-Shehri

First Class 2B
Waleed M. al-Shehri

Exactly three days after September 11th, the FBI gave a [National Press Release \(202/324-3691\)](#) on September 14th and released a list of 19 suspected hijackers who they “identified.” There were no images accompanying the list.

AMERICAN AIRLINES #11

BOEING 767

7:45 a.m. ¹³ departed Boston for Los Angeles

8:45 a.m. ¹⁴ crashed into North Tower of the World Trade Center

Satam Al Suqami - Date of birth used: June 28, 1976; last known address: United Arab Emirates.

Waleed M. Alshehri - Dates of birth used: September 13, 1974/January 1, 1976/March 3, 1976/July 8, 1977/December 20, 1978/May 11, 1979/November 5, 1979/October 2, 1991. Possible residence(s): Hollywood, Florida/Orlando, Florida/Daytona Beach, Florida. Believed to be a pilot

Wail Alshehri - Date of birth used: July 31, 1973; possible residence(s): Hollywood, Florida, and Newton, Massachusetts. Believed to be a pilot

Mohamed Atta - Date of birth used: September 1, 1968. Possible residence(s): Hollywood, Florida/Coral Springs, Florida/Hamburg, Germany. Believed to be a pilot

Abdulaziz Alomari - Dates of birth used: December 24, 1972 and May 28, 1979. Possible residence: Hollywood, Florida. Believed to be a pilot

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› [FBI Press Release \(202/324-3691\)](#)

As seen from the FBI Press Release, the "two guys" Betty was reporting to have gained entrance into the cockpit was Wail al-Shehri (seat 2A) and Waleed M. al-Shehri (seat 2B); both "believed" to be pilots by the FBI.

On September 27, 2001, another [FBI Press Release](#) became available, this time accompanied with photographs. ¹⁵ Again, all suspected hijackers, except for Satam al-Suqami, were "believed" by the FBI to be pilots.

Returning to Betty's call, for unknown reasons to us, Betty corrects her information given. Her new claims are that the other individual in the cockpit


¹³ 07:59 a.m. by the Commission.

¹⁴ 08:46 a.m. by Seismic data.

¹⁵ In the link now available the photographs have been removed.

with the pilots is Satam al-Suqami and his seating number is 10B in Business Class. Betty does not say which al-Shehri brother was replaced for al-Suqami or if all three were now in the cockpit; but she does not mention any other name or seat number that would correspond to any other suspected hijacker that was officially reported to have boarded the flight on the day of.

► FBI flash-card presentation of American 11 - Seat “10B”



Business Class 10B

Satam al-Suqami



Replaced one of the al-Shehri brothers or joined them in the cockpit with the pilots.

<p>14:00 →</p> <p>NYDIA GONZALEZ:</p>	<p><i>Yes, I'm here Betty.</i></p> <p><i>He's the one that's in the ... he's in the cockpit.</i></p> <p><i>Okay, you said Tom Sukani (Satam Al Suqami)? Okay.</i></p> <p><i>Okay and he was in 10B. Okay, okay, so he's one of the persons that are in the cockpit.</i></p> <p><i>And as far as weapons, all they have are just knives? Okay.</i></p>
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Craig Marquis, the American Air Lines Manager who was on duty at Operations Center in Fort Worth, Texas, was interviewed by the FBI on September 16, 2001. He told officials Betty's call was transferred to him by Nydia Gonzalez due to the seriousness of its content, and because "Ong wanted Central dispatch to contact the cockpit."

During this telephone call, ONG reported that there was a passenger on board who was armed with a knife. This passenger was seated in 10B and was identified as TOM ELSUQANI (phonetic). When MARQUIS first heard this, he thought that the knife might have been a Swiss army knife of some sort because it was not that uncommon for passengers to have these. ONG then informed MARQUIS that the passenger in seat 9B, DAVID LEWIN, had been fatally stabbed and that the number 1 flight attendant, K.A. MARTIN (MARTIN), AA employee number 307280, had been stabbed as well. MARTIN was in bad shape and was currently on oxygen. Besides these two individuals, the number 5 flight attendant, B. ARESTEGUI, AA employee number 167762, had been superficially wounded by the passenger with the knife.

In addition to these injuries, there were two men trying to gain access to the cockpit, and by this time, all passengers had been removed from first class. After the men gained access to the cockpit, ONG could hear loud arguing from the cockpit area. ONG also mentioned that there was something in the air that made it hard to breath. This

telephone conversation lasted from approximately 7:25 a.m. until approximately 7:49 a.m.

>Craig Marquis, American Air Lines Manager, interviewed by the FBI

September 16, 2001.

The time Craig Marquis talks of is local Central time, which is one hour behind Eastern, having the call between Betty and the Air Line Agents begin at 08:25 a.m., till 08:49 a.m. A discrepancy to when Betty's call ended can be seen as 3 minutes after impact of the aircraft. There is no official explanation for this 3-minute time difference.

We now turn to Madeleine's particular calls (three in all) that were not recorded. The reason given at the time, was that "American Air Lines officials told *The Times* that phone calls are not typically recorded, meaning the conversation was likely reconstructed by the FBI from interviews with Michael Woodward, [Flight Service Manager,] who took the phone call." ¹⁶

Betty, if remembered, first gave the flight number they were on as 12 and later corrected it to flight 11. We learn however from the Commission that

¹⁶ CNN article, September 20, 2001. Accessed 2014.

<http://web.archive.org/web/20051224062034/http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/vic.fligh.t.attendant/>

Madeleine also gave the flight number they were on as 12: “Michael Woodward, supervisor at the Boston office, hearing that a problem had been reported aboard an American airplane, went to American’s gate area at Logan with his colleague Beth Williams. Woodward noted that the morning bank of flights had all departed Boston and the gate area was quiet. He further realized that Flight 12 had not even departed yet, so he and Williams returned to the office to try to clarify the situation.” [9/11 CR, FOOTNOTE, 32, CH.1.]

On checking the BTS statistics, American Air Line Flight 12, both Betty and Madeleine initially reported being on, is recorded as a cancelled flight for September 11, 2001. This information however does not clarify if Betty and/or Madeleine made a mistake; BTS also has American Air Line Flight 11 down as a cancelled flight for the day of.

Madeleine’s first call at 08:25:20 a.m., was initially received by Evelyn Nunez, the Manager on duty at American Air Line in Boston. The *New York Observer* reported Evelyn “became very distraught early in the conversation” and so Woodward took over the call who was “friends with Sweeney for a decade.” [[NEW YORK OBSERVER](#): “STEWARDESS ID’D HIJACKERS EARLY, TRANSCRIPTS SHOW. FEBRUARY 16, 2004.”]

Evelyn Nunez was interviewed by the FBI on September 12, 2001. On the morning of, she said she arrived at her station at 04:45 a.m., and after completing her scheduled checks, she got a call from a flight attendant (no given time or name) who was supposed to fly on America 11, but couldn’t because she was sick. The FBI located the flight attendant who called in sick; Halle Cameron was her name, who said that on September 10th, she “played in a golf tournament and had dinner with friends. Upon returning to her home, she did not feel well. She called the scheduling line for American Airlines to call in sick.” This process was automated, so she “entered her employee number

and password to report that [she] would not be flying on Flight 11” the following morning.

Airline: American Airlines (AA)
Flight Number: 0012
Time Period: September 11, 2001 to September 11, 2001

On-Time Flights: LAX-BOS 0.00%

NOTE: Late, cancelled and diverted flights are subtracted from total flights to determine on-time percent.
A complete listing of [airline](#) and [airport](#) abbreviations is available. Times are reported in local time using a 24 hour clock.

[Excel](#) | [CSV](#)

Flight Number	Carriers	Origin Airport	Dest Airport	All Flights							
				Total Number	Average Departure Delay (minutes)	Average Taxi-Out Time (minutes)	Average Scheduled Departure to Take-off (minutes)	Average Arrival Delay (minutes)	Average Airborne Time (minutes)	Average Taxi-In Time (minutes)	Total Number Cancelled
0012	AA	LAX	BOS	1	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1

[Bureau of Transportation Statistics \(BTS\)](#)

American Air Line Flight 12

September 11, 2001.

Evelyn Nunez said that she received a call from Halle Cameron calling in sick, but the latter told the FBI that on the day of, “she received a call at 6:52 a.m., from American Airlines inquiring as to her whereabouts. They advised that they had not received her notification. She again advised that she was unable to come in to work.” Regardless, Halle Cameron’s stand-in was found: 24-year-old Jean Roger, born in San Diego, California, and lived in Longmeadow, Massachusetts.¹⁷

There was another Flight Crew replacement for American 11 on the morning of, and this was Ann Moreland, a purser for American Air Lines. She was

¹⁷ 911 Memorial Guide.

http://names.911memorial.org/#lang=en_US&page=person&id=4384

interviewed by the FBI on September 22, 2001, due to her contact with the Bureau about a “suspicious message” she found on her answering machine when she returned home on September 11th. Prior to this day, she was supposed to be scheduled for duty on American 11, but was replaced by another purser. We have not been able to identify the replacement.

From Ann Moreland’s phone records, it was found that the message was left on her answering machine around 09:51 a.m., after both towers had been hit.

When MORELAND returned to her residence on September 11, 2001, she discovered a suspicious message on her answering machine. MORELAND played the message to the reporting agents. The call was received consecutive to a message left by [REDACTED]

In this suspicious message, a women with a heavy foreign accent could be heard in the background. A man was also heard in the background in an apparent discussion stating the name BIN-LADEN twice. Another male then left a message that stated the following: “If this had to do with Israel, there's gonna be a backlash against the Jews.” The males had no apparent distinguishable accent.

MORELAND did not recognize any of the individuals in the telephone message and did not know why anyone would leave such a message on her recorder.

>FBI Interview with Ann Moreland
September 22, 2001

Returning to Madeleine’s phone call, the following information was given to Evelyn Nunez:-

- (a) Calling from American 12 at Gate 32 from Boston-Logan
- (b) Two flight attendants stabbed
- (c) “Passenger in row 9” (Daniel C. Lewin in 9B) “had their throat cut” by
- (d) “Passenger in seat 10B” occupied by Satam al-Suqami
- (e) “Hijackers said they had a bomb”

Elizabeth D. Williams, the Pease Manager, told the FBI that when she went with Woodward to check “American’s gate area at Logan” he found American flight 12 still at Gate 32, but the aircraft was “empty.” Mrs. Williams then said she searched the gate-side computer for any information she could find to when this aircraft would be flying out that morning. As previously seen, this was a cancelled flight as recorded by the BTS.

WILLIAMS stated on September 11, 2001, at approximately 8 a.m., she was working in her office at LOGAN AIRPORT when MICHAEL WOODWARD, Manager of Flight Services for AMERICAN AIRLINES AA, advised her that they needed to go to Gate 32 because two flight attendants had been stabbed. Upon arrival at the gate, WILLIAMS and WOODWARD found an empty airplane. WOODWARD then got on the phone and contacted EVELYN NUNEZ, an employee of AA at LOGAN AIRPORT. While WOODWARD was on the phone, WILLIAMS searched the gate-side computer for information for the flight time of the airplane at Gate 32.

>FBI interview with Elizabeth D. Williams, Pease Manager
September 13, 2001

The above information was corroborated by Woodward himself when interviewed by the FBI but with one small difference: When he went to Gate 32, he “realized the flight had left” and did not find it “empty” as Mrs. Williams had said. Woodward’s statement to the FBI does not corroborate his colleague (Mrs. Williams) but neither the Commission, when they report, “He [Woodward] further realized that Flight 12 had not even departed yet, so he and Williams returned to the office to try to clarify the situation.” [9/11 CR, FOOTNOTE 32. CH.1.]

Woodward’s relating seat numbering (except for 9B where Daniel C. Lewin a passenger was seated) was incorrect according to the official FBI seating of the “hijackers.” Seats 10C, 9G, and 9E were unassigned seats. Woodward also

related a different number of “hijackers”; officially there were five, not “four total.”

Details: For information of Boston, Dallas received information from American Airlines Security Personnel which indicates that a telephone conversation took place during the hijacking and subsequent crash of American Airlines Flight #11. Parties to this conversation were Flight Attendant Amy Sweeny (on board Flight #11) and Base Manager Michael Woodward (at Logan Airport). The conversation went generally as follows:

Sweeny: "The plane has been hijacked...flight attendant number 5 from business class and flight attendant number 1 from first class have both been stabbed...a hijacker also cut the throat of a business class passenger and he appears to be dead...the hijackers (four total) were all of middle eastern descent...three were sitting in business class...one spoke English very well." Sweeny then provided seat numbers 9B, 10C, 9G, and 9E as those being used by the four hijackers.

>FBI Interview with Michael Woodward
Declassified: January 26, 2007.


The FBI had another interview with Woodward. This time his story has more unexplained information. In this interview, Woodward states there were three hijackers seated in four seats and the passenger Daniel C. Lewin is a hijacker.

SWEENEY believed there were three hijackers in the business class section of the aircraft. All three hijackers were of Middle Eastern decent. At least one of the hijackers spoke English very well. The hijackers occupied seats number 9B, 9E, 9G, and 10C.

>FBI Interview with Michael Woodward
September 12, 2001.

Another FBI interview was conducted with Woodward but more unexplained data was forthcoming. In Woodward's previous interviews, he stated Madeleine told him the passenger who had been stabbed was fatally wounded. In this interview he states Madeleine told him the passenger, though stabbed, was

being taken care of by “a doctor and nurse.” Out of the 76 passengers onboard American 11, not one was listed as a physician and/or a nurse.



› Daniel C. Lewin's image is taken from the [public domain](#)

Mohamed Atta is shown seated in **8D** and Abdul al-Omari next to him in **8G**. The al-Shehri brothers sit next to each other occupying seats **2A** and **2B**, whilst Satam al-Suqami is seated in **10B**.

Woodward then changes the seating numbers, which Madeleine had initially relayed to him. He now claimed she told him that the three hijackers (not four) were seated in **10B** which was assigned to Satam al-Suqami; **9C** which was not a seating number on this Boeing 767; **9G** or **9D** both unassigned; and, Woodward repeated **9G**.

Shortly thereafter, the AA flight attendant AMY SWEENEY called on the airphone from Flight 11 and stated the flight had been hijacked. SWEENEY told WOODWARD the #1 attendant (KAREN MARTIN) and the #5 attendant (BOBBY ARUSTIGUE) has been stabbed. SWEENEY also stated that a business class passenger was stabbed and a doctor and nurse were caring for him. SWEENEY stated that three (3) hijackers gained access to the cockpit and the flight crew could not gain access or communicate with the pilots or the cockpit.

The hijackers were sitting in seats 10B, 9C, and 9G or 9D and 9G. SWEENEY described the hijackers as three Middle Eastern males. One of the males spoke good English and another spoke poor English.

>FBI Interview with Michael Woodward
September 12, 2001.

The FBI interviewed the Gate Operator, Maria Jackson, on September 25, 2001. She was shown a “photo spread” presumably of the 19 suspected hijackers (they don’t say) and “did not recognize anyone from the photo spread.” Her appearance at Gate 32 was from the very first call of passengers till boarding ended.

Another female employee was interviewed by the FBI on September 12, 2001, and this was with Jane Allen who was Vice-President of Flight Services. Mrs. Allen told officials that she received a call from Woodward saying he received a telephone call from American 11 and the caller was Flight Attendant Madeleine Sweeney. Mrs. Allen’s FBI interview also revealed accounts on Madeleine’s additional information. The latter was now reported to have said

there were three suspected hijackers onboard, but then proceeded to give four seat numbers, revealing a passenger who sat in 9B, Daniel C. Lewin, to be one of the hijackers. This information partially coincides with Woodward's latter interview with the FBI.

SWEENEY believed there were three hijackers in the business class section of the aircraft. All three hijackers were of Middle Eastern decent. At least one of the hijackers spoke English very well. The hijackers occupied seats number 9B, 9E, 9G, and 10C.

›FBI interview with Jane Allen, Vice-President Flight Services
September 12, 2001

The flight seats Madeleine was supposed to have given, always according to Mrs. Allen's interview, differ from those given by another witness whose name is redacted by the FBI. The anonymous witness stated that when Woodward and Mrs. Williams went to check Gate 32, the flight in question (no flight number given from this witness) had already departed, backing up Woodward's account. This same witness, further on in his interview with the FBI, will tell officials that Madeleine's call was coming from American 11 and she said the "hijackers were sitting in seats **10B, 9C, and 9G,**" eliminating seat **9B** that the passenger (later turned into a "hijacker") Daniel C. Lewin occupied. It is unclear why this witness corrected previous information.

In Woodward's interview with the Commission Staff he tells them that Madeleine gave seats **10B** (Satam al-Suqami's designated seat); **9D** (unassigned); and **9G** (also unassigned).

[U] Sweeney then told Woodward that the people who hijacked the airplane were seated in 10(B) and 9(D) and 9(G). She said that they had gained entry to the cockpit. She didn't say how they had done it. Woodward noted that the two first class flight attendants had been stabbed, so we can only guess how they did it (suggesting we may presume that they stabbed the attendants to get the key, or force them to open the cockpit).

▷COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR04017171): Team 7 INTERVIEW
Michael Woodward, Supervisor at the Boston Office
January 25, 2004.

The *New York Observer* reported, "Mr. Woodward ordered a colleague to punch up those seat locations on the computer;" but we don't know if the media took into consideration that three, possibly four, and even five sets of seating numbers were circulating at the time, with at least three seats being unassigned to a particular passenger and one passenger being named as a hijacker.

It could be argued that Madeleine was giving these seat locations as she saw the passengers seated at the time; but Flight Attendants use the passenger manifest they are given before boarding which contains names and seat numbering of each passenger. Furthermore, under such a serious situation as a hijacking, Madeleine would not have gone on guesswork to provide vital information to those on the ground. She would have used the passenger manifest to identify the correct hijackers, being a professional Flight Attendant that she was, and there is no evidence to prove otherwise.

ANONYMOUS WITNESS "HIJACKER" ASSIGNED SEAT

10B **Satam al-Suqami**
9C Unassigned passenger
9G Unassigned passenger

JANE ALLEN (VP OF FLIGHT SERVICES) “HIJACKER” ASSIGNED SEAT

9B **Daniel C. Lewin**
9E Unassigned passenger
9G Unassigned passenger
10C Unassigned passenger

WOODWARD INTERVIEW (COMMISSION STAFF) “HIJACKER” ASSIGNED SEAT

10B **Satam al-Suqami**
9D Unassigned passenger
9G Unassigned passenger

“At least 20 minutes before the plane crashed,” the *New York Observer* article continued, “the airline had the names, addresses, phone numbers and credit cards of three of the five hijackers.” This sounds incorrect when looking at the seating of the aircraft that day. But the article concluded, “They knew that **9G** was Abdulaziz al-Omari, **10B** was Satam al-Suqami, and **9D** was Mohamed Atta the ringleader of the 9/11 terrorists.” ¹⁸

The mistaken information from the media did little to change how the FBI had assigned and reported that **Abdul al-Omari** was seated in **8G**, and NOT the *New York Observer*’s 9G. And, the FBI had assigned and reported that **Mohamed Atta** was seated in **8D**, and NOT the *New York Observer*’s 9D. The only correct seating the *New York Observer* reported on, which coincided with the FBI, was for **Satam al-Suqami** who was seated in **10B**.

¹⁸ The *New York Observer*: “Stewardess ID’d Hijackers Early, Transcripts Show. February 16, 2004. Accessed 2012.
<http://web.archive.org/web/20120823034934/http://www.ratical.org/ratville/CAH/M.A.Sweeney.html>

It is unsure where the newspaper report was getting information that Atta and al-Omari were mentioned, because both Flight Attendants (Betty Ong and Madeleine Sweeney) never referred to them by name, and never referred to their seat numbers 8D and 8G. In addition, both ladies never refer to the names “Atta” and/or “al-Omari” as being participants in the hijack onboard American 11. No evidence exists to prove otherwise, and this work is based on official released data.

Another interview with Mrs. Gonzalez by the FBI was done on September 12, 2001. She said in this interview that the information Betty was passing came “from other flight attendants; she did not see the two passengers,” who were in the cockpit with the pilots. If anything, Mrs. Gonzalez said that Betty “could not provide any physical descriptions of them,” (the hijackers) and it is evident, that (a) Betty was relayed the information she was passing on, which (b) was partially recorded, though the Air Lines do not “typically” do that; and (c), the two men in the cockpit were one of the al-Shehri brothers (or both) together with Satam al-Suqami who had no pilot training. The al-Shehri brothers on the other hand, according to the FBI, were believed to have pilot training.

The FBI then asked Mrs. Gonzalez whether the flight crew made any announcements. The latter stated that Betty was saying no announcements were made, and that the passengers in Coach Class suspected “something was going on, but were not aware of the situation.” In other words, the passengers did not hear whatever was heard by radio transmission at Boston Traffic Control, “we have some planes”.

The FBI also had another interview with Woodward, which revealed further irregular data. According to this interview, he said he boarded American 11 at 07:30 a.m., on the day of “in order to check on the status of the flight and the flight attendants.” He briefly spoke with the onboard crew and also “looked

onboard.” Nothing caught his attention that was out of the ordinary. When flight crew “told him they were prepared for departure,” he “exited Flight 11.” [FBI INTERVIEW: MICHAEL WOODWARD, SEPT. 13, 2001.]

To the Commission Staff, Woodward stated he remained onboard “approximately one-half hour before departure” of the aircraft. This would have him leaving the aircraft about 08:00 a.m., which does not coincide with the Commission timeline having the aircraft’s takeoff time at 07:59 a.m. [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR04017171): TEAM 7 INTERVIEW: MICHAEL WOODWARD, SUPERVISOR AT THE BOSTON OFFICE, JAN. 25, 2004.]

But Woodward also told the Commission Staff he didn’t recall if he left the aircraft “a half hour before its scheduled departure time of 07:45,” which would have him leave at 07:15 a.m.; “or its actual departure time, at around 8:00 a.m.,” which would have him leave before he stepped foot on the aircraft. He did however “remember that boarding had begun.”

It should be remembered that all Woodward said to officials was taken for granted. He was the only employee that talked with Madeleine since her call was not recorded. However, Woodward’s various accounts to the FBI and the Commission Staff show inconsistencies.

According to a cleaning crewmember, Wayne Kirk, he told the FBI that he finished cleaning the aircraft at 07:30 a.m. There is no mention Kirk saw Woodward boarding the plane at that time. But when Kirk left, only one “flight attendant [approximately 50-years-old] was near the rear galley and the captain was outside checking the landing gear. Kirk thought it was odd that only those two crewmembers [Captain and Flight Attendant] had arrived at the plane. Usually the entire crew is sitting around and talking when the cleaning crew finishes.” [FBI INTERVIEW: WAYNE KIRK, MEMBER OF THE AMERICAN AIR LINES CLEANING CREW. SEPT. 12, 2001.]

More missing information comes from when the al-Shehri brothers (Wail and Waleed) board American 11 at 07:31 a.m.,¹⁹ just one minute after Woodward is supposed to have boarded the aircraft to chat with the 50-year-old flight attendant, and just one minute after Kirk left the aircraft when he finished his cleaning duties. Woodward makes no mention he saw any passengers aboard the flight this one minute after he arrived to check on the crew. He does however recall passengers boarding when he left the aircraft either at 08:00 a.m., or at 07:15 a.m., or at 07:30 a.m. He couldn't be precise.

On September 11, 2001, the FBI interviewed Kip Hamilton who was employed as the Managing Director of Reservations. Mrs. Hamilton explained to the FBI that at 08:20 a.m., a call came in from Betty. This particular call has been registered by the FBI to have been made at 08:18:47 a.m., and managed, as noted, by Nydia Gonzalez.

Mrs. Hamilton advised "during the conversation, passengers seated in seats 2A and 2B [the al-Shehri brothers] and 10B [Satam al-Suqami] were listed by the FA [Flight Attendant Ong] as individuals who had participated in the takeover of Flight 11." There is no mention from Mrs. Hamilton if any other suspected hijacker was reported as being participators in the "takeover of Flight 11."

**HAMILTON identified the individuals
designated by the FA as participating as follows:**

**Passenger 2A was identified as WAIL ALSHEHRI
Passenger 2B was identified as WALEE ALSHEHRI
Passenger 10B was identified as SATAM AL SUQAMI**

›FBI interview with Kip Hamilton (Managing Director of Reservations)
September 11, 2001

¹⁹ Team 7, Box 18: "Flight info tables." Scrbd account "911 Document Archive."
<http://www.scribd.com/911DocumentArchive>

Mrs. Hamilton gives to the interviewing FBI Agent various documents; amongst those documents is “a printout on passenger MOHAMED ATTA, seated in Seat 8D who had purchased a one-way ticket on Flight 11. A passenger printout on SATAM AL SUQAMI, who was seated in Seat 10B on Flight 11,” and also two passenger lists for American 11.

There is no mention why a passenger printout on Atta was given/requested, since he was not mentioned by name, not even once, by the flight attendants, Betty and Madeleine. We can assume this procedure was taken to eliminate various passengers with Middle Eastern names. If so, it is unclear why a printout of al-Omari’s passenger data was not given/requested.

The PENTTBOMB Report 265A-NY-280350 then states, “ONG advised the First Class passengers had been moved to the coach section but did not specify if this was done by the flight crew or the hijackers.” [PENTTBOMB 265A-NY-280350, “AMERICAN AIRLINES FLIGHT #11,” JICI: APR. 19, 2002.] This would mean that since Atta and al-Omari were not mentioned as being participators in the hijack, they also (seated in First Class) would have been moved to coach section. The same PENTTBOMB Report then tells us, “SWEENEY believed there were three hijackers in the business class section of the aircraft. All three hijackers were of Middle Eastern decent. At least one of the hijackers spoke English very well.”

But even after this clear information is given from Madeleine and Betty, this PENTTBOMB Report, further down concludes: “It has been determined that MOHAMED ATTA was both the pilot and the leader of the Flight #11 team. ATTA is the only hijacker associated with this flight that is known to have formally received flight training.” [PENTTBOMB 265A-NY-280350: AMERICAN AIRLINES FLIGHT #11, JICI APR. 19, 2002.]

The above PENTTBOMB Report conclusion turns out not to be in accordance with the FBI's Press Release, given earlier, on how 4 of the 5 suspected hijackers on American 11 were "believed to be a pilot."

Should Atta and/or al-Omari have participated in the hijack, Madeleine and Betty never mentioned they had. Both ladies advised that all Business passengers (Atta and al-Omari were in Business) had been moved to the Coach section of the aircraft. How the FBI "determined" Atta was both "the pilot and the leader of the Flight #11 team," was definitely not coming from those onboard American 11. There is no further information from the FBI to explain their conclusion.

Woodward further said that he didn't think Madeleine called anyone else from the aircraft "except him and believes the phone call was a total of eight or nine minutes." The FBI reports Madeleine's third and final call lasted 13 minutes and 21 seconds. Woodward also said Madeleine made no mention of a gun being onboard, nor about mace or pepper sprays being used; neither was there mention of box-cutters. [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR04017171): TEAM 7 INTERVIEW: MICHAEL WOODWARD, SUPERVISOR AT THE BOSTON OFFICE, JAN. 25, 2004.]

As regards the *New York Observer's* article claim, that within "20 minutes before the plane crashed, the airline had the names, addresses, phone numbers and credit cards of three of the five hijackers," turns out to have many versions than what was being reported.

VERSION #1

A former FBI Agent called Warren Flagg was interviewed on April 17, 2006, by *Newsday*. He told the press how all 19 suspected hijackers were quickly

“identified” by the FBI due to Atta’s “left behind luggage” at Boston-Logan International Airport.²⁰ [ALSO SEE COMPLETE DATABASE-LEFT BEHIND LUGGAGE]

In another newspaper interview, Warren Flagg said: “How do you think the government was able to identify all 19 hijackers almost immediately after the attacks? They were identified through those papers in the luggage. And that’s how it was known so soon that al-Qa’ida was behind the hijackings.”²¹

Warren Flagg was [FBI Special Agent John O’Neil’s former partner](#), and had also worked on the TWA Flight 800 case: “I worked on the [TWA] Flight 800 case, and the carnage from one plane was enough for me for a lifetime,” Flagg said. “The horror from four planes – let alone the towers – is beyond my comprehension.”²²

Though John O’Neil has a complicated but interesting story, we do not have enough room to add it here. We give our readers a link to check out at the [Public Broadcasting Service \(PBS\)](#).

VERSION #2

According to the following article published by *expressindia* on December 10, 2003, the suspected hijackers were “identified” by Indian intelligence not by Atta’s “left behind luggage.”

²⁰ *Newsday*: “An untold story of 9/11.” By Michael Dorman, April 17, 2006. Accessed 2010.
<http://web.archive.org/web/20060418230709/http://www.amny.com/news/nationworld/nation/ny-uslugg0417,0,1751421.story?coll=am-topheadlines>

²¹ AM New York: “An untold story of 9/11.” By Michael Dorman “Newsday” Staff Writer, published April 17, 2006. Accessed: 2010.
<http://web.archive.org/web/20060418230709/http://www.amny.com/news/nationworld/nation/ny-uslugg0417,0,1751421.story?coll=am-topheadlines>

²² <http://newsmine.org/content.php?ol=9-11/john-oneill.txt>

The screenshot shows the Express India website interface. At the top is a yellow header with the 'expressindia' logo and a search bar. Below the header is a red sidebar with navigation links under categories like 'GROUP SITES', 'COLUMNISTS', 'CITY NEWSLINES', and 'SERVICES'. The main content area has a breadcrumb trail 'Home > Top Stories > World' and the date 'Wednesday, December 10, 2003'. The article title is 'Indian intelligence wiretap identified 9/11 hijackers' by 'Press Trust of India'. The text reports that Indian intelligence agencies helped the US identify the hijackers on April 3, 2001, based on a wiretap of a Pakistani charity. A 'COMPLETE STORY' link is at the bottom right of the article.

›Used under the “fair use” Act: From the [U.S. Government Printing Office](#) Fair Use

VERSION #3

FAA employees at airports would have the knowledge and/or be in possession of a Watch List where names of individuals were set down “known by U.S. authorities to pose a threat to commercial aviation.” Today, many passports implement a chip; when the chip is scanned against computers at airport check-in, the name of the passport holder is traced through such a Watch List.

One of these Watch Lists was in direct line with the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, where they would receive “advance passenger information on a voluntary basis from airlines;” this system was called Advanced Passenger Information System (APIS), and it was said that due to this procedure, according to Mr. Robert Bonner, head of Customs and Border Protection,²³ they were able to identify all suspected hijackers by 11 o’clock on the morning of and not by Indian intelligence or Atta’s “left behind luggage.”

²³ Bonner’s offices were stationed in the WTC 6.

The Commission interviewed Mr. Bonner on January 26, 2004, and this is what he related amongst other things: “On the morning of 9/11, through an evaluation of data related to the passengers manifest for the four terrorist hijacked aircraft, Customs Office of Intelligence was able to identify the likely terrorist hijackers. Within 45 minutes of the attacks, Customs forwarded the passenger lists with the names of the victims and 19 probable hijackers to the FBI and the intelligence community.” ²⁴


Mr. Bonner’s story was not supported by Janet Riffe the Principal Security Inspector for American Air Lines. She said, “within an hour of the crashes AAL [American Air Line] faxed the five names of the hijackers on both flight 77 and flight 11.” The process was not explained. [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR04017182): TEAM 7 INTERVIEW: JANET RIFFE, FAA PRINCIPAL SECURITY INSPECTOR FOR AMERICAN AIR LINES, FEB. 26, 2004.]

But Mr. Bonner’s testimony was a little off. At least 13 suspected hijackers the Customs and Border Protection “ID” “within 45 minutes” turned up alive and safe after September 11, 2001. [SEE COMPLETE DATABASE: STILL ALIVE]

FBI Director Robert Mueller III acknowledged by September 21, 2001, that some of those behind the terror attacks may have stolen the identification of other people, and, according to at least one security expert, it may have been “relatively easy” based on their level of sophistication to forge documents. [CNN ARTICLE, SEPT. 21, 2001.]

²⁴ Robert C. Bonner’s witness testimony at the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the U.S. on January 26, 2004. Accessed 2010.
http://www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearing7/witness_bonner.htm

VERSION #4



› Satam al-Suqami's passport
Courtesy of the FBI

The FBI announced that they found Satam al-Suqami's passport after American 11 crashed: The passport officially blew out of the inferno passenger aircraft as it crashed into the WTC 1 and was subsequently “picked up” by “a passerby” to be

handed over to Detective Yuk H. Chin at the New York Police Department. [FBI INTERVIEW: DETECTIVE CHIN, SEPT. 12, 2001.]

3407	9/11/2001	MISC	Satam Al-Suqami	Suqami's passport recovered on the street near World Trade Center by a civilian; passport was soaked in jet fuel	265A-NY-280350-302 Serial : 13697
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› FBI Redacted Timeline of Satam al-Suqami

Released February 1, 2007 | Will be declassified on February 1, 2032

The FBI investigated the matter and called Detective Chin on September 12th. This is what he told them: “He was present in the 7th precinct squad when [he] learned that a plane had hit one of the World Trade towers. He further stated he and his partner responded and had just cleared the Battery park underpass, traveling westbound, when he heard jet engines throttling up and then an explosion. He abandoned his vehicle with all the debris falling in the vicinity of West Street and Albany Street.”

Detective Chin then recalls that “a male white approximately 30 years of age, 6’2”, dressed in business attire place[d] the aforementioned passport in his hand, explaining he had found it. In the chaos, the man left before being identified.” There is no further information in regards to the anonymous individual who gave the passport to the police; neither is there information if the police at some later point searched for him or if he himself visited the local authorities to give further details.

From Satam al-Suqami’s passport, officials contemplated the identity of at least this suspected hijacker, who was confirmed to have participated in the hijacking of American 11 by Betty and Madeleine. As regards to the passport in question, it has a peculiar pedigree.

On January 26, 2004, Walt Hempel from the Center for Immigration Studies (CIS) presented to the National Commission Hearing (Senate Office Building) the passport in question and U.S. Visa documents. Within the brief biography given by the FBI on Satam al-Suqami is recorded that he makes a reservation for May 15, 2001, to fly the following day from Fort Lauderdale in Florida to Freeport in the Bahamas. But when he arrives at the ticket counter, he is not allowed to board the flight because he does not have his passport with him.

1899	5/16/2001	FLT	AlShehri, Waleed/Satam Al Suqami	Continental 9273 from Ft. Lauderdale, FL to Freeport, Bahamas	Not allowed entry because they did not have their passports
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›FBI Redacted Timeline of Satam al-Suqami
Released February 1, 2007 | Will be declassified on February 1, 2032

Why Satam al-Suqami went to the airport to catch an international flight without the appropriate traveling documents is anyone’s guess; but it is evident at the time, a few months prior 9/11, that he did not have his passport.

An FBI interview with the Air Line check-in Ticket Agent (name redacted by the FBI) told the Bureau all about the passport Satam al-Suqami presented to her on September 11, 2001, in order to identify himself to board American 11.

AL SUQAMI did not check any luggage and used a passport as identification when he checked in. The passport had a red cover and expired in approximately 2004 or 2005. The picture in the passport showed AL SUQAMI as a younger man.

9/11 Commission Team 7-Box 17
Screeners 9/11 and Check-In

Walt Hempel at the National Commission Hearing on January 26, 2004, presenting Satam al-Suqami's passport and U.S. Visa documents.²⁵



²⁵ Center for Immigration Studies (CIS). Accessed 2013.
<http://www.cis.org/About>



Satam al-Suqami
Passport image



Satam al-Suqami
U.S. Visa image

VARIOUS IMAGES RELEASED OF SATAM AL-SUQAMI



FBI release



Media release



FBI release (visa)



9/11 Terrorist Travel
Monograph release
(passport) ²⁶



FBI release
(visa application)



FBI release
(passport)

Al-Suqami's **GREEN** cover passport
as shown by the CIS

Air Line check-in Ticket Agent: "The
passport had a **RED** cover..." ²⁷


The passport which al-Suqami used to
acquire a U.S. Visa on November 21,
2000, was numbered **B559583**.

The passport shown to the Commission

²⁶ 9/11 Terrorist Travel Monograph. Accessed 2012.

http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff_statements/911_TerrTrav_Monograph.pdf

²⁷ 9/11 Commission Team7 - Box17: Screeners 9/11 & Check-In.



and found in the WTC debris is also numbered **B559583** (left image) issued on August 11, 1998, with expiration date June 19, 2003.

The passport shown to the Air Line check-in Ticket Agent “expired in approximately 2004 or 2005,” and had a **RED** cover.

2. FIRST NAME AND MIDDLE NAME (Exactly as in Passport) SATAM			B-1/B-2 MAX B-1 MAX B-2 MAX OTHER _____ Visa Classification _____ MULT OR _____ Number Applications _____ MONTHS _____ Validity _____		
3. OTHER NAMES (Maiden, Religious, Professional, Aliases) M. A.			L.O. CHECKED _____ ISSUED/REFUSED _____ ON _____ BY _____		
4. DATE OF BIRTH (Day, Month, Year) 28, 6, 76		8. PASSPORT NUMBER B559583		21 NOV 2000	
5. PLACE OF BIRTH City, Province Country Riyadh Saudi Arabia		DATE PASSPORT ISSUED (Day, Month, Year) 11, 8, 98		REFUSAL REVIEWED BY _____ 00326-708-4	
6. NATIONALITY Saudi		7. SEX <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MALE <input type="checkbox"/> FEMALE		DATE PASSPORT EXPIRES (Day, Month, Year) 19, 6, 2003	
9. HOME ADDRESS (Include apartment no., street, city, province, and postal zone) Riyadh AL-SHIFA					
10. NAME AND STREET ADDRESS OF PRESENT EMPLOYER OR SCHOOL (Postal box number unacceptable) _____					
11. HOME TELEPHONE NO. 422-2152		12. BUSINESS TELEPHONE NO. _____			
13. COLOR OF HAIR Black		14. COLOR OF EYES Black		15. COMPLEXION _____	
16. HEIGHT 176		17. MARKS OF IDENTIFICATION None			

›Satam al-Suqami's U.S. Visa application
Released: November 21, 2000.

Going by the U.S. Visa application and images of the passport presented to the Commission from CIS, we are talking about the same passport with

identical number **B559583**. Even so, Satam al-Suqami boarded American 11 showing a passport with a **RED** cover that “expired in approximately 2004 or 2005,” as opposed to showing a Saudi **GREEN** cover passport which expired in 2003 and was “picked up” by “a passerby” to be handed to Detective Yuk H. Chin at the NYPD.

VERSION #5

A senior Special Agent assigned to the NSU, said to the Commission Staff: “On 9/11, I was acting director that day. I did the identity of the hijackers. We got the passenger manifest from the FBI. Entries weren’t so hard, but the benefits side was a nightmare.” [COMMISSION STAFF MEMORANDUM (MFR04021476) “ROCKY CONCEPCION: JUNE 15, 2004.”]

Which of the above given five versions should one believe, of how the 19 suspected hijackers were identified, is unsure. It is however a difficult choice for the historian to make.

Name	Suspected Hijackers	Seating numbers	Additional Information Given
Betty Ong Flight AA12 <i>Corrects later to AAL11</i>	2 suspected hijackers <i>Corrects 1 of the suspected hijackers</i> <i>No mention of Atta or al-Omari</i>	2A Wail al-Shehri 2B Waleed al-Shehri <i>*10B Satam al-Suqami</i> <i>*Replaced one of the al-Shehri brothers or joined them in the cockpit</i>	-passenger wounded -mace -knives <i>No box-cutters mentioned</i>
Madeleine Sweeney Flight AA12	3 suspected hijackers	9E not assigned 9G not assigned 10C not assigned	-bomb on board -passenger shot dead <i>No box-cutters</i>

Neither the FBI nor the Commission inform if Madeleine corrected the flight number as Betty had	Corrects 1 of the suspected hijackers	9B Daniel C. Lewin *10B Satam al-Suqami After Betty's correction	mentioned
	No mention of Atta or al- Omari		

Another call was reported to have been made; this time inside the airport. At 06:52:00 a.m., the FBI report “hijack ringleader” Mohamed el-Amir Atta received a phone call from inside Boston-Logan traced from a pay phone inside Terminal C, at Gate 19. It was later reported the call came from Marwan al-Shehhi the “hijack pilot” of United 175 that caused the demise of the South World Trade Center Tower, known as WTC 2. [COMMISSION STAFF REPORT, AUG. 26, 2004.]

CONCLUSION: Betty Ong's 4-minute call

Three telephone transcripts circulate of the same call. There's the Gonzales-Wansley version, and there's two American Air Line (AAL)-FBI versions.


The Gonzales-Wansley version was not used by the FBI in their flash presentation and neither was it referred to by the Commission.

The AAL-FBI #1 version was used by the FBI and presented in their flash presentation; the Commission refers to it in their 2004 Report.

The AAL-FBI #2 version was not used by the FBI and neither was it referred to by the Commission.

Gonzales-Wansley NOT USED	AAL-FBI (#1) USED	AAL-FBI (#2) NOT USED
<u>Singular:</u> Betty talks of one individual who has “mace or something” who “stood upstairs,” and “nobody knows what he’s going to do” next. No names mentioned; no hijacking mentioned.	A few seconds into the call, and Betty informs she thinks the aircraft is being hijacked. This very important information did not exist in the Gonzales-Wansley transcript.	Unidentified male intervenes asking, “...is anybody there? Is anybody there?” This information did not exist in the Gonzales-Wansley transcript.
<u>Unspecified:</u> Betty informs that “someone” (she’s not specific) is “calling medical” but “can’t get them”. It’s not clear if “calling medical” was an announcement for a doctor onboard or an attempt was made to reach medical assistance on the ground.	<u>CONCLUSION:</u> Betty gives the flight number as 12 instead of 11 but this was never referred to in the Commission Report. Betty informs the cockpit is not answering “their phone”; the cockpit door doesn’t open; she thinks “the guys” are up there (no information of who these “guys” were).	
<u>CONCLUSION:</u> Betty talks of one person spraying “mace or something”; there’s access to First Class, but breathing is difficult; the cockpit door doesn’t open, which means staff and/or passengers (unknown who) tried to gain access to the cockpit; no information if pilots are alive or dead; no		

information if shouts are heard from the cockpit; no hijacker names mentioned; no hijacking mentioned.



In order to identify the reasons why the above transcripts differ, some type of interview needs to be conducted with the individuals involved who received the call. This is not possible to be done; we do not know if the FBI and/or Commission Staff cleared up the matter and so decided to go with the AAL-FBI #1 transcript. There is no information that we could find that explained why this particular transcript was chosen from the other two.

Radio Transmissions: The FAA Operation Center had stated a very important factor: “There is no way to know if a transmission is coming from a particular aircraft, unless the individual transmitting declares who they are.” [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR04017201): TEAM 8 VISIT FAA OPERATION CENTER, JUNE 4, 2003.]

The FBI report two radio transmissions, heard by Boston Air Traffic Control, were being transmitted from the cockpit of American 11. The times of these broadcasts are:-

08:24:38 a.m. (duration 00:00:37)

08:33:59 a.m. (duration 00:00:09)

Air Traffic Operations Manager Terry Biggio at Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center (Regional Operations) stated in his testimony report, that at

08:13:30 a.m., somebody keyed the microphone on American 11, “while threat was being made in the cockpit;” “crew subsequently turned transponder off.” Because the transponder of the aircraft was turned off, all these broadcasts would be from unverified sources.

08:17:59 a.m. “A brief unknown sound (possibly a scream) from an **unknown origin** was heard.” [FAA SUMMARY OF AIR TRAFFIC HIJACK EVENTS REPORT. SEPT. 17, 2001. RELEASED 2005 (FOIA).]

08:24:00 a.m. “**Unverified source** transmits, believed to be hijacker.” [FAA ACCIDENT REPORT, NOV. 13, 2001.]

08:24:38 a.m. “Radio transmission partially unintelligible from an **unknown origin** was heard over the ZBW (Boston) radio.” [FAA SUMMARY OF AIR TRAFFIC HIJACK EVENTS REPORT. SEPT. 17, 2001. RELEASED 2005 (FOIA).]

08:24:44 a.m. Microphone keyed 3 times “we have some planes. . .” [[RUTGERS LAW REVIEW](#) FULL AUDIO TRANSCRIPT.]

08:24:57 a.m. “Radio transmission partially unintelligible stated ‘nobody move; everything will be ok. . .’” from an **unknown origin** was heard over the ZBW (Boston) radio. [A) FAA SUMMARY OF AIR TRAFFIC HIJACK EVENTS REPORT. SEPT. 17, 2001. RELEASED 2005 (FOIA); B) [RUTGERS LAW REVIEW](#) FULL AUDIO TRANSCRIPT.]

08:33 a.m. “**Unverified source** transmits, believed to be hijacker.” [FAA ACCIDENT REPORT, NOV. 13, 2001.]

08:33:59 a.m. “Radio transmission partially unintelligible stated ‘nobody move please; we are going back to the airport. . .’ from an **unknown origin** was heard over the ZBW (Boston) radio.” [FAA SUMMARY OF AIR TRAFFIC HIJACK EVENTS REPORT. SEPT. 17, 2001. RELEASED 2005 (FOIA).]

Bill Peacock, the FAA Director of Air Traffic Services, claimed they “didn’t know where the transmission came from, what was said, and who said it.”²⁸ David Canoles, the FAA’s Manager of Air Traffic Evaluations & Investigations, stated “the broadcast wasn’t attributed to a flight. Nobody gave a flight number.”²⁹ Craig Marquis, the American Air Lines Manager on duty at Operations Center in Fort Worth, Texas, was interviewed by the FBI; he tells them that there was “arguing over the microphone,” whilst someone keyed the microphone. ATCs were hearing a statement to the effect of “either turn back or we’ll kill you.” These words were never heard on a tape that the FBI released, which is inserted in their FBI flash-card presentation. “The pilot,” Craig Marquis said, “apparently keyed the microphone at some point during these events thereby allowing ATC to hear part of what was happening.”

Peculiarly enough, Craig Marquis’s description and Air Traffic Operations Manager Terry Biggio’s version of what was going on in the cockpit of American 11 is corroborated by an article written by a staff writer of *The Christian Science Monitor*, on September 13, 2001. The article reports Captain John Ogonowski “stayed at the helm of hijacked Flight 11 much of the way from Boston to New York, sending surreptitious radio transmissions to authorities on the ground as he flew.” Further down the article reports on interviewing some

²⁸ Website: History Commons. Accessed 2014.

http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=pete_zalewski

²⁹ *Washington Times*, September 11, 2002. Accessed 2010.

<http://web.archive.org/web/20020916222620/www.washtimes.com/september11/americans.htm>

of the ATCs involved and were told that “the button was being pushed intermittently most of the way to New York,” an action attributed to Captain Ogonowski. “He wanted us to know something was wrong. When he pushed the button and the terrorist spoke, we knew. There was this voice that was threatening the pilot, and it was clearly threatening.”³⁰

The article also reports what Craig Marquis had told the FBI, that there was “arguing over the microphone,” from the keyed in microphone of the cockpit. “During these transmissions, the pilot’s voice and the heavily accented voice of a hijacker were clearly audible. At other times, the transmission was clear, but exactly what was happening in the cockpit was confused.”

A simpler story was told by the Commission: “At 8:21, one of the American employees receiving Ong’s call in North Carolina, Nydia Gonzalez, alerted the American Airlines operations center in Fort Worth, Texas, reaching Craig Marquis, the manager on duty. Marquis soon realized this was an emergency and instructed the airline’s dispatcher responsible for the flight to contact the cockpit. At 8:23, the dispatcher tried unsuccessfully to contact the aircraft. Six minutes later, the air traffic control specialist in American’s operations center contacted the FAA’s Boston Air Traffic Control Center about the flight. The center was already aware of the problem.”

Because it was not unusual for an airliner to lapse into radio silence, “often there were 5 to 20 minute lapses in communication,” and despite “the combination of circumstance (NORAC, no transponder, serious deviation off course) was infrequent,” it was still “unusual to call this to the attention of the ‘aisle supervisor’ (area supervisor).” [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM

³⁰ *The Christian Science Monitor*: “Controllers’ tale of Flight 11,” by Mark Clayton. September 13, 2001. Accessed 2014.
<http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/0913/p1s2-usju.html>

(MFR04016790): TEAM 8 INTERVIEW: DANIEL D. BUENO, TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT SUPERVISOR, BOSTON CENTER, SEPT. 22, 2003.]

What American 11 did to alert they were hijacked and get the attention of the Boston Traffic Control Tower, was to send radio transmissions. This explanation is corroborated by Air Traffic Controllers; one being Toby Miller who was the General Duties Traffic Manager (Area C) at Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center. Miller acknowledged American 11 was in some distress due to its course deviation, which is “a factor that calls for a higher level of concern.” But without a “tip off” from the pilot, Miller explained, that the aircraft is being hijacked, “it would not be in an ATC’s ability to distinguish definitively that a plane had been hijacked.” [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR04016795): TEAM 8 INTERVIEW: TOBY MILLER, GENERAL DUTIES TRAFFIC MANAGER (AREA C) AT BOSTON AIR ROUTE TRAFFIC CONTROL CENTRE, SEPT. 22, 2003.]

This fact is also confirmed by Air Traffic Operations Manager Terry Biggio at Boston ARTCC Regional Operations Center. “Biggio and [sic- should be “had”] never experienced such a serious deviation before as was the case with American Air 11. The combination of the three factors -NaRDO, no transponder, course deviation- when applied to AA11, were enough for Biggio to deem it necessary to contact ROC. But, without the threatening communication from the cockpit, he doubts AA11 would have been recognized or labeled a hijack.” [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR00401680): TEAM 8 INTERVIEW: TERRY BIGGIO AIR TRAFFIC OPERATIONS MANAGER AT BOSTON ARTCC REGIONAL OPERATIONS CENTRE, SEPT. 22, 2003.]

If remembered, within Betty Ong’s 4-minute recorded call, there is no mention of a hijacking; this is corroborated by the above given statements that without the cockpit crew tipping off they were hijacked, American 11 would not have been “labeled a hijack”.

American 11's ATC Pete Zalewski's action, to turn on the overhead microphone within Boston Tower so all ATCs heard these unverified radio transmissions, was seen as a negative act by one colleague who is Jonathan Schiappani, the Operations Supervisor in Area C. The latter felt "this contributed to the emotional stress of the Air Traffic Controllers." [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR004016800): TEAM 8 INTERVIEW: JONATHAN SCHIAPPANI OPERATIONS SUPERVISOR (AREA C) BOSTON AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL CENTER, SEPT. 22, 2003.] According to a *USAToday* article, Pete Zalewski was "the same controller [who] handled Egypt Air Flight 990 when it crashed off the coast of Massachusetts in 1999."³¹

When the Commission Staff interviewed Zalewski, he told them he put the radio transmissions on loudspeaker, if you will, "so that everyone else could experience what he was experiencing and to generate a sense of urgency which he felt did not exist." But his explanation has two consequences.

First, Zalewski demotes his colleagues' sense of urgency. Second, as we shall see, the Captain of United 175 also heard the radio transmission and Zalewski knew this at the time since he asks the pilot if he also heard the transmission.

In regards to the actual radio transmissions from American 11, Robert Jones the Quality Assurance Officer at Boston Air Control reported the microphone was not keyed by Captain John Ogonowski to "covertly" inform "authorities of the hijack." Jones explained how after the attacks on the day of, he "assisted an FBI audio analyst in copying the recordings. The FBI analyst informed that in [the] analysis of the recording, he could pick up spit in the speech patterns of the hijackers being recorded smacking the microphone. It was the FBI analyst's

³¹ *USAToday*: "FAA employee: Hijacked jets almost collided." September 14, 2001. Cashed at "newsmine.org." <http://newsmine.org/content.php?ol=9-11/911-flight-controller-handled-egypt-air-flight-990.txt>

definitive conclusion that the hijackers were in position of the cockpit, and speaking directly, into the microphone, at the time of the recording.” [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR04016793): TEAM 8 INTERVIEW: ROBERT JONES, QUALITY ASSURANCE OFFICER AT BOSTON AIR CONTROL, SEPTEMBER 22, 2003.]

This information will clash with what Craig Marquis and Terry Biggio had said and also what the article in *The Christian Science Monitor* wrote, which was picked up by *USAToday*.³² Regardless, the Commission Staff summed up that Biggio declared American 11 a hijacked aircraft (“based on cockpit communications”) at 08:25 a.m. Five minutes later, the FBI was informed, because as Vanessa Minter, an American Air Line Reservation Agent on duty that morning stated, five minutes into the call with Betty, the FBI arrived and “pulled” her off the call. [WRAL, CAPITOL BROADCASTING COMPANY, INC.: INTERVIEW WITH VANESSA MINTER, SEPT 10, 2011.]³³

The above researched information shows that two versions circulate on how exactly the FAA confirmed American 11 a hijack. One version, corroborated by ATC employees, is that Captain John Ogonowski keyed the microphone as an intrusion in the cockpit was in progress. This was denied by the Commission. The other version is what the FBI declared to have happened and subsequently reported by the Commission. And that is, that Atta turned off the transponder then radioed two threatening transmissions heard by Boston Air Traffic Control.

There is no further information to substantiate either version was the correct version. This again is a difficulty for the historian to actually pinpoint what actually happened.

³² *USAToday*: “FAA employee: Hijacked jets almost collided.” September 14, 2001. Cashed at “newsmine.org.”

<http://newsmine.org/content.php?ol=9-11/911-flight-controller-handled-egypt-air-flight-990.txt>

³³ <http://www.wral.com/news/local/video/10111135/>

Near Midair Collision: The FAA report that in order to lessen the probabilities for civilian aircraft colliding with each other, a few security navigational aids are provided.

Incident Type	Year	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Year Total
Near Midair Collisions	2000	14	16	26	17	24	20	26	26	20	22	12	17	240
	2001	11	16	18	14	29	25							113

[Administrator's Fact Book](#)

July 2001

The Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) is designed to detect an aircraft that is at collision risk. When a collision is detected, TCAS issues a Traffic Advisory (TA) alert to advise positions, and a Resolution Advisory (RA) command to avoid collision. These collision risk systems are installed in a passenger aircraft where they “interrogate” the transponders of all nearby aircraft and obtain their distance and altitude from the replies received.

When a transponder is turned off, TCAS cannot “interrogate” nearby aircraft through their distance and altitude with a consequence of leaving that particular aircraft -without a transponder on- at risk to collide with other aircrafts. Of course there is a solution to avoid collisions when transponders are off, and this is where ATCs take over.

The Commission has not questioned the point on why three airliners (Americans 11 and 77 including United 93) would turn off their aircraft transponders, if the aircrafts could still be traced and would also endanger the operation by colliding with other aircraft, and into themselves. It would have been very interesting to hear the Commissions’ point of view.

08:13 a.m. American 11 does not respond to Boston Air Traffic Control. [\[FAA ACCIDENT REPORT, NOVEMBER 13, 2001.\]](#)

08:13:30 a.m. “Crew subsequently turned transponder off.” [\[BOSTON AIR TRAFFIC OPERATIONS MANAGER, TERRY BIGGIO.\]](#)

08:20 a.m. Boston ATC Pete Zalewski (radar sector 46) sees transponder “shut off.” [\[NBC NEWS - SEPTEMBER 9, 2006.\]](#)

08:21 a.m. “Radar stations stop receiving transponder returns.” [NTSB FLIGHT STUDY, FEBRUARY 19, 2002.]


By turning off the aircraft’s transponder, the suspected hijack pilot of American 11 commandeers his weapon of mass destruction into a near midair collision with United 175: At 08:36 a.m., “The two hijacked jets that demolished the World Trade Center nearly crashed into each other while heading to their target, according to an FAA employee at a regional control center. ‘The two aircraft got too close to each other down by Stewart International Airport in New Windsor, N.Y. about 55 miles north of New York City,’ the employee told *The Telegraph* of Nashua.”³⁴

The near midair collision of American 11 with United 175 took place over Stewart Army Subpost, otherwise known as STAS, located in New Windsor, 60 miles North of New York City off Interstate 87 near Newburgh. According to Major General Paul Weaver, Director of the Air National Guard, “there was no notification” for them “to launch airplanes,” to intercept any of the two planes

³⁴ *USAToday*: “FAA employee: Hijacked jets almost collided.” September 14, 2001.
<http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2001/09/13/investigate-collide.htm>

that flew over his base that morning that nearly collided into each other. “We weren’t even close,” he concluded.³⁵


For a flight path animated graphic of this near midair collision, a link can be found [here](#), courtesy of [flightexplorer.com](#).



NTSB Flight Path Study
February 15, 2002.

³⁵ National Guard: “Fighters raced after 2 airliners-Runaway airliners were simply too far to be caught.” September 16, 2001. Accessed 2011.
http://web.archive.org/web/20020606023303/http://www.staugustine.com/stories/091601/ter_0916010027.shtml

Total Fatalities: The passenger capacity of a Boeing 767-200ER is 181 according to [Boeing's 767 Family Chart](#).



›Chart [@Boeing](#)

Image use is in accordance with [Title 17 USC Section 107](#) (“fair use”)

The passenger manifest for American 11 was “locked out” by Craig Marquis the American Air Line System Operations Control Manager. From that point there were only a few Air Line personnel that could access passenger information. The ATC never had access to the flight manifest. [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFRO4020035): TEAMS 7+8 VISIT AMERICAN AIR LINES SYSTEMS OPERATION CENTRE (INTERVIEW WITH PERSONNEL), APRIL 26, 2004.] [FOR A COMPLETE LIST OF PASSENGERS, SEE APPENDIX H]

The flight in question had 98 individuals that reserved a seat, whereas only 81 were actual passengers; 17 were non-show. [CONDON & FORSYTH LLP, MARCH 15, 2004, UPON COMMISSION REQUESTS, FEB. 03, 2004.]

9/11 CR: “On September 11, Captain John Ogonowski and First Officer Thomas McGuinness piloted the Boeing 767. It carried its full capacity of nine flight attendants. Eighty-one passengers boarded the flight with them (including the five terrorists).”

Captain Cabin Crew	1
First Officer Cabin Crew	1
Flight Attendants Aircraft Crew	9
Passengers	76
“Hijackers”	5
<u>TOTAL FATALITIES</u>	<u>92</u>

The FBI conducted an investigation on September 17, 2001, regarding American 11’s non-show passengers. The investigation report was entitled “PENTTBOMB MC18200” and was issued on September 23, 2001. The Dallas FBI constructed a database (11/77 Database) containing “all available information on those persons with reservations or noted on the manifests” for American 11 on the day of. The referenced database reflected persons actually aboard the flight; persons who made reservations and were not physically aboard the flights (the non-shows); and, those persons who cancelled reservations prior to departure (the cancellations).

The airline information obtained by the FBI indicated, “82 persons were on board the aircraft.” We may assume the report was dealing only with passengers not including 11 members of the Cabin/Flight Crew. If so, this would be minus 1 fatal passenger than what the Commission reported.

Information obtained from AA reservation records indicated 164 reservations made for AA flight 11 departing Boston, MA on 09/11/2001. Of the 164 reservations made, 65 persons canceled their reservations prior to departure, 82 persons were on board the aircraft, and 17 persons were no shows.

›9/11 Commission Task Force File
 “PENTTBOMB MAJOR CASE 18200: NY.”
 October 2, 2001.

The “PENTTBOMB MAJOR CASE 18200: NY” Report extract (above) mentions “82 persons were onboard;” this also contradicts the official FBI flash-card presentation, which gives 81 persons onboard. ³⁶

The FAA and Department of Transportation (DoT) Accident Report of November 13, 2001, record 81 fatalities in their “passenger data” section. We may assume they did not include 11 members of the Cabin/Flight Crew. If so, this would be in agreement with the Commission findings.

7. PASSENGER DATA: (If available, list names, addresses, extent of injuries, and other information on continuation sheet.)	NUMBER ABOARD AIRCRAFT	81	NUMBER UNIN- JURED	0	NUMBER INJURED	0	NUMBER FATAL- ITIES	81
8. AIRCRAFT DAMAGE: Destroyed	World Trade Center North Tower Destroyed							
10. OPERATING STATUS OF NAVIGATIONAL AIDS/LIGHTS/COMMUNICATIONS: Normal								

›Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) | Department of Transportation (DoT)
Accident Report, November 13, 2001

The NTSB released a docket numbered DCA01MA060 on March 7, 2006, pertaining to the “accident” of American 11 and its “probable cause.” It clearly explains that due to the September 11th attacks being under the jurisdiction of the FBI, the NTSB generated all its reports “under the control of the FBI.” This would mean that any lists and/or reports generated from the NTSB would coincide with FBI data.

The docket below coincides with the number of fatalities the Commission reported: “Injuries: 92 Fatal.” It does not coincide with the FBI’s “PENTTBOMB” report that states 93 fatalities.

³⁶ As an additional peculiarity, the FBI note 7 individuals reserved seats through the same travel agency in Pakistan, India. The agency name and address was redacted, but the 9/11 Commission reported this agency to be “Intervia Travel Agency.” The FBI followed up their investigation with the travel agency, but we have no information of the result. The 7 peculiar non-shows were: Cooper K, Cooper S, Cooper A, Cooper P, Noris E, Noris O, and Noris W.

NTSB Identification: **DCA01MA060.**

The docket is stored in the Docket Management System (DMS). Please contact [Records Management Division](#).
 Scheduled 14 CFR operation of American Airlines
 Accident occurred Tuesday, September 11, 2001 in New York City, NY
 Probable Cause Approval Date: 3/7/2006
 Aircraft: Boeing 767-200ER, registration: N334AA
 Injuries: 92 Fatal.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 are under the jurisdiction of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Safety Board provided requested technical assistance to the FBI, and this material generated by the NTSB is under the control of the FBI. The Safety Board does not plan to issue a report or open a public docket.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

The Safety Board did not determine the probable cause and does not plan to issue a report or open a public docket. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 are under the jurisdiction of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Safety Board provided requested technical assistance to the FBI, and any material generated by the NTSB is under the control of the FBI.

[Full narrative available](#)

[Index for Sep2001](#) | [Index of months](#)

›NTSB Docket DCA01MA060
 March 7, 2006.

From the Air Line official counsel, Condon & Forsyth LLP, on September 11th in 2001, nine (9) First Class passengers, nineteen (19) Business Class passengers, and fifty-three (53) Coach Class passengers were reported to have boarded American 11. “American’s identification of a ‘no-show’ includes anyone with an active reservation who does not board the aircraft. However, no-shows do not include people who ‘misconnect,’ meaning that they fail to board their connecting flight. American is able to provide the following historical no-show data for AA Flight 11 in 2001: Number of no-shows for AA Flight 11 on 9/11/01: **17**; average number of no-shows for AA Flight 11 during 2001: **7.2**; average number of no-shows for AA Flight 11 on Tuesdays during 2001: **9.0**.” [CONDON & FORSYTH LLP, MARCH 15, 2004, UPON COMMISSION REQUESTS FEB. 03, 2004.] During 2001, American operated “AA Flight 11, 221 times and had 17 or more no-shows on 13 of those flights.” [CONDON & FORSYTH LLP, MARCH 15, 2004, UPON COMMISSION REQUESTS FEB. 03, 2004.]

Putting in comparison all the above statistics and data, here is what generates:-

81 Passengers onboard American 11 *not including crew/including “hijackers”*

--Condon & Forsyth LLP

--9/11 Commission Report

--FBI flash-card presentation

--Federal Aviation Administration / Department of Transportation

--National Transportation Safety Board

82 Passengers onboard American 11 *not including crew/including “hijackers”*

--FBI “PENTTBOMB” Report

Suspected hijackers onboard American 11

No.	Seat	Name	NOTES
1	8D	Mohamed Atta “hijack pilot”	No mention from Ong & Sweeney that he participated in the hijack
2	8G	Abdul al-Omari “muscle hijacker”	No mention from Ong & Sweeney that he participated in the hijack
3	10B	Satam al-Suqami “muscle hijacker”	Ong & Sweeney said he participated in the hijack
4-5	2A	Wail and Waleed al-Shehri “muscle hijackers”	Ong & Sweeney said they participated in the hijack

Air Flight Crew List

- **ARESTEGUI BARBARA - Flight Attendant Position 5 | First Class**

A 39-year-old Los Angeles Californian, who lived in Marstons Mills, Massachusetts.

Barbara was assigned to the forward right jump seat (1R Center), which was in the forward galley between the cockpit and First Class cabin. During departure she would be located in the forward galley and during the video safety demonstration she would monitor Zone A and assist in the manual safety demonstration towards the left hand side of the aircraft. Her service area was the forward galley and the First Class aisle. When deplaning she would be located at Zone A.

Barbara Arestegui was injured (“stabbed”) as related by Betty Ong.

- **COLLMAN JEFFREY - Flight Attendant Position 6**

42-years-old born in Yorkville, Illinois, who lived in Novato, California.

Jeffrey would be assigned to the middle left jump seat (2L) located in the middle galley within the main cabin. His responsibilities included relieving flight attendant number three during boarding position, cabin check of Zone A at departure, and during a video safety demonstration monitor Zone A relieving flight attendant number four in Zone A on the right hand side during a manual safety demonstration. Jeffrey’s service area included the main cabin and first class. When deplaning he would be located in Zones B and C.

The FBI reported Jeffrey had a domestic partner, Keith Alan Bradkowski; their relationship had been from 1999. Jeffrey’s partner informed the FBI that

his partner used to carry a “black carry-on bag by Travelpro and a standard issued black flight crew bag, which ‘looks like a large lunch box.’” [FBI INTERVIEW KEITH ALAN BRADKOWSKI, SEPT. 22, 2001.]

One of Jeffrey Collman’s bags was identical to one of Atta’s “left behind luggage,” which was “a brand name Travelpro pull-along suitcase, black in color.” [9/11 COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR04016228).]

- LOW SARA - Flight Attendant Position 7

29-years-old born in Batesville, Arkansas, who lived in Boston, Massachusetts.

Sara was assigned to the middle right jump seat (2R) in the middle galley within the main cabin. Her responsibilities included a boarding position of Zone B on the left hand side, cabin check departure of Zone B on the left hand side. During the video safety demonstrations, Sara monitored Zone B; and during a manual safety demonstration, she was located in Zone 8 on the left hand side. Sara’s service area included business class on the left hand side. When deplaning she would be located at Zone C.

- MARTIN KAREN Flight Attendant Position 1 | First Class

41-years-old born in Beverly, Massachusetts, and lived in Danvers.

Karen was assigned to the forward left jump seat (1L) located between the First Class cabin and the cockpit entrance. She was responsible for verifying all cabin emergency equipment. Karen’s preflight position was Zone A (first class) and Zone B (business class), boarding and departure position was Zone A, she armed the front left and right doors. She was the crewmember who used the

P.A. system to inform the passengers of the safety features of the aircraft and assisted all cabins with their duties.

Being a purser, Karen would verify and deposit all the money from the sale of headsets, movies, and liquor and forms. When deplaning she would be located at the entry door. She also had the responsibility to clip/take boarding passes from the passengers as they entered for boarding.

Karen Martin was injured (“stabbed”) as related by Betty Ong.

- MCGUINNESS THOMAS F. - Co-Pilot

42-years-old born in Burlington, Massachusetts, and lived in Portsmouth, New Hampshire. ³⁷ He flew F-14 fighters for the Navy.

- NICOSIA KATHLEEN - Flight Attendant Position 2

54-years-old born in South Bend, Indiana, who lived in Winthrop, Massachusetts.

Kathleen was assigned to the left jump seat (3L) at the back of the aircraft. This was the Flight Attendant that Wayne Kirk, Air Line cleaning crewmember, saw “near the rear galley and the captain was outside checking the landing gear. [FBI INTERVIEW: WAYNE KIRK, MEMBER OF THE AMERICAN AIRLINES CLEANING CREW, SEPT. 12, 2001.] This occurred at 07:30 a.m., when Kirk had finished his cleaning duties on the aircraft.

Kathleen’s responsibilities included checking emergency equipment on the left hand side in Zone B (business class) and Zone C (main cabin, coach). Her preflight position was to remain within five rows of last seat on the right and

³⁷ Remember September 11, 2001.

<http://www.legacy.com/Sept11/Story.aspx?PersonID=91730&location=3>

left hand side, her boarding position was the back galley, and to assist Zone C. Her departure position was the back galley and Zone C on the right hand side. Kathleen armed the rear doors on the left and right hand side of the aircraft. When deplaning she would be located at the back of the aircraft on the left hand side.

- OGONOWSKI JOHN A. - Captain (pilot)

50-years-old born in Lowell, Massachusetts, who lived in Dracut. He was an Air Force fighter pilot in Vietnam and joined American Airlines in 1978.

- ONG BETTY | Flight Attendant

Betty's responsibilities included checking emergency equipment in Zones B and C. Her boarding position was Zone A, assisting at the door, if flight attendant six was onboard she would pull the tickets. Betty was to check Zone B and C on the left hand side at departure for the safety demonstration area and would operate the video monitor in Zone C; if it was a manual safety demonstration she would be on the right hand side of Zone B and C, her service area would be the main cabin. When deplaning she would be located at the back of the aircraft.

- ROGER JEAN - Flight Attendant Position 8

24-years-old born in San Diego, California who lived in Longmeadow, Massachusetts.

Jean was assigned to the forward left jump seat (1L Center) in the forward galley. Her responsibilities included a boarding position of Zone B on the right

hand side, cabin check of Zone B on the right hand side at departure. During the video safety demonstration she would relieve flight attendant number three, and monitor Zone C; during a manual safety demonstration she would relieve flight attendant number 2 and be in Zone C on the left hand side. Jean's service area was the main cabin, so when deplaning she would be located at the middle of Zone C.

Jean Roger was a replacement for Halle Cameron.

- SNYDER DIANNE - Flight Attendant Position 4

42-years-old born in New Haven, Connecticut, and lived in Westport Point, Massachusetts.

Dianne was assigned to the mid-galley jump seat (2R) with responsibilities to checking emergency equipment for Zone A on the left and right hand side. Her boarding position would be located in the mid galley and to assist Zone B; at departure she would be located in the mid galley and Zone B on the right hand side. During the safety demonstration, Dianne would monitor Zone B, and during a manual safety demonstration she would have been located at Zone A on the right hand side. When deplaning Dianne would be located in Zone B, C.

- SWEENEY MADELEINE

Madeleine would be located at boarding position Zone C and to cabin check departure of Zone C. During the video safety demonstration, she would relieve flight attendant number 3 and monitor Zone C; and during the manual safety demonstration she would relieve flight attendant number 2 in Zone C on the

left hand side. Madeleine's service area included the main cabin. When deplaning she would be located in the back of Zone C.

Weapons Onboard: The only claim from Flight Attendant Madeleine Sweeney to be denied by the FAA and the American Air Line officials is in regards to a shooting. They will suggest instead that the passenger, Daniel C. Lewin, that Madeleine claimed to be a hijacker (always according to Michael Woodward) was not shot but stabbed to death by "muscle hijacker" Satam al-Suqami.

[U] As they received information from the 10th floor and field units, they posted information on butcher paper hung on the walls of the room. Anderson remembers taking a call from a "male voice" who relayed a report about a shooting on board one of the hijacked flights. She is not sure whether the voice was someone from the 10th floor or elsewhere. She is not sure whether this was the original reporting of the shooting to FAA or whether it was a second-hand report to the working room. She remembers that some thought this was "holy shit" news. She remembers not being surprised if the gun story was true because there may have been a member of law enforcement on board.

COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR04017272)

Team 7 INTERVIEW with Penny Anderson

FAA Civil Aviation Security Official, December 18, 2003.

›FAA Field Unit Report, December 18, 2003.

What was not clarified by the Commission Staff about Penny Anderson's statement, is on what she reported when not being surprised of hearing about "the gun story" and if it was true or not, "because there may have been a member of law enforcement onboard" American 11. In an official capacity, there has been no released information if an Air Marshal was onboard the flight on the morning of. [ALSO SEE AVIATION PARTICULARS: RULES & REGULATIONS]

The only comment the Commission Staff state is that Mrs. Anderson "was not tasked to follow up on the story and heard nothing more about it." But there were additional sources reporting a shooting onboard American 11 on

the morning of September 11th; these claims were coming from the FAA Washington Operation Center (WOC), and the Boston Operations Center. None have been refuted.

American Airlines Flight 11, departed today from Boston Logan International Airport (BOS), bound for Los Angeles International Airport (LAX). The aircraft type was a Boeing 767-200 with eighty-one passengers, nine flight attendants and two crew in the cockpit, which totaled 92 persons on this flight. At approximately 9:18 a.m., it was reported that the two crew members in the cockpit were stabbed. The flight then descended with no communication from the flight crew members. The American Airlines FAA Principal Security Inspector (PSI) was notified by Suzanne Clark of American Airlines Corporate Headquarters, that an on board flight attendant contacted American Airlines Operations Center and informed that a passenger located in seat 10B shot and killed a passenger in seat 9B at 9:20 a.m. The passenger killed was Daniel Lewin, shot by passenger Satam Al Suqami. One bullet was reported to have been fired.

*please
get this
confirmed
check*

›FAA Memo: Passenger Shot on Flight AA11

**Chronology ADA-30, Operations Center
Terrorist Attacks NY-DC 9/11/01**

TIME	Remarks
0835	Received call ANE/Barry of possible hijack AAL11, B767, Bos-Lax, pilot keying mike and intruder in cockpit," stating Don't move or I'll kill you.
0836	ACI/Smith conf with ANE ROC and command center.
0840	Received via conf with ANE/ROC Acft heading toward JFK.
0842	Via conference with ANE ROC reported a flight attendant has been stabbed.
0844	Via conference with ANE ROC reportedly a passenger had been shot.
0845	Received a report via conf with ANE ROC that an aircraft had hit the World Trade Center in New York City.

›Boston Operations Center Report, September 11, 2001.

We uncovered a phone call received by the FAA Washington Operation Center (WOC) reporting a shooting aboard American Airlines Flight 11. The WOC, a 24-hour operations center located in a room adjacent to the ACC, received the report of a shooting at 8:44 a.m. on September 11, 2001. The WOC never reported this information to FAA security personnel in the ACC.

›FAA Washington Operation Centre (WOC) Report, July 8, 2004.

Mike Morse, FAA National Security Coordination Staffer (FAA Headquarters in Washington), was interviewed by the Commission Staff. He recalled “Riffe [Principal Security Inspector for American Air Lines] was talking to all of the air carriers that day, not just American. Morse recalled that Riffe, at the time, indicated to Longmire that, ‘I think I got’ the information on the gun, indicating some uncertainty on her part. In subsequent discussion, American Air Lines denied they were the source of the information.” [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR03010901): TEAM 7 INTERVIEW: MIKE MORSE THE FAA NATIONAL SECURITY COORDINATION STAFFER IN FAA HQ, WASHINGTON, SEPT. 25, 2003.]

The FAA Administrator Jane Garvey informed Morse that she never saw the briefing book report on gun usage and he speculated that someone within FAA “pulled it off the hard drive and leaked it to the media.”

The GAO Office of Special Investigations did an investigation on the gun issue Morse recalled; he said the FAA had received a written response from them concluding that a gun onboard Flight 11 “was highly unlikely,” given the information their investigators were able to uncover. What this information was has not been revealed by the Commission or their Staff members.

Another source came from an ex-employee of FAA’s “Red Team,” ³⁸ Bogdan Dzakovic. [SEE AVIATION PARTICULARS: RULES & REGULATIONS]

As regards to knives and/or box-cutters taken aboard American 11, Monte Belger, Deputy Administrator of the FAA, remembered there was speculation at the time that the weapons must have been planted by ground personnel for the hijackers, “because the security folks didn’t believe that the hijackers could have succeeded in getting through four different checkpoint operations with weapons. Belger stated that he was not aware of any evidence to give credence to the notion that weapons were planted or that an insider

³⁸ When applied to intelligence work, red-teaming is sometimes called “alternative analysis.”

participated.” [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR04017272): TEAM 7 INTERVIEW: MONTE BELGER, FORMER DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR OF THE FAA AT THE GSA COMMISSION OFFICE, NOV. 24, 2003.]

On the other hand, U.S. Army Lieutenant General Mike Canavan, who was FAA Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security (ACS-1), assumed that the “terrorists” wouldn’t have tried to bring prohibited items through checkpoints because this action would have jeopardized “the entire plot unnecessarily.” He really didn’t know however if “the FBI sufficiently examined the people working at the airport who could have planted weapons.” [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR040117207): TEAM 7 INTERVIEW: LT. GENERAL MIKE CANAVAN, FORMER FAA ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY (ACS-1), NOV. 04, 2003.]

Though Canavan’s saying that the “terrorists” wouldn’t have tried to bring prohibited items through checkpoints because this action would have jeopardized “the entire plot unnecessarily,” is probable, it does not step on the boundaries of truth. Not only Atta commandeered his weapon of mass destruction to an almost mid air collision with United 175, but United 175 did the same with four other aircraft; and, United 93 did the same with another aircraft. The only aircraft that did not jeopardize “the entire plot unnecessarily,” was American 77 responsible for the demise of the Pentagon facility.³⁹ It is a fact of the day, which is extremely interesting.

A former security director at the FAA, Billie H. Vincent, stated to the press: “To have three successful operations at three separate airports without getting

³⁹ Chic Burlingame was captain of American Airlines Flight 77. Burlingame was a graduate of the Naval Academy and honor graduate of the Navy “Top Gun” school, in Miramar, California. He flew F-4 Phantoms for the Navy, where he landed the fighter jets on aircraft carriers in stormy conditions. He then left the Navy in 1979 to join American Airlines.

caught suggests some inside involvement.” [*MIAMI HERALD*, “EXPERT TELLS OF INSIDE HELP,” BY DAVID KIDWELL, SEPT. 12, 2001: CACHED BY 911RESEARCH.] ⁴⁰

Airworthiness of American 11: American 11 was withdrawn from use and stored (temporarily or permanently stored withdrawn from use) on December 20, 2013, at Roswell Industrial Air Center as reported by two sources. The first is from [Plainspotters](#) and the second source is from [Airport IQ](#).

BOEING 767-223ER

Aircraft delivery: August 14, 1986

First Flight: July 22, 1986

Fleet number: 324

Engines: 2 x General Electric CF6-80A2

Configured: F10C30Y128

Passenger seating configuration: Typical 3-class 181 persons

Typical 2-class 224 persons

Typical 1-class up to 255 persons

Typical Cruise Speed: 35,000 feet/Mach 0.80 (530 mph, 851 kph)

Cargo load: 3,180 cu ft (90.1 cu m)

Maximum Range: 6,385 nmi (12,195 km)

Interior Cabin Width: 15 ft 6 in (4.7 m)

Maximum Takeoff Weight: 395,000 lb (179,170 kg)

Wing Span: 156 ft 1 in (47.6 m)

Overall Length: 159 ft 2 in (48.5 m)

Tail Height: 52 ft (15.8 m)

Transponder Model: MODE S 2 HONEYWELL 066-01127-1301

⁴⁰ http://911research.wtc7.net/cache/planes/analysis/herald_091201.htm

Tail Number: 324

EGPWS: Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning
System [\[Aviation Week\]](#)

Departed: Boston-Logan International Airport

Terminal: B

Gate: 32

Right Runway No.: 4


Passenger screening responsibility: American Air Lines

Passenger screening duties: Globe Security ⁴¹

Passenger Checkpoint 1: North Main B5

Passenger Checkpoint 2: Middle B4 (opened at 07:15 a.m.)

Airport Closed-Circuit Television: None



©[Boeing](#) | 767 family

⁴¹ Globe Security also had screening duties at Jetport Airport in Maine, Portland.

American Air Lines

The Air Line Company

“Checkpoint screener performance and the detection rate of prohibited items at airport checkpoints were spotty, and these weaknesses were widely known.”

Commission Staff Report

August 26, 2004.

In August 2001, “the airline industry experienced what was then a record high in the number of airline passengers for a given month when 65.4 million travelers took to the air.”⁴² In addition, employment for network and low-cost carriers stood at 534,767 in July of 2001.⁴³ But the company was also “definitely concerned about fines,” Janet Riffe said when interviewed by Commission Staff. Being the FAA Principal Security Inspector for American Air Lines, she was in a position to also say “when she was assigned to be the PSI [Principal Security Inspector] for American, the carrier was involved in a global settlement of its many fines. As part of the settlement, FAA wanted to put out a press release to announce the agreement, but American was adamantly opposed to doing so because the company feared the bad publicity. Riffe stated that FAA General Counsel’s office would negotiate the fines in order to

⁴² Website RITA.

http://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/rita.dot.gov.bts/files/publications/special_reports_and_issue_briefs/issue_briefs/number_13/html/entire.html

⁴³ Employment at network carriers and low-cost carriers based on data from RITA-BTS, OAI, monthly P-1 (a) Form 41. Data are incomplete for regional and other carriers in 2001 and 2002.

avoid having to go to court with the airlines.” [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR04017182): TEAM 7 INTERVIEW: JANET RIFFE, FAA PRINCIPAL SECURITY INSPECTOR FOR AMERICAN AIR LINES, FEB. 26, 2004.]

Pretty much of what Riffe said was corroborated by Bruce Butterworth who was Director for Policy & Planning (ACS-1) at the FAA: “Usually, fines are between the FAA and the air carrier. The two lawyers would hash it out, and ultimately fines were lowered. Fines were lowered as a result of the negotiation settlement. Two things the carriers care about: Where the Air Line was in relation to the rest of the pack (United was always way ahead), and deflecting negative publicity. The longer it took to resolve the issue the colder the trail got on the evidence of the carrier/screener malfeasance which made throwing the book at them difficult.” [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR04017272): TEAM 7 INTERVIEW: BRUCE BUTTERWORTH, FORMER DIRECTOR FOR POLICY & PLANNING (ACS-1) AT THE FAA, SEPT. 29, 2003.]

Another individual interviewed by the Commission Staff in regards to the same matter was Rich Stevens the FAA Security Division Manager for the Northeastern Region. “Stevens stated that American [Air Lines] like to have penalties accumulate and then negotiate them down in a global settlement. As part of this strategy, American would delay the case so it got old, making it harder for the FAA to make its case before an Administrative Law Judge or in court because the trail was cold or the employee had moved on.” [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR04017223): TEAM 7 INTERVIEW: RICH STEVENS, FAA SECURITY DIVISION MANAGER FOR THE NE REGION, MARCH 1, 2004.]

Stevens remembered how “in 1993 nearly 162 cases had been written against AAL [American Air Line] totaling nearly \$6 million in fines. AAL and the FAA negotiated the fine down to \$75,000 [a diminished amount of

\$5,925,000] which FAA agreed to because many of the cases were so old, and therefore difficult to prove.”

Below is an extract from the Commission Team 7 Report, entitled: “Draft Monograph on Civil Aviation & Transportation Security,” presented by Sam Brinkley, William Johnstone, and John Raidt.

U.S. Air Carriers were profit-seeking enterprises that sought to minimize costs, including security expenses, and maximize revenues in order to succeed in a highly competitive business environment in which they had a moral, legal and economic obligation to protect the safety and security of their aircraft and passengers.

U.S. Airports were public hubs of economic activity in competition for air carrier revenues, travel business and customer satisfaction. As such they were, in most instances, high profile venues for both lawbreakers and local law enforcement authorities.

Security Control of Air Traffic and Air Navigation Aids (SCATANA):

11:15 Eastern: New England Region Hqs requested SCATANA. By 12:57 SCATANA is not in effect; need to reassess capabilities.”

14:17 Eastern: “SCATANA still not in effect, but military is approving all flights.”
[FAA’S REPORT “ATC SYSTEM ASSESSMENT, SHUTDOWN, & RESTORATION.” MARCH 21, 2002.]

16:20 Eastern: “SCATANA not approved at this time.”

18:17 Eastern: "Still not in SCATANA yet. Military is approving all flights." ⁴⁴

AFR 60-24/AR 95-21/OPNAVINST 3722.30C/
MCO P3720.1C Attachment 1 25 June 1976

SCATANA
Section IV

IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY CONTROL OF AIR TRAFFIC AND
AIR NAVIGATION AIDS

A. Situation.

Three types of situations may require the implementation of SCATANA.

1. In the first of these, an emergency has arisen which has resulted in the declaration of an Air Defense Emergency within the NORAD area. Under this condition SCATANA will be automatically implemented.

2. In the second situation, which applies only to NORAD, a NORAD region commander may direct implementation of SCATANA for his region when his region or an adjacent region is under attack and Air Defense Emergency has not yet been declared.

3. In the third situation, an emergency has arisen which has resulted in the declaration of a Defense Emergency outside the NORAD area. Under this condition, SCATANA may be considered for implementation.

B. Intention.

To provide for the most effective use of airspace by aircraft of civil and military agencies by:

1. Exercising security control of civil and military aircraft entering, departing or moving within the U.S. areas and their coastal approaches.

2. Selectively limiting air traffic, consistent with air defense requirements.

3. Exercising control over the following air navigation systems: VOR, VORTAC, TACAN and LORAN.

➤AFR 60-24/AR 95-21/OPNAVINST 3722.30C/MCO P3720.1C
Attachment 1, June 25, 1976.

⁴⁴ DoT Office of Inspector General (OIG) -FI-2012-0005- 2011 FOIA release.
http://atccsc.faa.gov/Operations/ATCCSCC_Logs/wkstnl5.east_log

The Security Control of Air Traffic and Air Navigation Aids otherwise known as SCATANA, according to the Departments of the Air Force, the Army, and the Navy Regulation of June 25, 1976, was a “plan prepared jointly by the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of Transportation (DoT), and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).” It was a “basic plan” of activities “that dispatch control, or operate United States military aircraft or provide air navigation aids in the area.”

When SCATANA is implemented, it would provide (a) security control of military and civil air traffic; and (b) control of certain federal and non-federal air navigation aids. When would SCATANA be implemented can clearly be seen in the above given extract (Section IV) of the Departments of the Air Force, the Army, and the Navy Regulation of June 25, 1976.

With SCATANA aviation code activated, all air carriers that incurred losses on September 11, 2001, would be eligible for aviation disaster relief, according to the Public Law 107-42. However, there are numerous sources that doubt if SCATANA was implemented at all when the Transportation Secretary, Norman Mineta, testified it was activated at 09:45 a.m., on the morning of.

Wikipedia states that it was Ben Sliney, the FAA National Operations Manager, who commanded SCATANA to be implemented, and not Secretary Mineta.⁴⁵ In addition, a video, entitled: “New Seconds from Disaster 9/11,”⁴⁶ where about 16:12 minutes into the video, Ben Sliney says: “I gave the order to land all aircraft at the nearest airport, regardless of their destination.” The order Sliney tells of was given after American 77 was involved in the Pentagon incident at 09:43 a.m. But still, SCATANA was not implemented.

⁴⁵ Wikipedia: “Ben Sliney.” Accessed 2014.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ben_Sliney

⁴⁶ Youtube upload: “New Seconds from Disaster 9/11.”

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nscv_S-5pRI

Public Law 107-42
107th Congress

An Act

Sept. 22, 2001
[H.R. 2926]

Air
Transportation
Safety and
System
Stabilization Act.
49 USC 40101
note.

To preserve the continued viability of the United States air transportation system.

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “Air Transportation Safety and
System Stabilization Act”.

TITLE I—AIRLINE STABILIZATION

49 USC 40101
note.
President.
Terrorism.

SEC. 101. AVIATION DISASTER RELIEF.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
the President shall take the following actions to compensate air
carriers for losses incurred by the air carriers as a result of the
terrorist attacks on the United States that occurred on September
11, 2001:

(1) Subject to such terms and conditions as the President
deems necessary, issue Federal credit instruments to air car-
riers that do not, in the aggregate, exceed \$10,000,000,000
and provide the subsidy amounts necessary for such
instruments in accordance with the provisions of the Federal
Credit Reform Act of 1990 (2 U.S.C. 661 et seq.).

(2) Compensate air carriers in an aggregate amount equal
to \$5,000,000,000 for—

(A) direct losses incurred beginning on September 11,
2001, by air carriers as a result of any Federal ground
stop order issued by the Secretary of Transportation or
any subsequent order which continues or renews such a
stoppage; and

(B) the incremental losses incurred beginning Sep-
tember 11, 2001, and ending December 31, 2001, by air
carriers as a direct result of such attacks.

(b) **EMERGENCY DESIGNATION.**—Congress designates the
amount of new budget authority and outlays in all fiscal years
resulting from this title as an emergency requirement pursuant
to section 252(e) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Act of 1985 (2 U.S.C. 901(e)). Such amount shall be avail-
able only to the extent that a request, that includes designation
of such amount as an emergency requirement as defined in such
Act, is transmitted by the President to Congress.

An article in *The Register* of September 17, 2001, written by Thomas C. Greene reported how “the FAA has told *The Register* that navigation aids were not disabled Tuesday, but would not comment further.”⁴⁷

The Airline Operations Center reports that it was the FAA who would not implement SCATANA and this was reported at 14:30 p.m. (Eastern).

1428	AAL ROC return to bldg.
1430	Cusack on duty. Via ADA/Noel FAA is not activating Scatana, not shutting down any nav aids. Commercial flights are not expected to resume until 9/12 after 1200E.
1444	Corcoran, Cusack, Newby, Fawley AWP reports traffic.

›Times shown Eastern Standard Time (EST)

Chronology ADA-30, Operations Center

Terrorist Attacks NY-DC 9/11/01

In [Code One](#) magazine, an article was published in January 2002, reporting the commander at NORAD, Major General Larry Arnold, issued the SCATANA order; “but I believe,” he stated, “the FAA shut down all aircraft from coming into the United States shortly before the SCATANA order was given. The FAA also stopped all air traffic from taking off.”

An article in *Defense Week* magazine suggested SCATANA was not implemented until 2:00 p.m. (Eastern), which would have been 30 minutes earlier than stated in the above Chronology ADA-30, Operations Center report. The article also notes “NORAD issued a ‘notice to airmen’ implementing a modified version of SCATANA approximately five hours after American Airlines Flight 11 slammed into the north tower of the World Trade Center. Although all civilian aircraft were grounded, ground navigation aids were not turned off (as they would have been during a nuclear attack), allowing airliners to safely

⁴⁷ *The Register*, “Did U.S. air emergency procedure aid suicide hijackers? Cold-war-era crisis regulations in doubt,” by Thomas C Greene, September 17, 2001. Accessed 2004.
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2001/09/17/did_us_air_emergency_procedure/

navigate to their new and unexpected destinations.”^{48,49} This “modified version of SCATANA” was ordered by General Ralph Eberhart, Commander in Chief of NORAD on September 11, 2001.⁵⁰ General Eberhart has never been specific to the actual time at which he asked his colleagues to start preparing the modified order.⁵¹

General Ralph Eberhart’s interview

[Washington Post](#)

June 17, 2004

SCATANA is a procedure that, as you say, allows us to take control of the air space. It’s a procedure that was designed, again, to counter the Soviet Union and their long-range bombers. It’s a procedure that if I had tried, and as the people approached me with, ‘Declare SCATANA,’ the problem was that we could not control the air space that day with the radars we had and all the aircraft that were airborne, 4,000 to 5,000 airplanes airborne. So if I suddenly, ‘We’ve got it, we will control the air space,’ we would have had worse problems than we had that morning, because I cannot provide traffic de-confliction like the FAA has.

What mine is designed to do is we see a bomber coming from a long range, we tell everybody to get the aircraft down safely, then nothing flies and we

⁴⁸ History Commons. Accessed 2010.

<http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a091101fbireturns#a1100scatana>

⁴⁹ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists: “This is not a test,” by Stephen I. Schwartz. November/December 2001 edition: Vol. 57, No. 6, pp. 50-51. Accessed 2010.

<http://web.archive.org/web/20020206003112/http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/2001/nd01/nd01schwartz.html>

⁵⁰ The *Washington Post*: “Transcript: 9/11 Commission Hearings for June 17, 2004.” Accessed 2014.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A49429-2004Jun17_5.html

⁵¹ Memorandum for the Record: Interview With CINC NORAD (Commander in Chief NORAD) General Edward “Ed” Eberhart.

<http://media.nara.gov/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00788.pdf>

control the air space. We are prepared to do that. But we're not prepared suddenly to take control of the air space and say, 'We have it,' because now we're talking, in terms of safety and security of air travel, we're talking about a bad situation getting worse.

The other thing, and I have the authority to do that. But I have the authority to do it against an external threat; the second thing that's very important to note, there are procedures in SCATANA that are designed to counter long-range bombers.

For example, we're supposed to turn off all the navigational aids. That morning, the last thing we wanted to do was turn off all the navigational aids. You turn them off so that the enemy bombers can't use them. But we don't want to turn them off so that the airplanes can't land safely. We don't want to turn them off so that law enforcement and 'Flight For Life' can't fly.

So what we did, and you said we executed it, but I think it's very important that we note that when we executed it, we executed a modified SCATANA 6 and that's what I told them is, 'I will execute SCATANA once you have a modified SCATANA that clearly delineates the lines in the road and doesn't cause a bad situation from getting worse.' So our SCATANA said, 'Leave the nav aids on.' Our SCATANA said, 'FAA, you still control the traffic that's flying.' Our SCATANA said, 'Law enforcement and 'Flight For Life' can continue to fly.' We don't want to ground them during this terrible tragedy, and then procedures for getting waivers to fly.

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Noticing again something General Eberhart says, and sounds crucial, is, "SCATANA is a procedure that, as you say, allows us to take control of the air

space. It's a procedure that was designed, again, to counter the Soviet Union and their long-range bombers.” Include the re-read of what the article in *Defense Week* magazine wrote -“...ground navigation aids were not turned off (as they would have been during a nuclear attack)...”- and these reports make a head turn as to why the initial order needed “ground navigation aids” to be turned off. A partial SCATANA would have sufficed, as General Eberhart ordered.

The FAA provides what exact ground navigation aids (NavAids) would have been turned off, if General Eberhart had not intervened. Link is [here](#).

1. Remote Transmitter/Receiver (RTR)

Provides communications between Air Traffic Control Specialists and pilots in the terminal airspace.

2. Tactical Aircraft Control and Navigation (TACAN) at Very High Frequency Omnidirectional Range (VOR) TACAN only (TACR)

TACAN provides Omnidirectional azimuth information primarily for military users of the National Air Space and distance information to all national air space users.

3. Visual Approach Slope Indicator (VASI)

Provides visual approach slope information.

4. Very High Frequency Omnidirectional Range (VOR)

Provides separate am and fm signals to the airborne avionics to determine the azimuth of the aircraft from the VOR site at a given time.

5. Automatic Surface Observation System (ASOS)

ASOS provides weather observations that include temperature, dew point, wind, altimeter setting, visibility, sky condition, and precipitation.

6. Airport Traffic Control Tower (ATCT)

Provides an observation platform from which ATCs direct air and ground traffic for the airport.

7. Glide Scope (GS)

Radiates an electronic signal from an antenna above a reflecting surface. The reflected signal travels to the receiving antenna of incoming aircraft. Pilot uses the reflected radiation signal to fly a prescribed angle of descent to the runway.

8. Localizer (LOC)

Provides horizontal course guidance during an approach procedure. The horizontal guidance information indicates to the pilot of incoming aircraft whether the aircraft is right of, left of, or aligned with the runway centerline.

9. Locator Outer Marker (LOM)

In precision approaches, there may be an NDB collated with the OM. If so, the marker is referred to as the locator outer marker (LOM). Indicates a position at which an aircraft at the appropriate altitude on the localizer course would intercept runway glide slope, and the non-directional beacon (NDB) radiates a signal which provides directional guidance to and from the transmitting antenna.

10. Medium Intensity Approach Lighting System and Runway Alignment Indicator Lights (MALSR)

Provides visual information on runway alignment, height perception, roll guidance, and horizontal references as the FAA standard for category I precision landings.

11. Outer Marker (OM)

Indicates a position at which an aircraft at the appropriate altitude on the localizer course would intercept runway glide slope.

12. Remote Communications RCO

Provides communication between pilots and AFSS for weather and flight plans.

13. Runway End Identifier Lights (REIL)

Provides rapid and positive identification of the end of a runway.

14. Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI)

Furnishes the pilot with visual approach slope information to provide guidance for safe descent.

All of the above NavAids were left on and working due to General Eberhart's intervention on the morning of September 11th in 2001, by ordering the FAA to ground only aircraft and leave NavAids on. Had these NavAids actually been turned off, it is uncertain if there would have been a complete and catastrophic event in the skies of the United States that morning. This is just one of those unprecedented harmful variables that almost cost; and, rarely discussed.

Norman Mineta's testimony at the 9/11 Commission Hearing (2004)

On Tuesday morning, September 11, 2001, I was meeting with the Belgium Transport Minister in my Conference Room adjacent to my office discussing aviation issues. Because of the agenda, FAA Administrator Jane Garvey was also in attendance.

A little after 08:45 my Chief of Staff John Flerady interrupted the meeting; he asked that Administrator Garvey and me to step into my office where he told me that news agencies were reporting that some type of aircraft had flown into one of the towers of New York's WTC. Information was preliminary, so we did not know what kind of aircraft, nor whether or not it was intentional.

John Flerady got to a telephone and contacted the FAA Operations Centre. I asked to be kept informed of any developments and returned to the Conference Room to explain to the Belgium Transport Minister that our meeting might have to be postponed.

In an incident involving a major crash of any type, the office of the Secretary goes into a major information gathering response. It contacts the model administration overseeing whatever mode of transportation is involved in the incident. It monitors press reports; contacts additional personnel to accommodate the surge in operations, and analyzes the information for me through the Chief of Staff. In major incidents, it will follow a protocol of notification that includes the White House and other agencies involved in the incident. These activities albeit in the nascent stage of information gathering took place in these initial minutes.

A few minutes after my return to the Conference Room, my Chief of Staff [Flerady] then again asked me to step back into my office. He then told me that the aircraft was a commercial craft, and that the FAA had received an unconfirmed report that a hijacking of an American airline flight had occurred.

While Mr. Flerady was briefing me, I watched as a large commuter jet [United 175] flew into the second tower of the WTC. [09:02 a.m.] At this point, things began to happen quickly.

Force Majeure: According to the [American Air Line Website](#), an American Air Line flight is cancelled under the following conditions:-

Force Majeure Events

American may, in the event of a force majeure event, without notice, cancel, terminate, divert, postpone or delay any flight or the right of carriage or reservation of traffic accommodations without liability except to issue an involuntary refund. The involuntary refund will be made in the original form of payment in accordance with involuntary refund rules for any unused portion of the ticket. American will also reserve the right to determine if any departure or landing should be made without any liability except the afore mentioned involuntary refund.

Force Majeure Event Means

Any condition beyond American's control including, but without limitation, meteorological conditions, acts of God, riots, civil commotion, embargoes, wars, hostilities, disturbances or unsettled international conditions - actual threatened or reported. Also, because of any delay, demand, circumstances or requirement due, directly or indirectly to such conditions, or any strike, work stoppage, slowdown, lockout or any other labour related dispute involving or affecting American's service, or any government regulation, demand or requirement, or any shortage of labour, fuel or facilities of American or others, or any fact not reasonably foreseen, anticipated or predicted by American.

September 10th

Portland, Maine

Atta and al-Omari's breadcrumbs

“No physical, documentary, or analytical evidence provides a convincing explanation of why Atta and [al-]Omari drove to Portland, Maine, from Boston on the morning of September 10, only to return to Logan [airport] on Flight 5930 on the morning of September 11.”

9/11 Commission Report

Portland Jetport Airport was where the FBI located and confiscated airport closed-circuit television (CCTV) footage of two men officially claimed as being Mohamed Atta and Abdul al-Omari. This particular tape has not been released to the public except for still images created from the footage. A Commission Staff Report of August 26, 2004, however, informs that the security tapes from Portland Jetport Airport were “reviewed by the Commission.” [FBI Report of Investigation, “Copy of Surveillance Video ATTA/ALOMARI in Portland, Maine,” Sept. 11, 2001.] There is no explanation why the actual footage was not released into the public domain.

The still images show two men pass security point to board a flight; the flight is officially reported as being a shuttle Colgan Flight with number 5930. This shuttle is supposed to have taken Atta and al-Omari to Boston-Logan

International Airport whose security tapes were not released; not even still images of these two men either waiting in the boarding area and/or passing through airport security points.

Beechcraft 1900

Image is in the [public domain](#)

Colgan Air Flight 5930, a Beechcraft 1900, with tail number N15301, was operated under a code-share and service agreement with U.S. Airways. The pilot was Mrs. Jody Anderson with her First Officer and Flight Attendant, Mr. Kenneth Anderson.



Michael Tuohey, the Ticket Agent who was supposed to have checked-in Atta and al-Omari at Portland Jetport, was interviewed by the FBI later on the day of. Mr. Tuohey was shown video footage of the pair passing through the airport's security checkpoint, which would mean the FBI had already started searching for information on Atta and al-Omari as suspected hijackers even though Ong and Sweeney made no reference of these two individuals.

The Ticket Agent tells the FBI that though he recognized both Atta and al-Omari, they were “no longer wearing the jackets and ties” they were wearing when he had checked them in. He did assume the jackets were “tucked into their carry-on baggage.” Mr. Tuohey also said that “security cameras behind his own desk, which should have captured the two hijackers,” had “in fact been out of order for some time.”⁵²

Paul Thompson, in his timeline of the above event, states the obvious. “Some reports say the pair [Atta and al-Omari] passes through at 5:53 a.m.,” and references these reports to be from September 14, 2001. “Other reports

⁵² Website “History Commons.” Accessed 2014.
http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=michael_tuohey_1

put it earlier, at 5:45 a.m.,” and references these reports to be from October 5, 2001. Thompson concludes: “Strangely, when stills from the surveillance camera are later publicly released, they show two time stamps, one of 5:45 and another of 5:53.” [*Portland Press Herald*, Oct. 05, 2001; FBI, Oct. 05, 2001; 9/11 CR, p.3.] These still images mentioned were released on September 19, 2001, as reported by [Reuters](#). The FBI released the timeline of the pair in Portland on October 4, 2001, as reported by the [Portland Press Herald](#).



Still image with two time stamps from Maine's Portland Jetport Airport
Security video: Al-Omari wears a white shirt; Atta a blue one.
September 11, 2001.

►Image released by the FBI now in the [Creative Commons](#)



Still image with two time stamps from Maine's Portland Jetport Airport
Security video: Al-Omari wears a white shirt; Atta a blue one.
September 11, 2001.

►Image Courtesy of the [National 9/11 Memorial and Museum](#) and the [FBI](#)

Officially, there were 8-10 passengers that boarded this shuttle Colgan flight on the morning of. Three passengers claimed to have seen Atta and al-Omari onboard, whereas Kenneth Anderson the First Officer who was also the Flight Attendant told the FBI he saw Atta on the flight, but not with al-Omari; he saw Atta with his cousin, Marwan al-Shehhi, who was the suspected “hijack pilot” of United 175.

PASSENGER WITNESS #1

Mr. Vincent Meisner was an employee of Honeywell, the Aerospace & Defense contractor, which merged with AlliedSignal in 1999. The company specializes in aircraft landing systems and aerospace electronic systems. Honeywell is also part of General Electric's computer business, known as Honeywell Information Systems and headquartered in Morristown, New Jersey.⁵³

PASSENGER WITNESS #2

Mr. Brian Guerrette was an employee since 1999 for the U.S. government in Augusta, at the Maine Bureau of Information Services that explored the use of satellites to carry data traffic to remote State Office sites and to serve as backup connections to the State of Maine computing Network.



PASSENGER WITNESS #3

Mr. Roger Quirion of Winslow, Maine, was also an employee for the U.S. government at the Maine Bureau of Information Services with Mr. Guerrette, as a systems team leader in the Development Services Division.

CO-PILOT WITNESS #4

On September 17, 2001, Mr. Anderson was shown "12 colored photos depicting men of apparent Middle Eastern descent" and was requested by the FBI if he could "identify any of those individuals as having been passengers aboard U.S. Airways [Colgan] flight 5930 on September 11, 2001." Mr. Anderson identified Atta; he did not identify al-Omari. Instead, he was "pretty sure" in identifying Marwan al-Shehhi with Atta.

⁵³ Honeywell Aerospace & Defense.
<http://honeywell.com/Pages/Home.aspx>

Abdulaziz Abdulrahan Mohamed al-Omari	Marwan al-Shehhi
 <p>Claimed by onboard passengers (Meisner, Guerrette, and Quirion) to have boarded Colgan Flight 5930 with Atta in Portland on September 11, 2001.</p>	 <p>Claimed by onboard co-pilot Kenneth Anderson to have boarded Colgan Flight 5930 with Atta in Portland on September 11, 2001.</p>

Anderson was then shown a photo spread with 12 colored photos depicting men of apparent Middle Eastern descent. He was asked if he could identify any of those individuals as having been passengers aboard US Airways flight 5930 on September 11, 2001. It should be noted that the man depicted in the top row, third photo from the left, is MOHAMAD ATTA. Anderson identified that picture, of Mohamad Atta, as having been a passenger aboard US Airways flight 5930 on September 11, 2001. Anderson initialed and dated next to that picture, and wrote #1 above Atta's head indicating he was one of the passengers. Anderson identified the man in the top row, last picture on the right the picture of MARWAN ALSHEHHI as possibly the second passenger aboard US Airways flight 5930. He was advised he was "pretty sure" that was the second passenger. In that he was not positive, Anderson did not initial that picture, but wrote #2 above Alshehhi's head. He reiterated that he was "positive" about the other picture Atta as having been his passenger.

► FBI Interview report (Colgan Air)
September 8, 2003.

According to a female American Air Line employee at Boston-Logan, she was the one who "processed" al-Omari onto American 11 and "issued his boarding

pass.” This procedure, always according to the employee, was done on September 9th, and not on September 11th.

GPRODNO	: M-INT-00067927
GBATES	: 265A-NY-280350-302~19191
TE	= 09/24/2001
IDESCR	[REDACTED]
PUTBATCH	: NCTA_004 (1st Batch of unredacted 302's delivered in August)
LLTEXT	: 9/24/01

September 9th instead of 11th

[REDACTED] American Airlines AA employee, ticket counter, [REDACTED] was recontacted by the interviewing agent and shown a photo spread of subjects. [REDACTED] provided the following information:

[REDACTED] identified ABDUL ALOMARI from the photo spread as the individual she checked in on AA flight 11 on September 9, 2001. [REDACTED] stated that he did not understand the security questions in English so she tried to bring the question up on the computer in Arabic. She was unable to do that so she asked for help from LOIS INTERNICOLA, a co-worker. Neither of them could get the computer to work and they could not find the book that contained a translation of the security questions. Finally, [REDACTED] called a translation service on the telephone located at her ticket station, number 17. [REDACTED] handed the phone to this individual and he answered the questions. [REDACTED] then processed him onto AA flight 11 and issued his boarding pass.

9/11 Personal Privacy

‣ FBI interview with female AA employee Boston Logan International Airport
September 24, 2001.

9/11 Commission Staff Team7 - Box17

It is evident the employee talks of processing al-Omari to board American 11 on September 9th. Regardless, the FBI report this incident refers to when al-Omari picked up his replacement ticket (he had lost the original) and was processed on September 9th to board American 11 on September 11th. If this is correct, then it is unexplained by the FBI why al-Omari went through a second boarding check-in for American 11 on September 11th since he had already been processed for this flight on September 9th.

A search for Air Line statistics was done through the [Research and Innovative Technology Administration \(RITA\)](#) and another search was done through the [Bureau of Transportation Statistics \(BTS\)](#). The result showed two

American 11 flights had been scheduled to fly out on September 9th; one flight left on time, the other was cancelled.

Airline: American Airlines (AA)

Flight Number: 0011

Time Period: September 9, 2001 to September 9, 2001

On-Time Flights:

BOS-LAX

100.00%

NOTE: Late, cancelled and diverted flights are subtracted from total flights to determine on-time percentage. A complete listing of [airline](#) and [airport](#) abbreviations is available. Times are reported in local time unless otherwise noted.

[Excel](#) | [CSV](#)

Flight Number	Carriers	Origin Airport	Dest Airport				
				Total Number	Average Departure Delay (minutes)	Average Taxi-Out Time (minutes)	Average Scheduled Departure to Take-off (minutes)
0011	AA	BOS	LAX	1	0.00	15.00	15.00

Flight Number	Carriers	Origin Airport	Dest Airport			
				Total Number	Average Departure Delay (minutes)	Average Taxi-Out Time (minutes)
0011	AA	BOS	LAX	0	0.00	0.00

[Bureau of Transportation Statistics \(BTS\)](#)

It should come to the attention of the reader that 4 individuals with the surname “al-Omari” were circulating at the time and were under investigation by the FBI. Specifically, they are/were:-

1. AbdulRahman AL-OMARI

The British Broadcasting Corporation (*BBC*) reported on September 23, 2001, that an individual named AbdulRahman al-Omari “lost his passport” whilst studying in Denver ⁵⁴ and had been “misidentified by the FBI” as one of the hijackers on American 11.

Wikipedia gives some biographical details of this individual, which coincides with an article published by *CBSNews* ⁵⁵ on February 11, 2009.

2. AbdulRahman AL-OMARI

The same *BBC* article of September 23rd reported that another man (who had the same first and last name as al-Omari #1) “surfaced on the pages of the English-language Arab News” as being again “misidentified by the FBI” as one of the suspected hijackers on American 11.

This second misidentified al-Omari was also well and alive after September 11, 2001, and was an active pilot for Saudi Arabian Airlines.

3. Abdulaziz Abdulrahman (Al-Zahrani) AL-OMARI


The Saudi Information Agency (SIA) revealed a third al-Omari who surfaced and was mis-identified as a suspected hijacker. This al-Omari was a married man who had a baby daughter and suspected to have been on American 11. ⁵⁶

⁵⁴ *BBC News*: “Hijack ‘suspects’ alive and well.” Published September 23, 2001. Accessed: 2010.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/middle_east/1559151.stm

⁵⁵ *CBSNews*: “The FBI’s Hijacker List.” Published September 14, 2001. Accessed: 2014.
<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2001/09/14/archive/main311329.shtml>

⁵⁶ Saudi Information Agency (SIA). Accessed 2009.
<http://web.archive.org/web/20031026101720/http://www.arabianews.org/english/article.cfm?qid=12&sid=6>

4. Abdulatif AL-OMARI



►Image courtesy of (a) [History Commons](#); (b) *Miami Herald*, Sept. 13, 2001.

Going into al-Omari's brief timeline created by the FBI, here is what is reported, which we were not able to substantiate:-

September 06th: Al-Omari is recorded by the FBI as checking into the Park Inn Hotel in Boylston Street, Newton (Boston) Massachusetts, ⁵⁷ at 5:43: p.m. He paid cash for a two-night stay.

September 07th: Al-Omari changes his room from single to double and his check-out date also changes for September 10th. The double room will now be shared from September 7th till September 10th, with Satam al-Suqami, the hijacker Madeleine Sweeney and Betty Ong (flight attendants) specifically stated to Air Line officials, participated in the hijack of American 11.

⁵⁷ Newton, Massachusetts is a suburban city in Middlesex County, Massachusetts, United States. It is approximately 7 miles (11 km) west of downtown Boston and is bordered by Boston's Brighton neighbourhood and the suburb of Watertown to the east.

September 08th: There is no FBI report for al-Omari on this day.

September 09th: Al-Omari's FBI timeframe for this day follows.

06:43 a.m.	Seen passing front desk to go for breakfast.	<i>Boston Park Inn Hotel staying in room 225</i>
07:02 a.m.	Returns to room 225	<i>Boston Park Inn Hotel key records show room key was utilized</i>
13:21 p.m.	Unknown activity by unknown individual	<i>Boston Park Inn Hotel key records show room key was utilized</i>
14:06 p.m.	Unknown activity by unknown individual	<i>Boston Park Inn Hotel key records show room key was utilized</i>
?	Al-Omari checks-out of the Park Inn Hotel.	<i>Check-out after 14:06 p.m. would have al-Omari at Boston-Logan in time for his 3:00 p.m. flight.</i>

	9/9/2001	H/R	Abdul Alomari	Checks out of Park Inn
3212				

›FBI Redacted Timeline of Abdul al-Omari
Released Feb. 01, 2007.

?	<p>"American Air Line replacement ticket picked up at American Air Line terminal by al-Omari."</p> <p><i>[FBI Redacted Timeline of Abdul al-Omari, released February 1, 2007; declassified on February 1, 2032.]</i></p>	<p><i>This is when the female American Air Line employee at Boston Logan, "processed" al-Omari onto American 11 and "issued his boarding pass."</i></p>
---	--	---

15:00

American 11 scheduled to depart

Boston-Logan Airport

Though the above timeframe is quite simple, and the FBI record al-Omari checking out of the Park Inn Hotel on September 9th, they then add another date as to when he checked out and this is for September 10th. On this latter check-out, al-Omari is seen in the company of Atta.

3275	9/10/2001	H/R	Abdul Alomari	Check out of Park Inn Room 225, 160 Boyston St., Newton, MA	Express Check-out Time 12:22 pm	Mohamed Atta	Boston FD-302, dated 9/13/2001, 1A11946
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►FBI Redacted Timeline of Abdul al-Omari
Released: February 01, 2007.

If two (2) check-outs were conducted by the same individual in the same hotel, a day apart, and this action did not seem peculiar or raise suspicions, then some type of incompetence was present. This is simple logic and there is no evidence to support otherwise.

Joseph Bureau, a Fleet Service Agent at Portland Jetport Airport handled “baggage, cargo, freight, mail, and the loading and unloading of planes;” he was also responsible for the preparation of “planes for flight.” On September 11th, Mr. Bureau did not recall seeing al-Omari who he heard of “through newspaper reports.” He did however give some anonymous hearsay for the FBI to chew on, which we give our readers in the section *Unrelated Events*.

Maria Cruz, a security employee, was at Boston-Logan (Gate 9) when Colgan Flight 5930 arrived from Portland’s Jetport at “approximately 06:45 a.m. on September 11th;” she could not identify al-Omari as one of the passengers, according to her interview with the FBI.


Gloria Meserve, the employee who checked out Atta at Portland Comfort Inn on September 11th, did not remember al-Omari checking out with Atta, who was suspected to have stayed at the Inn. Mrs. Meserve only saw Atta come down “at approximately 05:33 a.m.,” to give his room number to check-out. “Atta had not asked for a wake-up call and when he left he did not utilize the courtesy van.”

When al-Omari checked-out of the Park Inn Hotel in Boston on September 09th and again on September 10th, he is supposed to have driven to Portland, Maine, which is an average 182 miles away, less than a 3-hour drive, and spotted there for the entire day, now staying at the Comfort Inn establishment, this time sharing a room with Atta.

Both men are later seen at a Pizza Hut at 8:33 p.m. described as “two Middle Eastern males.” Just “8 minutes later,” at 8:41 p.m. they were “both photographed at Fast Green ATM.” At 9:15 p.m. just 39 minutes later, Atta and al-Omari are seen at the Jet Port gas station. The image frames below, have the date and time cropped.



The FBI released the original image shown in the first row and last to the right, this time with date and time, that depict these two men were not in Portland’s Jet Port gas station on September 10th of 2001. Instead, the time and date show they were there on Monday, November 10th in 2001, at 8:28 p.m.



›Image courtesy of the FBI

It is unknown why this particular security camera depicts a future date as opposed to a past date, which usually happens when such cameras have not been under some kind of maintenance.

One more CCTV traces only someone wearing Atta's black and white shirt ⁵⁸ (below frames) walking into the Wal-Mart; no date or time can be seen upon entrance, though it has been reported it was at 9:22 p.m.

"Staff members at the Wal-Mart in South Portland told *The Post* yesterday [October 11, 2001,] that Atta bought the \$1.84 box-cutters he used to hijack American Airlines Flight 11 less than 12 hours before he commandeered the

⁵⁸ "The Dumpster needed to be moved," she (Laura Wale) said. "The picture of (Atta's) shirt on the FBI Web site? They pulled that out of our Dumpster at the Comfort Inn." [*Portland Press Herald*, September 9, 2003.]

plane. He got there just in time. The store closed for the day at 10. The staffers, who asked not to be identified, said they had been warned not to give details. ‘We all know what he bought,’ one of them said. ‘We’re just not allowed to talk about it.’ The staffer was surprised the hijackers had not made their deadly purchase earlier. ‘It’s unbelievable they would leave it to the last minute,’ the staffer said. Wal-Mart spokesman Tom Williams refused to talk about what Atta purchased.” [New York Post, Oct. 12, 2001.]

It is unknown where the *New York Post* was getting its information. The FBI reported Atta purchased a “six volt battery adapter” when he went to the Wal-Mart that evening. The mainstream media persisted Atta went to the Wal-Mart to purchase box-cutters “to hijack American Airlines Flight 11.”

HIJACKERS TIMELINE (REDACTED)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 02-01-2007
CLASSIFIED BY: 60324 AOC/BAW/CB/PTD
REASON: 1.4.1(1)
DECLASSIFY ON: 02-01-2032

Six volt battery
adapler purchased;
Walmart
transaction on
video, not
reviewed.

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
	9/10/2001	O		Mohamed Atta and Al Omari at Wal-Mart, 451 Payne Road, Scarborough, Maine.	Witness Interview by Boston Division;	Mohamed Atta	Six volt battery adapler purchased; Walmart transaction on video, not reviewed.	280350-302, S. 64615
3278			Abdul Alomari					

‣ FBI Timeline on Atta for September 10, 2001.
Released: February 01, 2007.

The Comfort Inn establishment, where Atta and al-Omari were supposed to have stayed, is a mile from the airport. According to the *Evening Standard* reporting on October 5, 2001, both men “took a non-smoking room. At reception Atta asked if he could have 15 copies of *USAToday*, intending

perhaps to bulk up his luggage, but had to make do with four copies instead.” This was also reported by *The Independent* on September 8, 2002.

What was in the *USAToday* on September 10, 2001, which had Atta interested in buying “15 copies,” is anyone’s guess. But, if he wanted to “bulk up his luggage” with newspapers, he could have done so with any other newspaper, or even toilet paper for that matter. So we researched the *USAToday* archives for September 10, 2001, and traced an interesting article that may have interested Atta. It can be found [here](#). In case the link is dead by the time our readers read this, we have added the *USAToday* article in Appendix A.

The Commission had a theory as to why Atta and al-Omari went to Portland on September 10th, a day before the attacks, and flew into Boston the following day. “The hijackers chose to fly into Boston to avoid suspicion that might have been aroused if they had arrived at Logan at approximately the same time as eight other young Middle Eastern males to check in for Flight 11 and Flight 175. Such an intent might also explain why Atta appeared to be so upset that he had to check in again in Boston to get a boarding pass for Flight 11.”

There is no evidence to support the above theory for two reasons: First, Atta became an Advantage Profile (#IH0IL56) with American Air Lines to have passenger advantages/benefits. This Advantage Profile was created in New Jersey on August 25, 2001. With his Advantage Profile account, he would have “one-step check-in.”

Second, “Even if Portland offered an easy way into the system, the layout of Logan required the two hijackers to pass through security a second time when they changed to American Airlines Flight 11, said Jeffrey Monroe, Portland’s director of transportation.” [*Portland Press Herald*, Sept. 18, 2001.]

The Commission came up with a second theory as to why Atta and al-Omari went to Portland on September 10th and flew into Boston the following day. “It is also possible that they traveled to Portland to preserve operational security. If the hijackers’ plot had been discovered by U.S. intelligence or law enforcement, or by the U.S. aviation security system, the two terrorists would be apprehended during their check-in at the Portland airport. That outcome would have been preferable to being stopped at Logan Airport, where other members of Atta’s hijack team were also checking in, and where conspirators intending to hijack Flight 175 were assembling at the same time.”

There is no evidence that Atta was under surveillance at the time to support this second theory. Nor is there evidence that there was even a potential leak into the “the hijackers’ plot” which would have jeopardized the apprehension of Atta or any of the other suspected hijackers. Officials reiterated their ignorance of the plot and/or suspected hijackers more than enough at Commission Hearings and press releases to dispel such theories.

Following the Commissions’ logic, the “plot” could easily have been discovered if one searched the Electronic Gate Reader (EGR), which once initiated, the system “polls” the Sabre passenger reservation system and shows (a) names of all passengers holding reservations; (b) their check-in status; (c) their seat assignment (if pre-reserved); (d) their booking class; and (e), their destination city.

All five suspected hijackers on American 11 are recorded to have issued one-way tickets and used their Middle Eastern names prior to their departure. No preservation to “operational security” could have existed as the Commission theorized. Also see Suspected Hijackers’ Itinerary and Electronic Gate Reader (EGR)

Three mainstream media articles follow. The first was printed by the *Portland Press Herald*; the second was printed by *NewsChannel5*; and, the third article was printed by the *Associated Press*.

PORTLAND PRESS HERALD

OCTOBER 21, 2001

On Wednesday, new reports surfaced about another potential terrorist link to Portland. A Saudi pilot, who is on an FBI watch list for people wanted for questioning about possible terrorist ties, told a Moroccan newspaper that he had left a small plane at the Portland jetport.

Khaled Alzeedi, owner of an aviation company that operates in Delaware, Saudi Arabia and Morocco, had bought two small planes in Tennessee in the weeks before the September 11 attacks. Alzeedi and three of his assistants later flew one of the planes to Portland. Alzeedi said he dropped the plane at the jetport because he realized it needed a bigger fuel tank. He then left the country and said he planned to return, but could not because of the terrorist attacks.

Portland Police Chief Michael Chitwood says he has a lot of unanswered questions about the plane and the Saudi pilot. He sent two detectives to Northeast Airmotive on Thursday, but employees there said the FBI told them not to talk with anyone about the plane. "The FBI is saying there's no connection with this plane to Atta or September 11, but they're not sharing why they want to talk with the pilot," Chitwood said. "It bothers me. If there's no big deal to this, then why the hell didn't the FBI tell us about this six weeks ago?"

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NEWSCHANNEL5

OCTOBER 8, 2001 ⁵⁹

WTVF: Nashville - Alzeedi identified himself as the owner of Zidi Aviation, a Saudi Arabian company. A prototype Webpage developed for the company lists “pilot training” among its services and shows the cockpit of commercial jetliners. Zidi was also an authorized distributor of high-tech flight simulation equipment produced by a Boeing subsidiary. According to FAA records, Alzeedi ended up buying two Tampicos that had been listed on the Internet: Aircraft that he told service workers he planned to fly to Morocco in North Africa to train pilots.

FBI agents visited the Clarksville airport after the Sept. 11th attacks and questioned people about Alzeedi’s activities. One airport worker described Alzeedi as a “good family man” and expressed doubt that he would be involved in such a horrible plot.

In addition, *NewsChannel 5* has learned that Alzeedi may have had contact with two local FBI agents back in August at the Hilton Suites, just across from Nashville’s arena. Alzeedi and his party kept three rooms there for about a month while they waited on the aircraft. Alzeedi listed Room 412 as his room. One night, Alzeedi was inside Eddie George’s Grill in the hotel, when someone apparently stepped on his foot. That’s when, hotel workers say, he identified himself as an Iranian diplomat and demanded that the hotel compensate him for his injuries.

Then, in late August, the hotel locked Alzeedi and his party out of their rooms because of an unpaid bill of approximately \$2,500. Inside the rooms, hotel

⁵⁹ newschannel5 “investigates alzeedi.” Accessed 2010.

<http://web.archive.org/web/20021022152359/http://www.newschannel5.com/news/investigates/alzeedi.htm>

workers found satellite navigation equipment and wet suits. Suspicious, they called the FBI. It is believed that agents talked to Alzeedi at that point, but found nothing at that time to justify further investigation.

Aviators say, when flying a single-engine plane across the Atlantic, such equipment can be just basic survival gear. Today, the phone number once listed by Zidi Aviation is out of service, and email sent to Zidi Aviation's publicized address have been returned as "undelivered mail."

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ASSOCIATED PRESS

RANDALL CHASE & JOHN SOLOMON (WASHINGTON)

Del & Amanda Kell (Baltimore) ⁶⁰

Efforts to reach Alzeedi for comment were unsuccessful. The Jeddah, Saudi Arabia telephone number listed on Zidi Aviation's Website does not work, and e-mail sent to an address listed on the site was returned as undeliverable. Alzeedi and two or three other men stayed from Aug. 5 to Aug. 28 in three rooms at the Hilton Suites hotel in downtown Nashville, said Mark Moravec, hotel general manager. In the same period, Alzeedi was arranging the aircraft purchase from Outlaw Aircraft Sales of Clarksville, Tenn., about 60 miles northwest of Nashville.

The company's airfield and hangars are less than a mile from Fort Campbell, Ky., home of the Army's 101st Airborne Division. Alzeedi bought two Tampico TB-9 airplanes: Small, single-engine, European-made aircraft often used for

⁶⁰ <http://multimedia.belointeractive.com/attack/investigation/1015tennessee.html>

pilot training and by flying clubs. The planes were advertised on Outlaw's Website. Federal Aviation Administration records show the planes were registered Aug. 16 to Zidi Aviation Corp., which Alzeedi incorporated last year in Delaware. Alzeedi moved the planes to an unknown location, according to a law enforcement source who spoke on condition of anonymity.

Moravec said hotel management called the FBI in late August after there was a problem with Alzeedi's bill. "His credit card was declined and he was locked out of his room. Before he was locked out, security went in and found some items they thought were peculiar," Moravec said. Moravec declined to specify what was found. Two Nashville FBI agents went to the hotel to inquire about Alzeedi, law enforcement officials said. Moravec said the agents spoke with some hotel employees. Alzeedi left the hotel about a week later, settling the bill with a personal check, Moravec said.

Since August, the FBI has not spoken with Moravec or any of his employees, Moravec said. After the Sept. 11 attacks, Outlaw owner Robert Wyatt was questioned by the FBI. Wyatt was in Florida over the weekend and did not return several telephone calls from the *Associated Press*. FBI spokesman Jon Stephens in Nashville said he could not comment on whether Alzeedi was the subject of an investigation.

Sidney Garnett, executive vice president of Registered Agents Ltd., of Wilmington, Del., acknowledged his company handled the incorporation of Zidi Aviation last year. He declined to comment further on Alzeedi or Zidi Aviation. He said an FBI agent showed up at his office two to three weeks ago with a subpoena for Zidi Aviation's records. "We turned over everything we had in that file to the local FBI office," Garnett said.

The company had a Website that showed the cockpit of commercial jetliners and listed services including pilot training and private shuttles. The site was

changed this week to a black page listing the company's name, address and phone number in white print.

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Khaled Alzeedi ⁶¹ was not the only person involved in satellites. On August 28, 1998, a Pakistani newspaper, *DAWN*, connected an Iridium Middle East Corporation to be owned by Mawarid Overseas Company Limited, and Triniford Investments S.A. which was affiliated with the Saudi Binladin Group. The link to this article no longer exists.

⁶¹ Various spelling: Khalid al-Zeedi and Khaleed al-Zedi.

Aviation Protocols

*CJCSI 3610.01A*⁶² vs *CJCSI3610.01*⁶³

“There are clearly things that the Central Intelligence Agency does that are covert that the DoD ought not to do. There are things in the middle where we both do things and where we have individuals involved in teams that are led by them or led by us, and there be a mixture from time to time.”

Donald H. Rumsfeld, former Secretary of Defense
2004 Senate Hearing

The 9/11 Commission gives us the following information: “The FAA and NORAD had developed protocols for working together in the event of a hijacking. As they existed on 9/11, the protocols for the FAA to obtain military assistance from NORAD required multiple levels of notification and approval at the highest levels of government.”

In order to follow either the Commissions’ version, or any other, some information is preliminary. There were two in total “Amalgam Virgo” exercises ready to be conducted in 2001; “Amalgam Virgo 01” was a scheduled two-day drill between June 1st and 2nd, and had an alternate expanded date frame for June 1st till the 4th. The other “Amalgam Virgo” drill was due to be implemented during the month of September. This latter exercise (“Amalgam Virgo 02”) was planned before the September 11th events; it took place, however, on June 4, 2002.

⁶² http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/cjcsd/cjcsi/3610_01a.pdf

⁶³ http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/cjcsd/cjcsi/3610_01.pdf



United States Department of Defense

News Release

On the web: http://web.archive.org/web/20030806084027/www.defenselink.mil/news/May2002/b05312002_bt279-02.html

Media contact: media@defenselink.mil or +1 (703) 697-5131

Public contact: <http://www.dod.mil/faq/comment.html> or +1 (703) 428-0711

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

No. 279-02
May 31, 2002

NORAD TO SPONSOR MULTI-AGENCY, BI-LATERAL EXERCISE

On June 4, 2002, the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) will sponsor a multi-agency, bi-national exercise, Amalgam Virgo 02, involving an airborne terrorism scenario over the United States and Canada. The exercise, which was planned prior to the events of Sept. 11, is designed to allow many U.S. and Canadian agencies to test, improve and validate their coordination and operational procedures.

The exercise does not indicate an increased threat to the domestic airspace of either the United States or Canada.

Amalgam Virgo is an annual small scale, live-fly exercise sponsored by NORAD. NORAD and other agencies in the United States and Canada that are responsible for homeland security and homeland defense must be prepared for a variety of threats and contingencies. Through exercises like this one, the participating commands and organizations are able to improve preparedness and interagency coordination.

Approximately 1,500 people will take part in this exercise including members of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Transport Canada, the Transportation Security Administration, the Federal Aviation Administration, the Vancouver Airport Authority and Delta Air Lines.

NORAD public affairs is available to provide additional information. They can be reached at (719)554-6889.

›The Pentagon News Release
May 31, 2002.

For now, we are concerned with “Amalgam Virgo 01,” which took place on June 1st and ended on June 4th of 2001. It is interesting the cover of the exercise booklet depicts Mr. bin Laden’s portrait -see below- because in the 2001-2002 Military Almanac, the countries portrayed as “potential enemies” to the United States were described as being (in alphabetical order) Cuba, Iran (that was “removed” from the enemy list in March of 1999), Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria, “as historically defined by DoD.” Saudi Arabia is nowhere listed, the country where Mr. bin Laden was born and the country where most of the suspected hijackers were from.

	Active Troops	Reserve Troops	Heavy Tanks	Armored Infantry Vehicles	Air- planes	Heli- copters	War- ships	Amphibious, Major Mine, & Support Ships
POTENTIAL "ENEMIES"²								
Cuba	58,000	39,000	900	750	208	90	—	7
Iran	513,000	350,000	1,135	1,145	269	718	8	46
Iraq	429,000	650,000	2,200	4,400	350	500	—	7
Libya	76,000	40,000	2,210	2,620	594	202	4	19
North Korea	1,082,000	4,700,000	3,500	3,060	1,167	320	29	40
Sudan	104,500	—	170	488	46	28	—	—
Syria	316,000	396,000	4,850	4,785	640	221	2	12
Totals	2,262,500	6,175,000	14,965	17,248	3,274	2,079	42	131

↳ 2001-2002 Military Almanac



According to Global Security, “Amalgam Virgo 01” was an operation with a joint-service, cruise-missile defense that operated from Tyndall Air Force Base.

“Amalgam Virgo 01” had an incorporated suicide mission; a script scenario where a Haitian AIDS victim, in a deal with a Columbian drug cartel, takes a Cessna with the intent to crash it into the Southeast Air Defense Sector headquarters in Florida. This would enable the cartel to “flood the U.S. with flights of aircraft and to increase their market share,” and in return provide “money and support for the AIDS crisis” in Haiti. The scenario included the FBI contacting NORAD, with the intercept and possible simulated shoot-down of the aircraft by U.S. fighter jets.

This particular drill had been a modification of a drill called “Twin Star” where a live-fly joint FAA/NORAD exercise was conducted back in 1995 (or

[Team 8, Box 20, Miles Kara Work Files: NEADS Trip 2 of 3 Folder.] This

“Amalgam Virgo 01” June 1-4, 2001

NORAD FTX EXERCISE CHARTER

(PER NORAD INSTRUCTION 10-45)

- Mission:** Train NORAD Warriors
- Focus:** Air Sovereignty and Air Defense
- Goal:** Enhanced Mission Readiness
- Scenarios:** Based on *Perceived* Threats

Perceived Threats



Washington Times
May 29, 2000

Cohen Says T

Cohen Says Terrorist Threat Is 'Real'

Defense Secretary William S. Cohen yesterday warned the United States faces a "quite real" threat of a **terrorist** nuclear, chemical or biological weapon **attack** on **national soil** within 10 years.

Joint Vision 2020 Document: 'Prepare Now For Uncertain Future'

WORDS FROM THE TOP

"Missile technology is proliferating into the hands of rogue nations and terrorist organizations. As a nation we must research and develop options to combat these emerging threats."



STATEMENT OF

GENERAL RALPH E. EBERHART, USAF

COMMANDER IN CHIEF

NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND

AND UNITED STATES SPACE COMMAND







BEFORE THE UNITED STATES SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE





STRATEGIC SUBCOMMITTEE

8 March 2000


AMALGAM VIRGO EXERCISE GOALS

- Focus on a Realistic Current Threat
- Increase the Realism and Fidelity of Our NORAD/SEADS Live-fly Exercises
- “Train Like We’re Going to Fight”
- Exercise Contingency OPORD Concepts






CONSEQUENCE MGT CONNECTIVITY DRILL



CONSEQUENCE MGT CONNECTIVITY DRILL



INITIAL INVOLVEMENT WITH CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT



(SHORAD) ADA CONOPS AMALGAM VIRGO 01



CM Statistic and UAV Programs and Platforms SAMPLE

75,000 Cruise Missiles Distributed Amongst 75 Countries			
•AV Pointer	•Huntair	•Shadow 600	•Global Hawk
•AV Pointer Micro	•Hunter	•Skyeye	•Gnat 750
•Blimp	•Javelin	•Spectre II	•Hawk-i 7b/f/h
•Aerobot	•Model 324	•Tern	•Raptor
•Aerosonde	•Model 350	•Theseus	•SASS Lite
•Altus 2	•Model 410	•Truck	•STM-5B
•BQM-34	•Outrider	•MQM-107	•Seabat
•Chiron	•Pathfinder	•LEARS	•Shadow 200
•Darkstar	•Ferseus B	•Hummingbird	•Onithopter
•Eagle Eye	•Pioneer	•Dragonfly	•Entomopter
•Exdrone	•Porter	•Vindicator	•Seamos
•Firebee	•Predator	•VC-6	•Dirigible AAV
•Freewing	•Prowler	•Micro	•AMGSSS

LEARS UAV



LEARS COST

\$83,613.00
(Includes GPS driven air vehicle and Ground Control Station and is capable of carrying a 40lb payload)

•"The LEARS UAV was developed for sales to third world nations"
James H. Boschma
Technical Director
Bosch Aerospace, Inc
Huntsville, AL

"A Scary Thought" 16 AUG 99

AEROSONDE
ROBOTIC AIRCRAFT
AEROSONDE ROBOTIC AIRCRAFT PIV LLC - AEROSONDE NORTH AMERICA INC.



New Foundland to Scotland
26 hours
3,200 km



Federal Flight Rules Eyed For Unmanned Aircraft


Aviation Week & Space Technology June 5, 2000

"Pentagon and FAA officials have ordered a Defense Dept. study of how UAVs should be integrated into national airspace"




"Predictions are that the U.S. may be operating as many as 2,000 UAVs in 5-10 years. The market is ready to explode"

DRONE SAFETY PROCEDURES



AW 00-2 TRACK SYNOPSIS All times in local CST time (+5 for zulu)



NORAD AV PROPOSAL GUIDELINES

Need your proposals for a live-fly event


- ✓ Multi-region exercise preferred
- ✓ Should be short duration (1-2 days)
- ✓ Should focus on emerging threats
 - ✓ Cruise missile defense
 - ✓ Anti-airborne terrorism
 - ✓ WMD
- ✓ Should include outside agencies
 - ✓ FBI, RCMP, FEMA, DTRA...

NI 10-45 OBJECTIVES

- ✓ Exercise Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment (ITW&AA).
- ✓ Exercise command interface with higher and lateral headquarters.
- ✓ Exercise intelligence, logistics and personnel functions.
- ✓ Exercise command, control and communications systems and procedures.
- ✓ Exercise NORAD Headquarters, region and sector joint binational battle staffs.
- ✓ Exercise crisis action planning, deployment planning and CONPLAN execution.
- ✓ Exercise regeneration, NBC and battle staff support operations and test concepts.
- ✓ Exercise contingency operations (including Cruise Missile Defense).
- ✓ Exercise air sovereignty and air defense missions.
- ✓ Exercise the counterdrug mission.

EVERYONE PARTICIPATES

- ANR
- CANR
- WADS
- NEADS



WHITE FORCE
AUGMENTATION



ANR/CANR/CONR/WADS/NEADS

SUMMATION

AMALGAM VIRGO 01 Will Provide:

- 1 Challenging and Realistic Training ... (PA)
- 2 Significant break from "Cold War" Paradigm
- 3 State-of-the-art Target
- 4 Integration of New Concepts
- 5 "Train-Like-You-Fight" Wargaming
- 6 Robust Battle Management Training
- 7 Joint Training for Unconventional Threat

RETURN TO
FINAL REPORT

RETURN TO
TAB SUMMARY

UNCLASSIFIED

AV 01-02: Suicide Mission:

Background information: Mr. Reginald Montrose (Haitian with AIDS (advanced stages)) is frustrated with trying to get support for the AIDS victims in Haiti and as a result, he makes a deal with the Colombian drug cartel to get money and support for the AIDS crisis in return for destroying the C2 node for the southeast US (SEADS). This results in Mr. Montrose taking a private aircraft from the St Petersburg/Clearwater FBO with the intention of crashing it into the SEADS building (485). This destruction will allow the drug cartel to flood the US with flights of aircraft and to increase their market share in the US drug market. A friendly ASA aircraft (BE-55 N9511Y) will fly a similar ground track to the suicide aircraft. This will drive a sort issue with NORAD C2.

NOTE: The scenario intention is for SEADS to launch PAM fighters to intercept the target aircraft and after intercept and ID, attempt to turn the target aircraft away from the coastline of Florida. Target aircraft will remain on course to SEADS and will not make the turns. This will develop into an ROE drill that will challenge the battlestaff as they work to keep the target aircraft from impacting SEADS.

Scenario flow as follows:

STARTEX SITREP INFO: Several months prior to exercise, drug lords begin relationship with Haitians concerning AIDS support on the island. Money begins to arrive on island and is associated with construction of six new hospitals. These hospitals begin to focus their services on AIDS patients.

0535Z: (Sim MIA ARTCC MOS/SEADS Exercise Director) calls SEADS MCC (DSN 523-5205) with the following script. "This is MIA MOS with a heads-up on a possible person that may kill himself and others by crashing a stolen airplane somewhere in the southeast United States. St Pete aerodrome manager has just notified us that a possible suicide note was found in a suspicious car that was parked just outside the KPTE FBO. St Pete tower say that one of the FBO airplanes took-off around midnight without clearance. The FBO says that a Cessna 310 (tail number N7675Q) is missing from their ramp and they believe the suicide suspect stole the missing aircraft. The LEA and FBI have both been notified and are assessing the situation".

0555Z: (Sim MIA ARTCC MOS/SEADS Exercise Director) calls SEADS MCC (DSN 523-5205) and 325 FW command post (DSN 523-2155) with the following script. "This is MIA MOS with notification of a possible suicide martyr threat to the US. We have just received word from the Miami FBI office that a Lucia Montrose of Haiti (sister of a Mr Reginald Montrose) has received a suicide note from her brother indicating he is going to take his own life by flying an airplane into a facility at Tyndall AFB, FL. We are currently receiving fax copies of two suicide notes from Mr Montrose and would like to fax them to your unit for assessment. Can I get your fax number please?"

0605Z: SEADS exercise sim cell will fax suicide notes (attachments 1 and 2) to SEADS MCC. The notes will read as follows:

UNCLASSIFIED

NCT0024071

UNCLASSIFIED

Note to Sister:

Lucia,

By the time you get this letter, I will have fulfilled my obligation I've made with the generous supporters from our sister Latin country. I hope you understand the choice I've made to help so many of our brothers and sisters. Although the cost in lives may seem high to you, what I have done will ensure notoriety to a movement that has been much neglected by the United States and the world. I do not mean to inflict injury to the people of Florida, however, our generous brothers that have supported our country's cause need our assistance to support their endeavors.

Please do me one last favor. Contact the world press to ensure the world will know the plight of the AIDS epidemic to our homeland.

My days are numbered and I am looking forward to the next journey. I will miss you sweet sister. Godspeed. I love you.

Note found at KPIE FBO:

To whom it may concern,

Please forgive me for taking advantage of your generosity and support over the last few days. I have a greater mission that I must complete and an obligation I need to meet. I ask that you take care of some unfinished items for me so that I can at least have the peace of mind to know that these things will be taken care of. Please return this rental car to Alamo. The keys are in the glovebox and I have filled the gas tank. I rented it from the Alamo facility at Tampa International. The rental paperwork is also in the glovebox.

I have taken out an insurance policy with Lloyds of London to cover the cost of the aircraft. I am truly sorry that such a beautifully handling aircraft will be destroyed but it cannot be helped. The policy is also in the glovebox. Please contact Mr. Randy Baker at the FBO and make sure he gets the policy so he can recover the cost of his aircraft.

I have worked so very hard for the last six years to make the world aware of the problems in my beautiful country. AIDS is a very serious problem there and the United States refuses to provide support to the thousands of Haitians that have become infected with the AIDS virus. I should know as I have been diagnosed with AIDS since 1997. I am so very tired and therefore feel that I have no other alternatives.

I would like to thank our compassionate Latin brothers from Colombia for providing the financial support for our new AIDS clinics in Haiti. They have been very generous to our people and therefore I feel mine is but a small price to pay for their tremendous gifts if

UNCLASSIFIED

NCT0024072

UNCLASSIFIED

money and support. I have been asked to complete a mission for our brothers from Colombia and this is what I am attempting to do as you read this letter. Please do not try to stop me as I am prepared to take whatever actions needed to be successful.

0600Z: NORAD sim cell cues the NORAD leadership with the following script. "We have just received a call from FBI in Washington DC and we believe there is an individual that has taken off recently from St Pete/Clearwater IAP with the intention of being a martyr. His aircraft is a Cessna 310, tail number N7675Q. We have reason to believe he is going to crash his airplane into a facility on Tyndall AFB. We do not know the current location of the aircraft. We will call you when we have more information from the FBI."

0610Z: Target aircraft hits the IP.

The suicide target aircraft will not answer any radio calls from SEADS and fighter. Target will remain on course to KPAM throughout scenario or until simulated shot down. The friendly ASA aircraft flying the similar course will answer all radio calls by SEADS or the fighters. Scenario fruition is now up to Blue Forces.

UNCLASSIFIED

In January 2002, the Commander of the 1st Air Force at Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida was Major General Larry Arnold. He was interviewed by *Code One Magazine* in regards to the scrambling of aircraft on the morning of: "You might ask why the aircraft weren't scrambled immediately. The procedure is that the FAA contacts the national military command center [at the Pentagon] whenever there is a problem. They, in turn, go to NORAD to see if assets are available. Then the Secretary of Defense grants approval to intercept a hijacked airplane, which has heretofore been classified as a law enforcement issue." Maj. Gen. Arnold also testified to the Commission on May 23, 2003, on the same subject. He stated that he had "instructed Col. Marr to go ahead and scramble the airplanes" instead of waiting for the appropriate Pentagon authority.

On Friday, June 1, 2001, a minor 103 days prior to a National Special Security Event day in New York City, the U.S. Department of Defense incorporates two specific changes into its Air-Defense Protocol (CJCSI 3610.01A) in regards to “aircraft piracy (hijacking) and destruction of derelict airborne objects” over U.S. soil with specific reference to cancellation of its previous protocol (CJCSI3610.01) dated July 31, 1997, to accommodate “Amalgam Virgo 01.” The protocol was never rescinded.

First change: Enclosure A: Section 3 - Procedures (a) General

The first change that will concern us and not located in the July 1997 protocol (CJCSI3610.01) is in regards to military procedures in a case of a hijacking. If the hijacking be deemed as though it would affect in any harmful way “national security or military preparedness,” then “assistance may not be provided” to aviation for the on-going hijacking situation.

Military personnel will provide the following types of support: Intercept, surveillance, lift, equipment, and communications. Military personnel may not participate in a search, seizure, arrest, or other similar activity. This restriction would include the apprehension of aircraft hijackers or use of military aircraft (fixed-wing or helicopter) or other vehicles as platforms for gunfire or the use of other weapons against suspected hijackers. In addition, assistance may not be provided under this enclosure if it could adversely affect national security or military preparedness.

Second change: Enclosure A: Section 3 - Procedures (b) General

The second change states that the Deputy Director for Operations ⁶⁴ (DDO) with the National Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon, upon being notified of a hijack situation, will:-

(1) Determine whether or not the assistance needed is reasonably available from police or commercial sources. If not, the DDO, NMCC, will notify the appropriate unified command or NORAD to determine if suitable assets are available and will forward the request to the Secretary of Defense for approval in accordance with DODD 3025.15, paragraph D.7 (reference d).

(2) If suitable assets from a unified command or NORAD are not reasonably available, the DDO, NMCC, will coordinate with the appropriate Military Service operations center to provide military assistance.

The Commission tells us what should have happened: “If a hijack was confirmed, procedures called for the hijack coordinator on duty to contact the Pentagon’s National Military Command Center (NMCC) and to ask for a military escort aircraft to follow the flight, report anything unusual, and aid search and rescue in the event of an emergency. The NMCC would then seek approval from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to provide military assistance. If approval was given, the orders would be transmitted down NORAD’s chain of command.” This is what actually happened, and comes from the statements of the on duty personnel at Pentagon’s National Military Command Center

⁶⁴ Under the “Intelligence Reform And Terrorism Prevention Act” of 2004, the position was upgraded to Director of the National Clandestine Service (D/NCS).

(NMCC). On the morning of, two bodies and two individuals commanding those bodies were charged with the responsibility to act when a hijacking occurred in the United States. The Air Defense Protocols are clear on this.

The first body responsible, including the person commanding that body, was the Administrator of the FAA. This would have been Mrs. Jane Garvey. The next body and person responsible would have been the Deputy Director for Operations of the NMCC, which was located within the Pentagon. This would have been Brigadier General Winfield. These two commanders would undertake the responsibility to notify and request assistance from DoD who would then forward the request for approval to the Secretary of Defense.

Once the Administrator of the FAA, in this case Mrs. Garvey, notified the commander of the National Military Command Center, in this case Brigadier General Winfield, the former need not be troubled further regarding notification. The FAA's job done, everything now falls toward the actions of the National Military Command Center. The person above Brigadier General Winfield (Deputy Director for Operations NMCC) was General Richard Myers, who was Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; he took over command from Chairman General Shelton due to the latter's absence abroad on September 11th in 2001.

Brigadier General Winfield on the day of was absent from his post. He had requested to be relieved at 08:30 a.m., the same time, according to FAA transcripts, that American 11 was in serious trouble. Navy Captain Charles J. Leidig took Brigadier General Winfield's place.

“On September 10, 2001, Brigadier General Winfield, U.S. Army, asked that I stand a portion of his duty as Deputy Director for Operations (NMCC) on

the following day. I agreed and relieved Brigadier General Winfield at 08:30 a.m., on September 11, 2001.”

Navy Captain Charles J. Leidig

9/11 Commission Testimony

Being as this was, Navy Captain Leidig would now need to forward all requests or proposals from the FAA to the DoD military assistance and then on to the Secretary of Defense for approval. This is what he did:-

“Shortly after assuming duty, I received the first report of a plane’s striking the World Trade Center. Some time after, I learned of the second plane’s collision with the World Trade Center. In response to these events, I convened a Significant Event Conference which was subsequently upgraded to an Air Threat Conference. During the Air Threat Conference Brigadier General Winfield relieved me and resumed duties as Deputy Director for Operations for the National Military Command Center.”

Navy Captain Charles J. Leidig

National Commission On Terrorist Attacks

Upon The United States, June 17, 2004.

When exactly Brigadier General Winfield resumed duties, the Commission tells us was around 10:15 a.m., to 10:30 a.m. This is nearly two hours later and when the last suspected hijacked airliner (United 93) had crashed. We do not know where Brigadier General Winfield was from 08:30 a.m., till way after 10:00 a.m., roughly a 2 hour absence of one of the most important people with the responsibility to deal and handle with a hijacking over U.S. soil together

with the Administrator of the FAA according to the Air Defense Protocol (CJCSI 3610.01A) created in June 1, 2001.

The Administrator of the FAA, Mrs. Garvey, reported during the attacks that as many as eleven aircrafts may have been hijacked. Since Brigadier General Winfield was relieved by Navy Captain Leidig, and was now in charge with Mrs. Garvey, an important question would have risen: Did Mrs. Garvey notify Navy Captain Leidig of these eleven possible hijackings? According to NORAD's timeline of response released on September 18, 2001, the only open communication with the FAA was for two flights; American 77 and United 93.

Apart from missing military personnel that morning, there was also a missing link in the FAA. This was Mike Canavan the Associate Administrator of the Civil Aviation Security who was in Puerto Rico, apparently leaving no designated replacement in his absence. Lt. General Mike Canavan stated the following at the 9/11 Commission Public Hearing on May 23, 2003, regarding this absence: "Here's my answer, and it's not to duck the question. Number one, I was visiting the airport in San Juan that day when this happened. That was a CADEX airport, and I was down there also to remove someone down there that was in a key position. So when 9/11 happened, that's where I was. I was able to get back to Washington that evening on a special flight from the Army back from San Juan, back to Washington. So everything that transpired that day in terms of times, I have to, and I have no information on that now, because when I got back we weren't, that wasn't the issue at the time. We were, when I got back it was, What are we going to do over the next 48 hours to strengthen what just happened?" ⁶⁵

The Commission finalizes their section on the matter by stating, "The protocols in place on 9/11 for the FAA and NORAD to respond to a hijacking

⁶⁵ http://www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing2/9-11Commission_Hearing_2003-05-23.htm

presumed that the hijacked aircraft would be readily identifiable and would not attempt to disappear; there would be time to address the problem through the appropriate FAA and NORAD chains of command; and the hijacking would take the traditional form: That is, it would not be a suicide hijacking designed to convert the aircraft into a guided missile. On the morning of 9/11, the existing protocol was unsuited in every respect for what was about to happen.”

Regardless, the four suspected hijacked airliners did not “attempt to disappear.” When a transponder is turned off on a civilian aircraft, the ATC can still see the plane’s altitude and longitude. In addition to this, and according to former Counterterrorism Advisor Richard Clarke, the “Secret Service had a system that allowed them to see what FAA’s radar was seeing.” [Richard Clarke, *Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror* (Free Press, 2004).]

Complete database

Comprehensive insights | alphabetical order

“We [the FAA Command Center] became the Department of Defense’ on 9/11.”

John White, Air Traffic Tactical Operations Manager [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFRO4017327): Teams 7+8, VISIT to the FAA Air Traffic Control System Command Center in Herndon, Virginia and Dulles Airport Control Tower. July 22, 2003.]

Accident Report, Package, File: The last facility that spoke with an aircraft is responsible for compiling the accident package. The package is held and reviewed at the Air Traffic Control Tower Region. The originals are kept at the locations that handled the aircraft. Finally, the complete accident package is sent to FAA Headquarters.

Robert McLaughlin, from FAA-HQ Security Operations in Washington told the Commission Staff in an interview they had with him, that “He was surprised that apparently the FAA never undertook an after-action report on the events of 9/11. He reported that such analysis was typically done in the wake of major incidents.” [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFRO4020021): Team 7 INTERVIEW: Robert McLaughlin, FAA HQ Security Operations, June 3, 2004.]

The Commission Staff did however learn that all packages from the four “hijacked” aircrafts on the day of “were handled slightly differently; the

packages were split between the Great Lakes, Eastern and New England Regions due to the level of work involved in the task.” [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR04016766): Team 8 INTERVIEW: FAA Eastern Region Ron Ruggeri, Dec. 17, 2003.]

Robert Jones, the Quality Assurance Officer at Boston Air Control explained an accident package “is developed and published by the FAA and has a defined scope and purpose. The file is all the information collected regarding an accident,” and the timeline is “pieced together through the call toll records.” [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR04016793): Team 8 INTERVIEW: Robert Jones, Quality Assurance Officer at Boston Air Control, Sept. 22, 2003.]

New York’s Air Traffic Control “accident file was put together by Marty Fournier and Kevin Delaney.” [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR04016817): Team 8 INTERVIEW: George Leonard, Acting Quality Assurance Support Manager.] Delaney was also the individual who, upon “his own volition,” destroyed “a single cassette tape-recording” which “was made at the Center ⁶⁶ on September 11 -beginning around 11:40 a.m., and lasting about an hour- of controllers giving first-hand accounts of their actions in interacting with, or tracking, two of the hijacked aircraft that morning.” [May 4, 2004, letter from Kenneth M. Mead, Inspector General of the U.S. Department of Transportation to The Honorable John McCain, Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science & Transportation.]

Robin Hordon, ATC on the morning of, had noted that whenever there was “an incident, an emergency, on-air trouble, some type of a near midair [collision] or a breakdown in aviation rules,” ATCs “would immediately take the voice tapes and secure them.” In addition to this procedure, they “would immediately take the radar data on that controller’s scope that day and secure

⁶⁶ New York Air Route Traffic Control Center, in Ronkonkoma, on Long Island.

them. Whenever there was an incident, all of the information, all of it was secured. Period.”

A few abnormalities resulted in not securing voice tapes mentioned by the above ATC for the two “hijacked” air liners, American 11 and United 175. When the Inspector General of DoT set out to inquire on an irregularity that occurred within the FAA, this is what was revealed: “The Quality Assurance Manager [Kevin Delaney Supervisor (NYARC)] told us that sometime between December 2001, and February 2002, he destroyed the tape of his own volition, by crushing the cassette case in his hand, cutting the tape into small pieces, and then depositing the pieces in trash cans throughout the Center. He advised that he felt strongly that the tape never should have been made.” [Office of Inspector General Kenneth M. Mead. Report No. CC-2004-003, May 04, 2004.]

The tape referred to by the Inspector General was nothing more or nothing less than “a single cassette tape-recording” which “was made at the Center ⁶⁷ on September 11 -beginning around 11:40 a.m. and lasting about an hour- of controllers giving first-hand accounts of their actions in interacting with, or tracking, two of the hijacked aircraft that morning.”

The Commission Staff was told “no copies of the tape were made and that the tape has been irrevocably lost.” The inspector general’s report stated: “The destruction of evidence in the government’s possession, in this case an audiotape particularly during times of a national crisis, has the effect of fostering an appearance that information is being withheld from the public. We do not ascribe motivations to the managers in this case of attempting to cover up, and we have no indication that there was anything on the tape that would

⁶⁷ New York Air Route Traffic Control Center, in Ronkonkoma, on Long Island.

lead anyone to conclude that they had something to hide or that the controllers did not carry out their duties.”⁶⁸ The matter ended there.

Mr. Delaney was interviewed by the Commission Staff, and advised them “he had an argument with FAA headquarters regarding whether the events of 9-11 should be declared an aircraft accident or an incident. If it was deemed an accident, Delaney stated that he was supposed to provide the names of everyone involved in the accident including those that perished at the WTC. Delaney further noted that in an accident package he is required to provide transcripts and other pertinent information that relates the status of the aircraft in question. This information is not included in an incident package. He noted to Commission staff that the attacks of September 11th were acts of war, and that as such he did not personally feel it was appropriate to put those names in the compilation of materials to be submitted. He noted as well that there is no category in the tools available to him as an FAA Quality Assurance officer to account for aircraft involvement in acts of war.” [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR04016818): Team 8 INTERVIEW: Kevin Delaney New York Air Route Center Supervisor, Sept. 30, 2003.]

In addition, material which was “taken by the FBI on September 11, 2001, and immediately thereafter does not exist,” stated the official counsel for American Air Lines. [Condon & Forsyth LLP, August 19, 2004, upon Commission requests July 18, 2004.] As a consequence, should this case, mostly termed as 9/11, ever be taken to court, legal individuals would not be able to acquire any material from the Airline Company because it “does not exist.” In addition, it is evident no further material about the events of that day will be released to the public domain from American Air Lines.

⁶⁸ *New York Times*. F.A.A. Official Scrapped Tape of 9/11 Controllers’ Statements, by Matthew L. Wald. May 6, 2004. Accessed 2010.
<https://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/06/national/06CND-TAPE.html>

ACS-I: The Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security, also termed ACS-I, was responsible for coordinating FAA's response to a hijacking.

Air Carrier Standard Security Plan (ACSSP): The Air Carrier Standard Security Plan in effect on September 11, 2001, "required air carriers to ensure that their employees who obtain details of an on-going act of air piracy 'do not divulge to persons other than those with an operational need to know...any information about the incident or efforts to resolve the incident.' See *ACSSP*, § XI, p. 110. Thus, the FAA-mandated procedure for responding to reports of an aircraft hijacking (on September 11, 2001,) required the air carrier to limit the disclosure of information to those persons with an operational need to know. This would not normally include pilots of other aircraft. As with other aspects of the nation's response to the September 11th terrorist attacks, the air carriers were forced to improvise in notifying other American Airlines aircraft. The FAA countermeasures in place did not address or contemplate the simultaneous multiple hijack threat." [Condon & Forsyth LLP to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: "American Airlines' SOC Notifications," Aug. 17, 2004.]

After-Action Report: No comprehensive After-Action Report "was never completed by the FAA," in regards to the September 11th events. "Everyone was working day and night on emergency measures. The potential for other attacks was real. Months later (March/April) an attempt was made to complete a report, but the creation of TSA [Transportation Security Administration] was underway and it was increasingly difficult to get all of the principles in one place to discuss what happened and generate 'lessons-learned.'"

Mike Morse, the FAA National Security Coordination Staffer in FAA-HQ, Washington, D.C., reported that Larry Bruno, the Security Regulatory Manager, was initially tasked with writing the “9/11 After-Action Report,” but “found it impossible because people could not make time to cooperate.” When Morse was tasked with the assignment, he “indicated that to accomplish the mission would require that higher level officials made it a priority.” [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR03010901): Team 7 INTERVIEW: Mike Morse the FAA National Security Coordination Staffer in FAA HQ, Washington, D.C. Sept. 25, 2003.]

Air Scramble: No American Air Line personnel at System Operations Control called the military in response for an air scramble. [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR04020035): Teams 7+8 VISIT to American Air Lines Systems Operation Centre; INTERVIEW with personnel, April 26, 2004.] In addition, Continental U.S. North American Aerospace Command Region (CONR) Major General Craig R. McKinley “noted to Commission staff that no calls came from the FAA to the NMCC [National Military Command Center at the Pentagon] as dictated by protocol [CJCSI3610.01A] in place on 9/11.” [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR04016750): Team 8 VISIT to CONR; INTERVIEW: Major General Craig R. McKinley, Feb. 03, 2004.]

Norfolk TRACON Operations Supervisor John Harter told Commission Staff the northbound aspect scramble of 090 for 60 (Atlantic Ocean, south of Martha’s Vineyard) was “unusual” to him; normally scrambles proceed east. “The northern aspect and uniqueness of the order caused him to task the East Feeder Radar to call Navy Patuxent Advisory to find out about shutting down their warning area. All they could figure out was that someone through secure communications changed the scramble order to which they were not privy.”

[COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR04017307): Team 8 INTERVIEW: Norfolk TRACON Operations Supervisor John Harter, Dec. 01, 2003.] Though Harter believed the 090 for 60 scramble orders had been around for years, he did not conclude that it was used on that particular morning because of that reason; Harter thought its use was “unusual.”

William Casson the Peninsula Radar Controller at Norfolk TRACON was also interviewed by the Commission Staff: “He took the call from HUNTRESS on the scramble line. He recalled the order contained a heading, 010, and altitude and a frequency. After that the flight strip came out with different information, 090 for 60. Langley tower called for release and he released the aircraft, gained comms [communications] with the pilot and tried to release the flight to East Peninsula. There was some initial confusion and the pilot came back to him on his frequency and he limited the flight to 23K feet, the limit for Norfolk TRACON.” [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR04017309): Team 8 INTERVIEW: William Casson the Peninsula Radar Controller at Norfolk TRACON, Dec. 01, 2003.]

Stephen Roebuck, Air Traffic Control Specialist at Sector Radar 47 Boston Control Tower, thought the jets would follow American 11; “but since it had already hit [the WTC 1] he couldn’t predict their next course of action. So Roebuck asked the pilots if they were in contact with ‘company’ (military), and they said they were. Roebuck noted that normally clearing area for fighters is very specific, so this unknown generic hold was extremely unusual.” [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR04016794): Team 8 INTERVIEW: Stephen Roebuck the Air Traffic Control Specialist at Sector radar 47 Boston, Sept. 22, 2003.]

For a more comprehensive and detailed account on this subject, visit a former professional Commission Staff member’s blog [here](#).

Air Traffic Controllers vs Cabin Crew: Air Traffic Controllers' communication with a passenger aircraft cabin crew (pilot and co-pilot) comes from two sources: First would be from ground control where all ATC communications, within a designated Traffic Control Center, is recorded on tape and then transcribed by the FAA. In the case of American 11, much of the communications was done through Boston's Control Centre where the FBI collected all voice and radar data along with several controllers' written statements. A second source would be from the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR), one of the so-called black boxes, which is located in a special area of the aircraft. The other black box is the Flight Data Recorder (FDR) and provides a different function.

The Flight Data Recorder is designed to retain information on the maneuvering, operating status, and condition of an aircraft. It reads/records time, pressure altitude, airspeed, vertical acceleration, magnetic heading, control-column position, rudder-pedal position, control-wheel position, horizontal stabilizer, and fuel flow.

The Cockpit Voice Recorder retains the final 30 minutes of happenstance in the cockpit cabin. It has four channels with impact tolerance of 3,400 Gs-6.5ms. Its fire resistance is 1,100 degrees F° (about 30C° minimum). The water pressure resistance of the CVR can allow it to submerge to 20,000 feet with an underwater locator beacon of 37.5 KHz. The battery has a 6-year "shelf life" with a 30-day operation, according to [The National Transportation Safety Board \(NTSB\)](#).

The NTSB transcribed the traffic control tape recordings from Boston Control Tower in regards to American 11. There has been no release of transcripts from the flight's CVR due to the inability to locate this black box at the tower complex crash site in New York City.



NEW YORK STATE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT OFFICE

**1220 Washington Avenue
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**Edward F. Jacoby Jr.
Director**

To: Governor George E. Pataki
cc: Mr. James G. Natoli
Director of State Operations
From: Edward F. Jacoby, Jr.
Director
Date: 9/18/01 6:00 P.M.
Subject: World Trade Center Plane Crash

Executive Summary

- Investigators have identified the signal from one of the black boxes in the WTC debris.
- Two locations have been opened for unsolicited donations. Hudson Valley Pysch Center in Poughkeepsie and the Stratford Army Engine Plant in Stratford, Conn.
- Sublevel six beneath the WTC is completely flooded with sublevel five partially flooded. DEC is determining if the excess water is due to broken pipes, water from firefighters or breaches in the retaining wall.
- Dredging operations at Pier 25 have enabled trucks to offload debris (metals) onto barges for disposal at Freshkills. The Army Corps of Engineers has started dredging operations at Pier 6.
- A screen sifting operation has been established at the Freshkills site.
- This afternoon a major attack began on the Internet against Web servers with one agency reporting 4,000-5,000 unsuccessful attempts against two of their public web servers.
- 17 G.O.D. trucks have offloaded their goods at the pier in Newark. Items include steel toed boots, respirator masks, and food and clothing.
- Cumulative total of 46,760 tons were removed from WTC site on Monday 9/17 from 12am-12pm.
- City Harvest, Red Cross and Salvation Army will be the only organizations allowed to feed people at the Red Zone. Currently these three organizations are waiting to hear from FDNY on locations to best suit them.



Dan Rather from *CBSNews* had reported that the Mayor of New York notified the public of a flight recorder found in the tower complex; this source can be found [here](#). Minutes later, the reporter redacted his report in a later video, to which this source no longer exists but used to be [here](#). On the other hand, Mayor Giuliani held up a photo of an Air Lines flight recorder, and appealed to the public in New York Wednesday, September 12, 2001, for help in locating the devices.

AirInc.: This was “a service provided to major airline carriers that has its own dedicated communications link with an aircraft, and serves the primary purpose of providing a backup method of communicating with an aircraft.” [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR04016815): Team 8 INTERVIEW: Charles Alfaro Operations Supervisor at New York Air Route Centre, Sept. 30, 2003.]

There is no official mention if this service was used by the ATC to provide additional assistance with American 11.

Airport Departure: American 11 departed from Boston-Logan International Airport in Massachusetts (MA), the United States. The flight pulled back from Terminal B at Gate 32 and taxied onto a right side Runway No. 4 (R4).

In 1923 the airport was referred to as “Boston Airport, MA;” in 1944 as “Boston Commonwealth Airport, MA;” and in 1956 it was finally named to “Boston-Logan International Airport, MA.”

The FAA Administrator’s Fact Book of July 2001, offers a statistic record from January to May 2001 and report that amongst the fifty busiest Airport Traffic

Control Towers was Boston-Logan's, ranked the 11th busiest. Dulles International Tower was ranked the 16th busiest, and Newark Liberty Tower was ranked the 19th busiest.

Tail Number 334: American 11's tail number was N334AA. The letter "N" specifies the aircraft is registered in the United States, because registration numbers in this country are commonly referred to as an "N" number. The "AA" specifies the Air Line Company; in this case, American Air Lines (AA).

"Tail Number 334, which was the equipment used on Flight 11 on 9/11/01, was one of several dozen 767 aircraft used on this route during 2001." [Condon & Forsyth LLP, March 15, 2004, upon Commission requests Feb. 03, 2004.]

Arrival at Boston: At 06:06 a.m., American 11 arrives from San Francisco to Boston-Logan International Airport as American Air Lines Flight 198. [FBI INTERVIEW: Salvatore P. Misuraca, ramp Service Customer Manager for American, Sept. 11, 2001.] This was a turn-around flight, and prepared to be serviced to set off later with another flight number. Also see Turn-around Flight


Average Load Factor by Day of Week:

Sep 2001 (9/1/01 - 9/9/01)							
<u>Flight</u>	<u>Mon</u>	<u>Tue</u>	<u>Wed</u>	<u>Thu</u>	<u>Fri</u>	<u>Sat</u>	<u>Sun</u>
11	38.5%	N/A*	29.7%	44.3%	43.6%	61.2%	45.2%
77	18.8%	22.7%	N/A*	31.3%	35.2%	45.2%	38.9%

* Flight did not operate due to off-schedule operation

›Commission Staff (Team 7) Box 18, AAL-QFR Responses.

From the above chart can be seen that from Saturday, September 1st, till Sunday, September 9th, the day al-Omari was issued his boarding pass and processed for check-in on American 11, Tuesday's AAL11 flight did not operate "due to off-schedule operation." The Tuesday in question is September 4th.



As of August 7, 2008, American Air Lines, "During periods of irregular operations / off-schedule operations / weather disruptions, agency-assisted Reaccommodations, including rebooking and reticketing when applicable, must be completed at least 60 minutes prior to the replacement flight's departure time. Adequate time must be allowed for system updates and passenger processing (security processes, baggage checks, baggage transfers, gate transfers, boarding, etc.)." ⁶⁹

Bin Ladens' Flights Out: The Commission Staff learned of this subject by two individuals including a *New York Times* article of June 01, 2004, entitled: "The Great Escape." An FBI Report referenced No. 03009447 entitled: "Pertaining to the departure of Saudi Arabian nationals from the United States on September 13 and September 14, 2001," gives some details. All articles and the FBI investigation report follow.

⁶⁹ American AirLines, Schedule Change Notification. Accessed 2014.
http://www.aa.com/i18n/agency/Booking_Ticketing/Booking/schedule_change.jsp

Saudi Departures Following 09/11/2001

- 09/18/2001 - 09/20/2001 Bin Laden family Charter, Ryan International Airlines Flight 441
 - 23 Passengers, no children, 20 Passengers were interviewed based upon the discretion of the FBI.
 - A maid was not interviewed.
 - The wife and son of Khalil Bin Laden were present during interviews, but were not interviewed separately.
 - Khalil Bin Laden was interviewed twice prior to the departure date. He then called the interviewing agent and requested security assistance in getting to the airport. A third interview was conducted during the ride.
 - Searches of the aircraft and passenger luggage were conducted, identities were checked against the manifest, and record checks were conducted.
- Prior to 09/23/2002, several chartered flights which contained Saudi passengers drew a considerable amount of attention. These flights are summarized below. After 09/23/2002, an undetermined number of Saudis departed the United States aboard commercial and chartered aircraft.
- 09/14/2001 Providence Rhode Island Charter flight
 - 4 Passengers, no children.
 - Extensive investigation including follow-up interviews were conducted into 2002.
- 09/16/2001 Jetlease USA Charter flight from Lexington, KY
 - 14 Passengers, no children.
 - All passengers were identified and confirmed prior to departure. INS, USCS, and FBI records were checked.
- 09/19/2001 Las Vegas Charter Flights (three flights)
 - 48 Passengers (three children) on 09/19/2001, 18 passengers (no children) on 09/20/2001, 34 passengers (one child) on 09/24/2001
 - FBI SAC of Las Vegas made contact with the Saudis at the Hotel prior to departure and obtained copies of passport and passenger lists.
 - Record checks were conducted and interviews were conducted where necessary.
 - 5 individuals in the party were interviewed because of information in IIIA.
 - 3 departed on 9/19/2001, with no derogatory information in IIIA.
 - One departed on 9/20/2001, with no derogatory information in IIIA
 - One, a US citizen intended to depart for Boston commercially sometime after 9/20/2001, was not identical to information in IIIA
- Following departure of these three flights a subpoena was served for telephone records of the party. No connections to the 19 hijackers of 09/11/2001 were identified.
- We have information about one Saudi Airline flight which arrived on 09/10/2001 in the course of normal business. This flight was stranded at Newark International in New Jersey along with all other commercial flights at the time. As of 09/13/2001 the flight was still

stranded.

- Investigation was conducted, which included interviews and record checks.
 - The passenger list consisted of 26 crew and 92 passengers.
 - This flight departed after the flight restrictions were lifted.
- In addition to Saudis we identified a UAE 747 which departed from Lexington, KY on 09/15/2001. No Saudis were aboard the flight. We have included this information because the *Vanity Fair* article includes a reference to a 747. No children were on board the flight.
 -

›FBI Report, No. 03009447.

The *Vanity Fair* article mentioned by the FBI is entitled: “Saving the Saudis,” written by contributing editor Craig Unger in 2003 and can still be found [here](#), but slightly altered from the original edition in regards to images and the copy the Commission Staff had. See Appendix B

Saudi Government: Bin Laden Loyalists: How High Do They Go?



Newsweek
May 5, 2003 | [Copyright](#)



Byline: Michael Isikoff with Stefan Theil in Berlin

Moving to quell an embarrassing scandal, Saudi Arabian authorities recently detained for questioning one of their own diplomats amid suspicions that he may have funneled hundreds of thousands of dollars out of official Saudi accounts to Al Qaeda operatives in Europe, NEWSWEEK has learned.

The unfolding probe into the activities of Muhammad J. Fakihi, who until recently served as acting chief of the Islamic Affairs section of the Saudi Embassy in Berlin, is being watched closely in Washington as a test of how aggressively the Saudi government is willing to root out Osama bin Laden loyalists within its own ranks. Interrogated by Saudi investigators, two sources told NEWSWEEK, Fakihi has acknowledged he sympathized with bin Laden and that he steered embassy funds to charities and mosques suggested by Qaeda loyalists. ...

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June 1, 2004

OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR

The Great Escape

By CRAIG UNGER

Americans who think the 9/11 commission is going to answer all the crucial questions about the terrorist attacks are likely to be sorely disappointed — especially if they're interested in the secret evacuation of Saudis by plane that began just after Sept. 11.

We knew that 15 out of 19 hijackers were Saudis. We knew that Osama bin Laden, a Saudi, was behind 9/11. Yet we did not conduct a police-style investigation of the departing Saudis, of whom two dozen were members of the bin Laden family. That is not to say that they were complicit in the attacks.

Unfortunately, though, we may never know the real story. The investigative panel has already concluded that there is "no credible evidence that any chartered flights of Saudi Arabian nationals departed the United States before the reopening of national airspace." But the real point is that there were still some restrictions on American airspace when the Saudi flights began.

In addition, new evidence shows that the evacuation involved more than the departure of 142 Saudis on six charter flights that the commission is investigating. According to newly released documents, 160 Saudis left the United States on 55 flights immediately after 9/11 — making a total of about 300 people who left with the apparent approval of the Bush administration, far more than has been reported before. The records were released by the Department of Homeland Security in response to a Freedom of Information Act request filed by Judicial Watch, a conservative, nonpartisan watchdog group in Washington.

The vast majority of the newly disclosed flights were commercial airline flights, not charters, often carrying just two or three Saudi passengers. They originated from more than 20 cities, including Chicago, Dallas, Denver, Detroit and Houston. One Saudi Arabian Airlines flight left Kennedy Airport on Sept. 13 with 46 Saudis. The next day, another Saudi Arabian Airlines flight left with 13 Saudis.

The panel has indicated that it has yet to find any evidence that the F.B.I. checked the manifests of departing flights against its terror watch list. The departures of additional Saudis raise more questions for the panel. Richard Clarke, the former counterterrorism czar, told The Hill newspaper recently that he took full responsibility for approving some flights. But we don't know if other Bush administration officials participated in the decision.

The passengers should have been questioned about any links to Osama bin Laden, or his financing. We have long known that some faction of the Saudi elite has helped funnel money to Islamist terrorists — inadvertently at least. Prince Ahmed bin Salman, who has been accused of being an intermediary between Al Qaeda and the House of Saud, boarded one of the evacuation planes in Kentucky. Was he interrogated by the F.B.I. before he left?

If the commission dares to address these issues, it will undoubtedly be accused of politicizing one of the most important national security investigations in American history — in an election year, no less.

But if it does not, it risks something far worse — the betrayal of the thousands of people who lost their lives that day, not to mention millions of others who want the truth.

Craig Unger is the author of "House of Bush, House of Saud: The Secret Relationship Between the World's Two Most Powerful Dynasties."

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Cancelled to Fly: The difficulty historians are faced with is with the online statistical records from the [Bureau of Transportation \(BTS\)](#) where statistics record American 11 was cancelled to fly on the day of. A phone call to the Bureau, including to the Department of Transportation (DoT), cleared up some anomalies seen in their following display charts. The telephone call was recorded and uploaded [here](#).

BTS stated that when their charts depict tail number as **UNKNOWN** and actual departure time as **00:00**, it would mean the particular flight in question, in this case American 11, was cancelled to fly out of Boston-Logan International on the day of. *Also see American Air Lines-Force Majeure*

It has been said, though we could not corroborate this, but it has been said, that when BTS was confronted on a separate occasion by email, their response was that the airline company at the time did not file any information for their flight (American 11). As a consequence, the BTS and DoT did not acquire the company for such aviation information; hence they have the flight recorded as cancelled. Again, we have not been able to corroborate this.

►American 11 Flight Schedule | September 11, 2001
(sheet 1)

Detailed Statistics Departures						
Airport: Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA-NH - Logan International (BOS)						
Airline: American Airlines (AA)						
Month(s): September						
Day(s): 11						
Year(s): 2001						
NOTE: A complete listing of airline and airport abbreviations is available. Times are reported in local time using a 24 hour clock.						
Carrier Code	Date (MM/DD/YYYY)	Flight Number	Tail Number	Destination Airport	Scheduled Departure Time	Actual Departure Time
AA	09/11/2001	11	UNKNOWN	LAX	07:45	00:00
AA	09/11/2001	145	UNKNOWN	SJC	11:00	00:00
AA	09/11/2001	153	N232AA	ORD	08:30	08:29
AA	09/11/2001	163	UNKNOWN	LAX	15:30	00:00
AA	09/11/2001	181	UNKNOWN	LAX	11:00	00:00
AA	09/11/2001	189	N3BMAA	SEA	08:45	08:43
AA	09/11/2001	193	UNKNOWN	SFO	15:25	00:00
AA	09/11/2001	195	UNKNOWN	SFO	09:00	00:00
AA	09/11/2001	197	UNKNOWN	SFO	17:10	00:00
AA	09/11/2001	223	UNKNOWN	LAX	17:30	00:00
AA	09/11/2001	225	UNKNOWN	SAN	18:10	00:00

Scheduled Departure Time	Actual Departure Time
07:45	00:00
11:00	00:00
08:30	08:29
15:30	00:00
11:00	00:00
08:45	08:43
15:25	00:00
09:00	00:00
17:10	00:00
17:30	00:00
18:10	00:00

- Analysis of above BTS chart

The departure is given from Boston-Logan International with a carrier code of AA (American Air Lines) and date for September 11, 2001. The flight number is 11; however the tail number is recorded as UNKNOWN.

Data obtained from American Air Lines confirms the tail number of this flight to be 334 (N334AA) via the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The flight is chartered with a destination for Los Angeles and is scheduled to depart at 07:45 a.m.; the actual departure time is recorded for 00:00, with schedule elapse time in 374 minutes, being actual elapse time in 0 minutes.

American 11 Flight Schedule | September 11, 2001
(sheet 2)

Scheduled Elapsed Time (Minutes)	Actual Elapsed Time (Minutes)	Departure Delay (Minutes)	Wheels-off Time	Taxi-out Time (Minutes)	Delay Carrier (Minutes)	Delay Weather (Minutes)
374	0	0 00:00	0 00:00	0 N/A	N/A	N/A
380	0	0 00:00	0 00:00	0 N/A	N/A	N/A
165	0	-1 08:41	0 00:00	12 N/A	N/A	N/A
377	0	0 00:00	0 00:00	0 N/A	N/A	N/A
380	0	0 00:00	0 00:00	0 N/A	N/A	N/A
373	0	-2 08:56	0 00:00	13 N/A	N/A	N/A
385	0	0 00:00	0 00:00	0 N/A	N/A	N/A
397	0	0 00:00	0 00:00	0 N/A	N/A	N/A
395	0	0 00:00	0 00:00	0 N/A	N/A	N/A
381	0	0 00:00	0 00:00	0 N/A	N/A	N/A
375	0	0 00:00	0 00:00	0 N/A	N/A	N/A

Wheels-off Time	Taxi-out Time (Minutes)
00:00	0
00:00	0
08:41	12
00:00	0
00:00	0
08:56	13
00:00	0
00:00	0
00:00	0
00:00	0
00:00	0

●Analysis of above BTS chart

BTS shows a departure delay in minutes of 0 and wheels-off time 00:00. The taxi-out time in minutes is also 0 with delay time in minutes being N/A (not applicable). Delay due to weather is also not applicable whereas delay by the National Aviation System (NAS) in minutes depicts not applicable. Finally, departure delay in minutes shows 1, and wheels-off time due to all the aforesaid is 00:01.

BTS and their flight charts are corroborated however by the Research and Innovative Technology Administration (RITA), which is an administration that coordinates the U.S. Department of Transportation's (DoT's) research programs and is charged with advancing the deployment of cross-cutting technologies to improve the Nation's transportation system as directed by Congress in its founding legislation. RITA brings together important data, research and technology transfer assets of DoT, including:-

1. The Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS)
2. The National Transportation Library (NTL)
3. The Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS)
4. Positioning, navigation and timing
5. Research, development and technology
6. The University Transportation Centers (UTC)
7. The Transportation Safety Institute (TSI)
8. The Volpe National Transportation Systems Center (VNTSC)

When flight statistics are requested by the BTS under DoT, statistics for each aircraft can be acquired which will include:-

- Airline information
- Date of departure
- Flight number
- Destination
- Departure time and actual departure time
- Elapsed time and actual elapsed time
- Departure delay
- Wheels-off time and taxi-out time
- Delay and aviation delay
- Departure delay

Capps I: Here, we are given some information from the Commission that Atta, whilst being screened at Portland Jetport Airport, showed up as a Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS) selectee. This was a system

“created to identify passengers who should be subject to special security measures,” the Commission states; and continues: “Under security rules in place at the time, the only consequence of Atta’s selection by CAPPS was that his checked bags were held off the plane until it was confirmed that he had boarded the aircraft. This did not hinder Atta’s plans.”

In other words, once Atta’s bags were checked in at Portland, they would be put onboard some flight (even Colgan Air Flight 5930) and travel parallel with Atta to Boston. Once landing at Boston-Logan, the bags would be transferred but remain on hold until (a) Atta checked-in at American Air Lines; (b) picked up his second boarding pass; (c) clear a second screening (which he did); and finally (d), board American 11. Only then would Atta’s bags board American 11 to accompany him on the same flight.

<div style="text-align: right;">TSA (ACS-90) 493-5091 March 6, 2002 rev. 6/2/04</div> <div style="text-align: center;">CAPPS and the “Selectee” Status of 9/11 Hijackers</div>					
SELECTEE STATUS OF SEPTEMBER 11 th HIJACKERS					
Flight	Hijacker	Checked Bags	Selectee	Reason	Clearance
American Flight 11 (BOS-LAX)	Al Shehri, Wa'il	1	Yes	CAPPS	EDS
	Al Shehri, Walid	0*	Yes	CAPPS	EDS
	Al Sugami, Satam	1	Yes	CAPPS	EDS
	Alomari, Abdulaziz	Same PNR.	No	---	N/A
	Atta, Mohamed	2 bags checked by the two passengers	No	---	N/A

▷CAPPS I Screening for American 11
September 11, 2001.

If noticed in the above chart, Atta and al-Omari had the identical passenger name record (PNR). We could not find any information from American Air Lines that would answer the following: If a passenger lost the original ticket and is re-issued the ticket, will this new ticket still hold the initial PNR? Or is a new PNR

created? If remembered, on September 9th, al-Omari re-issued his ticket because he lost the original one.

Cargo: American 11 had “two ULD’s [unit load devices ⁷⁰] of cargo, and one package of hazardous material: Dry ice.” [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR04017182): Team 7 INTERVIEW: Janet Riffe, FAA Principal Security Inspector for American Air Lines, Feb. 26, 2004.] No further information exists (at least from the Commission) on the quantity of this “dry ice” that was being transferred on American 11, and neither the facility it was scheduled to be delivered to.

Catering Company: American 11 was catered by [SkyChef](#). On the morning of, the catering company crew boarded the aircraft at 06:10 a.m., and departed the aircraft at 07:20 a.m.

Check-in Counter: American Air Line check-in counter opened at 04:00 a.m., “which was the earliest time passengers could have checked in for AA Flight 11.” [Condon & Forsyth LLP, March 15, 2004, upon Commission requests Feb. 03, 2004.]

Cleaning Crew: At 06:10 a.m., the Air Line cleaning crew boarded American 11. Wayne Kirk, member of the crew, noticed that it was quieter than usual that morning. He told the FBI in a September 12, 2001, interview, that the cleaning crew and the few members of the airplane crew who were present did not

⁷⁰ Wikipedia: “A unit load device (ULD) is a pallet or container used to load luggage, freight, and mail on wide-body aircraft and specific narrow-body aircraft. It allows a large quantity of cargo to be bundled into a single unit.”
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unit_load_device

11 speak with each other. Other members of the cleaning crew onboard American were Scott Mallette; Chris La Forest; Sergio Tungor; Luis Chavez; Mr. Martinez; and Mr. Corcoran. Mallette, La Forest, Tungor and Chavez were regular members of Kirk's cleaning crew, whereas Martinez and Corcoran were added to the crew for this assignment.

We were not able to locate Mr. Martinez and Mr. Corcoran to offer our readers further information on their added assignment, but at 06:15 a.m., Wayne Kirk stated that Captain John Ogonowski entered the cockpit and from 06:50 a.m., till 07:10 a.m., was checking on the progress of the cleaning crew. At 07:30 a.m., all cleaning crew leaves the aircraft. When Wayne Kirk left the plane, "the flight attendant [approximately 50-years-old] was near the rear galley and the Captain was outside checking the landing gear. Kirk thought it was odd that only those two crew members [Captain and Flight Attendant] had arrived at the plane. Usually the entire crew is sitting around and talking when the cleaning crew finishes." The Flight Attendant in question was Kathleen Nicosia. At the same time, Michael Woodward, Flight Service Manager for American Air Lines in Boston, Massachusetts, boarded the aircraft "in order to check on the status of the flight and the flight attendants," as he told the FBI who interviewed him on September 13, 2001. There is no mention from either Wayne Kirk or from Michael Woodward that they noticed each other.

Cockpit Doors:

Cockpit Doors

In 1964 the FAA implemented a rule requiring the "closing and locking of crew compartment doors of scheduled air carriers and other large commercial aircraft in flight to deter passengers from entering the flight deck either intentionally or inadvertently."²⁰⁵

²⁰⁵ Chronology; www.faa.gov

While flight standard rules implemented in the 1960's required that air crew keep the cockpit door closed and locked in-flight. This rule, however, was neither observed by flight crew, nor enforced by the Federal Aviation Administration. (PLACEHOLDER: PROVIDE MORE ON THIS)

►TEAM 7 DRAFT MONOGRAPH on CIVIL AVIATION AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
Sam Brinkley, William Johnstone, John Raidt

The Commission Staff Report of August 26, 2004, stated: “Under American Airline’s policy in effect on 9/11, every crew member, including each of the flight attendants, had a key to the cockpit. The airline’s Flight Standards Manual instructed the crews to guard their keys carefully. Rules implemented in the 1960s required that air crews keep the cockpit door closed and locked during flight, though the requirement was not always observed by flight crews or enforced by the FAA.”

U.S. Army Lieutenant General Mike Canavan, who was FAA Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security (ACS-1), was interviewed on the subject by the Commission Staff. Canavan told the Commission Staff: “He remembered that there had been an effort to seek hardening of cockpit doors but that the air carriers did not want this change because it added weight and cost money. He said that in terms of hardened cockpit doors, hardened containers and the screening rules, the air carriers would either delay or kill the reform.” [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR040117207): Team 7 INTERVIEW: Lt. General Mike Canavan, former FAA Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation, Nov. 04, 2003.]

“We do not know exactly how the hijackers gained access to the cockpit,” the Commission reports. “FAA rules required that the doors remain closed and locked during flight. [Betty] Ong [Flight Attendant on American 11] speculated that they had ‘jammed their way’ in. Perhaps the terrorists stabbed the flight attendants to get a cockpit key, to force one of them to open the cockpit door,

or to lure the captain or first officer out of the cockpit. Or the flight attendants may just have been in their way.”

Janet Riffe the Principal Security Inspector for American Air Lines, “Was aware that American had one key that fit all cockpits and jet-bridges. She thought that this was a questionable practice, but there was no regulation prohibiting it, and any attempt to regulate it wouldn’t meet the cost/benefit requirements of federal regulatory law.” [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR04017182): Team 7 INTERVIEW: Janet Riffe, FAA Principal Security Inspector for American Air Lines, Feb. 26, 2004.]

Michael Woodward the Supervisor at the Boston Office, “Confirmed that every flight attendant on board was issued two keys: A jet bridge key, that gets them through all of the jet bridge gates throughout the system except for Chicago, and a cockpit key which, prior to 9-11, opened all cockpit doors and also opened the cabinets for emergency equipment like the defibrillator and the enhanced medical kit. Flight Attendants carried the keys on their person.” [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR04017171): Team 7 INTERVIEW: Michael Woodward, Supervisor at the Boston office, Jan. 25, 2004.]

Code-share Agreement: The [Pacific Magazine and Islands Business](#) offers an explanation of what code-share is: “You’re not quite sure what a codeshare is? Well, every airline’s codesharing nowadays so as to keep in business. It’s when you board an aeroplane brandishing, say an American Airlines ticket and find the plane is run by, say, Air Iraq, and it’s not a hijack.” Unknown if pun was intended from the writer of the article.

Travelbiz Australia confirmed on September 12, 2001, that the “hijacked US airliners” of September 11th, were confirmed code-share flights with Qantas and Air New Zealand. “Qantas and Air New Zealand have confirmed that the

flights used in the wave of terrorist attacks in the US overnight were involved with code-share arrangements with the local carriers. Qantas said that it believed six US residents were flying as Qantas codeshare on American Airlines Flight 77 from Washington Dulles to Los Angeles which was deliberately crashed into the US defence headquarters, the Pentagon, just before midnight AEST. Qantas also said one of its US-based staff members was travelling on company business aboard American Airlines Flight 11 from Boston to Los Angeles, which crashed into the World Trade Centre (WTC) in New York. No passengers or crew are believed to have survived either crash.”⁷¹

Two passengers were Qantas employees onboard American 11, not one as the above article states: Albert Dominguez, seated in 11J, was a 66-year-old Australian. He was a baggage handler for Qantas. The other passenger was 34-year-old Laura Lee Morabito, seated in 2D. Mrs. Morabito was a non-revenue Qantas employee (through the Oneworld Alliance) traveling on company business. She was confirmed in Coach Inventory as a business traveler and upgraded at the gate to First Class. She never had a pre-reserved seat in Coach because non-revenue travelers are not allowed advance seating.

‣Qantas code-share agreement with American Air Lines

American Airline Flight 77

American Airline Flight 11

‣Air New Zealand code-share agreement with United Air Lines

United Airline Flight 175 (operated with tail #NZ9051)

⁷¹ Travelbiz Australia.

<https://web.archive.org/web/20020223125031/http://www.travelbiz.com.au/articles/96/0c007296.asp>

Communication Nets: Three communication networks were used by the FAA and could be activated in an emergency:-

‣Primary Net, which was operated out of the Washington Operations Center (WOC) adjacent to the Air Control Center, and which could be activated by FAA Operations. It served as a means of bringing other Federal Agencies, including CIA, FBI, the White House, the National Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon, regional FAA division managers, and the Secret Service into the loop, and also as a way of assembling decision-makers to allow for coordinated action. This was activated at 09:20 a.m., on September 11, 2001.

‣Tactical (or Secondary) Net, which was an internal network for FAA personnel, was also activated on September 11, 2001, at 08:55 a.m.

‣Tertiary Net, which was apparently not used on September 11, 2001, was allowed for “side bar” communications that may not have been appropriate for the Primary Net.

Cross-country Flight Course: John Hartling was one of the Air Traffic Control Specialists at Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center. He Handled data regarding American 11 from 12:33 p.m., till 13:03 p.m., on the morning of.

When Hartling was interviewed by the Commission Staff, he noted the pre-planning air route taken by American 11 was “in no way predictable,” and could have been “modified on any given day to allow for developing weather conditions. It is usually a ‘company’ (Airline Company) decision as to which route one of their flights may take, and Hartling believes much of this decision is based on the amount of fuel a particular route necessitates.” [COMMISSION

MEMORANDUM (MFRO4016789): Team 8 INTERVIEW: John Hartling, Air Traffic Control Specialist at Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center, Sept. 22, 2003.]

Electronic Gate Reader (EGR): The initiation of the Electronic Gate Reader (EGR) is done at the discretion of the on duty Gate Agent. When initiated, the system downloads information for the particular flight that is inquired in such as (a) names of all passengers holding reservations; (b) their check-in status; (c) their seat assignment (if pre-reserved); (d) their booking class; and (e), their destination city. In addition, the Electronic Gate Reader “polls” the Sabre passenger reservation system for any updates to the pre-mentioned passenger data. The EGR records do not provide the exact time of individual passenger check-in, the check-in location (ticket counter vs. departure gate), nor the identification of the check-in agent. The EGR system for a particular flight is manually initiated by the gate agent usually several hours prior to boarding, when updates occur at approximately 15-minute intervals and provide a “snapshot” of any changes in information since the last update. For this reason, the ticket counter check-in times from the EGR system reflect only “approximate” times.

During actual boarding of the flights, the “polling” process occurs more frequently, at approximately 15-second intervals. The EGR records the time that a passenger’s boarding pass goes through the EGR and, provides an accurate record of when the passenger boards the aircraft. [Condon & Forsyth LLP, March 15, 2004, upon Commission requests Feb. 03, 2004.]

Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (Egpws): BOEING 767-223ER had a system that was designed to alert Cabin Crew that the aircraft was being commandeered into immediate danger of the ground or into an obstacle. This

system was the Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System also known as EGPWS. According to an article in Aviation Week, “The hijacked passenger jets that hit the World Trade Center buildings were equipped with EGPWS, notes Bateman. The twin towers were in the database, and EGPWS probably began sounding warnings 40 sec. before impact; but the system is not designed to wrest control from the pilot to avoid a collision.” [Aviation Week, Sept. 25, 2005.](#)

FBI Notification: Larry Wansley, Director of Security for American Air Lines at Ft. Worth, Texas, called Special Agent Danny Defenbaugh at the FBI’s Dallas Field Office a little after 08:45 a.m., to inform of American 11’s situation. What was not questioned by the Commission Staff, who interviewed Larry Wansley, is the following they relate he said:-

“While he [Wansley] was on the call with [Special Agent] Defenbaugh in Baker’s office, he heard the shriek of someone who was in the conference room and saw the footage of the plane going into the WTC[1]. He remembers the commentator said that it was a small airplane. He told [Special Agent] Defenbaugh to turn on the TV to see what was going on. Wansley said [to the Commission Staff] he did not connect the hijacking with the incident at WTC[1] because the commentator said that it was a small airplane. While they were watching the WTC[1] story on TV, [Special Agent] Defenbaugh told Wansley that he was sending a team of agents to AAL headquarters. As they were talking on the phone and watching the events related to the WTC[1] on TV, they watched the second jet hit the WTC[2].” ⁷²

⁷² COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFRO4017173): Team 7 INTERVIEW with Larry Wansley, Director of Security, American Airlines, January 8, 2004.
http://www.911myths.com/index.php/9-11_Commission_Records#Box_DH.1

The impact of American 11 into the WTC 1 was never broadcasted live as Wansley said when “he heard the shriek of someone who was in the conference room and saw the footage of the plane going into the WTC[1].” The footage the Naudets captured of American 11’s impact was broadcasted by the U.S. media 13 hours later by “Gamma Agency” as the known distributor.

Since Wansley’s “primary function was to serve as a liaison to the FBI,” he later “received a commendation from the FBI on his efforts.”

Yet another irregularity crops up: Mrs. Vanessa Minter, an American Air Line Reservation Agent on duty that morning was interviewed by WRAL. She stated that five minutes into the call with Betty Ong (Flight Attendant on American 11) the FBI arrived and “pulled” Mrs. Minter off the call. [WRAL, CAPITOL BROADCASTING COMPANY, INC.: INTERVIEW WITH VANESSA MINTER, SEPT 10, 2011.]⁷³ This would mean that by 08:30 a.m., the latest, the FBI was aware of American 11’s hijacking situation. However, Larry Wansley, Director of Security for American Air Lines at Ft. Worth, Texas, called Special Agent Danny Defenbaugh at the FBI’s Dallas Field Office a little after 08:45 a.m., to notify them that American 11 was a hijacked aircraft.

FAA vs Commission Staff: In a Commission Staff meeting with Andrew Steinberg, the FAA Chief Counsel, he complained how the Commission Staff had turned down “many offers of FAA technical assistance and offers of help to better understand FAA air traffic matters.” [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR04017322): Team 8 MEETING: FAA Chief Counsel, Andrew Steinberg, Dec. 12, 2003.] The result of this meeting was Steinberg saying to the Commission Staff: “You have to understand that we don’t know how the FAA

⁷³ <http://www.wral.com/news/local/video/10111135/>

will be handled in the NC's [National Commissions'] report. So we have to, and should, approach this as more of a litigation matter."

Fire Axe: American 11 (BOEING 767-223ER) had a fire axe located behind the seat of the First Officer near the floor. "The First Officer sits on the right of the cockpit while the Captain sits on the left. The fire axe is used to break through panels to aid in the extinguishing of on-board fires and is also used as an extrication tool for escape." [Unidentified Special Investigator and Firearms Instructor, Firearms Training Unit, FBI Academy, interviewed on Dec. 19, 2001.]

The axe could also be used as a defensive weapon; but we do not have any information if First Officer Thomas McGuinness of American 11 was able to use it, and/or if Atta, or whoever commandeered the aircraft, secured the weapon from McGuinness's reach.

Flight Schedule: "From March 2 through September 11, 2001, the scheduled departure time for AA Flight 11 was 7:45 a.m. From January 1 through March 1, 2001, the scheduled departure time for AA Flight 11 was 8:15 a.m. The flight was daily and non-stop during the entire time period referenced." [Condon & Forsyth LLP, March 15, 2004, upon Commission requests Feb. 03, 2004.]

Flight Training: The flight training data in regards to the suspected hijackers onboard American 11 comes from the 9/11 Commission Briefing Flight Training, January 13, 2004, and created by John Allen the Deputy Director, Flight Standards Service.

MOHAMED ATTA

Height: 6.7" / Weight: 153lb (69kg)

Hair/Eyes: Brown

Third Class Medical Pass: July 24, 2000

Surgery: Appendicitis (unknown date)

Identifying body marks, scar, tattoos: Abnormal ⁷⁴

Aircraft PA-34-200T Tail# N759HA: 29.10hrs

Temporary Airman Certificate Issued: November 20, 2000 ⁷⁵

Commercial Pilot Certificate Issued: December 21, 2000

Commercial Pilot Certificate: No.2638990

Application for lost/destroyed: June 04, 2001

No	Condition	Yes	No	Condition	Yes	No	Condition	Yes	No	Condition
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Frequent or severe headaches	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Heart or vascular trouble	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Mental disorders of any sort, depression, anxiety, etc.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Military medical discharge
<input type="checkbox"/>	Dizziness or fainting spell	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	High or low blood pressure	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Substance dependence or failed a drug test even as substance abuse or the illegal substance in the past 2 years	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Medical rejection by military service
<input type="checkbox"/>	Unconsciousness for any reason	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Stomach, liver, or intestinal trouble	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Alcohol dependence or abuse	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Rejection for life or health insurance
<input type="checkbox"/>	Eye or vision trouble except glasses	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Kidney stones or blood in urine	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Suicide attempt	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Admission to hospital
<input type="checkbox"/>	Hay fever or allergy	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Diabetes	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Motion sickness requiring medication	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Other illness, disability, or surgery
<input type="checkbox"/>	Asthma or lung disease	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Neurological disorders, epilepsy, seizures, stroke, paralysis, etc.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>				APPENDICITIS

Continuation and/or Administrative Action: None. See instructions. Date: _____

FAA Medical Record of MOHAMED ATTA, July 24, 2000.

Knowledge area codes in which questions were answered incorrectly.
See appropriate Advisory Circular (AC) Knowledge Test Guide available via
the Internet: <http://afs600.faa.gov/data/advisorycircular/ac60-25d.pdf>
A single code may represent more than one incorrect response.

B09 H307 H66 I23 H342

Computer Assisted Testing Service (CATS)

FAA Airman Computer Test Record, Mohamed Atta, December 19, 2000.

Score 93, Grade PASS


⁷⁴ This must have referred to the scar from Appendicitis surgery.

⁷⁵ On this certificate, the weight of Atta is 148lb (67kg); a difference of 5lb (2kg) from what was stated on the application for lost/destroyed Pilot Certificate.


**Application for lost/destroyed
Commercial Pilot Certificate
June 04, 2001.**


Signature


**Temporary Airman Certificate Issued
November 20, 2000.**


AIRMAN'S SIGNATURE

**Airman Certificate and/or Rating Application
December 21, 2000.**

Signature of Applicant MOHAMED NMN ATTA 

**FAA Medical Record
July 24, 2000.**

statement that accompanies this form.
Signature of Applicant 

Various FAA forms, documents and applications where
Atta's signature appears



Terrorists Who Had FAA Certificates

→ Mohamed NMN⁵ Atta (Citizenship: Egyptian)

- DOB: 09/01/1968
- Approximately 250 total flight hours (based on entries on last airman application dated 12/21/2000)
- Commercial Pilot, Airplane Multiengine Land, Instrument Airplane; Private pilot privileges in airplane single engine land
- First certificate issued: 9/18/2000 (Private, issued in Florida at Huffman Aviation)
- Last certificate issued: 12/21/2000 (Commercial, issued in Florida at Huffman Aviation)
- Various permanent addresses given for Florida
- Took flying lessons at Airman Flight School, Norman Oklahoma; Huffman Aviation in Venice, Florida; Jones Aviation in Sarasota, Florida; obtained Boeing flight simulator training at Sim Center and Pan Am International in Opa-locka, Florida

⁵stands for "no middle name"



9/11 Commission Briefing Flight Training, January 13, 2004.

Created by John Allen, Deputy Director-Flight Standards Service.

COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR04021445): Team 7 VISIT to FAA HQ, Washington D.C.,
January 13, 2004.

- Approximately 250 total flight hours based on entries on last airman application dated December 21, 2000.
- Commercial Pilot - Airplane Multiengine Land, Instrument Airplane.
- Private pilot privileges in airplane single engine land.
- First certificate issued September 18, 2000; Private certificate issued in Florida at Huffman Aviation with last certificate issued December 21, 2000; Commercial certificate issued in Florida at Huffman Aviation.
- Took flying lessons at (1) Airman Flight School (Norman, Oklahoma); (2) Huffman Aviation (Venice, Florida); (3) Jones Aviation (Sarasota, Florida).

- Obtained Boeing flight simulator training at Sim Center and at Pan Am International (Opatocka, Florida).

Terrorists Who Had FAA Certificates

➔ **Waleed Ahmed Al-Shehri (Citizenship: Saudi Arabia)**

- DOB: 01/01/1976
- Approximately 250 total flight hours (based on entries on last airman application dated 02/24/1996)
- Commercial Pilot - Airplane Single and Multiengine Land
- Instrument Airplane
- Flight Instructor – Airplane Single Engine, Instrument Airplane
- First Certificate Issued: 03/01/1995 (Private, Embry Riddle Aeronautical University-ERAU)
- Flight Instructor Certificate Issued: 12/10/1997 (ERAU)⁶
- Last Rating Issued to Commercial certificate: 3/19/1996 (Addition of multiengine rating, ERAU)

⁶No indication that CFI was renewed; should have been renewed 12/99 and 12/01

(Note: This individual was subsequently cleared of being a hijacker by the FBI.)

9/11 Commission Briefing Flight Training, January 13, 2004.

Created by John Allen, Deputy Director-Flight Standards Service.

COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR04021445): Team 7 VISIT to FAA HQ, Washington D.C.,
January 13, 2004.

It remains unclear why the Commission Staff were briefed by the FAA on an individual who had been cleared by the FBI of being a “hijacker” on American 11; but it does show that Waleed M. al-Shehri was still an elusive individual (at least for the FAA) even in 2004, and there is no evidence to prove otherwise.

In all 9/11 Commission Report accounts, this person is referred to simply as “Waleed al-Shehri” without an initial or middle name. This, after FBI Press Releases had Mr. al-Shehri with an “M” as a middle initial; and after September 13, 2001, when Mr. Waleed Ahmed al-Shehri began drawing universal attention of his innocence; and after the FAA investigated Mr. Waleed Ahmed al-Shehri’s renewal of his Pilot Certificate in 2003; and after the 9/11 CR was printed in the summer of 2004, whereas the Flight Training Briefing was presented to Commission Staff much earlier, on January 13, 2004.

Waleed Ahmed Al-Shehri	First Class Medical ID# (b) (6)
	Issued 8/18/2003
	Restriction: Must wear corrective lenses

Details: In response to continuing inquiries, New York is providing information to the field to clear up the misidentification of WALEED AL SHEHRI.

During the course of the PENTTBOM investigation, the identity of suspected hijacker WALEED M. AL SHEHRI, date of birth December 20, 1978, has become confused with the identity of WALEED AL SHEHRI, date of birth [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The correct identifying information is as follows: **PLEASE NOTE: THE TWO ARE NOT IDENTICAL.**

(SUSPECTED HIJACKER)
WALEED M. ALSHEHRI
WALEED MOHAMMED AL SHEHRI
DOB: December 20, 1978
Florida DL#: A426-893-78-460-0
1600 N Ocean Dr #8
Hollywood, FL 33019
SSAN: None

(AIRLINE PILOT)



A comparison of the Florida Driver's license photographs of the two Waleed Al Shehris show them to be not identical.

Fueling the Aircraft: American 11 refueled with a total of 76,000 pounds of JET-A ⁷⁶ fuel comprised of 36,000 pounds in each wing tank. The aircraft's center ("belly" tank) was not filled. [FBI INTERVIEW: Shawn Trotman, American Air Lines "fueler." Sept. 16, 2001.]

The Commission Staff Timeline (Team 7) report that the aircraft's JET-A fuel capacity was 137,000 lbs (20,450 gallons). The Staff Commission Report of August 26, 2004, states the flight "was loaded with 76,400 pounds of fuel, above the average fuel load of 70,000 pounds." This is an additional 400 pounds of fuel added without reporting the "belly" was not filled with fuel. NIST investigators, however, took this into consideration. See World Trade Center

Funding: The Commission had noted (by 2004) that the U.S. government had not been able to determine the origin of the money used for the September 2001 attacks. "Ultimately," they reported, "the question is of little practical significance." [9/11 CR, p.172.] The Intelligence Community saw it as a significant enough element to acquire information not only of the country this money came from, but also from whom.

Though the Commission go into an extensive detailed report on the financing issue, the report is a repeat on what the FBI had discovered, which led to creating a 155 page report of August 29, 2004, entitled: "National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: Monograph on Terrorist Financing, Staff Report to the Commission," by John Roth, Douglas Greenburg, Serena Wille, and prefaced by Philip Zelikow. The Commission does estimate however that the "plot" of 9/11 cost "\$400,000-\$500,000 over nearly two years." How did this estimate generate? From the "intelligence report, interrogation of KSM,

⁷⁶ Wikipedia article: Jet A fuel has a flash point higher than 38 °C (100 °F), with an auto ignition temperature of 210 °C (410 °F).
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jet_fuel#Jet_A

[Khalid Sheikh Mohammed,] July 25, 2003,” as inserted in the Commission Report footnote 110, Ch.5.

According to an article in the [Daily Mail](#), the individual who illuminated the funding and cost, “didn’t crack after CIA interrogators pushed him around, slapped him, physically intimidated him or waterboarded him 183 times. The mastermind of the September 11 terrorist attacks finally spilled his information about upcoming al-Qaeda plots after he was kept awake for 180 hours - seven and a half days - straight.” All 92 tapes of the “interrogations” were destroyed.

Another article in the [Bolivar Commercial](#), reports that “Navy Commander Alphonso Mortimer Doss was promoted in 2011 to his current rank in a ceremony held at Navy Operational Support Center Jacksonville, Fla.” The Commander “was ordered in 2006 by the Deputy Secretary of the Navy to assist in conducting the Annual Review Boards for suspected enemy-combatants held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. There, Doss’ team was charged with interviewing detainees and conducting boards to determine if the detainee in question should be released, transferred to another facility or be recommended for continued detention at Guantanamo Bay. It was during this tour that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed admitted to Doss’ team that he was one of the masterminds behind 9/11.”

In February 2014, Navy Commander Alphonso Mortimer Doss is killed “for \$1 million in life insurance money,” as reported by [The Florida Times Union](#).

Others, like SSA Brian Filbert who was contacted by the Commission Staff on January 28, 2004, was “familiar with the oft-cited \$500,000 estimate of the plot cost,” but could not say how that number was generated or by whom. [COMMISSION STAFF MEMORANDUM (MFR04016482): Team 4 INTERVIEW: SSA Brian Filbert, Jan. 28, 2004.]


The FBI also delved into allegations of al-Qaida's illicit diamond trades in the Republic of Liberia, a country in West Africa bordered by Sierra Leone to its west, Guinea to its north and Ivory Coast to its east. It covers an area of 111,369 square kilometres (43,000 sq mi) and is home to about 4 million.

The official diamond trade in Sierra Leone has grown from 1.4 million dollars in diamond exports in 1999, to 6.5 million dollars in 2000, 26 million dollars in 2001, 41.7 million dollars in 2002, and 33.4 million dollars during the first five months of 2003. The Sierra Leonean Police, the U.S. Embassy officials in Sierra Leone, and U.N. Special Court personnel, opined that the majority of diamonds are illegally smuggled out of the country and that the total of official and illicit diamonds exported from Sierra Leone on a yearly basis is estimated to be an amount up to 300 million dollars.

›FBI Report "Allegations of AlQaida Trafficking in Conflict Diamonds,"
Executive Summary, July 18, 2003.

The FBI is also suspected, this has never officially been confirmed, but is also suspected to have delved into the following case that comes from two reports and was picked up by [The Wall Street Journal](#).

One report came from a Pakistani article online edition called [Dawn](#). It reported a story from the "PTI Website." The [9/11 Myths](#) Website did a substantial research into the article, and suggested that the PTI stands for [India's Premiere News Agency](#). Where, and if, PTI gathered the information cannot be traced due to Website's lack of searchable archives. The other report came from an online Indian outlet, [The Times of India](#). They built upon Dawn's report and both reports were published on October 09, 2001. The *Wall Street Journal* picked up the story the following day. An interesting article on the subject can be found at [Salon Website](#). The link to the story can be found [here](#). There is no mention in the 9/11 CR if this story was accurate or not; no FBI report has been found corroborating or denying the story. The motive behind its conception remains unknown.



Previous Next

09 October 2001 Tuesday 21 Rajab 1422

Gen Mahmud's exit due to links with Umar Sheikh

Monitoring Desk

NEW DELHI, Oct 8: Director General of Pakistan's Inter- Services Intelligence (ISI) Lt Gen Mahmud Ahmed has been replaced after the FBI investigators established credible links between him and Umar Sheikh, one of the three militants released in exchange for passengers of the hijacked Indian Airlines plane in 1999.

The FBI team, which had sought adequate inputs about various terrorists including Sheikh from the intelligence agencies, was working on the linkages between Sheikh and former ISI chief Gen Mahmud which are believed to have been substantiated, reports PTI website.

Informed sources said there were enough indications with the US intelligence agencies that it was at Gen Mahmud's instruction that Sheikh had transferred 100,000 US dollars into the account of Mohammed Atta, one of the lead terrorists in strikes at the World Trade Centre on Sept 11, it adds.

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India helped FBI trace ISI-terrorist links

MANOJ JOSHI

TIMES NEWS NETWORK [TUESDAY, OCTOBER 09, 2001 11:08:55 PM]

NEW DELHI: While the Pakistani Inter Services Public Relations claimed that former ISI director-general Lt-Gen Mahmud Ahmad sought retirement after being superseded on Monday, the truth is more shocking.

Top sources confirmed here on Tuesday, that the general lost his job because of the "evidence" India produced to show his links to one of the suicide bombers that wrecked the World Trade Centre. The US authorities sought his removal after confirming the fact that \$100,000 were wired to WTC hijacker Mohammed Atta from Pakistan by Ahmad Umar Sheikh at the instance of Gen Mahmud.

Senior government sources have confirmed that India contributed significantly to establishing the link between the money transfer and the role played by the dismissed ISI chief. While they did not provide details, they said that Indian inputs, including Sheikh's mobile phone number, helped the FBI in tracing and establishing the link.

A direct link between the ISI and the WTC attack could have enormous repercussions. The US cannot but suspect whether or not there were other senior Pakistani Army commanders who were in the know of things. Evidence of a larger conspiracy could shake US confidence in Pakistan's ability to participate in the anti-terrorism coalition.

Indian officials say they are vitally interested in the unravelling of the case since it could link the ISI directly to the hijacking of the Indian Airlines Kathmandu-Delhi flight to Kandahar last December. Ahmad Umar Sayeed Sheikh is a British national and a London School of Economics graduate who was arrested by the police in Delhi following a bungled 1994 kidnapping of four westerners, including an American citizen.

INDIA HEADLINES

SC stays firm, no crackers after 10 pm

Law panel rules out common code for all

Private parties can move SC

Courts have given little hope to rape victims

Activists slam BJP 'exhibiting' rape victim

No issues, so BJP focuses on Congress

MP removes hoardings of President

Pak - Baglihar violates treaty

J&K welcomes initiative

India's offer is a major step, says US

Pakistan disowns its agents

News, FDI for FM radio soon

India hosts training programme for UN peacekeepers

For RSS, Advani balances peace package

Daler gets conditional bail

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Boeing Company ⁷⁷: As regards funding expenses on the Boeing Company and even though they were financially wounded as a result of the September 2001 event, the “company and employee cash contributions,” the company’s 2001 financial report states, “were more than \$92.7 million. A substantial portion of these gifts, more than \$43.9 million, came from exceptionally generous Boeing employees and retirees, through ECF and individual donations.” In addition, the report announces that the amount of “\$8.4 million” was given “in relief funds for victims of Sept. 11 tragedies.” ⁷⁸

However, on September 18, 2001, Boeing’s Press Release was bitter. “Given the impacts of the horrific attacks of September 11, and the resulting capacity reductions now anticipated by its airline customers, Boeing’s Commercial Airplanes unit is setting in place plans to reduce its employment by approximately 20,000 to 30,000 people by the end of 2002. This includes a reduction in related support personnel at Boeing’s Shared Services Group.” ⁷⁹

Victim Compensation Fund: The Stabilization Act, which was approved on September 22, 2001, under SEC. 403. stated its was “to provide compensation to any individual (or relatives of a deceased individual) who was physically injured or killed as a result of the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001.” When a claim was made for this compensation, “the claimant waives the right to file a civil action (or to be a party to an action) in any Federal or State court for damages sustained as a result of the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001.”

⁷⁷ William Edward Boeing (1881-1956) an American aviation pioneer founded The Boeing Company.

⁷⁸ Boeing’s financial report (2001).

<http://www.boeing.com/companyoffices/financial/finreports/annual/01annualreport/>

⁷⁹ Boeing’s Press Release, September 18, 2001. Accessed 2014.

http://web.archive.org/web/20011020000450/http://boeing.com/news/releases/2001/q3/nr_010918z.html

According to the “Final Report of the Special Master for the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001,” in their Volume I edition, it states that “the Fund was an unqualified success: 97% of the families of deceased victims who might otherwise have pursued lawsuits for years have received compensation through the Fund. The Fund provided generously for those directly affected by the attack. In total, the Fund distributed over \$7.049 billion to survivors of 2,880 persons killed in the September 11th attacks and to 2,680 individuals who were injured in the attacks or in the rescue efforts conducted thereafter. The average award for families of victims killed in the attacks exceeded \$2 million. The average award for injured victims was nearly \$400,000.”

Though the abovementioned report mentioned “2,680 individuals who were injured in the attacks or in the rescue efforts conducted thereafter,” the [TenantWise](#) Website reported, “Given that approximately 5,000 people were lost, that means, sadly, a commensurate loss of 1.25 MM sq. ft that will not immediately need to be replaced.”

The discrepancies as to the exact number of people who lost their lives on that morning in New York will perhaps remain unclear for time to come; not even the exact number of those lost in the towers are known according to a Wikipedia article for American 11 at its impact into the WTC 1, “killing all 87 people aboard plus the hijackers, and an unknown number in the building’s impact zone.”⁸⁰ And, “nearly 1,000 first-responders,” reported *The Daily News* on November 11, 2010, “and other World Trade Center workers have died since 2001.”⁸¹

⁸⁰ Wikipedia article, “American Airlines, Flight 11.” Accessed: 2010.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Airlines_Flight_11

⁸¹ *Daily News* article, “As death toll of 9/11 responders nears 1,000, pols want autopsy standards to pinpoint causes.” By Michael McAuliff, November 11, 2010. Accessed: 2014.

NIST investigators confirm the unknown exact loss of lives, in particular they refer to the WTC 1 demise when stating, “Of the roughly 7,545 building occupants who started that morning below the 92nd floor, all but 107 escaped the building. Those left behind were trapped by debris, awaiting assistance, helping others, or were just too late in starting their egress.” As a conclusion, “It remains unclear how many of these people survived.” [NIST NCSTAR 1, Sept. 2005.]

Tax deductions were made from the Victim Compensation Fund: “The presumed methodology determines the net income after deducting the average effective combined federal, state and local income tax rate for the victim’s income bracket applicable in the state of the victim’s domicile. The computation of tax rate was based on the lesser of two rates - one calculated using Internal Revenue Service (IRS) data or one calculated based on the victim’s actual tax returns.” [Department of Justice: Final Report of the Special Master for the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, Vol. I.]

Gate & Terminal Departure | Checkpoints: “American gates B4 and B5, America West gates 37-38, American Eagle gates 22-25 in Terminal B. TSA [Transportation Security Administration] officially took over responsibility of airport checkpoints nationally on February 17, 2002. Logan International Airport has 14 checkpoints.” ⁸²

Abbott Installations had finished a week before September 11 working at the adjacent Gate to Gate 32, Terminal B, at Boston-Logan. [FBI Interview

<http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/death-toll-9-11-responders-nears-1-000-pols-autopsy-standards-pinpoint-article-1.453796>

⁸² TSA to Federalize Ninth Checkpoint at Logan International Airport, October 23, 2002.

https://web.archive.org/web/20030427183837/http://www.massport.com/about/press02/press_news_tsa3.html

Katherine Goudreau, Director of Airport Systems, Sept. 13, 2001.] No information exists as to what this work pertained to.

Boston-Logan International (2001)



Terminal B


›Image [Creative Commons | WoodyBox 2000](#)

An airliner will pull out of a Gate that belongs either to the flight's Air Line Company, or to one of its code-share partners. The Boston Ground Control transcript, with the Cabin Crew of American 11, printed in the [New York Times](#), was given earlier, and verifies the flight pulled out of Gate 32 on the morning of. From additional information sought, all employees at Boston-Logan, who were either involved or participated in the process of American 11's flight, told

of Gate 32 being the Gate the flight pulled out from. The Terminal was reported as being Terminal B.

There were 19 Gate Agents working at American Air Line Boston-Logan ticket counter and two Gate Agents working at Gate 32 from where American 11 pushed off on the morning of. For [personal privacy reasons](#), we will not add the names of these Gate Operators; some names however can be found in the [Commission Staff \(Team 7\) Box 18 Report](#).

All Gate Operators' names, who processed for check-in the five suspected hijackers on American 11, have also been withheld by the Commission under the [9/11 Personal Privacy Act](#): "Records containing information about a living individual of a private or personal nature that could reasonably be expected to cause a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy, including but not limited to information about the physical or mental health or the medical or psychiatric care or treatment of the individual, and that (1) contain personal information not known to have been previously made public, and (2) relate to events less than 75 years old. This information includes social security numbers, addresses and telephone numbers of those closely connected with the hijackers and not accused of complicity, and visa and immigration information not compiled for law enforcement purposes."



General Telephone & Electronics Corporation (GTE):

2. GTE Air phone Records American does not have any records for telephone calls made from the GTE phones on Flights 11 and 77. The service provider for these phones was AT&T Claircom. Claircom maintained all records pertaining to calls made from these phones. Itemized records for phone calls were not provided to American. The only reports American received from Claircom were monthly system wide reliability reports, which did not list individual calls made on specific flights. Claircom went out of business in 2002.

Commission Staff (Team7) Box18 "AAL Letters"

"Claircom International/AT&T Wireless Services (Aviation Communications Division) is 90 percent owned by McCaw Cellular Communications Inc., and 10 percent owned by Cantel. McCaw is the nation's largest provider of cellular service, offering wireless voice and data communications. McCaw is a wholly owned subsidiary of AT&T and will make the transition to the operating name of AT&T Wireless Services during the third quarter of 1995. Claircom International/AT&T Wireless Services is a subsidiary of AT&T Corp." ⁸³ On May 27, 1997, Claircom Communications Group, Inc., was involved in a law suit due to their "tariff doctrine." ⁸⁴ In 2001, the company provided American Air Lines with Air phone capabilities. By 2002, the company "went out of business." ⁸⁵ Today, its co-founder and director (Bruce R. McCaw) is Board of Directors to Auto Research Center, LLC. ⁸⁶

Impact Force: American 11 hit the North World Trade Center Tower - distinguished by its antenna- at various official speeds, carrying 10,000 gallons (66,000 lb) of fuel on impact. Also see [Fueling the Aircraft](#)

⁸³ "Claircom International chosen as premier SATCOM airborne telephone; Claircom International has installed SATCOM airborne telephones on more aircraft, more aircraft types than any competitor.." The Free Library. 1995 Business Wire, September 17, 2014.

<http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Claircom+International+chosen+as+premier+SATCOM+airborne+telephone%3b...-a017385327>

⁸⁴ HARDY v. CLAIRCOM COMMUNICATIONS GROUP INC.

<http://caselaw.findlaw.com/wa-court-of-appeals/1468269.html>

⁸⁵ <http://www.boe.ca.gov/proptaxes/pdf/lta02056.pdf>

⁸⁶ Auto Research Center: BOARD OF DIRECTORS. Accessed 2014.

<http://www.arcindy.com/board.html>

American 11-WTC 1

Impact speed 494 mph

Study of Traces of Tritium at the World Trade Center, October 2002.

Maximum speed 558 mph

Aircraft engine data.

Impact speed 443 mph

NIST NCSTAR 1, September 2005.

Insurance | ©[insure.com](https://www.insure.com): The President of the National Air Disaster Alliance, Gail A. Dunham, stated, “Traditionally, airlines receive \$2.7 million per passenger from their insurance companies within 10 days of a crash.”

Jump-seat: The Commission Staff requested to know when it was allowed for a passenger to sit in a jump-seat usually occupied by Flight Crew. It would be logical such a request would be the result of why two Flight Attendants (Betty Ong and Madeleine Sweeney) onboard American 11 never once referred to Atta and/or al-Omari’s seat numbers including their lack of giving out the names of these suspected hijackers as being involved in taking over the aircraft. The reason was however a different one. The Commission Staff revealed their inquiry into jump-seat authority was because various witnesses had seen some suspected hijackers prior to September 11 sitting or requesting jump-seat authority. See Sightings of “hijackers”

The response to the inquiry came from the official counsel of American Air Lines: “The procedures which permitted an individual to ride ‘jump seat’ in the cockpit as of September 11, 2001, were set forth in the American Airlines Flight Manual Part 1. The Flight Manual Part 1 section entitled ‘Jumpseat Occupancy’ is attached hereto as Exhibit ‘A.’ According to American’s records, no documentation for a jump seat passenger was filed for Flight 11.” [Condon & Forsyth LLP, March 15, 2004, upon Commission requests Feb. 03, 2004.]

All parts of the Flight Manual Part 1 section entitled “Jumpseat Occupancy” was closed by the [9/11 Commission Statute](#).

“Left behind luggage”: In a 9/11 Commission Memorandum (MFR04016228) is a review of the investigation conducted by the FBI on some “left behind luggage” which was referred to as the “Rosetta stone” of “identifying” nineteen individuals suspected to have hijacked four civilian airliners on the day of. The Memorandum records one suitcase checked in by Atta, which was “a brand name Travelpro pull-along suitcase, black in color;” the other was “a brand name Travel Gear suitcase, green in color” checked-in by al-Omari.

Salvatore P. Misuraca, the ramp service manager for American Air Line on September 11th told the FBI that at 07:30 a.m., the Crew Chief for American 11, Donald Bennett, received a call “from a passenger service representative, stating that a passenger had just boarded flight 11, and the passenger service representative wanted to determine if the passenger’s two suitcases had arrived from U.S. Airways,” meaning from the shuttle Colgan flight that came in from Portland.

Bennett told the passenger service representative that both cases had arrived, “but would not be put on flight 11, because the baggage compartment had already been locked for departure.” This procedure, for a passenger service representative to call the ramp crew was not a usual custom; it was only done if the “affected passenger has asked about the baggage.”

Details out of the way, luggage for an aircraft model 767 was containerized; this meant that passenger luggage (including the two suitcases belonging to Atta and al-Omari) would have been put into “large hard body containers” and then put into storage compartments on the aircraft. In order a passenger gain access to their luggage from the passenger compartment, and due to this

containerized policy, any luggage “would be difficult to access.” [9/11 Commission files, Team 7/ Box 18: “Atta’s luggage.”] Furthermore, all luggage from U.S. Air Flights, such as the shuttle Colgan flight that came in from Portland, “are always late, and this is a common occurrence.” [Philip A. DePasquale: Baggage handler “Expediter” for American Air Lines.]

Explanations out of the way, Philip A. DePasquale, baggage expediter for AAL at Boston-Logan, placed new tags on both suitcases, placed them onto the baggage belt for American 181, the turn-around flight of American 11; but, as can be seen in this link [here](#), American 181 was a cancelled flight on September 11, 2001.

After the crash of

Flight 11 was reported, Mr. DePasquale examined the two suitcases. He stated that the tags on the two suitcases had a covert marking that indicated that the suitcases belonged to a passenger, “that was a security issue.” Mr. DePasquale called Howard Crabtree, the senior ramp supervisor for American Airlines, and told him that what he had determined. Mr. Crabtree has a FBI report of interview (302-440). Mr. Crabtree examined the luggage and directed Mr. DePasquale to open the suitcases.

›9/11 Commission Team 5, FRC Box 21

Review of investigation conducted by the FBI of Atta’s suitcases at Boston, MA
February 10, 2004

DePasquale was the individual who initially added new tags on the cases before placing the luggage onto the baggage belt to be loaded onto American 181. Nowhere does he state that the tags he added indicated the passenger “was a security issue.” But when he next examines the cases after American 11 had crashed, he reports the suitcases “had a covert marking that indicated that the suitcases belonged to a passenger that was a security issue.” The tags no doubt were put on from Portland’s Jetport Airport once Atta was screened there as a CAPPS I selectee. Also see CAPPS I

FBI Special Agents from Boston, and police officers from the Massachusetts States Police, were involved in the search of both suitcases. After receiving a warrant at 2:20 p.m., it was not till 3 p.m., the search began and ended at 22:48 p.m. “A total of 25 items were seized in regard to the black Travelpro suitcase/bag,” which belonged to Atta, and “a total of 14 items were seized from the green Travel Gear suitcase/bag,” which was checked in by al-Omari. [FBI report, File No. 265D-NY-280350, transcribed on Sept. 14, 2001; released March 15, 2004.] The following materials were discovered in both suitcases:-

ATTA’S TRAVELPRO SUITCASE:

Four page letter in Arabic
Electronic flight computer with case
Islamic Finder Prayer Schedule
Simulator Check-ride procedures
Flight planner sheets attached to cardboard
Videotape of flight procedures for a Boeing 747-4000
Videotape of flight procedures for a Boeing 757-200
Plastic device for determining the effect of an aircraft’s weight on range
A folding knife
A brand name “First Defense” Cayenne (red pepper) spray

AL-OMARI’S TRAVELGEAR SUITCASE:

Three English grammar books
Arabic to English dictionary
Perfume bottle
Brand name “Brylcream” anti-dandruff hair dressing
Saudi passport for al-Omari

Hudson United Bank cheque book in al-Omari's name

Three photographs ⁸⁷

Handkerchief

Twenty dollar bill in U.S. Currency

There is no mention that jackets and ties were “tucked” into these bags as Michael Tuohey had assumed when he identified checking-in Atta and al-Omari wearing jackets and ties then “no longer wearing the jackets and ties” when showed CCTV footage by the FBI. See September 10th-Portland, Maine

These were not the only suitcases found. In Atta's rental car, which was left in the parking garage of Boston-Logan, the FBI found another bag. This car was pointed out by a citizen and here's how the story goes: “After the attacks a citizen called to report an encounter he had with the hijackers in the airport parking garage that morning. Apparently one of the hijackers opened his car door and hit the citizen's car. The citizen then opened his car door and purposely let it hit the hijackers' car. He reported how odd it was that they just sat in the car and didn't react to his provocation. This report helped identify the car and the evidentiary material found inside.” [9/11 Commission Team 7: “Site visit and briefing.” Aug. 15, 2003.]

But the above story was related to the wrong suspected hijackers. The civilian who pointed out the car mentioned the individuals inside were the other three suspected hijackers remaining from American 11, who were Satam al-Suqami and the al-Shehri brothers. Still, it remains difficult to establish which individuals were actually involved.

Maria Cruz, a security employee, stated that the shuttle Colgan flight 5930 arrived at Boston-Logan's Airport (Gate 9) at “approximately 06:45 a.m., on

⁸⁷ The FBI has never informed who was depicted on these photos.

September 11, 2001. When the 9/11 Commission Team 7 visited the airport, they described that “from that gate passenger[s] go up an escalator and outside across a parking garage and into the main terminal B.” Team 7 continued to point out that American 11 “was out of the gate and ready to push at 07:40 a.m. and off the ground at 07:59 a.m. the estimated time of arrival was 10:55 a.m. in Los Angeles.” The Commission Staff conclude their statement: “There are two issues for the Commission to consider. First, is whether Atta intended his luggage be discovered and searched? Based on what is reported as having occurred, this is unlikely. The search of Atta’s Travelpro suitcase provided early information about the nature of the Islamist threat, the probable links to al Qaeda, and the techniques used in the hijacking of the aircraft. Atta was concerned enough about whether his luggage had been switched from US Airways Flight 5930 to American Airlines Flight 11 that he made a last minute request to the gate agent about the suitcases.”

But there are at least five (5) different versions coming from official accounts that differ with this theory on how the suspected hijackers were “identified”.

See American 11-Aircraft Calls

As a final point on this subject, the Air Line “Load planning quality control record” shows American 11’s final load of containers was at 07:47 a.m. (Below chart). Atta inquired about his luggage at 07:30 a.m., according to Salvatore P. Misuraca, the ramp service manager for American Air Line.

11 1155 000000				
NO-AAA				
*** LOAD PLANNING QUALITY CONTROL RECORD ***				
0011 11 BOS	ACFT334	CRY	GHT	LOCAL
ACTUAL OUT TIME	--	1140	0740	
PLANNED OFF TIME - REVISED	--	1156	0756	
FINAL PSOR COUNT - RES	--	1136	0736	
FINAL CONTAINER UPD - CREW CHIEF	BOSX	1147	0747	
RADIO CLOSEOUT - AUTO	--	1147	0747	

>American Air Line
 Load Planning Quality Control Record of American 11
 September 11, 2001.

The Crew Chief for American 11, Donald Bennett, told the passenger service representative to tell Atta "that both cases had arrived, but would not be put on flight 11, because the baggage compartment had already been locked for departure." This statement contradicts the Air Line Load Planning Quality Control Record seen above; it was another 17 minutes till the last container was loaded. There is no official explanation on this discrepancy.

Lufthansa Flight 592 - Hijacking 1993: An unidentified ATC was interviewed by the Commission Staff who told them about an incident with a Lufthansa hijacking in 1993 and how that flight had been intercepted by Otis air defense aircraft. The Lufthansa hijacker threat was to crash the plane into Wall Street. [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR03010864): Team 8 INTERVIEW: ATC (name redacted), Oct. 22, 2003.]

The above Lufthansa hijacking event was corroborated by FAA Eastern Region employee, Ron Ruggeri, who was the Assistant Air Traffic Manager at Kennedy Airport, and was on the Air Traffic Telecom. His supervisor, Jimmy Jackson, received a page that they had a hijacked aircraft. Ruggeri brought the FBI officers who arrived to the Tower to the operations desk. Ruggeri patched

the FBI into a call to the Lufthansa hijacker. They established communications and the FBI agents spoke with the hijacker for the rest of the event. [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR03010864): Team 8 INTERVIEW: ATC (name redacted), Oct. 22, 2003.]

The *New York Times* reported on the sentencing of the Lufthansa hijacker back in 1996. They do not refer to the hijacker's threat which "was to crash the plane into Wall Street." The article can be found [here](#).

Mineta Transportation Institute Report: According to the Mineta Transportation Institute Report (MTI Report 02-06) published September 2003, tunnels into the city of Manhattan seemed slower than usual on the morning of; "the snarled traffic saved more lives."

Nada/F: The "National Air Disaster Alliance/Foundation" also known as Nada/F was founded by air crash survivors and victims' family members to raise the standard of Aviation Safety, Security and Survivability, and to Support victims' families. On their Website is an interesting perspective: "In point of fact, United Airlines filed for bankruptcy in Chicago on December 9, 2002, without having paid one dime in actual claims to September 11 victims. US Airways filed for bankruptcy in Alexandria, Virginia, on August 11, 2002, without having paid one dime to September 11 victims. American Airlines (after its smaller insurance policies on Flights 11 and 77 paid out \$28,735.63 and \$42,372.88, respectively) has also been considering bankruptcy. These two airlines' bankruptcies and American's financial plight, have been brought about, not by any September 11 victim's lawsuit, but by the arguably excessive salaries and 'bonuses' paid to its management for poorly managing the airlines and for helping to bring about the large downturn in air travel by having failed to

protect their passengers from hijacking and sabotage as the law required. And this in spite of both United and American having received their share of the 10 billion dollars of taxpayer money paid to airlines in the above ‘bailout bill.’ The U.S. Congress is currently considering additional bailout bills.” [[National Air Disaster Alliance/Foundation \(Nada/F\)](#)]

NORAD Timeline:

American Airlines Flight 11 - Boston enroute to Los Angeles	
FAA Notification to NEADS	0840*
Fighter Scramble Order (Otis Air National Guard Base, Falmouth, Mass. Two F-15s)	0846**
Fighters Airborne	0852
Airline Impact Time (World Trade Center 1)	0846 (estimated)***
Fighter Time/Distance from Airline Impact Location	Aircraft not airborne/153 miles

NORAD Timeframe of American 11
September 18, 2001

► Text of the Timeframe can be found at [Scrbd account “911 Document Archive.”](#) A copy of the original NORAD Timeframe can be found at [Archive.org](#)

NORAD’s Timeline is partially corroborated by the fighter pilots that were scrambled on the morning of. They only contradict one point, which is “aircraft not airborne/153 miles” distance away from the twin towers. This is what those pilots tell us: “While flying towards New York they were told by NEADS that a second plane [United 175] had just hit the World Trade Towers. ‘We were about 60 miles away and could see the burning because the visibility was unlimited that day,’ said the lead pilot. NEADS told the pilots to fly a holding pattern over the southwestern end of this training area [Atlantic Ocean, south of Martha’s Vineyard] as they tried to determine the next tactic.”⁸⁸

⁸⁸ TSgt Bruce Vittner, *Historian’s Report for September 11, 2001*.

Both towers were hit by 09:02 a.m.; therefore, putting these fighters on “a holding pattern” would raise a question as to why NEADS believed no other building in this 15,65 acre tower complex was not in danger of also being hit, since there were another eleven (11) buildings still standing and another two suspected hijacked flights on the loose, with a plethora other flights falsely reported to have been hijacked, as Administrator of the FAA, in this case Jane Garvey stated. See *Aviation Protocols*


At 09:30 a.m., the fighters were informed by NEADS that they “might be told to shoot down a commercial aircraft;” they responded they had no problem with that order. The *Historian’s Report* concludes, “The pilot was flying over the North Tower [WTC1] at about 6,000 feet when it imploded.”⁸⁹ The pilot says: “When we were flying to New York, NEADS told us that our mission was to intercept, divert, or if unsuccessful in those to call them for authorization to shoot down. That certainly got our attention.” After returning to Otis base at 18:00 p.m., Richard and his partner Maj. Robert Martyn were debriefed by intelligence and sent home.

The following timeframe in *Air Force Magazine* reports that Military fighters were airborne at 08:52 a.m., just six minutes after American 11 crashed at 08:46 a.m. “When word came on Sept. 11 that airliners had been hijacked, air defense fighters scrambled at Otis ANGB, Mass., and Langley AFB, Va., and went off to intercept the airliners. However, according to a NORAD fact sheet released shortly after the attacks, the fighters simply had no chance to intercept the four hijacked airliners. The first notification that something was wrong came in at 08:40 and at 08:46. A fighter scramble order was sent to Otis. Only seconds after the scramble order, American Air Lines Flight 11 out of Boston slammed into the World Trade Center’s north tower. The two Otis F-15s

⁸⁹ “Imploded” is a jargon word used in demolition procedures.

did not take to the air until six minutes later.” [Air Force Magazine, Vol. 85, No.2, Feb. 02, 2002.]

The article is corroborated by the Traffic Management Officer (east position) transcript released October 21, 2003.⁹⁰



›Conversation between New York's Air Traffic Center Pete Mulligan
Air Traffic Control Command Center Mike Artist
09:12 a.m. (13:12 p.m. Central)

Passenger Screening: The responsibility for the screening of passengers was entirely with the Air Line Company American Air Lines. The security company contracted by the Air Lines was “Globe Security.”⁹¹ Passengers would use two checkpoints: Checkpoint #1 was in the “North Main” also termed as B5; checkpoint #2 was in the “Middle B4” and opened on September 11, 2001, at 07:15 a.m. No Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) was available at either checkpoint on the day of, “Because the airport’s security checkpoints and gate area were not monitored by video surveillance equipment at that time, no

⁹⁰ <http://www.scribd.com/doc/14141827/NYC-B1-NTMO-East-Position-3-Fdr-Transcript>

⁹¹ Globe Security also had screening duties at Jetport Airport in Maine, Portland.

conclusive evidence exists regarding when and how the Flight 11 hijackers passed through checkpoint screening.” [Commission Staff Report, Aug. 26, 2004.]

Planners: In order for any flight operation to go according to plan, planners must be aware of aircraft characteristics in their planning. For instance, planners know “Not to plan faster aircraft behind slower aircraft when applying minimum separation criteria; for example, F-15 following bomber aircraft using same route and altitude.” [Joint Training Manual for the Armed Forces of the United State, Aug. 03, 1998.] This was taken into account, because American 11, which first hit the WTC 1, had a quicker engine than United 175, which 16½ minutes later hit the WTC 2. Also see Airworthiness of American 11

American 11 WTC 1	United 175 WTC 2
BOEING 767-223ER	BOEING 767-222
Engine Manufacturer	Engine Manufacturer
General Electric	Pratt & Whitney
Engine Model CF6-80A2	Engine Model JT9D-7R4D
Static thrust 48,800lb _f	Static thrust 46,300lb _f
Top speed 558mph	Top speed 528mph

Pre-Flight Planning: American 11 had its pre-flight planning done at 05:59 a.m., since a pre-flight planning is usually done “approximately 2-3 hours before departure.” [FBI INTERVIEW: Peggy Jean Houck, American Air Lines Dispatcher. Sept. 11, 2001.] Chris Reck did the pre-flight for American 11. [FBI INTERVIEW: Chris Reck, AAL Flight Dispatcher, Sept. 16, 2001.]

A pre-flight plan would entail flight path, fuel load, and other aspects of the flight plan. As a consequence, whoever overtook the flight would have needed to turn this pre-flight plan off. If this was not possible by the Cabin Crew, then

the ATC could change the pre-flight plan of an aircraft when in need to do a “handoff,” as it is called, which is handing off the aircraft’s route to another Control Tower. This happened with United 93: Linda Justice Air Traffic Controller in Area 6 at Cleveland Air Traffic Control Center stated to the Commission Staff in her interview: “When she saw the plane [United 93] was heading eastbound, she changed the routing of the plane. ‘The easiest way to do a handoff is to change the flight plan,’ she said. She changed the plan to show that Washington Center was the recipient. In her opinion, it was an unpopular decision because ‘That is also where Camp David is.’ The controversial step was putting in Hagerstown because the misconception was that she had communicated with the plane and cleared it through. The tag read, Hagerstown-National. Before, the tag had read LAX [Los Angeles International Airport] (its original destination).” [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR04017319) Team 8 INTERVIEW: Linda Justice, ATC Area 6, CATCC, Oct. 02, 2003.]

Radar Unit: The radar unit capturing image of American 11 was the FPS 678 radar at West Covington, Connecticut. [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR04017202) Teams 7+8 follow-up VISIT to the FAA Operations Center, Feb. 06, 2004.]

Raytheon Executives: From the passenger list of American 11, three (3) Raytheon key executives died on the day of.

Peter Gay | Boarded flight AA11

Vice-President of Electronic Systems on special assignment at the El Segundo, CA division office where the Global Hawk UAV remote control system is made.

Kenneth Waldie | Boarded flight AA11

Senior Quality Control Engineer for Electronic Systems.

David Kovalcin | Boarded flight AA11

Senior Mechanical Engineer for Electronic Systems.

Recognition: The AA Kean Committee No. 006327 Report, and the FBI, released audio and/or dialogue transcripts from the Flight Crew calls that were made from American 11. Another report, the 9/11 Commission Files Team 1A/ Box 33, released interviewed reports of employees who were involved in these calls. The claimed ringleader Mohamed Atta of the nineteen suspected hijackers was supposed to be on American 11 on the morning of. The voice heard coming from the cockpit of that aircraft -“we have some planes”- was officially termed to being Atta’s voice, even though Betty Ong, when in conversation with Nydia Gonzalez the Manager of American Air Lines at Raleigh Reservation Center, reported, “So they haven’t made any announcements. Not even to the passengers. No one.” [9/11 Commission Report Team 7 (Box 18)]

Bill Peacock, the FAA Director of Air Traffic Services, claimed that “we didn’t know where the transmission came from, what was said and who said it.” ⁹² David Canoles, the FAA’s Manager of Air Traffic Evaluations & Investigations, stated that “the broadcast wasn’t attributed to a flight. Nobody gave a flight number.” ⁹³ In addition, an early FAA report will state that both these transmissions came from “an unknown origin.” ⁹⁴

⁹² Website: History Commons. Accessed 2014.

http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=pete_zalewski

⁹³ *Washington Times*, September 11, 2002. Accessed 2010.

<http://web.archive.org/web/20020916222620/www.washtimes.com/september11/americans.htm>

⁹⁴ <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB165/faa7.pdf>

How was the voice recognized as being Atta's from American 11, at 08:24 a.m., via radio transmit? In order there be a feasible answer, there would have to have been a pre-recording of Atta's voice to compare it with. This pre-recording has never been released to the public.

SATORI: An FAA system that assists to "exploit and display raw radar and computer information." [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR04016817): Team 8 INTERVIEW: George Leonard, Acting Quality Assurance Support Manager.]

Selective Calling: Selective calling would mean, "A dispatcher can selectively call, via radio, a particular cockpit. A chime rings in the cockpit to notify the pilot of the call. This is another form of voice communications between the company dispatcher and the pilot. The four-digit code to dial a plane is programmed into the flight plane and would be known to every dispatcher. It is also filed with ATC." [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR04020035): Teams 7+8 VISIT to American Airlines Systems Operation Centre (Interviewing personnel) April 26, 2004.]

Sightings of "hijackers": Various sources below pertain to witness accounts of seeing some of the suspected hijackers of American 11 within various areas of the United States prior to seeing their images on the official FBI Website and/or on or within U.S. media outlets. The suspected sightings are in chronologic order.

April-May 2000

According to an *ABCNews* article,⁹⁵ the suspected hijacker ringleader, Mohamed Atta, approached a U.S. Department of Agriculture employee, Johnelle Bryant, to apply for a loan to modify a crop-duster plane around “the end of April and the middle of May 2000.” This would mean Atta applied twice for a loan; once at “the end of April” in 2000 and again in “the middle of May” in 2000. The FBI Miami field office investigated the matter; they report the event for an approximate date to have been for April 2000. There is no mention of the May 2000 encounter.

04/2000 (approx. date)


Mohammed Atta appeared at the United States Dept. of Agriculture and approached Johnell Bryant, the Farm Loan Manager, to obtain a loan to buy a six-passenger, twin-engine airplane that he wanted to convert into a crop-dusting plane. Bryant explained that Atta did not qualify and Atta became angry and threatened to slit her throat. Atta made reference to a picture of Washington, D.C. on Bryant's wall and asked Bryant how she would feel if another country attacked her country and destroyed the monuments. [302, Serial 9165]

›FBI Miami Report | 265A-NY-280350-MM
October 11, 2001.

Paul Thompson, in his [History Commons](#) Timeline for Atta, notes: “Government officials not only confirm the account and say that Bryant passed a lie detector test, but elaborate that the account jibes with other information they have received from interrogating prisoners.”

⁹⁵ *ABCNews*: “Face to Face With a Terrorist: Government Worker Recalls Mohamed Atta Seeking Funds Before Sept. 11,” by Brian Ross. Accessed 2002.
https://web.archive.org/web/20020802130652/http://abcnews.go.com/sections/wnt/DailyNews/ross_bryant020606.html

Atta is officially recorded as issuing his first RB1/B2 U.S. Visa on May 18, 2000, in Berlin, Germany. The visa expired in 2005. By the year 2002, the visa application could not be reviewed by the Commission “because it had already been destroyed.”



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The United States Department of State - Bureau of Consular Affairs

NIV Applicant Detail — Mohamed Atta

QUIGLEYPR on November 08, 2001 10:54 ET

J. McClellan
8/7/02**Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) - Information Protected under INA 222(f) and 9 FAM 40.4**

Issuing Post Name Control Number
BERLIN 2000138 958 0003

Surname
ATTA

Given Name
MOHAMED MOHAMED ELAMIR

Passport Number Gender Date of Birth Nationality
1617066, Regular Male 01SEP1968 EGYPT

Place of Birth
Egypt (EGYP)

Class	Entries	Issue Date	Expiration Date	Foil Number
B1/B2	M	18-MAY-2000	16-MAY-2005	34137932

Judication History

Issue Date	Status
17-MAY-2000	Issued

Auditor's note: "M" = multiple entry,
year 8/29/02**Foil History**

Foil Number	Class	Date Printed	Foil Status
34137932	B1/B2	18-MAY-2000	Printed and passed QA

Namecheck(s)

Seq #	Status	Source	DNC/Class Hits	DNC/Class Worst Hit	Local Worst Hit	Data Entry Date
1	RECEIVED	CLASS	0	NR	NR	17-MAY-2000

AUDITOR'S NOTE: ACCORDING TO BERLIN
CONSULAR CHIEF JIM LEVY TOLD
US WE COULD NOT VIEW THE
APPLICATION BECAUSE IT HAD ALREADY
BEEN DESTROYED.

Jody Woods
8/7/02

Source: See WP 19A-0

Purpose: To provide information on one of the 19 9/11 hijackers.

http://cadata.ca.state.gov/pls/public/rpt_niv_applicant_detail.report?P_JULIAN_DTE=17-MAY-2...00&P8BATCH_ID=

›Courtesy of the 9/11 Commission

The Commission were neither able to review Atta's INS immigration file (A 90 568 993). "DHS informed us," the Commission stated, "that the Privacy Act barred the Commission from obtaining immigration files on legal permanent

residents and naturalized citizens, even those convicted of terrorism or related crimes.” [9/11 and Terrorist Travel Staff Report, Aug. 21, 2004.]

On June 03, 2000, just a month after Atta acquired his U.S. Visa, he “arrived from Prague, Czech Republic, at Newark Airport [United States] as a tourist. He was given a customary six-month stay, valid until December 2, 2000.” [9/11 and Terrorist Travel Staff Report, Aug. 21, 2004.] This is recorded as Atta’s first entry into America; nothing earlier is officially reported as an entrance into the States. The claimed dates of Atta’s presence in the States (prior to the official recorded entry) coincide coincidentally or not, we can’t substantiate, but coincides with when Vigilant Overview 2000 (also termed VO-00) had an implemented crop-dusting exercise. The topic of this particular exercise also coincides with the subject of Atta’s loan request from the U.S. Agricultural Department: Applying for a loan to modify a crop-duster plane.

This crop-dusting exercise was a CINCNORAD-sponsored CPX drill. It was “An exercise where the HQ NORAD staff will assume the primary responsibility for planning, controlling and executing VO/AW exercises and will provide assistance to the Regions in the planning of BRAVE exercises.” [NORAD Instruction Manual 10-45 (Aug. 03, 1998) Operations CINCNORAD Exercise Program.]

The drill was overviewed by WADS together with NORAD, operating out of Holloman Air Force base in New Mexico, 8 miles southwest of Alamogordo. The 57,000 acres base was named after Col. George Holloman who was killed in a B-17 crash in March 19, 1946. The drill was corroborated by the Commission timeline as to its date.

Event Subject											
NOT IN DMMS NBC Crop Duster Chemical Incident (Initial) -(Holloman AFB) (Event 1/3)											
Go To Event: 144814		Event Information									
MSEL #: 144814	Event Level: 3	Phase: III	Status:								
Injecting Cell: NORAD	Inject Day: C plus 39	Classification: S-RELCAN									
Inject Mode: Phone	Simulated Unit:	Training Audience Unit:									
Exercise: VO 00	Simulated Element:	Training Audience Element: WADS									
Location: NORAD NBC	Sim. Sub-Element:	Training Audience Sub-Element:									
Event Planned Inject: DD HH NN MMM YYYY Hawaii Time NORAD Time Wash DC Time Iceland Time											
ZULU Time 19 16 00 Apr 2000		190600Z Apr 2000		191000L Apr 2000		191200Q Apr 2000		191600S Apr 2000			
<p>*NOT IN DMMS* NBC Crop Duster Chemical Incident (Initial) -(Holloman AFB) (Event 1/3)</p> <p>Initial Report. Holloman AFB, NM. A crop duster flies over the airfield and releases an aerosol over a portion of the airfield. The spray spreads over a portion of the airfield. Six aircraft mechanic display symptoms of pesticide poisoning. Airfield security is increased and local authorities. Airfield runway remains open. Amending reports to follow.</p> <p>The WADS Sim Center will construct and inject an OPREP-3 report. The NBC Cell will receive the reported information. The WADS NBC Cell will then create an ENHAZ report. The ENHAZ report will be passed through the NORAD NBC reporting channels to NORAD HQ NBC Cell with info copy to CONR.</p>					<p>Training Audience Expected Action:</p> <p>WADS NBC Cell is expected to conduct appropriate analysis of this initial chemical event through the execution of proper NORAD NBC Warning and Reporting procedures. An environmental hazard (ENHAZ) report should be filled out and forwarded to the NORAD NBC Cell.</p>						
<p>Drafter: MAJ Gladney</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Key Event?</p> <p>Primary JMET: ST 8.4</p> <p>Associated JMETs:</p>		<p>Command: CINC NORAD</p> <p>Primary Theme: FORCE PROTECTION</p> <p>Associated Themes:</p> <table border="1" style="width: 100%;"> <tr><td>Current Ops</td></tr> <tr><td>Future Ops</td></tr> </table>		Current Ops	Future Ops	<p>Notes/Remarks: Coord w/NJ38T</p> <p>Primary Training Objective: (NORAD) Exercise command interface with higher and lateral HQ</p> <p>Associated Training Objectives:</p>					
Current Ops											
Future Ops											
Updated by:		Updated: 4/6/00 2:36:45 PM									

▷ RDOD0 #30341 Report

4/19/2000	VO 00	Crop duster chemical incident	Inside-Inside	WADS	Holloman	Holloman	Crop Duster	Crop Duster flies over Holloman and release an aerosol. Six mechanics display symptoms of pesticide poisoning.
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▷ 9/11 Commission Timeline

For Official Use Only


Texas Service Center

Enforcement Operations Division


911 Terrorist Review



American Airlines #11
Boston to Los Angeles
North Tower of World Trade
Center



Mohamed Mohamed Elamir
Awad Elsayed ATTA
DOB: 1SEP68
COC: Egypt
COR: Germany



Terrorist Timeline

1995	2ATTA shared an apartment with known consirator Ramzi Bin ALSHIBH in Germany. ATTA and ALSHIBH as warehouse workers at a computer company in Hamburg, Germany.
1998	2ATTA, Ramzi Bin AL-SHIBH, Marwan ALSHEHHI and Ziad JARRAH and others formed and maintained an al Qaeda terrorist cell in Germany
2000-2001	2In Florida made inquiries regarding starting a crop dusting company

›Courtesy of the Texas Service Center

In the “Summary of Penttbom Investigation” by Penttbom Team Room 1B-999, February 29, 2004, and released on January 26, 2007, it was found that on May 08, 2000, Atta had issued a new Egyptian passport, even though his old one expired in 2005. This was a questionable if not suspicious act to which there is no further information.

(LES) On 3/28/00, Atta applied for an extension of his German visa in Hamburg, Germany. On 5/8/00, Atta was issued a new Egyptian passport, # 1617066, by the Egyptian Consulate in Hamburg, Germany. His old passport was still valid for five more years.

“Summary of Penttbom Investigation” Penttbom Team Room 1B-999
February 29, 2004 | Released January 26, 2007.

Why did Bryant not report this incident earlier? There are three issues to consider in order to answer that. First, is whether Bryant reported the event but it was not picked up by the media; hence, this was the first time the public heard of this at the time. Second, is whether Bryant exaggerated in the details;

hence, she didn't report the incident. And third, is whether Bryant thought it was an exercise/drill she was participating in, but was never actually informed in the long run.

But Atta's appearance in the States during the spring of 2000 is also supported by Daniel Hopsicker's investigation. "The truly amazing thing about what loan officer Johnelle Bryant had to say about Mohamed Atta's presence in this country in the Spring of 2000 is that her testimony has been confirmed by numerous other credible sources." [[MadCow Morning News.](#)]⁹⁷

November 2000

An American Air Line pilot reported that Satam al-Suqami was seen trying "to sit in the jump-seat of a flight from Miami to the East Coast." Two dates for November 2000 were reported for this event; the 12th and the 26th. [Commission Staff (Team 7) Box 18 Report.]

December 14, 2000

A Delta Air Line pilot claimed that on December 14, 2000, he saw Atta "working at the Crown Plaza Hotel in Albany, NY, and tried to steal his flight bag." [Commission Staff (Team 7) Box 18 Report.] Some reviews from customers, who have stayed at the hotel, can be found [here](#).

January 2001

An American Air Line pilot reported that Satam al-Suqami was seen trying "to sit in the jump-seat of a flight from Miami to the East Coast." Three dates for January 2001 were reported for this event; the 16th, 22nd, and the 28th. [Commission Staff (Team 7) Box 18 Report.]

⁹⁷ http://www.911myths.com/index.php/File:Atta_Eagle_Jet_Application.pdf


March 01, 2001

Alvin Case, a passenger on his way to the Gate area to catch his flight (American Trans Air Flight 626) at Boston-Logan, identified Atta staring at the arrival and departure monitor.

April 04, 2001

The Commission was given a CCTV recording from Pacific Avenue Branch in Virginia Beach as being captured at an ATM. What exactly was supposed to have been on this tape is unknown. However, as the image below shows, it was supposed to have been of Atta at Virginia Beach SunTrust Bank.

THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES				
COMMISSION DOCUMENT REQUEST				
DOCUMENT REQUEST: <u>DOCUMENT REQUEST #23-4</u>				
SUBJECT: <u>A COPY OF THE SECURITY SYSTEM VIDEOTAPE SUPPOSEDLY DEPICTING MOHAMED ATTA IN VIRGINIA IN THE FIRST HALF OF 2001.</u>				
PACKET #1				
(FEBRUARY 2, 2004)				
DATE	TYPE of DOCUMENT	SUBJECT	TOTAL PAGES	BATE STAMP #s
2001	VHS VIDEOTAPE	VHS VIDEOTAPES- MOHAMED ATTA IN VIRGINIA IN THE FIRST HALF OF 2001.	2	001-002
TOTAL PAGES			2	



►Released January 18, 2007.

April 14, 2001

An American Air Line pilot reported that Satam al-Suqami was seen trying “to sit in the jump-seat of a flight from Miami to the East Coast.” One date for April 2001 was reported for this event: April 14th. [Commission Staff (Team 7) Box 18 Report.]

May 2001

A Huntleigh Security Pre-Board Screener (name redacted) had been stationed in Terminal B at Boston-Logan with Globe Aviation Services from October through July 2001. Globe Aviation Services was the security company that handled the baggage screening of passengers. The female Pre-Board Screener remembered that four months prior the attacks, around May 2001, she saw Atta (suspected hijack pilot of American 11) “videotaping the main security checkpoint.” She “identified Atta from a photo array shown to her.” [Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms Special Agent Interview Huntleigh Security Pre-Board Screener (name redacted) Sept. 17, 2001.]

May 18, 2001

On October 02, 2001, the FBI interviewed a passenger, Jack Kerns, who was onboard United Air Lines Flight 1951 on May 18, 2001, that left Boston-Logan at 07:29 a.m. Mr. Kerns recognized another passenger as being Atta “who kept moving around the plane and had been asked to calm down” by another passenger who was identified as Waleed al-Shehri, one of the individuals Madeleine Sweeney (Flight Attendant onboard American 11) identified as a hijacker. Mr. Kerns spotted Atta again after the above incident in late May or early June of 2001, and this was in the Jamaica Plain area. He “observed Atta in the area of Boston Clutch on Washington Street; went over to him [Atta] and

attempted conversation but Atta walked away in the direction of Green Street.” Later in the summer Mr. Kerns said that Atta approached him as he was working at [Hattoff’s Oil Company](#) and asked him how much fuel the truck he was servicing held. When Mr. Kerns made a comment about the Washington trip [May 18th] he said Atta just turned and walked away. [FBI INTERVIEW: #M-INT-00081761 Jack Kerns, Oct. 02, 2001.]

Hattoff is not an “oil company” but a gas station on Washington Street, Kenton Road on the Jamaica Plain in Massachusetts, with a variety of customer reviews that can be seen [here](#).

August 2001

An American Air Line pilot reported that Satam al-Suqami was seen trying “to sit in the jump-seat of a flight from Miami to the East Coast.” Two dates for August 2001 were reported for this event; the 2nd and the 16th. [Commission Staff (Team 7) Box 18 Report.]

August 28, 2001

Fernando Murga, a Baggage Screener for Globe Security at Boston-Logan, told the FBI he saw Atta “conversing with another Globe Security employee,” whose name is redacted by the Commission. Murga had the impression Atta and the Globe Security employee knew each other “because of the way they interacted.” Murga also stated that this employee “routinely allows Arab passengers to pass through security without the proper scrutiny.” Murga gave the name of an American Air Line employee who could corroborate his story. He additionally reported the incident to his superiors at Globe Security “but he believes they ignore his allegations because they don’t want controversy.” [FBI INTERVIEW: #M-INT-00131524 Fernando Murga, Jan. 31, 2001.]

We may assume Fernando Murga reported to his superiors on the employee who “routinely allows Arab passengers to pass through security without the proper scrutiny,” and not that he saw Atta, who was unknown at the time.

Summer 2001

It is unknown if the following event is connected to any previous event already given, but in the summer of 2001, the Commission Staff (Team 7) visited and interviewed Edward T. Cox who was the Airport Operations Officer/Airport Security Coordinator at Washington Dulles International Airport. Cox told them he “was aware of a summer 2001 incident in which police were called to the C and D terminals to investigate a Middle Easterner appearing individual who was filming gates and United [Air Line] aircraft. He recalled that one of the gates may have been D-1, which generally is used for West Coast bound flights. [COMMISSION STAFF MEMORANDUM (MFR03010908): Team 7 INTERVIEW: Edward T. Cox, Airport Operations Officer/Airport Security Coordinator at Washington Dulles International Airport, Oct. 16, 2003.]

September 10, 2001

Edward S. Faggen, Vice-President and General Counsel for Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority, reported: “After 9/11, a review of their videotapes revealed that the hijackers had apparently been videotaped on the evening of 9/10/01 in Terminal B. The hijacked flight left from Terminal D, but Faggen pointed out that the Mobile Lounges for Band D departures were located adjacent to each other. The FBI has a copy of the videotape, as does MW AA, [Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority,] and the Commission has requested a copy.” [COMMISSION STAFF MEMORANDUM (MFR04017172): Team 7 INTERVIEW: Edward S. Faggen, Vice-President and General Counsel for

Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority Washington Dulles International Airport, Sept. 29, 2003.]

This particular video footage has never been seen by the public.

Speed bug: A speed bug is a plastic clip that is placed on the speed indicator and serves as a reminder to the pilots to keep within certain speed parameters. “It is very common for speed bugs to fall off and they have to be replaced often.” [FBI INTERVIEW: Santa Cruz, Sept. 17, 2001.]

Captain Ogonowski of American 11 reported the aircraft had a problem (“bug”) with its speed, and “it would take from 45 minutes to one 1 hour to fix this problem.” [FBI INTERVIEW: Fred Murray, Crew Chief of American, Sept. 21, 2001.]

Mike Boudreau and Greg Moore, American Air Line technicians, “were servicing the cockpit due to a bug that is related to the plane speed.” [FBI INTERVIEW: Santa Cruz, aircraft mechanic, Sept. 17, 2001.]

Suicide attacks: “The FAA was aware of previous threats to conduct suicide hijacking, including the use of aircraft as a weapon of mass destruction in plots associated with Usama bin Laden who had declared war against the United States in 1996 and 1998. The FBI, however, had deemed the threat to civil aviation domestically to be ‘low.’” [Executive Summary Commission Staff, Team 7 Report: Draft Monograph Civil Aviation & Transportation Security.]

McDONNELL: Said in an offline TELCON that Alis Chiricanas Airlines hijacking was blown up by the hijacker, he believes.

HAWLEY: Mike Sheehan of CTC gave a presentation on suicide terrorism that Pat McDonnell tasked Hawley to follow-up on--"Countering suicide terrorism" --he brings it to our attention because suicide hijack was on the radar screen. He raises the point because it shows international suicide terrorism was on the radar of the ACS.

HAWLEY: Strategic threat vectors took suicide hijack off the list.

HAWLEY: Hawley said that a strategic assessment was published on 9-11-01, in the strategic assessment, "if they conduct a hijacking domestically, it will be a suicide hijack." Duane Mercer wrote an intelligence note on Ressam (UBL connection) that said in the last paragraph "it was significant that Ressam chose a domestic airport." This report was published on 9-11-01. "There was recognition within Intelligence and that they are targeting domestic airports; Ressam was clearly tied to UBL. Hawley said it would be a suicide hijack. (Hawley didn't elaborate on this point. What was he inferring? Or did the assessment say "suicide hijack?")

Manno indicated that suicide hijacking was "on our mind" after 1998 and was included in a 2000 and 2001 CD ROM presentation on the terrorist threat to civil aviation, but again no specific, credible information was available. The Air India and Air France hijackings were the basis for the concern about the suicide tactic.

›Commission Staff (Team 7) Box 19.

Suspected hijackers' itinerary:

Wail al-Shehri

Ticket #0012109108519

PNR: HKGTVB

Ticket Issued: August 26, 2001.

Payment: \$2,232,25 VISA

One-way: Boston-Los Angeles

Seating: First Class 2A

Ticket name: **Wyail AlShehri**

Luggage 1

Waleed M. al-

Ticket #0012109108613

Shehri (not to be
confused with
Waleed Ahmed al-
Shehri)

PNR: ?HTTLK
Issued: August 26, 2001.
Payment: \$2,232,25 VISA
One-way: Boston-Los Angeles
Seating: First Class 2B
Ticket name: **Wail AlShehri**
Luggage 1

Satam al-Suqami

Ticket #0012178864231
PNR: ICIOBH
Issued: August 28, 2001.
Payment: \$1,920,25 CASH
One-way: Boston-Los Angeles
Seating: Business 10B
Luggage 1

Abdul al-Omari

Tickets #1012135020182
#0012179084144 ⁹⁸
PNR: JNEHJU
Issued: August 28, 2001.
Payment: \$2,113,00 VISA
One-way: Portland-Boston-Los Angeles
Seating: Business 8G
Luggage 1

Mohamed Atta

Ticket #0012135020181

⁹⁸ Al-Omari had lost his initial ticket for this flight and was issued a new ticket.

PNR: JNEHJU
Issued: August 28, 2001.
Payment: \$2,113,00 VISA
One-way: Portland-Boston-Los Angeles
Seating: Business 8D
Luggage 1

“Tag jump”: When a plane turns its transponder off, it is referred to as “coasting.” The plane does not “disappear” from the screen when this happens. The ATC is simply unable to find any specific information on the plane, such as Air Line Company, flight number, flight plan. The host computer will continue to look for the plane in the system after it loses the transponder signal. Specifically, the host computer will attempt to locate the plane through tracking its primary radar return. It is possible that the host computer could identify the wrong target in such a search as John White, the Air Traffic Tactical Operations Manager of System Efficiency Division at Herndon, Virginia, speculated. John White said that a “tag jump” may have generated reports that American 11 was still airborne after it crashed into the WTC 1. This was an aspect which the Commission were “unable to identify the source of this mistaken FAA information.” [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR04017327): Teams 7+8 VISIT to the FAA Air Traffic Control System Command Centre in Herndon, Virginia, and Dulles Airport Control Tower. July 22, 2003.]

Tracking: When the New York Air Route Center tried to “partially validate” where American 11 was supposed to be, when it was at flight level 290, it was not possible. Paul Thumser, the Operations Supervisor in Area B, requested ATC to transfer Eagle Flight 936 to flight level 310. “Vectored with a slight

adjustment, the Eagle went just to the left of the American [Flight 11] probable track 10 to 15 miles northwest of LaGuardia. The Eagle did not spot AA11. It was major trouble that the Eagle flight did not see AA11. They had high confidence if AA11 was at Flight Level 290 the Eagle would have spotted it.” [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR04016821): Team 8 INTERVIEW: Paul Thumser Operations Supervisor in Area B of the New York Air Route Centre, Oct. 01, 2003.]

The FAA Eastern Region representative, Ron Ruggeri, who was the Assistant Air Traffic Manager at Kennedy Airport, requested a colleague to check a Situational Display to locate American 11; when done so, it showed the flight in “Whiskey [Warning Area] 105.” [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR04016766): Team 8 INTERVIEW: FAA Eastern Region Ron Ruggeri, Dec. 17, 2003.]

“Whiskey 105” is a military zone used for training southeast of Long Island, a few minutes flying time from New York City. [Filson, 2003, p. 56.] There is no explanation from the Commission why a civilian aircraft detoured into a military training zone. But this also happened to Egypt Air Flight 800.

Traffic Situation Display (TSD): The computer program used at the FAA Air Traffic Control System Command Center in Herndon, Virginia, and at the Dulles Airport Control Tower Command Center, to monitor the flow of air traffic, is called Traffic Situation Display (TSD). It receives radar data from field facilities by satellite communication and displays such data at the Command Center.

The computer displays at the Command Center are not in “real-time;” the information is delayed approximately 1-5 minutes. In terms of technical capability, the Command Center can isolate one radar track of a plane, but it

cannot “see” the radar information that an ATC tracking the plane can view on his/her radar screen.

TSD does not transmit transponder information (i.e., altitude, speed, etc.,) to the Command Center and neither do they talk directly to pilots; it neither transmits text messages to pilots in the cockpit. [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR04017327): Teams 7+8 VISIT to the FAA Air Traffic Control System Command Centre in Herndon, Virginia, and at the Dulles Airport Control Tower. July 22, 2003.]

Transcripts: The FAA and DoT used [Miller Reporting Company, Inc.](#), in regards to transcribing “911 Tapes and all pre-recorded media,” as their Website states.

Turn-around Flight: American 11’s turn-around flight was American 198 from San Francisco International Airport to Boston-Logan International Airport. The flight took 5 hours and 37 minutes (2,701 miles/4,346 kilometers). Usual departure time from San Francisco was at 21:50 p.m. (00:50 a.m. Eastern) with arrival time in Boston at 06:24 a.m. (Eastern). “On 9/11/01, AA Flight 198 arrived in Boston at 6:03 a.m. (Eastern).” [Condon & Forsyth LLP, March 15, 2004, upon Commission requests Feb. 03, 2004.]

On September 11, 2001, American 198 arrived at Boston-Logan at 06:06 a.m. [FBI INTERVIEW: Salvatore P. Misuraca, Ramp Service/Customer Service Manager for AAL, September 11, 2001.]

Undercover “Terrorist”: Two suspected hijackers were identified as being employees at Boston-Logan International Airport and at Portland Jetport Airport before September 11 in 2001. “A document discussed a known terrorist who

worked as a baggage handler at Logan that the airport was unable to fire because of civil liberty issues.” It was suggested that the “known terrorist” was “conducting surveillance operations.” [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR030070523): Team 7 INTERVIEW: FAA Special Agent (name redacted) Aug. 18, 2003.]

DOCUMENTS TO REVIEW

[REDACTED] suggest we obtain the following documents:

- 1) Quarterly Review and Status Report for the Northeast Division, including the employee attitude study.
- 2) Carter Commission report Documents to obtain
- 3) “COMPREHENSIVE INSPECTION SURVEY FOR 1998 and 1999.
- 4) LAWLESS MEMO ON ISLAMIC TERRORISTS IN BOSTON
- 5) LAWLESS MEMO ON UNDERCOVER SYSTEM ASSESSMENT
- 6) LIST OF DROPPED CASES AT BOSTON THAT WERE NEVER LOOKED INTO.
- 7) An ACI document discussing extremist Islamic organizations operating in Boston.

Joseph Bureau, a Fleet Service Agent at Portland Jetport Airport, was interviewed by the FBI. He told them how he had “heard a female employee for American Air Line talking” to the Administrator of Portland Jetport Management. The unknown woman was described as being “22 to 24 years of age, about 5’2’ tall, with long dark hair.” Bureau overheard the unknown woman say “that she recognized one of the 19 individuals” the FBI released photos of as the suspected hijackers, and that he had been employed “as a window washer at the [Portland] Jetport [Airport] earlier in the summer of 2001.”

The unknown American Air Line employee was located and pointed to the FBI a specific individual depicted in the images of the nineteen suspected hijackers. She indicated that it was the man who had been a window washer at

the airport. It is unknown which suspected hijacker this anonymous woman pointed out to the FBI.

Very first passenger: Tony Durante, an American Air Line baggage handler, boarded American 11 about the time Captain Ogonowski was “busy doing the preliminary check.” When Durante arrived, he noticed a “male passenger in first class at this time sitting in the first seat on the left side of the plane.” The passenger had “black hair, [was] slight build wearing khaki pants and a long sleeve shirt and he was possibly oriental.” [FBI INTERVIEW: Tony Durante, baggage handler, Sept. 14, 2001.] There is no further information from the FBI on this subject.

Aviation Particulars

“We’re not the conspiracy theorists on this particular issue. It seems to me like 19 amateurs with box cutters taking over four commercial airliners and hitting 75% of their targets that feels like a conspiracy theory. It raises a lot of questions.”

Hollywood Star Charlie Sheen

Alex Jones & Paul Joseph Watson, *Actor Charlie Sheen
Questions Official 9/11 Story.*

March 20 2006.⁹⁹

Chain of Command: When the Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) was informed of the hijacking of American 11 on the morning of, from this point onwards, the flight “became Cape TRACON’s [Terminal Radar Approach Control] responsibility to coordinate the fighter scramble; Boston Center took responsibility for clearing the skies.”¹⁰⁰

All U.S. airspace on September 11th in 2001 was divided into 21 zones. Each zone was about 50 miles (80.5 km) in diameter and divided into sectors. The zones were termed “Terminal Radar Approach Control” abbreviated as TRACON. Within each TRACON were a number of airports; each of which had its own airspace within a 5-mile (8-km) radius. For example, once an aircraft took

⁹⁹ <http://www.prisonplanet.com/articles/march2006/200306charliesheen.htm>

¹⁰⁰ FAA Boston Center Field Site Interview with Daniel D. Bueno, Traffic Management Supervisor, Boston Centre. September 22, 2003.
<http://media.nara.gov/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-01139.pdf>

off from the airport within its designated TRACON airspace, it then entered a sector of traffic control airspace, where it was monitored by at least two ATCs.

Focusing on Cape TRACON's actions, according to Daniel Bueno who was Operations Supervisor at Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center, TRACON had "to coordinate the fighter scramble," being a procedure from the "Otis Cape TRACON Letter Agreement;" this meant "getting the fighters safely into the national airspace system."¹⁰¹

In order for this to work, a direction and a distance were required. This was necessary because fighters were kept out of the National Airspace System on the morning of, due to military exercises and drills. In addition, "Whiskey 105" military training zone was active that morning. If remembered, American 11 detoured into "Whiskey 105" military training zone for unknown reasons to us. [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR04016766): Team 8 INTERVIEW: FAA Eastern Region Ron Ruggeri, Dec. 17, 2003.]

The National Air Space is divided between ATC Towers, TRACON Centers, and enroute Centers. Airport Ground Control puts pilots in the "system" once they are cleared for departure. The ATC Tower gets the plane in position for take-off and tracks the plane within the Tower's Air Space after take-off. The TRACON picks up the track of the plane once it leaves the Tower's Airspace. The en-route Center, which has more Air Space than the Tower and TRACON Center, works the plane through the Air Space System.

There are 21 en-route Centers located domestically, with a higher percentage of them concentrated in the Boston, Chicago, and the Miami "triangle." Some FAA Centers did not have primary radar capability. [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR04017327): Teams 7+8 VISIT to the FAA


¹⁰¹ 9-11 Revisited: A site devoted to the events of 9-11. "Archive for the 'Langley Scramble' Category." Accessed 2014.
<http://www.oredigger61.org/?cat=5>

Air Traffic Control System Command Centre in Herndon, Virginia, and Dulles Airport Control Tower. July 22, 2003.]

Since Cape TRACON was located at Otis Air National Guard Base at Cape Cod in Massachusetts, the Commission noted that Daniel Bueno, “by trying to get military assistance through the TRACON, the Boston Center did not follow the protocol in seeking military assistance through the prescribed chain of command.” Daniel Bueno did not seek the military to assist in the hijacking; he requested Cape TRACON “to coordinate the fighter scramble,” because he assumed the military would scramble/order their fighters to intercept/go after American 11; and when they did, they would need coordination from Cape TRACON so they be allowed into National Airspace.


American Air Lines did not have any personnel present at the FAA Operations Center at Herndon, Virginia, on September 11, 2001. “In addition, American [Air Line] personnel did not communicate with any ATA [Air Transport Association] representative who may have been present at the subject Operations Center.” [Condon & Forsyth LLP, Aug. 19, 2004, upon Commission requests July 18, 2004.]

► Air Traffic Control System Command Center in Herndon, Virginia
Floor Position Maps-Command Center



Secretary Rumsfeld, who was the only individual to approve scramble fighters under the new protocol, testified that he could not be found that morning because he had been

meeting with congressional representatives in a room a few steps away from the NMCC in the Pentagon and it was there where he first learned of the twin towers disaster. “As my breakfast with the members of Congress was coming to a close that September morning,” Mr. Rumsfeld reflects, “my senior military assistant, Vice Admiral Edmund Giambastiani, passed me a note. An aircraft [American 11] had crashed into one of the World Trade Center’s twin towers in New York. It was, I assumed, a tragic accident.” [Donald Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown: A Memoir* (New York: Sentinel Penguin Group, 2011)]



The above chart depicts those in command at NORAD facilities on September 11, 2001, and can be found (in full scale) in the *National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Source Book*, released on November 13, 2003.

Taking to his office, Mr. Rumsfeld sat at his desk and saw his Vice Admiral turn on the TV set “to see the video of one of the towers burning.” This “video” Mr. Rumsfeld meant is unclear; as we all witnessed, it was a live stream take when both Twin Towers were in flames. But, knowing how the military like to jiggle with words. . .Mr. Rumsfeld turned off the volume of the video/live coverage and glanced at the screen “from time to time,” during which he received his intelligence briefing from his regular Briefer.

Up to this point, there is no mention from Mr. Rumsfeld if he had been contacted or advised of a hijacking.


As the former Secretary “reviewed the threat reports from around the world,” and just a few minutes into that briefing, he is distracted by the scenes on the TV, missing by milliseconds United 175 crashing into the WTC 2. Mr. Rumsfeld witnessed the aftereffect of that crash and the fireball that erupted at 09:02 a.m. “Within the seventeen minutes ¹⁰² between the first and second plane crashes, the world passed from one period of history into another,” he said.

From 09:02 a.m., when Mr. Rumsfeld witnessed the fireball from the WTC 2 caused by United 175, until the moment when American 77 impacts with the Pentagon at 09:40 a.m., (according to the FAA) or at 09:43 a.m., (according to NIST), this is a 38 minute window frame that Mr. Rumsfeld tells us absolutely nothing happened in his office except that he continued to observe and absorb “news of the attacks in New York” from the TV.

CHAINS OF COMMAND FOR A HIJACKING INTERCEPT ON 9/11



¹⁰² United 175 impacted the WTC 2 just 16½ minutes after American 11 hit the WTC 1.



This chain of command had to be climbed within 38 minutes, because at 09:43 a.m., (or 09:45 a.m.,) the Pentagon is hit by another “hijacked” Boeing as Mr. Rumsfeld is still in his office when “the small, round, wood table at which we were working, once used by General William Tecumseh Sherman, trembled.” The chain of command was not climbed during these 38 minutes, so Mr. Rumsfeld leaves his office and walks “along the E Ring, the Pentagon’s outer corridor;” and reaches “heavy smoke;” but was “forced to a lower floor.” He “headed to a nearby stairwell and down a flight of stairs toward an exit” and was later seen on the lawn of the Pentagon around 10:30 a.m., helping the wounded.

Since Secretary Rumsfeld was not requested to join the chain of command most of the morning till 10:30 a.m., this required Major Arnold to bypass the secretary’s required approval for interceptor/fighter scrambles. So Colonel Marr at NORAD orders fighter pilots from Otis Air Base to “battle stations” but they were not given the order to scramble. As a consequence, Colonel Marr

spends 8 minutes phoning his superior, Major Arnold, seeking the authorization needed to scramble the alerted fighter-interceptors. When authorization is finally issued (according to NORAD at 08:46 a.m.) exactly 28 minutes after the following events had taken place:-

- American 11 officially declared “hijacked” at 08:13:30 a.m., due to the pilot’s action: “Keyed mike while threat was being made in the cockpit”.
[Terry Biggio, Air Traffic Operations Manager]
- FAA’s Boston Centre contacts the Regional Operations Centre (ROC)
- ROC contacts the FAA Command Centre in Virginia
- The FAA Command Centre (Ben Sliney) contacts Lt. General Canavan
- Lt. General Canavan is in Puerto Rico
- Unidentified individual replaces Lt. General Canavan
- Unidentified individual contacts the Pentagon Command Centre
- The Pentagon Command Centre has a temp that morning, Captain Leidig
- Captain Leidig contacts Colonel Marr at NORAD who gives the orders for fighters to scramble - Orders freeze
- Captain Leidig contacts his superior, Major Arnold, for the next 8 minutes
- Secretary Rumsfeld is where he said he was

On duty that morning at Cape TRACON was ATC Steven Walsh. In his September 30, 2003, interview he stated that after Mr. Bueno called Tim Spence at the Cape TRACON’s ATC Supervisor’s Desk, he had no idea “that the scramble of the PANTA flights ¹⁰³ on 9/11 was in response to the hijacking of

¹⁰³ F-15s call signs are PANTA 45 and PANTA 46. When “coming out” they are under one flight call sign (PANTA 45); the lead jet has the call sign. If the fighters split, they are both identified by different call signs.

AA11.”¹⁰⁴ Walsh also said that the flight time from Otis Air Force Base to New York was “approximately 12 minutes for an F15.”

Taking this time window into consideration, if Mr. Bueno called Cape TRACON immediately after hearing the Cabin Crew keying their microphone “while threat was being made” at 08:13:30 a.m., and the “hard southern turn” the aircraft did at 08:26:30 a.m., we can then estimate NEADS was alerted of a situation around 08:37 a.m., the latest. If we include 15 minutes (?) for F-15s to go airborne and 12 minutes to arrive at New York (according to ATC Walsh) the fighters would have been in the area a little after 9 o’clock.

At 08:39:58 a.m., as recorded on the NEADS tapes, Colin Scoggins, the Military Operations Specialist at Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center, calls Boston Central requesting the location of American 11 to inform their fighters where to go to intercept it. Boston Central does not know where the flight is going. This is a logical estimate since no communication with the cockpit was available due to the transponder being turned off. But NEADS was not asking Boston Central where the aircraft was going; they were asking where the aircraft was at that moment. Boston Central finally understood and responded the aircraft was “heading towards Kennedy;” “like 35 miles north of Kennedy now at 367 knots.”

So at 08:44:59 a.m., NEADS gives the order to airborne its fighters based on latitude and longitude of the aircraft.

At 08:46 a.m., Colonel Marr and Major Arnold approve the order for NEADS to take their fighters to the skies. The fighters eventually take off at 08.53 a.m.; NEADS is informed at 08.50 a.m., American 11 has hit the WTC 1.

¹⁰⁴ September 30, 2003, interview.
<http://media.nara.gov/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00256.pdf>

Nash, the F-15 fighter pilot remembered: “We were going as fast as the airplanes could go. We did everything we could but unfortunately couldn’t stop anything.” [Leslie Filson, *Air War over America: Sept. 11 alters face of air defense mission* (HQ 1st Air Force Public Affairs Office, Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida, 2003).]

Jeanne Yurman was interviewed by phone on *CNN* being an eye-witness who claimed to have heard a sonic boom just seconds before American 11 hit the WTC 1 at 08:46 a.m. This would mean she heard something pass that reached well above 700 mph which is the speed of sound. ¹⁰⁵

Another eyewitness, Carl Teterskis, heard the same thing. He told what happened on the Website “Stories of September 11” on January 14, 2004: “With the Trade Towers to my left and the Marina straight ahead I was taking in the usual sights, joggers, fellow commuters, a mother pushing her baby in a stroller. The calm and tranquility was suddenly pierced with the thunderous sound of a plane. My first impulse as I looked to the sky was that I would see an F-16 streaking by. Looking overhead in the wrong sector of space a tremendous boom resonated?? Holy shit he broke the sound barrier?” ¹⁰⁶

And yet another witness, Mike Alvarado, heard the same thing: “On the morning of Sept, 11, 2001, my fiancé Lisa Mewa and I were going to get our marriage license. We had arrived early. I bought a cup of coffee from a cart. We’re looking at the Twin towers when we saw the first plane. I commented to Lisa that I thought the plane was flying pretty low. Then it went straight into the building. The sound of the impact was like a sonic boom.” ¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁵ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d3LXJwl-7xY>

¹⁰⁶ Carl Teterskis, Story #10324, *The September 11 Digital Archive*, 14 January 2004, <http://911digitalarchive.org/stories/details/10324>

¹⁰⁷ Mike Alvarado, Story #1551, *The September 11 Digital Archive*, 29 August 2002, <http://911digitalarchive.org/stories/details/1551>

Col. Bob Marr, NEADS commander, ordered F-15 pilots to scramble from Cape Cod, 160 miles to the northeast from where American 11 crashed. As the jets rolled down Runway 5 at Otis Air National Guard Base and took off, it was “with fire igniting behind them; flight lead Duffy told his wingman they would fly supersonic.” As this may be, supersonic flight causes ground sonic boom shudders; even so, when those fighters took off, they climbed with supersonic going down to Long Island. “At the time I just wanted to get there,” flight lead Duffy remembered. “We were high enough that we wouldn’t blow out windows or do any damage to anything.” [Leslie Filson, *Air War over America: Sept. 11 alters face of air defense mission*. Published by Headquarters 1st Air Force Public Affairs Office, Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida, 2003.] This disproves the claims of wagging tongues that if those fighters flew supersonic that morning, windows around New York would have blown out.

These sonic boom sounds were also heard by witnesses in regards to the WTC 2. Georgette Cammarata remembers hearing someone call out “a plane hit the building. I kept walking,” she says, “stopping a few minutes later to what I thought was the sound of a sonic boom. A huge plane was aiming directly for Tower Two and in the minute that it would take me to turn my head, the plane struck. I witnessed a body plunging to finality. Fear finally struck and I started to run.” ¹⁰⁸

Kristi Maglio remembers walking towards “the FDR to the Brooklyn Bridge, but that’s when we heard this sonic BOOM! It was 2 WTC collapsing. Of course at the time we didn’t know it, but all I knew was I was NOT walking across any

¹⁰⁸ Georgette Cammarata, Story #7227, *The September 11 Digital Archive*, 13 September 2002, <http://911digitalarchive.org/stories/details/7227>

bridge after hearing that noise. So we turned around and walked towards uptown.”¹⁰⁹

We are told however, on the aftermath, that “Commanders throughout DoD did not place a high priority on developing accurate information regarding the events of September 11, 2001. DoD relied on NORAD to develop information to be reported to the press and subsequently to the 9/11 Commission. However, after September 11, 2001, NORAD officials primarily focused their efforts on identifying and correcting operational weaknesses. Gathering information related to the events of September 11, 2001, was considered to be an additional duty. Consequently, the events were neither adequately reported nor documented. There were no files maintained at CONR or NORAD tracking how the information reported was developed. Once Operation Noble Eagle¹¹⁰ began, [September 14, 2001,] NORAD, CONR and NEADS did not have adequate staff to execute their expanded air defense mission. All administrative functions that could be were terminated and personnel were reassigned to operational duties. For example, the historian for NEADS was pulled from his duties of collecting data for historical purposes and placed in the Operation Center working with the radars. Senior officials were working extended shifts.” [Report on Forensic Capabilities and Incident Reporting Related to Air Defense Actions; Report No. 05-INTEL-13, May 27, 2005.]

Boston Air Traffic Controllers’ positions: In the case of American Air Lines Flight 11, traffic control changes made on the morning of, are depicted in the following chart with an analysis of that chart.

¹⁰⁹ Kristi Maglio, Story #683, *The September 11 Digital Archive*, 29 May 2002, <http://911digitalarchive.org/stories/details/683>

¹¹⁰ Operation *Noble Eagle* is the name given to the United States and Canadian military operations related to “homeland security” and support to federal, state, and local agencies. The operation began 14 September 2001, in response to the September 11, 2001, attacks.

Facility	Time Period (UTC)	Position
BOS	1152:37 – 1217:48	LCE
BOS	1155:32 – 1210:49 1157:42 – 1210:00	ID (B) SL
ZBW	1205:32 – 1208:50	Sector 47R
ZBW	1204:51 – 1233:59	Sector 46R

›NTSB: [9/11 ATC Air Traffic Recording, December 21, 2001](#)

FACILITY	TIME PERIOD (UTC)	Position
BOS = Boston ZBW = Boston Traffic Control Airspace	Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) is 4 hours ahead of Eastern Standard Time (EST)	LCE = Boston Local East Controller ID (B) = Radio transmission from initial departure (ID) position B
		SL = Radio transmission from Lincoln departure
		Sector 47R = Richard Beringer was ATC at sector radar 47 together with Stephen Roebuck
		Sector 46R = Peter Zalewski was ATC at sector radar 46

For a comprehensive list of names of on duty Aviation personnel on September 11, 2001, see Appendix G.

Rules & regulations: Federal Air Marshals Program (FAM) - Cathal Flynn, the FAA Associate Administrator of Civil Aviation Security, “had to work to save” the Federal Air Marshals Program (FAM) back “in 1993-1994 over the opposition of the FBI and the DoD.” The program was adopted shortly after the Cuban

missile crisis of 1961 to help prevent hijackings of American Airlines. It remained in effect for four decades.

This Federal Air Marshals Program should not be confused with a rule stated by FAA officials. And that is, that it required Airlines to apply to the agency for their pilots (not Air Marshals) to carry guns in cockpits and for the Airlines to put pilots through an agency-approved firearms training course. The aviation agency said, however, that throughout the life of the rule not a single U.S. air carrier took advantage of it, effectively rendering it “moot.”

According to Jon Dougherty’s May 16, 2002, article in *WorldNetDaily*, only two months prior to September 11th in 2001, two armed pilots were banned, and the “FAA rescinded a rule allowing guns in cockpits just before the terror attacks.”¹¹¹

As the Commission saw it, all airport screening would have the capability “to identify and confiscate weapons and other items prohibited from being carried onto a commercial flight.” There is no mention regarding Captain John Ogonowski’s screening on the morning of, and holds the following: On September 15, 2001, the FBI interviewed David Aylward, a Pre-Board Screener (PBS) at Boston-Logan on the morning of, from where American 11 took off. Mr. Aylward worked for Globe Aviation Services, the Swedish-Israeli owned security companies that controlled the checkpoints at this specific airport through which passengers gained access.

Here is what the FBI report in regards to that interview: “He [Aylward] does not recall seeing any Middle Eastern passengers passing through the security checkpoint. He recalled conducting a hand wand check on the pilot [John Ogonowski] of American Airlines flight 11 when he came through the security

¹¹¹ Jon Dougherty’s interview at *WorldNetDaily*, published May 16, 2002. Accessed 2010. <http://web.archive.org/web/20120520075401/http://www.wnd.com/2002/05/13933/>

checkpoint. He also recalled doing a bag check on one of the passengers who passed through the security checkpoint but could not offer any further details on this matter.”

As to why Mr. Aylward had needed to check Captain Ogonowski is uncertain; the FBI does not say. But, as a consequence of September 2001, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act signed into law by President Bush on November 19, 2001, has a provision allowing pilots to be armed, but the law does not mandate that the right be granted. There is no mention in regards to the Air Marshal Program.

The Draft Monograph on Civil Aviation & Transportation Security Report, stated the Federal Air Marshals Program was a “domestic program” having “withered because of the system’s confidence in checkpoint screening operations, the absence of hijacking events, and the cost of the program that required the air carriers to give-up seats to Marshals that could otherwise be sold to paying customers.”

When the Commission Staff interviewed Monte Belger who was Deputy Administrator of the FAA, he reported the “program was allowed to wither because it was a lower priority in an environment where resources were constrained. He stated that at the time, people didn’t think there was a serious domestic threat, citing the absence of a serious domestic aviation security event in the 10 years leading up to 9-11. He saw some of the language citing a domestic threat in AC1 as ‘throw ins.’” [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR04017272): Team 7 INTERVIEW: Monte Belger, former Deputy Administrator of the FAA, Nov. 24, 2003, at the GSA Commission Office.]

Either way, Rich Stevens, FAA Security Division Manager, felt the Federal Air Marshal Program was “extremely important because it was classified and the bad guys did not know where and when we were flying. It was a good

deterrent.” [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFRO4017223): Team 7 INTERVIEW: Rich Stevens, FAA Security Division Manager for the NE Region, March 01, 2004.]

How would an airline company and/or airport employee know that a flight is at “high-risk” in order to put onboard U.S. Air Marshals? The only answer would be for the Intelligence Community to advise them certain individuals would be flying a certain flight, and Air Marshals should be put on the aircraft.

Penny Anderson is on record saying “there may have been a member of law enforcement onboard” American 11 on September 11th. No official information exists to explain Mrs. Anderson’s statement.

[U] As they received information from the 10th floor and field units, they posted information on butcher paper hung on the walls of the room. Anderson remembers taking a call from a “male voice” who relayed a report about a shooting on board one of the hijacked flights. She is not sure whether the voice was someone from the 10th floor or elsewhere. She is not sure whether this was the original reporting of the shooting to FAA or whether it was a second-hand report to the working room. She remembers that some thought this was “holy shit” news. She remembers not being surprised if the gun story was true because there may have been a member of law enforcement on board.

►COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFRO4017272), Team 7 INTERVIEW with Penny Anderson (FAA Civil Aviation Security Official), December 18, 2003.

As good as it got: Robert McLaughlin from FAA HQ Security Operations told the Commission Staff in an interview they had with him, that before the September attacks, he “recalled having heard the name bin Laden fairly frequently, but never with specific threat information. Based on what he saw, he perceived that the threat to civil aviation had gone up ‘a little bit’ in the months preceding 9/11.” [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFRO4020021): Team 7 INTERVIEW: Robert McLaughlin, FAA HQ Security Operations, June 03, 2004.]

Before September 11th, the FAA was strictly a regulatory agency. In that capacity, the organization often “got its nose bloodied” in attempting to exert

influence over the industry stakeholders, and to do more than the system would sustain. Civil Aviation Security officials wanted to do more, but absence of public or Congressional support, the security system did “as good a job as it could.”

Mike Morse the FAA National Security Coordination Staffer in FAA-HQ, Washington, D.C., was interviewed by the Commission Staff. He told them that “this was the greatest weakness of the system,” and used an example to describe his point. “An attempt by the FAA to institute background checks for those who were given unescorted access to secure areas in airports in the late-1980s” was received with severe pushback from Congress and the industry stakeholders. “The most unpopular ones such as this would often result in legislation (appropriations riders) that would restrict FAA ability to enforce such unpopular proposals.” [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR03010901): Team 7 INTERVIEW: Mike Morse the FAA National Security Coordination Staffer in FAA HQ, Washington, D.C. Sept. 25, 2003.]

Identification Friend or Foe (IFF): “American 11 stops transmitting Identification - Friend or Foe (IFF) beacon signal while over the Hudson River.” [FAA’s Report: ATC System Assessment, Shutdown, & Restoration, March 21, 2002.]

The IFF originated in World War II for just that purpose; a way for secondary radars to identify U.S. aircraft from enemy aircraft by assigning a unique identifier code to U.S. aircraft transponders. The system is considered a secondary radar system since it operates differently and independently from the primary radar system that tracks aircraft skin returns only, although the same CRT display is frequently used for both. It was initially intended to distinguish between enemy and friend but has evolved such that the term IFF

commonly refers to all modes of operation, including civil and foreign aircraft use.


Non-prohibited: To the knowledge of Timothy Ahem, who was the Vice-President of Safety, Security & Environmental for American Air Lines, the “terrorists” did not carry anything onto the airplanes that the government prohibited. [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR04017213): Team 8 INTERVIEW: Timothy Ahem, Vice-President of Safety, Security & Environmental for American Air Lines. Jan. 07, 2004, at AAL Corporate Headquarters, Ft. Worth, Texas.] But this turns out not to be as straight forward as was being reported. Box-cutters, knives, mace, pepper spray, and plastic explosives, weapons reported by passengers and Flight Crew to have been used onboard by “hijackers,” were all prohibited items by the government. Even more disturbing is the fact that Air Line employees could pass security checkpoints if they carried a box-cutter. [Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms Special Agent Interview Huntleigh Security Pre-Board Screener (name redacted) Sept. 17, 2001.]

The effects of pepper spray depend upon the spray. If it is airborne the victim will breathe it in and experience breathing problems, perhaps coughing. If you were sprayed directly in the face it will shut your eyes. The substance could also cause nausea or panic. The effects of mace (which is less widespread than pepper spray) would depend upon the vapor. Making a large group of people cough or experience difficulty in breathing would be easier with pepper spray mace, which is designed more to spray directly at someone. However, the effect really depends on the particular product. Residue of pepper spray and/or mace would remain at a crime scene but would have been destroyed by fire. [COMMISSION STAFF MEMORANDUM (MFR04020033): Team 7 INTERVIEW: FBI specialists on mace and pepper spray, May 05, 2004.]

GOVERNMENT
EXHIBIT
PA00111
11-45563-100

Exhibit Number: PA00111

Red bandana recovered from the
United Airlines Flight 93 crash site



▶Air Carrier Standard Security Program on September 11, 2001
Checkpoint Operations Guide, July 1994

Items NOT allowed to enter the sterile area:

Checkpoint
Operations
Guide-7/94Checkpoint
Operations
Guide-7/94Checkpoint
Operations
Guide-7/94

TEAM 7 DRAFT: MONOGRAPH on CIVIL AVIATION AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY

Sam Brinkley, William Johnstone, John Raidt

The FAA was required by law to regulate the safety and security of civil aviation while at the same time promoting the aviation industry -a dual mandate that was the subject of continuous question by critics.

U.S. Air Carriers were profit-seeking enterprises that sought to minimize costs, including security expenses, and maximize revenues in order to succeed in a highly competitive business environment by which they had a moral, legal and economic obligation to protect the safety and security of their aircraft and passengers.

U.S. Airports were public hubs of economic activity in competition for air carrier revenues, travel business and customer satisfaction. As such they were, in most instances, high profile venues for both lawbreakers and local law enforcement authorities.

The **U.S. Intelligence Community** was responsible for collecting information on threats to national security, providing its services to many government “customers” including the Federal Aviation Administration. Its ability to collect information on behalf of its customers was constrained by legal strictures and practices intended to protect personal rights, especially within the United States. The Intelligence Community’s ability and willingness to share information with fellow agencies and the public was constrained by agency customs and procedural strictures intended to protect methods of collection and sources of information.

Congress was required to set aviation security policy, fund the federal components and oversee the system as it dealt with the many competing priorities and political influences affecting the national agenda including issues

of budgeting, economics, national security, and the regulation of an industry from which it also received political contributions.

The architecture of the civil aviation security system, and the standards by which it would function, were the product of these institutions, and the tug of war between competing public policy interests: Cost versus benefit; public convenience versus precaution; regulation versus partnership; differing perceptions about credible threat and acceptable levels of risk; and the implacable clash between economics and public safety.

A unique unit of the FAA was the “Red Team.” This was an FAA Office of Civil Aviation Security (CAS) headquarters-based unit created consequent to the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103. Its primary mission was to conduct covert airport security penetration testing for the purpose of identifying both localized and systemic vulnerabilities, and to help strengthen FAA’s regulatory inspection capabilities. [Kenneth M. Mead, Inspector General (U.S. DoT) writing to Elaine Kaplan Special Counsel U.S. Office of Special Counsel, Aug. 16, 2002.]

A former member of the FAA Red Team, Bogdan Dzakovic, turned whistleblower after September 11th and wrote his claims of security issues being breached at various U.S. airports he had screened. One of those letters was written to Elaine Kaplan who was a member of the Special Counsel. She in turn forwarded the accusations to the Department of Transportation on August 16, 2002.

Bogdan Dzakovic’s accusations

Mr. Dzakovic alleged that Admiral Cathal Flynn, then-Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security (CAS), and Leo Boivin, then-Manager of the Red

Team, suppressed Red Team testing results and directed the Red Team to not conduct follow-up inspections of airports that yielded especially poor testing results. Specifically, for example, Mr. Dzakovic alleged that in 1997 or 1998, he reported to Mr. Boivin that during a testing trip to the San Juan, Puerto Rico airport, he observed that the airlines suspended many security measures at times when the airport was particularly busy. Mr. Dzakovic alleged that rather than initiating steps to correct this problem, Mr. Boivin instructed him not to return to that airport in the future. Mr. Dzakovic further alleged that contrary to the Red Team's usual practice of submitting written reports after each testing trip, Mr. Boivin told him not to write a report on his visit to the San Juan airport. Mr. Dzakovic suspected that Mr. Boivin attempted to suppress this information because it reflected unfavorably on the airline industry.

Mr. Dzakovic also alleged that in August 1999, Mr. Boivin ordered him to begin providing prior notification to FAA local field offices in advance of visiting airports for CTX. Explosives Detection System (EDS) testing, in violation of the Red Team's protocol of unannounced testing. Mr. Dzakovic asserted his belief that his management instituted pre-notification for the purpose of forewarning the airlines and improving testing performance, thus making CTX appear more effective. Mr. Dzakovic related that he followed Mr. Boivin's orders on two testing trips, but after observing a large discrepancy in the resulting data, he independently decided to return to his previous practice of conducting unannounced testing.

Mr. Dzakovic alleged that Tony Fainberg, then-Director of the CAS Office of Policy and Planning (located in FAA headquarters), abused his authority by instructing Mr. Dzakovic to exclude data from a study conducted on the

reliability of TIP.¹¹² Mr. Dzakovic related that in 1998, FAA sent him to Reno, Nevada, to conduct a small-scale study on the accuracy and reliability of TIP. He believed this study was the only one of its kind conducted and that it was used by FAA to evaluate whether TIP would be a worthwhile investment to improve airport security. Mr. Dzakovic explained that the study compared the ability of screeners to recognize TIP computer-generated weapons on X-ray monitors against their ability to recognize real weapons. Mr. Dzakovic alleged that Mr. Fainberg instructed him to exclude data on one of the screeners from the final results he reported because this individual scored high in her ability to recognize real weapons, but performed poorly with the TIP-generated images. Mr. Dzakovic suspected that Mr. Fainberg directed the exclusion of this data in order to make TIP appear more effective.

The Department of Transportation (DoT) followed up on the above accusations, and though they did not find all that was suspected to be so, they did find irregularities in airport security:-

“We found programmatic weaknesses involving the reporting of Red Team findings and regarding corrective action. Further, we found that changes made by FAA as a result of Red Team testing generally did not have the desired effect of creating sustained improved performance by airport screening companies.”

¹¹² TIP: A software program, developed in the early 1990s that superimposes the images of fictional threat objects on the monitors of X-ray screening machines for the purpose of keeping screeners alert, helping screeners recognize a variety of potential threat objects, and assessing screener performance. TIP was not designed to detect actual explosive devices or threat items.

“We found that the Red Team submitted, to CAS headquarters, a written report of findings for each of its missions. CAS headquarters in turn forwarded Red Team summary reports to CAS field units, having regulatory responsibility for direct, day-to-day oversight of airport security for follow-on remedial action (e.g., letters of correction (LOCs) to air carriers, and fines). However, the field units typically did not receive LOCs that headquarters unilaterally issued to air carriers, or the carriers. LOC responses back to headquarters. We further found that CAS headquarters did not track the resolution of deficiencies identified through Red Team testing. We concluded that such lack of information dissemination and tracking organizationally hindered CAS capacity to effect coordinated remedial action.”

“The FAA told us that based on the Red Team’s creative “out of the box” approach to testing its findings were deemed not suitable for civil enforcement proceedings, because the Red Team’s techniques went beyond the standardized criteria applicable to the field regulatory units. Significantly, as noted by Mr. Dzakovic, the Red Team consistently found and reported throughout its existence high rates of test failure, reflecting often stark localized and systemic security vulnerabilities.”

“Following September 11, 2001, FAA’s Red Team stood down and our office was requested by the President and the Secretary, on an interim basis, to conduct similar covert testing nationwide. We, too, have found an alarmingly high incidence of testing failures, consistent with reports we have issued over the last several years showing vulnerabilities in screening of passengers; checked and carry-on baggage, as well as cargo; access to secure areas of airports; and issuance and control of airport identification

badges. The persistence of these problems and lack of sustained improvement in aviation security led to the legislation federalizing security screening under TSA, along with the full range of measures that are being planned and implemented by TSA to strengthen screening operations.”



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Ex-employee says FAA warned before 9/11

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Enlarge

By H. Darr Beiser, USA TODAY

"Immediately (after 9/11), numerous government officials from FAA as well as other government agencies made defensive statements such as, 'How could we have known this was going to happen?' " Bogdan Dzakovic testified later before the 9/11 Commission. "The truth is, they did know."

By Catherine Rampell, USA TODAY

From 1995 to 2001, Bogdan Dzakovic served as a team leader on the Federal Aviation Administration's Red Team. Set up by Congress to help the FAA think like terrorists, the elite squad tested airport security systems.

In the years leading up to the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Dzakovic says, the team was able to breach security about 90% of the time, sneaking bombs and submachine guns past airport screeners. Expensive new bomb detection machines consistently failed, he says.

The team repeatedly warned the FAA of the potential for security breaches and hijackings but was told to cover up its findings, Dzakovic says.

Eventually, the FAA began notifying airports in advance when the Red Team would be doing its undercover testing, Dzakovic says. He and other Red Team members approached the Department of Transportation's Office of the Inspector General, the General Accounting Office and members of Congress about the FAA's alleged misconduct regarding the Red Team's aviation security tests. No one did anything, he says.

Then came 9/11.

"Immediately (after 9/11), numerous government officials from FAA as well as other government agencies made defensive statements such as, 'How could we have known this was going to happen?' " Dzakovic testified later before the 9/11 Commission. "The truth is, they did know."

WHISTLE-BLOWERS TELL TALES

■ **Speaking out:** Whistle-blowers tell of cost of conscience | Ex-employee says FAA warned before 9/11



■ **Paying the price:** 'Privilege' blocks fired translator from suing FBI | 'They treat a whistle-blower like a virus'



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AVIATION SECURITY - INVESTIGATIONS

February 3, 1999 through September 14, 2001

<u>Subject Area</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Summary</u>
Screeners & Baggage Handlers	Sept. 14, 2001	Employees who are non-U.S. citizens without proper INS status were authorized to enter secured areas of Dulles, ongoing investigation.
Security Badges	Sept. 14, 2001	Arrest warrants were issued against non-U.S. citizens who obtained security badges at Miami International Airport.
Security Badges	Sept. 13, 2001	Employee at Miami International Airport pleads guilty to using job in ID section to make false security badges for coworkers.
Cockpit Access	June 7, 2001	Civilian used false FAA ID card to obtain unauthorized cockpit access on 3 separate flights.
Access Control	June 5, 2001	Non-employee of Miami International Airport illegally used an Airport Secured ID Display Area access badge to gain entry to a secured area.
Access Control	February 1, 2001	Miami International Airport employee gained access to secured areas by providing false data on Airport ID Badge application.
Screeners	October 25, 2000	Private firm (Argenbright) failed to conduct background checks on checkpoint screeners at Philadelphia Airport. Company fined \$1 million, \$350,000 restitution and \$200,00 in investigative costs.
Access Control	May 1, 2000	Employees at Dallas-Ft. Worth Airport allowed unauthorized personnel to use their security badges to gain access to secured areas.
Screeners	March 27, 2000	Private firm (Aviation Safeguards) falsely certified on at least 70 occasions that criminal background checks had been accomplished on employees seeking access to secure areas at Miami International Airport.
Access Control	Feb. 3, 1999	Miami-Dade County Police Office falsely certified that criminal background checks had been accomplished on 22 employees seeking access to secure areas at Miami International Airport. Upon hiring, applicants had clearance to enter secured areas of the airport.

Here is a portion of what Kenneth M. Mead, the Inspector General of the U.S. Department of Transportation (DoT) testified to before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States on Aviation Security. His testimony was released in May 22, 2003: “Before September 11th, the aviation security model was mostly based on reacting to known security threats instead of being proactive against potential threats. The model, dating back to the early 1970’s, was implemented through a system of shared responsibilities. Industry provided and paid for the security; FAA’s role was to establish security requirements and ensure compliance with these requirements. Within the model were counter pressures to control security costs and limit the impact of security on aviation operations, so that industry could concentrate on its primary mission of moving passengers seamlessly and safely through the system.”

Mr. Mead further stated to the Commission that, “Many of these weaknesses, even for the threats the model was designed to prevent, existed for years, such as underutilization of bulk explosives detection machines, lack of performance standards for screening companies and their employees, inadequate controls to prevent unauthorized access to secure areas of the airport, ineffective background investigation requirements for employees working at the airport, and deficiencies in the cargo security program.”

[Kenneth M. Mead (Inspector General of the U.S. Department of Transportation) testifying at the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States on Aviation Security, May 22, 2003.]

Globe Security (Globe Aviation Services): American Air Lines at Boston-Logan contracted Globe Security (Globe Aviation Services) Swedish based with ICTS International Israeli based. The company controlled checkpoints through which

passengers gained access. Globe Aviation was based in the Netherlands that developed products and provided consulting and personnel services in the field of aviation and general security. It was established in 1982, by former members of the Shin Bet, Israel's internal security agency, and El Al Air Line security agents. The company's shares were traded on NASDAQ under the symbol "ICTS."

The firm and its subsidiaries specialized in aviation security services, operated airport checkpoints and electronic equipment, such as x-ray screening devices and manual devices, and verified travel documents. Security services and consulting were also provided to other public and private transportation sectors. In 2008, the company employed 3,350 people with annual sales revenue of \$98.8 million. ¹¹³

Globe Aviation Services at Boston-Logan did not release CCTV footage of the suspected hijackers onboard American 11, either going through checkpoints and/or waiting in the boarding area. According to the Commission, "it lacked closed-circuit television surveillance through the checkpoint." At best, the sayings of boarding and screening passengers on the day of had to be taken at the word of Air Line employees.

On November 19, 2002, the U.S. Senate narrowly voted to grant corporate immunity by a vote of 52-47 to Globe Aviation Services responsible for Boston-Logan security on September 11th. On July 26, 2002, the U.S. House approved HR5005, and a provision was slipped in very late to grant the immunity. ¹¹⁴

¹¹³ ICTS International N.V. Website. Accessed: 2009.

<http://www.icts-int.com/content3a9f.html?id=6>

¹¹⁴ PlaneSafe Website: Article by Mary Schiavo "9/11-Litigation & Legislation: Foreseeability of 9/11 Attacks on the U.S. Homeland." Published April 9, 2003.

http://www.planesafe.org/?page_id=281

Level III Plan: U.S. airport security was operating during the summer of 2001 under a Level III Plan, which had an alert status that “Information indicates a terrorist group or other hostile entity with a known capability of attacking civil aviation is likely to carry out attacks against U.S. targets; or civil disturbances with a direct impact on civil aviation have begun or are imminent.” [FAA Team 7 Draft Monograph on Civil Aviation & Transportation Security Report.]

Throughout that summer, and indeed, since (???) the domestic aviation system was operating at Security Alert Level III. This level indicated....and required...(PLACEHOLDER: ADD AVSEC INFORMATION.)

In view of this Level III alert status, airport operating measures would have gone into effect, which was to “arrange for, and deploy plainclothes security personnel or LEOs for surveillance in terminals and other locations as appropriate. Where available, request EOD and tactical teams to respond and/or utilize explosives detection measures such as K-9 or electronic sniffers. Post signs at each ticket counter and screening checkpoint or make routine public announcements that emphasize the need for all passengers to closely control baggage and packages to avoid transporting items without their knowledge.”

In view of this Level III alert status, air carrier measures would have gone into effect, which was to “apply the Contingency Passenger Profile Criteria, issued by the FAA, to all originating passengers and those passengers transferring from air carriers not subject to this requirement. The FAA will determine the profile criteria when it receives threat information, and the air carrier will take the following countermeasures in conjunction with this requirement. Physically search or screen with an approved device specifically identified in the security directive, the carry-on property of those identified as

selectees and hand wand or pat down that person. Inspect by x-ray, physically search, or screen with an approved EDS or other appropriate device the checked property of selectees. Remove batteries from all electrical and electronic devices in the checked baggage of selectees, and place batteries separate from the devices except where the air carrier screens the baggage with an EDS or other approved device of a selectee unless that person are aboard the same flight or a verifiable tracking system establishes the unaccompanied baggage is a result of circumstances beyond the selectee's control."

There was a Federal Aviation Regulation (Part 108) through which the FAA set its security framework for Air Lines. Though these rulemakings began to be discussed and considered as early as August 1997 due to "a threat assessment that estimated the potential threat to domestic civil aviation to be equivalent to some portion of the Bojinka Plot (12 explosions that involve the loss of an entire aircraft and incur a large number of fatalities)" these rulemakings were not decided "till July 17, 2001, with an effective date of November 14, 2001."

Belger Monte, Deputy Administrator of the FAA, identified this FAA proposed rule pending in 2001 which was "to certify screeners and increase training requirements. He said that Admiral Flynn [Associate Administrator of Civil Aviation Security] pulled back the final rule because he perceived an inability to quantitatively test the system and performance. He wanted to put in place the TIP (Threat Imaging Projection System) first. Belger stressed that better trained, more dedicated individuals would be more likely to detect weapons, but, the U.S. domestic system wasn't designed to detect weapons which were not prohibited." [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR04017272): Team 7

INTERVIEW: Monte Belger, former Deputy Administrator of the FAA at the GSA Commission Office, Nov. 24, 2003.]

First rule the FAA considered: “To prohibit persons from carrying a deadly or dangerous weapon, explosive, or incendiary.” The rule “was dropped because the FAA has determined that airport operators are able to handle such occurrences through their local laws that control the presence of weapons and other deadly items on airport property.”

Second rule the FAA considered: “An air carrier is required to detect and prevent the carrying of explosives or dangerous weapons onto an aircraft or into a secure area,” meaning the passenger area of an aircraft. The comments the FAA received from air carriers on this rule included “Alaska Airlines, FedEx, UPS, United Express, CAA, RAA and ATA state that the air carrier cannot detect [the] introduction of deadly or dangerous items 100% of the time; they believe that deter should be substituted for detect. In the final rule, the FAA decided to accept this and the rule reads *prevent or deter.*”

The Commission Staff learned that the industry would exercise its influence by getting Members of Congress to submit “veiled” questions to the FAA on security measures. There was no congressional pressure put on the stakeholders to increase security.

When interviewing Bruce Butterworth the former Director for Policy & Planning (ACS-1) at the FAA, it was his opinion that Congress pressured the FAA (in the form of inquiry) to “roll back” the regulations. He said that the occasional question from a Hill staffer was often “veiled;” they were not going to come out and say they were opposed to increasing safety of civil aviation, but it was clear they opposed increased spending on the measures. In Butterworth’s view, part of the intelligence flow problem was on the FAA side, which didn’t necessarily wish to receive information that would cause problems

for the industry. FAA Security was often concerned about preventing roll-backs of existing security measures, and perhaps hoped that the information on increasing threats was not “real.” Butterworth admitted that more could have been done on the part of FAA as a regulator of the industry to “beef up” civil aviation security. In hindsight, he thinks they could have pushed for more intelligence, come down harder on checkpoints and enforced searches of selectee-only carry-on baggage. The rule only required that a selectee’s checked bags were screened. [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR04017272): Team 7 INTERVIEW: Bruce Butterworth, former Director for Policy & Planning (ACS-1) at the FAA, Sept. 29, 2003.]

Willie Gripper, who was the Deputy Director of Civil Aviation Security Operations Office of Security & Hazardous Materials at FAA Headquarters, stated to the Commission Staff that he received an intelligence briefing in late June 2001. The airport and air carriers in Boston also received the briefing from FAA’s Office of Civil Aviation Security Intelligence, which was a CD-ROM presentation provided by Pat McDonnell, the Head of Aviation Security Intelligence. Based on the information that Mr. Gripper received he was told that the system needed to be on-guard against a possible hijack attempt that summer in 2001. He also stated that FAA put the airports/air carriers on notice through the issuance of Information Circulars describing the threat. As a consequence, Mr. Gripper wanted to conduct an after-action report to see what happened on September 11, 2001, how and why it happened and how the system responded, in order to help determine what immediate changes were needed. He did not receive the necessary cooperation to undertake the study, “perhaps because there was so much else going on,” the Commission Staff reported. Specifically, Mr. Gripper requested that an evaluation staff be created to do the after action analysis. “This request was denied,” the

Commission Staff report, and assumed “perhaps because of resource constraints.” [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR040420012): Team 7 INTERVIEW: Willie Gripper, Deputy Director of Civil Aviation Security Operations Office of Security & Hazardous Materials at FAA Headquarters on May 05, 2004.]

James Padgett the Manager of the Global Issues Division, Office of Civil Aviation Security Intelligence told the Commission Staff that “on a number of occasions, the FAA found out information well after the fact involving a possible plot to attack an airport or the surveillance of an airport.” When pressed by the Commission Staff on the matter, “he said he could not be more specific on the information, other than that one may have involved Los Angeles Airport (LAX) in the late 1990s (he was very vague on this point).” [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR040417186): Team 7 INTERVIEW: James Padgett the Manager of the Global Issues Division, Office of Civil Aviation Security Intelligence, Oct. 07, 2003.] There is no additional information if the Commission Staff ever delved into this matter further, except that James Padgett stated a possibility that “someone with affiliations to terrorists was surveying, or wanted to talk to someone working at LAX.”

The Inspector General Kenneth Mead of DoT in his testimony before the Commission did state that he thought the security system, “before September 11, had in fact undergone incremental improvements over the years;” he did “believe in fact it provided a deterrent value for certain types of threat. Overall, though, the model on which the system was based did not work very well, and there were significant weaknesses in the protections it provided, even for the types of threats the system was designed to prevent.” [Commission Staff Report, Aug. 26, 2004.]

World Trade Center

►Image: [Creative Commons](#)



“I feel this way about it. World trade means world peace and consequently the World Trade Center buildings in New York had a bigger purpose than just to provide room for tenants. The World Trade Center is a living symbol of mans’ dedication to world peace

beyond the compelling need to make this a monument to world peace, the World Trade Center should, because of its importance, become a representation of mans’ belief in humanity, his need for individual dignity, his beliefs in the cooperation of men, and through cooperation, his ability to find greatness.”

Minoru Yamasaki (WTC Architect)

For a detailed history of the twin towers, visit skyscraper.org.

According to the Quarterly Review of Trade and Transportation 1990-1991 issue in *Portfolio*, all six buildings (WTC 1-WTC 6) were built around a 5-acre Plaza in honor of Austin Tobin. [CASTING GIANT SHADOWS: THE POLITICS OF BUILDING THE WORLD TRADE CENTRE, BY ROGER COHEN.] The building complex in lower

Manhattan of New York City consisted of seven buildings and a shopping concourse. It was the world's largest commercial complex, with many businesses, government agencies, and international trade organizations. Most prominent were the 110-story rectangular twin towers; one rising to 1,362 ft (415m) and the other to 1,368 ft (417m). Both structures, and the concourse portion, were completed in 1973; the cost, 750 million U.S. Dollars.

Floor	WTC 1 Height	WTC 2 Height
sub-levels 1-5	11'0"	11'0"
service level	16'0"	16'0"
1-concourse	22'0"	22'0"
2-plaza	12'0"	12'0"
3-6 storage	11'6"	11'6"
7-lower mechanical	14'0"	14'0"
8-upper mechanical	10'0"	10'0"
9-typical	12'0"	12'0"
10-39	12'0"	12'0"
40	14'0"	14'0"
41 lower mechanical	14'0"	14'0"
42 upper mechanical	14'0"	14'0"
43 lower esc floor	14'0"	12'0"
44 sky lobby	14'0"	14'0"
45 upper esc floor	12'0"	12'0"
46 typical	12'0"	12'0"
47-74	12'0"	12'0"
75 lower mechanical	14'0"	14'0"
76 upper mechanical	14'0"	14'0"

77 upper esc floor	12'0"	12'0"
78 sky lobby	14'0"	14'0"
79 upper esc floor	12'0"	12'0"
80 typical	12'0"	12'0"
81-105	12'0"	12'0"
106 typical	14'4"	14'4"
107 restaurant	17'6"	17'6"
108 lower mechanical	14'0"	14'0"
109 upper mechanical	11'8"	11'8"
110 roof to top of roof panels	15'4"	15'4"

The architects who designed the World Trade Center were Minoru Yamasaki of Associates of Rochester Hills, Michigan, and Emery Roth & Sons of New York. Structural engineers were Skilling, Helle, Christiansen, Robertson of New York. Foundation engineers were the Port Authority of New York & New Jersey Engineering Department with electrical engineers being Joseph R. Loring & Associates, New York. The mechanical engineers were Jaros, Baum & Bolles, New York with the General Contractor/Agent being Tishman Realty & Construction Company, New York.

The building agreement between the City and the Port Authority was created and signed on June 6, 1967, with a change in the "street system by discontinuing and closing volumes of streets below designated upper limiting planes and streets with no upper or lower limits in the area bounded by Liberty Street, West Street, Vesey Street, and Greenwich Street."

IN WITNESS THEREOF, the Port Authority and the City have caused these presents to be signed by their duly authorized officers and their corporate seals to be hereunto affixed the day and year first above written.

ATTEST:

Approved as to form: *[Signature]* CITY CLERK

[Signature]
Corporation Counsel
Approved as to form:

[Signature]
General Attorney

THE CITY OF NEW YORK

By *[Signature]*
MAYOR

Seal

Seal
THE PORT OF NEW YORK AUTHORITY
ESTABLISHED
BY *[Signature]*
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
APRIL THIRTIETH
1921
Seal

Document taken from the public domain

Floors	Predominate Uses
110	Elevator Machine Room, Tank Rooms, Broadcasters
108-109	Mechanical Equipment, Elevator Machine Room
106-107	Restaurant (Windows on the World)
79-105	Offices
78	Sky lobby Floor, Offices
77	Offices, Elevator Pits
75-76	Mechanical Equipment
45-74	Offices
44	Sky Lobby, PA Kitchen, Offices
43	Port Authority Cafeteria, Elevator Pits
41-42	Mechanical Equipment, Elevator Machine Rooms
9-40	Offices
7-8	Mechanical Equipment
3-6	Core Area, Locker Rooms
Plaza	Main Entrance Mezzanine from the Plaza
Lobby	Main Entrance Lobby from Concourse
B-1	Truck Dock Access, Storage and Maintenance Subcontractors, Elevator Pits
B-2	Storage and Maintenance Subcontractors, Elevator Pits, Parking Access
B-3	Storage and Maintenance Subcontractors, Parking Access
B-4	Storage and Maintenance Subcontractors, Parking Access
B-5	Mechanical Equipment
B-6	Mechanical Equipment, Elevator Machine Room

General breakdown of floor uses in the WTC1, by Merritt & Harris, Inc: 20 - 251E - Section V - 1 - Page 2. Dec. 06, 2000.

Renovations

- Sprinkler installation for LL5/73 compliance.
- Fire alarm system modernization.
- Approximately 65% elevator system modernization including cabs, controllers, SCRs, ADA control panels.
- Electric Power Upgrade - 1999.
- Chilled water risers.
- Condenser water upgrade.

Within the UBC Seismic Zone 2a, an area of minimal seismicity, the two towers soared in a 15,65-acre complex and was watched over by two security companies: E-J Electric Installation Corporation, and Securacom otherwise known as Stratesec. [THE MERRITT & HARRIS INC., EVALUATION REPORTS: PROPERTY CONDITION ASSESSMENT OF WORLD TRADE CENTER PORTFOLIO, DEC. 06, 2000.]

E-J Electric Installation Co., was the country's oldest independent electrical contractor that won a \$28 million contract in 1996 to tighten security at the tower complex. The Long Island City, N.Y. based contractor installed 2 million feet of fiber-optic cable, hundreds of security cameras, access control and 110 turnstiles, including systems integration. According to their Website (link [here](#)) E-J Electric Installation Co., was Prime Contractor for a \$34 million design, build, and, maintain project for the World Trade Center Security System. The company was chosen on a negotiated basis using technology, long term maintenance, management ability and price as a criteria. As prime contractor, E-J Electric Installation Co., had the engineer, general contractor and security integrator all working under its supervision. The company erected a primary Security Command Center and a backup Security Command Center, Master Computer system as well as a Redundant Computer system, including a Communication Network utilizing 1,500,000 feet of fiber optic cable and a backup electrical power supply system; and included:-

- Control access to sensitive building areas
- Access controls to interior building areas
- Centralize security monitoring and coordination
- System redundancy using a Parking Access Control system
- Closed Circuit Television (CCTV)
- Door Access Control system

- Intrusion Detection/Alarm system
- Lobby turnstiles and barriers
- Visitors' desk stations
- Digital badging
- Door locking
- Intercoms and duress alarms

In the 1970s, United Air Lines decided to computerize its reservation system, and chose E-J Electric to direct and oversee the entire project because E-J was capable of producing significant savings over the use of factory-wired components and it could assume unit responsibility for the total assignment. They became the expert electrical contracting firm in the U.S. on installing nation-wide computerized reservation systems for air lines. This complicated job required the interconnection of 250 individual locations with 150 tons of data/comm equipment, using 12,000 miles of communication circuits. To accomplish this task, E-J entered into a joint venture arrangement with local NECA contractors for most of the contracts. To assure timely completion and uniform installation, step-by-step instructions were compiled for field personnel and a copy was provided to each of the cooperating contractors. E-J's strategy was a key element in the successful, on-time completion of the entire project.

The second company, Securacom Inc., handled screening and checking at Dulles International Airport. This company has been subjected to a great deal of attention due to its clientele list. Apart from Dulles International Airport, Stratesec Inc., also offered security to Hewlett-Packard, EDS, United Air Lines, Gillette, MCI, and other facilities including hospitals, prisons, corporations, utilities, and universities. But the most talked of client has been the World Trade Center in 1996 when Stratesec Inc., was contracted to provide electronic

security services. The contract ended on September 11, 2001, according to an article published in *Washington Spectator* in February 15, 2005. The link to that article is no longer available, but cached by us and can be reviewed in Appendix C.

Hudson-Manhattan Railroad Tunnel: “The history of the PATH system traces back to the incorporation of the Hudson Tunnel Railroad Company on May 26, 1873, led by President Colonel De Witt Clinton Haskin, a businessman from Upstate New York who made his fortune on the construction of the California Pacific Railroad and in Utah silver mines.” For a detailed account, visit the [ASCE Website](#).

Construction Contracts:

CONTRACT SERVICE	DATE	CONTRACTOR NAME	AREAS
Elevator modernization	March 1994	A.C.E. Elevator Co.	WTC 4 & WTC 5
Elevator modernization	July 1994	A.C.E. Elevator Co.	WTC 1
Elevator modernization	July 1994	A.C.E. Elevator Co.	WTC 2
Information and communication systems for the Operations Control Center	August 1996	HSQ Technology	Entire complex
Purchase of fire alarm system equipment and technical services	March 1997	Siemens Cerberus	Entire complex
Ground fault protection upgrade	October 1997	Case Contracting Ltd.	Entire complex
Fire alarm system (phase III) XL3 conversion	November 1999	Hatzel & Buehler, Inc.	WTC 1 & WTC 2

January 2000 Rehabilitation of B1-Level (truck deck) floor slab	T. Moriarty & Son, Inc.	Subgrade WTC 1
September 2000 Fire alarm system upgrade (phase III) levels B1, B2 public and tenant office space in WTC4, WTC5	Katco Electric Co. Inc.	WTC 4 & WTC 5
November 2000 Concourse floor renovations and IRT subway entries	T. Moriarty & Son, Inc.	WTC Mall
February 2001 Tenant standby power 41A substation	E.J. Electric Installation Co.	WTC 1
March 2001 Fire alarm system device upgrades (phase III)	Case Contracting Ltd.	WTC 1
April 2001 Security system upgrade B1 CCTV system	ARC Electrical & Mechanical Corp.	Subgrade WTC 1
May 2001 Domestic water backflow prevention devices	T. Moriarty & Son, Inc.	Entire complex
May 2001 Five (5) Condenser water systems and five (5) expansion condenser water riser repair	Cyan Contracting Corp.	WTC 1 & WTC 2
May 2001 Fire alarm (phase III) device installation	Barbaro Electric Co., Inc.	WTC 2
June 2001 Fire alarm system subgrade backbone	Barbaro Electric Co., Inc.	Subgrade WTC 1

A press release (#101-2001) ¹¹⁵ was issued by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey on July 24, 2001. The news was that New York Governor, George E. Pataki, and New Jersey Acting Governor, Donald T. DiFrancesco, “Hailed the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey’s decision to privatize the management and operation of the World Trade Center, a world renowned

¹¹⁵ The link to this press release is no longer available; however, the document was cashed in 2010 and can be found in full in Appendix F.

icon that for three decades has been New York City's most famous landmark." Mr. Larry Silverstein of Silverstein Properties, Inc., and Westfield America, Inc., were willing to "lease the Twin Towers and other portions of the complex in a deal worth approximately \$3.2 billion -the city's richest real estate deal ever and one of the largest privatization initiatives in history."

"I am proud to assume the stewardship of the World Trade Center, one of New York's greatest jewels. We are committed to maintaining the World Trade Center's high standards and building on the fine record established by the Port Authority in operating the property as a first-class office and retail complex."

Larry Silverstein, Chief Executive Officer


Silverstein Properties, Inc.

July 24, 2001.

Demise & Health: The Mineta Transportation Institute Report 02-06, noted, "Dust removal and disposal was a problem for building owners, as well as for the business and residential tenants. Because the dust contained toxic substances and carcinogens, including asbestos and fiberglass, a thorough professional cleanup was required." [Saving City Lifelines: Lessons Learned in the 9-11 Terrorist Attacks, Sept. 2003.] The [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention \(CDC\)](#) came out with their report on health issues derived from the September 2001 attacks. The World Trade Center Health Program was created when Congress passed the James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act of 2010. The report provides health test and medical care results for people who worked in response and recovery operations at the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and the passenger-jet crash site in Pennsylvania. The

Administrator added to the List of WTC-Related Health Conditions that were eligible for coverage in their “WTC Health Program” the following cancers:-

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- Malignant neoplasms of the lip, tongue, salivary gland, floor of mouth, gum and other mouth, tonsil, oropharynx, hypopharynx, and other oral cavity and pharynx.
- Malignant neoplasm of the nasopharynx
- Malignant neoplasms of the nose, nasal cavity, middle ear and accessory sinuses
- Malignant neoplasms of the larynx

- Malignant neoplasms of the esophagus
- Malignant neoplasms of the stomach
- Malignant neoplasms of the colon and rectum
- Malignant neoplasms of the liver and intrahepatic bile duct
- Malignant neoplasm of the retroperitoneum, peritoneum, omentum and mesentery
- Malignant neoplasms of the trachea; bronchus and lung; heart, mediastinum and pleura; and other ill-defined sites in the respiratory system and intrathoracic organs.
- Mesothelioma
- Malignant neoplasms of the soft tissues (sarcomas)
- Malignant neoplasms of the skin (melanoma and non-melanoma), including scrotal cancer.
- Malignant neoplasms of the breast
- Malignant neoplasm of the ovary
- Malignant neoplasms of the urinary bladder
- Malignant neoplasms of the kidney
- Malignant neoplasms of renal pelvis, ureter and other urinary organs
- Malignant neoplasms of the eye and orbit
- Malignant neoplasms of the thyroid
- Malignant neoplasm of the blood and lymphoid tissues (including, but not limited to, lymphoma, leukemia, and myeloma).
- Childhood cancers
- Rare cancers

The Mental Health Impact of 9/11 Report, written by Dr. Susser and presented at the Public Health Aspects of September 11th, in March 14, 2002, at Hunter College, stated: “By definition, terrorism is an assault on the mental health and well-being of the public. Its goals are to create panic, fear, and anxiety. The attacks on the WTC affected the mental health of New Yorkers in 3 ways: It created psychological distress for millions, exacerbated or precipitated mental disorders among some smaller groups, and threatened social cohesion, one of the foundations for mental health, in a variety of ways.” [SUSSEER E. MENTAL HEALTH IMPACT OF 9/11. PRESENTED AT: THE PUBLIC HEALTH ASPECTS OF SEPTEMBER 11TH; MARCH 14, 2002; HUNTER COLLEGE, CUNY, NEW YORK, NY.]

The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) in February 2002 presented their environmental report, entitled “The Environmental Impacts of the World Trade Center Attacks-A Preliminary Assessment.” The report went into the “major reason for concern” in regards to the demise of the twin towers, was its “large volume of toxic materials that was apparently present. For example, by some accounts the north tower [WTC1] had as much as 300 to 400 tons of asbestos. Also in the two towers were as many as 50,000 personal computers, each of which contained a wide variety of harmful constituents including four pounds of lead, as well as much lesser but still troubling amounts of mercury. The towers also contained 300 mainframe computers, and powering all these devices were hundreds of miles of wires and cables containing polyvinyl chloride and copper. The thousands of fluorescent lights used in the towers also contained mercury, a toxic metal.” The report further states how “large amounts of fiberglass, used in insulation, were contained in the towers,” and to this must be added “the unknown tons of plastics, which when burned produce harmful dioxins and furans; an unknown amount of painted or stained products and materials, which were one of many sources of volatile organic compounds

within the destroyed buildings; and thousands of chairs and other office furniture containing such chemicals as polybrominated diphenyl ethers, which are persistent organic pollutants believed to pose dangers similar to PCBs.”

The NRDC report finally states that “Several storage tanks containing petroleum products and a number of small hazardous waste-generating entities at the World Trade Center complex, which were destroyed on September 11th, added to the toxic mix.” [TOXICS TARGETING: COMPUTERIZED ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT: WTC COMPLEX, NEW YORK, NY 10048, SEPT. 18, 2001.] Two Con Edison substations below 7 World Trade Center contained approximately 130,000 gallons of transformer oil contaminated with PCBs. [NRDC: “PERSONAL COMMUNICATION WITH MICHAEL CLENDENIN, CONSOLIDATED EDISON, JAN. 28, 2002.”]

The above given is only illustrative, the NRDC reported; “and does not capture the full breadth of the toxic constituents that were dispersed into the environment on September 11th.” ¹¹⁶

The Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA) ¹¹⁷ that had their offices based on the top floor of the WTC 6, conducted their report entitled: “Health & Technical Assistance for the World Trade Center (WTC) Dust Cleaning Program,” from December 9, 2002, till February 21, 2003. This report differs tremendously as to the conclusions on the toxic air pollution the twin towers’ demise produced.

¹¹⁶ NRDC Website.

<http://www.nrdc.org/>

¹¹⁷ Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA).

<https://www.osha.gov/nyc-disaster/wtc-additional.html>

OSHA Activity Final Report

2002-2003 ¹¹⁸

With the work practices employed by cleanup workers, none of the results posed a significant risk to worker safety and health. Workers exhibited good hygiene practices and wore gloves while cleaning.

Air sampling conducted on workers while cleaning the locations where the above wipe samples were taken, confirmed work practices employed at the time of sampling were sufficient to control airborne contaminant exposure to below the PEL.

Metals

Samples taken for metals were all well below OSHA PELs.

Fibrous glass sampling

Exposure to significantly less than 1 fiber per cubic centimeter of air total fibers sampling: Non-detected.

Crystalline silica

None of the 75 air samples taken for crystalline silica exceeded the permissible exposure limit.

Air sampling

All samples were non-detected for asbestos.

Total and Respirable Dust

Sample should be discounted due to suspected field contamination.

¹¹⁸ <https://www.osha.gov/nyc-disaster/wtc-additional.html>

BUDGET CATEGORY	BUDGETED IN AGREEMENT	TOTAL EXPENDITURES
Personnel	\$68,000.00	\$32,252.28
Travel	\$100,400.00	\$43,674.97
Equipment	\$78,551.00	\$31,938.90
Supplies	\$5,483.00	\$3,360.48
Other (Sample Shipping Costs)	\$2,000.00	\$308.00
Total	\$254,434.00	\$111,534.63

This table represents the total bugeted monies and all logged expenditures against this agreement at the time of the drafting of this report (4/25/03). Any additional expenditures not logged will be processed in accordance with the said provisions of these interagency agreements.

©[OSHA Activity Final Report, 2002-2003](#)

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©[AP Photo: David J. Phillip](#)

*The George W. Bush Presidential Center, Dallas, Texas.
April 24, 2013.*



It is extraordinary to those who read about the toxic environment and potent air pollution these dinosaur towers produced upon their demise, and how the President of the United States was allowed to roam amongst the towers' toxic environment.

The OSHA report concludes: "Based on the results of this inspection project, OSHA found the exposure risks to workers is very low as long as the contractors

involved continue to follow the work practices required by contract. The risks posed by safety hazards, however, is somewhat greater. Care must be taken by the contractors to minimize safety hazards such as fall, ladder, and electrical hazards identified by OSHA during its inspection activities and they need to ensure continued compliance with OSHA's hazard communication and personal protective equipment standards. These worksites are considered low risk and OSHA believes no further programmed Agency safety and health intervention is necessary. OSHA will continue to respond, however, to employee complaints, referrals, and other agency requests for assistance relative to this project.”¹¹⁹

First Responders | Images in the [Creative Commons](#)




It is uncertain why many first responders did not abide by the “good hygiene practices” OSHA notably observed and reported on.

What Is the Chemical Makeup of the Dust Deposits?

The chemical makeup of the dust samples, although quite variable, reflects the chemical contributions of materials used in building construction or found in buildings, such as glass fibers, concrete, gypsum wallboard, steel girders, wiring, ductwork, electronics, computers, paper, and many others.

The mean concentrations of some heavy metals in the WTC dust samples (such as antimony, molybdenum, zinc, copper, lead, chromium, manganese, nickel, and barium) are relatively high compared to their mean concentrations in natural soils from the eastern United States.

The plot to the right compares the concentration ranges and mean concentrations of chemical elements in the WTC dusts (this study) to the mean concentrations of the same elements in soils from the eastern United States (other studies).



©USGS Environmental Studies

¹¹⁹ OSHA Activity Final Report, 2002-2003.
<https://www.osha.gov/nyc-disaster/wtc-additional.html>



Image © ex-FEMA employee [Kurt Sonnenfeld](#)
September 12, 2001.

Burnt cars; rust appearing after the dust clouds, from both towers' demise, dispersed.

Dr. Stephen Levin, of the Mt. Sinai Hospital, had noted: "I was astonished at the degree to which

solid material was turned into pulverized dust, as a consequence of that building collapse. I think it was striking." But the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sampled the dust that settled around Ground Zero; one specialist told *ABC Network* that they believed clouds that appeared immediately after the collapse were mostly gypsum dust from high walls and cement dust and plaster which can cause health problems. Asbestos was also found, that turned out to be carcinogens, producing cancer. The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) did an analysis which showed mercury at the 3rd lowest concentration of metals at the mean value (mv) of 0.011 parts per Billion (ppB). The most abundant element concentration in the leaching tests was Strontium at 1,000 ppB (1 ppM) - 100,000 times more than the mercury value. It appears that the leaching of the sample was only partial and inadequate as the reader will see from the spectrometry values given above.¹²⁰ "All trace elements analyzed in the WTC dust and beam coating samples, some elements (such as mercury and tin) were not analyzed in these samples. Major elements are listed in percent concentration and trace elements are listed in parts per million concentration. One percent equals 10,000 parts per million."¹²¹


¹²⁰ http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2001/ofr-01-0429/leach1/wtcleachfig1_11-1.gif

¹²¹ <http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2001/ofr-01-0429/chem1/WTCchemistrytable.html>

The protective bathtub which prevented flooding from the river was not significantly damaged by the destruction of the twin towers, whereas the rail lines, tunnels and most of the rail cars had only light damage. In fact, the trade center mall survived well. It was noted at the time that the order and method of destruction of each tower minimized damage to the bathtub and adjacent buildings. Even paper, the most flammable material seen at Ground Zero, survived.



›Image courtesy of Konstantin Petrov and Ljudmila Petrova
[Link to image](#)



›Image courtesy of Konstantin Petrov and Ljudmila Petrova
[Link to image](#)



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Some vertical round holes were seen cut into buildings 4, 5 and 6, plus a cylindrical arc into Bankers Trust and into Liberty Street in front of the former building. The north wing of building 4 was left standing, neatly sliced from the main body which virtually disappeared.



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As a consequence, 43,600 windows, ¹²² 600,000 square feet of glass, 200,000 tons of structural steel, 5m sqft of gypsum, 6 acres of marble, and, 425,000 cubic yards of concrete vanished in the explosion of both towers. Approximately 1,400 motor vehicles were towed away from the neighborhood, though all seriously damaged/destroyed buildings had a WTC prefix.

¹²² Windows had "Fixed glazed vision glass fits between the column covers (approximately 1'10" wide and 7'8" high.) The glass was single pane." Merritt & Harris, Inc., Dec. 06, 2000.

Alan Reiss, who was the trade center's Director of Department of Operations and Maintenance, was interviewed by the Commission Staff on November 03, 2003, at the Port Authority Offices. Amongst various context discussed, he noted that "The Silverstein deal closed in July of 2001, the contract had been signed in early spring (Reiss thinks probably early April), and after the contract was signed, the Port Authority personnel began to train up their Silverstein successors."

Reiss told the Commission Staff that in order to gain access to the roof of the towers, "One had to first gain access to the 110th floor, which building occupants could not do. Once on the 110th floor, one had to pass through two doors, which were separated by a small stairwell, in order to access the roof. Each of these doors had both an electronic card key lock and a traditional key lock. In event of a power outage, the electronic card key would unlock, but one would still need the traditional key, which no building tenant had. Those who regularly accessed the roof, e.g., window washers, had copies, as of course building security did, with a backup set of all keys to entire complex kept in Operations Command Center. Reiss said that the thinking is that in a fire you want to go down, not up, because fire, heat and toxins go up." [FRONT OFFICE BOX 5: EMERGENCY RESPONSE FOLDER 1 (TAB 5) ALAN REISS-MFR]

Why WTC 2 collapsed first: Why Tower 2 collapsed first, even though it was struck 16½ minutes after Tower 1 had been struck, has been a debate amongst scientists and citizens. One explanation came from the U.S. Department of Energy and in their report released on October 1, 2002, filed "UCRL-JC-150445". "The reasons that WTC 2 collapsed first," the report states, "included the higher speed of the aircraft at collision (586 mph) compared to the speed of the aircraft colliding with WTC 1 (494 mph), as well as noncentral

[sic] and lower point of impact in the case of WTC 2.” [STUDY OF TRACES OF TRITIUM AT THE WORLD TRADE CENTER, BY T.M. SEMKOW, R.S. HAFNER, P.P PAREKH, G.J. WOZNIAK, D.K. HAINES, L. HUSAIN, R.L. RABUN, P.G. WILLIAMS. SUBMITTED TO 23RD AMERICAN CHEMICAL SOCIETY NATIONAL MEETING, ORLANDO, FL, APRIL 7-11, 2002. PUBLISHED OCTOBER 1, 2002.]

American 11 was a Boeing type aircraft 767-223ER with two turbofan engine models CF6-80A2 manufactured by General Electric; the top speed this aircraft could do, was 558 mph. It had a quicker engine than United 175 had, which was a Boeing type aircraft 767-222 with two engine models JT9D-7R4D manufactured by Pratt & Whitney; the top speed this aircraft could do, was 528 mph. Based on the engine type/model of both aircrafts, specifically for United 175, the aircraft could not have crashed into the WTC 2 at the speed of “586 mph” as the above mentioned report stated since the aircraft could only go up to the speed of 528 mph.

NIST investigators corroborate the fact how United 175 did not impact the WTC 2 at the speed of “586 mph”; on the contrary, they state the aircraft sped at 542 mph (give or take 24 mph). But, the aircraft in question had a maximum speed of 528 mph. As to American 11, NIST states the aircraft impacted the WTC 1 at 443 mph (give or take 30 mph). The aircraft’s maximum speed was at 558 mph.

Table 6–4. Summary of aircraft impact conditions.		
Condition	AA 11 (WTC 1)	UAL 175 (WTC 2)
Impact Speed (mph)	443 ± 30	542 ± 24
Vertical Approach Angle	10.6° ± 3° below horizontal (heading downward)	6° ± 2° below horizontal (heading downward)
Lateral Approach Angle	180.3° ± 4° clockwise from Plan North ^a	13° ± 2° clockwise from Plan North ^a
Roll Angle (left wing downward)	25° ± 2°	38° ± 2°
a. Plan North is approximately 29 degrees clockwise from True North.		

►NIST NCSTAR 1, September 2005.

As to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) findings on the question: “There are some important differences between the impact of the aircraft [UA175] into WTC 2 and the impact [of AA11] into WTC 1. First, United Airlines Flight 175 was flying much faster, with an estimated speed of 590 mph, while American Airlines Flight 11 was flying at approximately 470 mph.” FEMA states United 175 flew at “an estimated speed of 590 mph.” Referring once again to the aircraft’s engine power, the top speed this aircraft could do was 528 mph. FEMA then states American 11 (at the time of impact) “was flying at approximately 470 mph,” which is possible since the top speed this aircraft could do was 558 mph.

FEMA concludes: “The zone of impact in WTC 2 was nearly 20 stories lower than that in WTC 1, so columns in this area were carrying substantially larger loads. It is possible, therefore, that structural damage to WTC 2 was more severe than that to WTC 1, partly explaining why WTC 2 collapsed more quickly than WTC 1.” [\[FEMA Report, Ch. 2: WTC 1 and WTC 2\]](#)

Differences

<p><i>United 175-WTC 2</i></p> <p>Maximum speed 528 mph Impact speed 542 mph Impact speed 586 mph Impact speed 590 mph</p>	<p>Aircraft engine data. NIST NCSTAR 1, September 2005. <i>Study of Traces of Tritium at the World Trade Center</i>, October 2002. FEMA <i>World Trade Center Building Performance Study</i>, May of 2002.</p>
<p><i>Actual estimated speed: 580 mph 510 knots</i> <i>Maximum possible operating speed: 400-430 mph 350-370 knots</i> <i>Optimal speed for guidance: 280-300 mph 240-260 knots</i></p> <p><i>Boeing sets its maximum passenger plane speed for a 757 at 360 knots (420 mph) at sea-level or low-altitude. But a pilot could not have hit the WTC 2 building at 420 mph because it cannot be guided at that high velocity. A pilot would want to drive the aircraft around 250 knots (290 mph) in order to have a hope of hitting the target.</i></p>	

<i>A Boeing can fly at over five hundred knots, but only high up above 30,000 ft altitude, because the atmosphere there is only one-third its density at sea-level. Planes climb to that height in order to achieve such cruising speeds. ¹²³ The height United 175 had when impacting the WTC 2 was less than 10,000 ft. Any pilot can verify this information.</i>	
<i>American 11-WTC 1</i>	
Impact speed 443 mph	NIST NCSTAR 1, September 2005.
Impact speed 470 mph	FEMA <i>World Trade Center Building Performance Study</i> , May of 2002.
Impact speed 494 mph	<i>Study of Traces of Tritium at the World Trade Center</i> , October 2002.
Maximum speed 558 mph	Aircraft engine data.

Martin Fournier, Operations Supervisor Area C New York Air Route Centre, “Watched CNN; he saw a second aircraft [UAL175] go behind the towers. ‘It looked fake for some reason.’ The speed of the aircraft was 500 or 600 mph, and he noted that the reason it looked distorted may have been because aircraft ‘just don’t fly that fast under 10,000 ft.’ [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR04016827): TEAM 8 INTERVIEW FOURNIER MARTIN OPERATIONS SUPERVISOR AREA C (NEW YORK AIR ROUTE CENTRE), SEPT. 30, 2003.]

Regardless of professional opinion on aircraft speed capacity, and how (at least for United 175) the aircraft could not have impacted the WTC 2 at the speed officials were relating it had, the Commission state nothing further.

Wind direction: According to the Local Climatological Data from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, September 2001 studies, the wind direction in New York on September 11th and 12th in 2001 was approximately NORTHWEST.

¹²³ <http://www.richplanet.net/911.php>

Tritium release: Tritium is an isotope of hydrogen, which allows it to readily bind to hydroxyl radicals, forming tritiated water (HTO), and to carbon atoms. Since tritium is a low energy beta emitter, it is not dangerous externally (its beta particles are unable to penetrate the skin), but it is a radiation hazard when inhaled, ingested via food or water, or absorbed through the skin. [[Wikipedia “Tritium”](#)]

The FAA reported that United 175, Boeing type aircraft 767-222, with serial number 21873, operated by United Airlines, was delivered in February 1983, with 43.2 Ci of tritium in emergency signs. [SABATINI, N.A. FAA, U.S. DoT, MARCH, 26, 2002.] The 43.2 Ci of tritium was contained in four EXIT signs (10 Ci each) and four slide/raft handles (0.8 Ci each). The same activity of tritium was present upon the April 1987 delivery of American 11, Boeing type aircraft 767-223ER, serial number 22322, operated by American Airlines.

Since neither of these aircraft were modified after delivery [CASHDOLLAR, J. FAA, U.S. DoT, APRIL 23, 2002.] the total activity from the aircrafts were 34 Ci at the time of their impact. [STUDY OF TRACES OF TRITIUM AT THE WORLD TRADE CENTER, BY T.M. SEMKOW, R.S. HAFNER, P.P. PAREKH, G.J. WOZNIAK, D.K. HAINES, L. HUSAIN, R.L. RABUN, P.G. WILLIAMS. SUBMITTED TO 23RD AMERICAN CHEMICAL SOCIETY NATIONAL MEETING, ORLANDO, FL, APRIL 7-11, 2002. PUBLISHED OCTOBER 1, 2002.]

Assembled Collection ¹²⁴: The assembled collection of the towers' demise, gathered by NIST investigators, included:-

- 6,977 segments of video footage, totaling in excess of 300 hours. The media videos included both broadcast material and outtakes.

¹²⁴ NIST NCSTAR 1, September 2005.

Additionally, NIST received videotapes recorded by more than 20 individuals.

- 6,899 photographs from at least 200 photographers. As with the videos, many of the photographs were unpublished.

As a consequence, NIST investigators were able to ascertain various accounts coming from “3,032 of the catalogued photographs and 2,673 of the video clips in the databases,” which “were timed with accuracies of ± 3 s or better.” [NIST NCSTAR 1, SEPTEMBER 2005.] There is no mention why the Secret Service Report estimated the WTC 1 crash at Eastern 09:00 a.m., and the impact into the WTC 2 at Eastern 09:10 a.m. [SECRET SERVICE REPORT, SEPT. 12, 2001, FILED AS 602.010. DECLASSIFIED OCT. 05, 2008, AND RELEASED APRIL 23, 2010, THROUGH FOIA FILED NUMBERS 20080330 AND 20080331.]

Table 6–1. Times for major events on September 11, 2001.


Event	Time
First Aircraft Strike	8:46:30 a.m.
Second Aircraft Strike	9:02:59 a.m.
Collapse of WTC 2	9:58:59 a.m.
Collapse of WTC 1	10:28:22 a.m.

►NIST NCSTAR 1, September 2005.

0900 hrs	Plane crashed into World Trade Center.
0910 hrs	Second plane crashed into other tower at World Trade Center.

►U.S. Secret Service Report (Sept. 12, 2001-filed 602.010.)
Declassified: Oct. 5, 2008. - FOIA 20080330/20080331 April 23, 2010.

Seismic data: “The collapse of the towers was not of any magnitude that was seismically significant.” [NIST REPORT, DEC. 14, 2006.]



Won-Young Kim from the Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory of Columbia University in Palisades, New York, and Gerald R. Baum of the Environmental Geology and Mineral Resources Program in Maryland Geological Survey undertook to record seismic data of when the twin towers were hit and destroyed. “The collapse of the WTC towers,” the report states, “generated large seismic waves observed in five states and up to 428 km away. The North Tower collapse was the larger seismic source and had a magnitude ML 2.3. [KIM ET AL., 2001.] In the case of the WTC attack, the impacts of the two planes could be determined with an accuracy of about ± 2 seconds. Although the

impact times are inferred from oscillatory surface wave arrivals, the nearest station, PAL (Palisades, NY), was only about 34 km away from the WTC. In case of the plane impacts to the WTC towers, the observed peak amplitudes on the vertical component record at PAL (Palisades, NY; $r = 34$ km) are 230 and 260 nanometers/sec for the first (North Tower) and the second (South Tower) impacts, respectively. A nanometer is 10^{-9} meters.”

Economic news: The [New York Assembly](#) on May 16, 2002, chaired by Herman D. Farrell, Jr., with keynote speaker Sheldon Silver, gave to the public their estimate on the damages (economic wise) of the September 2001 devastation. Edward M. Cupoli was their Chief Economist. While the loss of jobs after September 11th was large, in the “recent months” of their report, they found that number “shrunk with indications of revival in hotel revenues in New York City. The decline in residential rents appears to have subsided. A good number of the jobs that moved out of New York City have returned. Continued weakness in office space market, and in the air transport industry, as well as rising insurance rates in the city, are the concerns.” Statistically, 127,200 fewer jobs were recorded in the fourth quarter of 2001 than the fourth quarter of 2000. Another 136,800 fewer jobs were seen in the first quarter of 2002 than the first quarter of 2001. And 92.7 percent of the jobs lost in the fourth quarter of 2001 were in New York.

Communications: “I went down to the scene, and we setup HQ at 75, Barkley Street, which was right there with Police Commissioner and the Fire Commissioner. They had an Emergency Management, and we were operating out of there when we were told that the World Trade Centre was going to collapse.” [MAYOR GIULIANI TO ABCNEWS AT 12:01 P.M., SEPT. 11, 2001.]

The demise of the towers knocked out Verizon's switching center in Lower Manhattan and severely damaged the infrastructure for cellular telephones. Telephone communications for the NYPD Command and Control was also destroyed. As a consequence, cell-phone service was subsequently overloaded. NYC Transit lost a key portion of its fiber-optic network in one tunnel. The new repeaters installed inside the towers worked until those fell, but the Port Authority police radios did not work in the tunnels. The emergency communications systems were not all interoperable. Communications problems impeded overall coordination. [MTI REPORT 02-06, SAVING CITY LIFELINES: LESSONS LEARNED IN THE 9-11 TERRORIST ATTACKS, SEPT. 2003.]

NYC Transit had multiple communications systems for both bus and subway systems, its own radio network, a six-wire system, an emergency booth communications system, a train dispatch system, and computer networks, all of which continued to function. NYC Transit also had the only telephone structure independent of Verizon. Therefore, it had working phone links with both the fire and police departments, and its NEXTEL radios continued to work. NYC Transit and New Jersey Transit quickly deployed mobile communications centers. This capacity enabled NYC Transit to provide landline service to the NYPD Command post and to emergency services in the field, while transit technicians assisted in the repair of the damaged communications systems.

Merritt & Harris Inc.: The Merritt & Harris Inc., Evaluation Reports were requested by the Port Authority of New York-New Jersey in 2000 on the safety and maintenance of the twin towers, "to adequately determine the present conditions at the World Trade Center (WTC)," the report stated. "Merritt & Harris, Inc., performed onsite observations between September 13 and October 31, 2000." They did however limit their inspection to the visible areas,

because in “many areas, building finishes concealed structural components from view.” And though the inspection of the façade of the towers was performed from ground level and from the roofs, they “neither took material samples nor performed tests on the building materials or systems.”

The evaluating company neither observed equipment that was not operating at the time of their inspection “due to seasonal requirements. No attempt was made to operate the equipment as the facility was occupied and appropriate climate control was required.” Their professional opinion was that “a Mechanical Contractor should be retained to start the equipment and witness its operation over a period of time.”

Merritt & Harris Inc., engaged an independent consultant “to conduct a Phase I Environmental Site Assessment and Asbestos Audit at the site in conjunction with the due diligence. The survey was conducted by members of the staff of R.W. Crandlemere and Associates, Inc., (Crandlemere) of Weymouth, Massachusetts.” Merritt & Harris Inc., also engaged “an independent consultant to conduct an Elevator Review at the site in conjunction with the due diligence. The survey was conducted by members of the staff of The BOCA Group International (BOCA) of New York, New York.” Their final engagement was with “an independent consultant to conduct a Curtainwall Investigation at the site in conjunction with the due diligence. The survey was conducted by members of the staff of Heitmann & Associates, Inc., (Heitmann) of New York, New York.” All reports can be found [here](#).

Evacuation: An interesting study had begun in 2002 of the evacuation procedures at the World Trade Center on September 11th in 2001. The study was created by the Columbia University School of Public Health, and entitled: “The World Trade Center Evacuation Study.” The Commission Staff (Team 8)

set up a meeting with participants of the study on October 21, 2002, and learned the purpose of the study was “to identify the individual, organizational and structural factors that affected evacuation from the WTC” on the day of.

Amongst the issues highlighted at the meeting and presented by Dr. Robyn Gershon, was one that Sally Regenhard (member of the Skyscraper Safety Campaign) stated; and that was that “if the firefighters had been given proper communication, they could have gotten more people out rather than heading upstairs.”

This improper communication was picked up by *The New York Times* who ran an article on July 7, 2002: “Yet most firefighters never heard those warnings, or earlier orders to get out. Their radio system failed frequently that morning. Even if the radio network had been reliable, it was not linked to the police system. And the police and fire commanders guiding the rescue efforts did not talk to one another during the crisis. Cut off from critical information, at least 121 firefighters, most in striking distance of safety, died when the north tower fell, an analysis by *The New York Times* has found.” The article further on reports: “Although Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani created the Office of Emergency Management in 1996 and spent nearly \$25 million to coordinate emergency response, trade center officials said the agency had not conducted an emergency exercise there that included the Fire Department, the police and the Port Authority’s emergency staff.”

Even in July 2002, “fire officials cannot say where many firefighters died, in part because the magnetic command boards, which the department used to track companies, were lost in the collapses,” the *New York Times* reported. The *Times* tried to “track those locations using a database that compiled more than 2,500 sightings of fire companies and individuals. Based on those eyewitnesses, the *Times* concluded that 33 fire companies, which lost 121

men, were operating in the north tower when it collapsed. Of the other firefighters who died, the eyewitness accounts placed 97 in the south tower, 34 in the Marriott Hotel and 13 outside the building. The locations of 78 firefighters could not be traced. Fire Department records indicate that many of them had been assigned to the south tower.” [THE NEW YORK TIMES: “9/11 EXPOSED DEADLY FLAWS IN RESCUE PLAN,” BY JIM DWYER, KEVIN FLYNN & FORD FESSENDEN. JULY 07, 2002]

Dr. Gershon's concerns

“Dr. Gershon said that data currently points to the fact that the WTC towers were terribly lacking in readiness. Some fire wardens did not know where the stairwells were. Employees had not practiced evacuation and did not know where the stairwells were. Stairwells were not labeled. Doors were locked between floors. Elevators were not marked so people did not know which of the two doors opened to the floor and which opened to the wall on particular floors. Construction for certain floors re-arranged the floors and blocked off certain fire exits etc. People did not know where evacuation chairs were placed for the handicapped (which had been installed after the '93 bombing). Stairwells were not large enough to evacuate the building at the same time. No one ever calculated the amount of space needed for a full building evacuation. Also, the fact that the interior of the building had all the equipment, elevator, etc., made the plane impact even greater.”

Even so, NIST investigators report that, “Following the February 26, 1993, bombing of WTC1 and in light of the 4 hours needed to evacuate the building, several improvements had been made to the stairwells: Battery operated emergency lighting, photo luminescent floor strips indicating the path to be

followed, and explicit signs on each doorway to indicate where it led.” [NIST NCSTAR 1, SEPTEMBER 2005.]

Sally Regenhard’s concerns

“Sally Regenhard interjected that the Port Authority did not follow NY fire code. She feels that even though they state, that they exceeded the NY Code, this is a false statement. She feels that the PA [Port Authority] should not be above the law and that they should have accountability. In addition, she is concerned over the fact that the new WTC 7 building is following the same path as the previous buildings in terms of not applying the NYC fire code. She felt this should be pointed out.”


Columbia University data also shows that sixteen or eighteen people managed to escape from above the impact area (floors 77 to 85) in the South Tower (WTC 2); but no one managed to escape above the impact area (floors 94 to 99) from the North Tower (WTC 1). They did not offer an explanation for this. If they gave an explanation to the Commission Staff, it was not shared with the public.

The following report (released under FOIA) has no date as to when it was actually written, though a handwritten date of April 9, 2002, is given for its deposition exhibit. The report has inserted on its title page (below) the old tower complex. In addition to this, the context page includes “Asbestos locations,” which was widely used in the structure of the old tower complex. And, in addition to this, in the overview of the report it distinctly talks of the old tower complex. We may conclude from this evidence that this report was prepared for the old tower complex prior September 11, 2001.

WORLD TRADE CENTER

Property Risk Report

Prepared for


Silverstein Properties, Inc

Alternative Insurance Works
521 Fifth Avenue
New York, NY 10175

WILLIS

CONFIDENTIAL

15001



OVERVIEW

The World Trade Center is one of the most prominent commercial real estate complexes in the world and a hallmark of the Manhattan skyline.

This document discusses many of the physical characteristics of the complex, various protection and risk control aspects and some of the potentially catastrophic incidents that might occur.

The discussion focuses on the following components of the complex:

- **The two 110-story office towers (One and Two World Trade Center)**
- **The office portion of the two nine-story buildings (Four and Five World Trade Center)**
- **The retail area of the World Trade Center, referred to in the report as the Mall which consists of retail space located on the Concourse level**
- **The Subgrade space, which consists of six basement levels (B-1 through B-6) that project about 70 below the Concourse.**

It is estimated that 50,000 people work in the World Trade Center and that 150,000 commuters' travel through the concourse to access Path and MTA subway trains, on a daily basis. Annually approximately 2 million tourists visit the Observation Deck.

Much of the discussion of the physical characteristics has been taken from documents developed by the Port Authority's real estate advisors. The loss estimates (PML's and MFL's) outlined in the report are predicated on conventional risk control conventions of the major HPR underwriters.

On page 27 of the report, the probable maximum losses of the complex were detailed and set down. One such probable maximum loss was from fire, and is worth adding, since official reports conclude the destruction of the towers was by fire.

Probable Maximum Loss From Fire

This discussion is based on circumstances and protection criteria outlined in the Risk Classification and Loss Estimate for High-Rise Buildings, PM.S.6.I, dated September 1995 and the FM's Property Loss Prevention Data Sheet 1-3, titled High-Rise Buildings and MFL of High-Rise Buildings.

The underlying premise of this PML is that a fire originates on an upper floor (assume 90th floor) with the sprinkler protection out of service and that the fire floor is connected to the floor above via unprotected open stairs. Under these conditions, fire damage would be expected on floors 90 and 91. Floors 93 through 97 would receive varying degrees of smoke damage and floors 85 through 89 would receive damage from the water used to extinguish the fire.

Assuming that criteria, a building value for a tower of \$1.19b [billion] (\$250/sf [square foot]) and a floor value of \$10.8m [million], then the damage to the fire floors at 100% would amount to \$21.6m [million]. If smoke damage averaged \$2m [million] for the 5 floors above the fire or a total of \$10m [million] and water damage of \$2m [million] to the 6 floors below the fire floor, then a PML in the range of \$40m [million] could result.

In reality, the combustible loading of the typical occupancy in the Towers is not sufficient to create the spalling and ensuing structural damage associated with this scenario and a PML in the \$10-20m [million] range is reasonable.

The mitigating circumstances are an outstanding well-trained PA emergency organization and the close proximity of the NYC Fire Department that monitors the PA's emergency communication channels and would be responding before being called.

On page 29 of the report, another probable maximum loss of the complex was "Aircraft striking the tower." This also is worth adding, since official reports conclude the towers were hit by two Boeing passenger airliners, American 11 and United 175.

Aircraft Striking a Tower

This scenario is with in the realm of the possible, but highly unlikely.

In 1946 a military aircraft struck the Empire State Building. Since that time the manner in which aircraft are "controlled" has dramatically changed. In the event such an unlikely occurrence, what might result? The structural designers of the towers have publicly stated that in their opinion that either of the Towers could with stand such an impact from a large modern passenger aircraft.

The ensuing fire would damage the "skin", in this scenario, as the spilled fuel would fall to the Plaza level where it would have to be extinguished by the NYC Fire Department. The replacement of the "skin" is estimated at 35% of the building replacement value or \$420m. Loss of rents for 1 year or \$150m for a total estimate of < \$600m

Alternative Insurance Works: World Trade Center Property Risk Report
Prepared for: Silverstein Properties, Inc.
Handwritten date of deposition exhibit: April 9, 2002.

ALTERNATIVE INSURANCE WORKS



JOHN P. HICKEY, CSP, PE

Summary: John Hickey has over 30 years experience in the field of insurance and risk management. His specific focus has been in loss control and claims management, guiding large, multi-national organizations to most effective ways to reduce the costs of risk by controlling risks. John's work with diverse entities from petrochemical, to oil and gas exploration, to manufacturers have given him a broad set of perspectives when applying loss control and claims management techniques. Also, John has worked with many captive insurance and self-insurance structures, where pro-active cost containment is critical to the financial success of such alternative programs. John's thorough, analytical approach to service issues, coupled with a keen insight into client need, make him among the most respected risk management executives in the consulting and brokerage industries. Below is a synopsis of his career.

On the cover page of this report is "Deposition Exhibit Hickey." On page 90 of this report it explains who this individual is. See left

On October 9, 2001, as stated in the Rebuild NY - Renew America, Governor Pataki was seeking “up to \$54 Billion in Federal Assistance for New York’s Disaster Relief, Economic Revitalization, Working Families & Security.”

**THEY'RE SAYING
IT'S KOCH
TO BE GOOD**

For 65 years Koch has served in the forefront of the nation's building industry — setting precedents in engineered construction techniques. We're proud of our dedicated and talented work force for their success in the erection of the World Trade Center.




Photo courtesy of Grano Steel Products Co.
Over 6 million square feet of modular floor system at the World Trade Center was built at the Koch Carteret plant.

KOCH **KARL KOCH ERECTING CO., INC.**
400 ROOSEVELT AVENUE
CARTERET, N. J. 07008 201 969-1700

32 Civil Engineering-ASCE June 1971

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Surely, the winds will blow...

Uniquely, the 110-story World Trade Center Tower buildings are ready for them. Levinson Steel worked with the Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Company to fabricate twenty thousand damping units weighing a mere thirty pounds each for the Port Authority. They were designed to act as shock absorbers between each exterior column and the pre-fabricated floor system to convert the vibration into heat energy.

In contrast, Levinson also fabricated 15,000 tons of heavy structural steel—columns, beams, girders and trusses—for the plazas that surround the towers.



THE LEVINSON STEEL COMPANY

South 20th and Wharton Streets • Pittsburgh Pa. 15203

(412) 481-3200

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Limitations on exclusive rights](#): Fair use. From the U.S. Government Printing Office Fair Use.

Koch & Levinson: The above adverts were published during the construction of the old tower complex as a guarantee to the material used in the structure. One advert is from Civil Engineering - ASCE June 1971 edition; the other is from the Levinson Steel Company, undated.

Innuendo: When the WTC1 “shook” at 08:46 a.m., it was the official time depicted for American 11’s impact into the north face of floor 96 creating a gash through to floor 99. NYPD Inspector John Odermatt of the Office of Emergency Management (OEM) “thought the event might have been a freak accident involving a ground-to-air missile.” [MTI REPORT 02-06, SAVING CITY LIFELINES: LESSONS LEARNED IN THE 9-11 TERRORIST ATTACKS, SEPT. 2003.]

The WNBC outlet picked up the story and reported on it two years later on September 1, 2003, when transcripts created from tapes of PA emergency calls/transmissions were released. “With confusing reports flooding into the Port Authority that day, the transcripts demonstrate how workers ‘showed a tremendous degree of professionalism under extremely chaotic circumstances,’ spokesman Harry Spector said. The Woolworth Building, itself once the tallest in the world, was cited as a possible source of the attack. ‘Can you send somebody over to the Woolworth Building to check the roof?’ a Port Authority police officer asked. ‘There’s a possible...they said it was...we just had a second explosion, possibly a missile from the roof of the Woolworth Building.’ ‘The Woolworth Building?’ replied a police operator. ‘Yeah, on...on Broadway,’ the officer said. Transcripts created from tapes of Port Authority emergency calls and radio transmissions illustrate the utter disorientation caused by the worst terrorist attack in U.S. history.” ¹²⁵

¹²⁵ WNBC: “Innuendo, Erroneous Reports Abound In WTC Transcripts,” September 1, 2003. <http://web.archive.org/web/20080927032647/http://www.wnbc.com/news/2439367/detail.html>

New York Daily News

Radio Dispatch: “They’re shooting at the Trade Center from the Woolworth Building.”

Mercury News

WTC Police Channel 07: “The first one they think was a guy shooting the missiles off the Woolworth Building.”

Portland Inymedia

Police Channel: “Woolworth Building! They’re firing missiles from Woolworth Building!”

Mailgate News

Police Officer report at 09:18 a.m.: “...there was a missile launch at the Woolworth building.”

9/11 Commission Hearing

Alan Reiss, WTC Police Desk: “...the police had a report that a missile had been fired at the World Trade Center from the Woolworth building.”

Marine Corps News

Lance Cpl. Alan Reifenberg: “There was a swooshing sound, then an explosion, and it sounded really low. It was if someone, one or two floors above me, had launched a shoulder-fired missile.”

NYC Fire Department

Fireman Bellers Neighborhood: “As we pulled ‘round the corner, we stopped the rig, and a cop walked over to us and said, ‘I saw them shoot a missile launcher off that building, you guys better be careful up there.’”

Fireman: “On the way out between tower one and six, we heard something like an incoming missile, and we started to run. That’s when the second tower came down. I was knocked down.”

EMT

John Rothmund: “At that time we were looking at the top of the towers and all the rubble and people coming off, and all of a sudden you heard - it sounded like another airplane, or a missile.”

P. Ashby: He thought he saw something like a missile shot at WTC1 from across the way. In his testimony, a blanked out paragraph appears and is then followed by: “So thought somebody launched missile from the east river or over the Hudson to knock it down, I mean that’s what I’m thinking if they are if they are still out there to launch another missile I got to get the hell out of there because we were in war zone. I’m trying to walk towards not the Brooklyn Bridge because I figured that would be another historic location for them to attack or launch [a] missile, I was trying to head towards the Manhattan bridge and take my chances there.”

Fox News

An FBI informant wearing a wire to secretly record a conversation with a city tax assessor ended up making what is believed to be the only known uninterrupted audio recording of the Sept. 11 attack on the World Trade Center. “It’s another

one,” a man on the street screams. “It’s another one!” A hysterical woman cries: “It’s like a missile.” ¹²⁶

The following story was picked up but was not meticulously researched at the time of this writing. This is how the story goes: At about 07:00 a.m., on the morning of, two employees from Odigo received cellphone text messages warning them not to go to their offices traced blocks away from the WTC due to an impending attack. The episode was covered in the Israeli online newspaper *Haaretz* and can be found [here](#).

Treasure hunt: “The Reuter’s story was partially confirmed by a Deutsche Bank employee who had survived the attacks by fleeing the WTC after the first plane hit. According to the employee, about five minutes before the attack the entire Deutsche Bank computer system had been taken over by something external that no one in the office recognized and every file was downloaded at lightning speed to an unknown location.” [MICHAEL C. RUPPERT, *CROSSING THE RUBICON* (NEW SOCIETY PUBLISHERS, 2004.)]

“The difficulty with lost certificates was dramatically demonstrated during the September 11, 2001, tragedy when thousands of certificates were destroyed in vaults maintained by broker-dealers.” [FEDERAL REGISTER, VOL. 67, No. 151 - NOTICES. AUG. 06, 2002.]

“Trading on the Nasdaq Stock Market continued without a glitch for an hour and a half after the disaster. ¹²⁷ [[Computer World](#), Sept. 11, 2001.]

¹²⁶ <http://newsmine.org/content.php?ol=9-11/sound-recorded.txt>

¹²⁷ This would be when the final “hijacked” airliner crashed in Pennsylvania at 10:03 a.m. (NIST) or at 10:10 a.m. (FAA).

Typical ten-wheel truck

WTC4: “. . .someone had tried to break in...”

On the day of, it was reported by the [Daily News](#) that a ten-wheel truck, filled with gold bars estimated at \$231 million, was abandoned in the delivery tunnel under WTC



5. On September 17, 2001, *CNN* reported: “We have learned that 11.8 metric tons of gold worth an estimated \$110 million and 30.2 million ounces of silver valued at \$121 million [total \$231 million] is buried in the rubble below of one of the collapsed buildings of the WTC.” [\[Youtube account.\]](#)

The *CNN* report was referring to building 5 and its delivery tunnel where the ten-wheel truck had been abandoned. Who gave this information to *CNN* is unknown; whose gold it was is unknown, though many have suspected it belonged to the Bank of Nova Scotia. Though the bank reported they had “more than \$200 million in gold and silver” in the vault under building 4, the bank’s spokeswoman, Pam Agnew, could not verify at the time if the gold found in the ten-wheel truck belonged to the bank; the bank never did verify. At a later point, *The New York Times* reported “the Bank of Nova Scotia, which kept gold in the Comex vault, reported \$200 million of gold lost in the wreckage.” From the latter report, it can be assumed the gold being hauled out in a ten-wheel truck did not belong to the Bank of Nova Scotia.

CNN’s report was never picked up on until a month later when the story was brought up again -revised and intermixed with theories- which led to the unfortunate sweep of \$419 or \$420 million unaccounted for.

WTC4 treasure in its vault

The National Real Estate Investor	\$650 million
N.Y. Mayor Rudolph Giuliani	\$230 million removed via tunnel

<i>CNN</i> report	\$231 million buried “in the rubble;” possibly same gold/silver
Bank of Nova Scotia	\$200 million “lost in the wreckage”
<i>New York Times</i>	
<u>Total difference</u>	<u>\$419-\$420m (unaccounted for)</u>

On October 15, 2001, officials talking to *The New York Times* said that an attempted robbery (did not say when) was detected at the vault area of WTC 4. “It looked like they used a blowtorch, a crowbar,” said an unidentified official. “The Port Authority police began periodic patrols, and then a closed-circuit television system was put in.” The attempted robbery was assumed by most (if not all) to have been noticed on October 15th; but officials had made this discovery a month earlier, and most probably was the source for *CNN*; they in turn preferred not to go into specifics.

On October 30, 2001, British TimesOnline.co.uk reported that the gold talked of on October 15th was initially discovered on October 30th, never mentioning *CNN*’s report of September 17th. The following day, the New York Firefighter Department and the New York Police Department supported the October story, never mentioning *CNN*’s report of September 17th.



RICH GARLOCK: The vault was huge; two levels, 3,000 square feet each. When they opened the door, I realized why it was so big: There was a lot of gold and silver. The silver bars were like large loaves of bread, only they weighed about 70 pounds. The gold was smaller, but also very heavy, about 28 pounds each. It was around Halloween [October 31, 2001,] and I joked that I was going to come dressed as a Brinks guard. The team did a test run with the Brinks truck to

make sure that it had the clearance, driving it up and then back out. The next morning The New York Post reported the vault had been emptied. In fact, it took a week to remove. The police said, “Hey, we couldn’t have better publicity.”

Copyright: [America Rebuilds](#) documentary

From the New York Police Department, Captain Tom DePrisco discredits firefighter Garlock’s account that they began removing the gold/silver from WTC 4 “around Halloween;” instead the process lasted “a week,” with the operation beginning on October 16th, and concluding the transfer within two days.

The same day of October 31st, the [Daily News](#) comes out with a report saying this October gold was not found in the vault of WTC 4, as the NYFD/NYPD were saying, but “was found in a delivery tunnel under 5 World Trade Center.” The *Daily News* was reporting CNN’s report in a twisted form: The truck of gold was found on October 31st as opposed to have been detected on September 17th.

Abandoned tunnel of the Hudson & Manhattan Railroad
Suspected route the “\$230 million in gold and silver” took to be removed
›Courtesy of [Cryptome](#)



[Creative Commons](#) certified in the public domain

Reuters and *New York Daily* took up the story further reporting that the “\$230 million in gold and silver” was removed

through “a delivery tunnel beneath 5 World Trade Center.” The same day as

this was announced on November 1, 2001, former New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani announced “more than \$230 million” worth of gold and silver bars that had been stored in a bomb-proof vault had been recovered. In February 2007, the International Association of Fire Fighters issued a letter accusing Giuliani of “egregious acts” against the 343 firemen who had died in the September 11th attacks. The letter asserted that Giuliani rushed to conclude the recovery effort once gold and silver had been recovered from WTC vaults and thereby prevented the remains of many victims from being recovered.

The [National Real Estate Investor](#) reported that the vault under WTC 4 contained a total amount of treasure estimated at \$650 million; the mayor however estimated the vault contained a total amount of \$230 million. If what the National Real Estate Investor reported is true, then the amount difference is humungous.

WTC 4 treasure in its vault

The National Real Estate Investor	\$650 million
New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani	\$230 million
<u>Total difference</u>	<u>\$420 million</u> <i>unaccounted</i>

Up to this point -from October 15th and onwards- all the activity reported by the media and officials had to do with the \$230 million worth of gold suspected to have been found in the vault of WTC 4 and not with the \$231 million worth of gold found in the ten-wheel truck as initially reported in September.

WTC 4 treasure in its vault

The National Real Estate Investor	\$650 million
-----------------------------------	---------------

\$230 million removed via tunnel

\$231 million buried “in the rubble”

Possibly the same gold/silver

\$200 million “lost in the wreckage”

The New York Times

Total difference \$419-\$420 million *unaccounted*

►WTC 4 Tenant List

South Plaza 9-story offices: Total of 576,000 Sq.Feet

Company	Business Services	Floor(s)	Sq Feet
Merrill Lynch & Company, Inc.	Financial	2? 3?	2,083,555
Tony Gemelli Restaurant Bar	Restaurant	Lower	10,000
* Deutsche Bank *	Financial Institution	4 5-Green Coffee Association 6	273,991
Green Coffee Association	Personal Services	5	7,500
** New York Board of Trade **	Government	7-Gelderman, Inc., Overseas-Chinese Banking Corp. 8 9	125,000
Overseas-Chinese Banking Corp.	Financial Institution	7	6,516
Gelderman, Inc.	Personal Services	7	4,000
The Mall (image here)	Shopping Centre	Concourse	

*In February 2002, Deutsche Bank employees from Downtown locations relocated to Deutsche Bank headquarters at:

--31 W. 52nd. Street


--280 Park Avenue

- 885 Third Avenue
- 1501 Broadway
- 55 Broad Street
- 14 Wall Street
- 16 Wall Street (Purchase completed from J.P. Morgan Chase)
- 126 East 56th Street
- 1251 Avenue of the Americas
- 1290 Avenue of the Americas
- 1301 Avenue of the Americas

******According to [Computer World](#), the Board of Trade would run a so-called “disaster-recovery” drill on a quarterly basis, which would last 1hr and 45 minutes. In 2001, “the quarterly test scheduled for September 8 had been postponed to September 15 due to electrical work being done at 4 World Trade Center.” This would mean that on September 8, 2001, “electrical work” was ongoing at the WTC 4, just 3 days prior the attacks. Their financial records lay in the 4x6 foot fireproof safe which was buried under the rubble of the twin towers. It is unknown if the safe was ever recovered and/or financial records.

In 2000, an evaluation report on the condition of the tower complex was requested by the New York Port Authority; the company contracted to develop the report was Merritt & Harris, Inc. On December 06, 2000, their report deemed the roof of the WTC 4 was “nearing the end of its anticipated service life and replacement should be anticipated.” No other irregularity was reported. *Also see Merritt & Harris Inc.*

FEMA’s report stated that “most of WTC 4 collapsed when impacted by the exterior column debris from WTC 2; the remaining section had a complete burnout.” [FEMA, WORLD TRADE CENTRE BUILDING PERFORMANCE STUDY, SEPT. 2002.]



►Gold London fix - September 2001, courtesy of kitco.com

A decade later, in September 11, 2011, the value of the WTC “lost gold” would have come to the sum of \$1,080.77 billion (or \$1.08 trillion).

WTC6: “. . . there was nothing in the vault but dust and debris”

Kurt Sonnenfeld, former Director of Broadcast Operations for FEMA’s National Emergency Response Team, noted how WTC 6’s sub-level vault was empty. “When the North Tower [WTC 1] fell, the U.S. Customs House (Building 6) was crushed and totally incinerated. Much of the underground levels beneath it were also destroyed. But there were voids. And it was into one of those voids, recently uncovered, that I descended with a special Task Force to investigate. It was there we found the security antechamber to the vault, badly damaged. At the far end of the security office was the wide steel door to the vault, a combination code keypad in the cinderblock wall beside it. But the wall was cracked and partially crumbled, and the door was sprung partially open. So we checked inside with our flashlights. Except for several rows of empty shelves, there was nothing in the vault but dust and debris. It had been

emptied. Why was it empty? And when could it have been emptied?” [\[elperseguido\]](#)

›Rescue worker going down a “void” - September 16, 2001.

[Creative Commons](#) certified in the public domain



Sonnenfeld explained that the vault in WTC 6 could not have been emptied after the explosion of the twin towers; “building six was evacuated within twelve minutes after the first airplane [American 11] struck the

North Tower. [WTC 1.] The streets were immediately clogged with fire trucks, police cars and blocked traffic, and the vault was large enough, 15 meters by 15 meters by my estimate, to necessitate at least a big truck to carry out its contents. And after the towers fell and destroyed most of the parking level, a mission to recover the contents of the vault would have been impossible. The vault had to have been emptied before the attack.”



©Bill Biggart Digital Journalist | Image use is in accordance with [Title 17 USC Section 107](#) ("fair use") distributed without profit.

The above image taken by Bill Biggart, who lost his life when Tower 1 exploded, shows WTC 6 had sustained fire damage prior to any debris touching it from the twin towers. If the explosions heard by many witnesses, including the firefighters, were set off prior to the towers' demise, then it is logical that these explosions would have created WTC 6's fire damage and would also explain the huge crater seen in WTC 6 in the following image.



›Aerial view of WTC 6 crater which formed after the twin towers' demise
[Creative Commons](#) certified in the public domain

›WTC6 Tenant List

U.S. Customs House 8-story offices: Total 537,693 Sq.Feet

1. U.S. Department of Commerce Cabinet Department of the United States Government (Promotion of the economic growth).

Owned floors 2 to 6 settled in Suite 600.

2. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. Director from 1999 till 2004 was Bradley A. Buckles.

The U.S. Department of Laboris, a federal law enforcement organization within the United States Department of Justice, had responsibilities including the investigation and prevention of federal offenses involving the unlawful use, manufacture and possession of firearms and explosives; acts of arson and bombings; and, illegal trafficking of alcohol and tobacco products.

3. The Peace Corps New York Regional Office.

The stated mission of the Peace Corps includes three goals: Providing technical assistance; helping people outside the United States to understand American culture; and helping Americans to understand the cultures of other countries. This was a volunteer program run by the United States government.

Gaddi H. Vasquez was the first Hispanic American director. His focus was to increase volunteer and staff diversity. He also led the establishment of a Peace Corps program in Mexico.

4. Eastco Building Services (2001)

5. Export Import Bank of the United States (EXIMBank)

Official export credit agency of the United States federal government (self-sustaining). The Bank came under criticism suspected to favoring special interests ahead of that of the U.S. taxpayer. These interests include that of heavily subsidized corporations such as Boeing or Enron as well as those of well-connected foreign governments and nationals (such as a 1996 \$120 million low-interest loan to the China National Nuclear Power Corporation (CNNP)) 65% of loan guarantees over 2007 and 2008 went to companies purchasing Boeing aircraft.

In 2012, the Bank's loan guarantees became even more skewed, with 82 percent of them going to Boeing customers.

In 1998 John Robson was Chairman; Vice-Chairman was Eduardo Aguirre.

The bank owned floors 6 to 2 (?) with a total space of 635sq.ft.

6. United States Custom House. Commissioners of Customs Agency of the U.S. federal government that collected import tariffs and performed other selected border security duties. Head of Customs was Robert C. Bonner from 2001 till 2003.

7. U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA AAPHIS) U.S. federal executive department responsible for developing and executing federal government policy on farming, agriculture, forestry, and food.

They were established on the second floor.

8. U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission.

They were established on the third floor, Room 350.

9. U.S. Department of Labor a cabinet-level department of the U.S. federal government.

Responsible for occupational safety, wage and hour standards, unemployment insurance benefits, re-employment services, and some economic statistics.

They were established on the sixth floor.

10. Administrator, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (AAPHIS).

They were established on the sixth floor.

11. U.S. Department of Commerce.

They were established on the sixth floor.

12. U.S. Export Assistance Center.

They were established on the sixth floor, Suite 635.

Statistics: The following buildings were partially or completely destroyed in the September 11, 2001, disaster.

- One World Trade Center (north tower)
- Two World Trade Center (south tower)
- Four World Trade Center
- Five World Trade Center
- Six World Trade Center
- Seven World Trade Center
- The Marriott Hotel
- One Liberty Plaza
- Saint Nicholas Greek Orthodox Church

The following buildings suffered major damage.

- The Millennium Hilton Hotel
- One World Financial Center
- Two World Financial Center
- Three World Financial Center
- The Federal Building
- Banker's Trust Building

NIST's Final Report on the Collapse of the World Trade Center Towers, released in 2005, notes how the rescue and search efforts for victims at the tower complex stopped in the week of October 7, 2001. [NIST NCSTAR 1: PREFACE, P.31. SEPT. 2005.] This is twenty-seven (27) days after the complex destruction.

- Height to tip of Tower One television mast: 1,727 feet
- Height to roof of Tower One: 1,368 feet
- Height to roof of Tower Two: 1,362 feet
- Steel used in construction: 181,400 metric tons
- Windows: 43,600 / Elevators: 198 / Doorknobs: 40,000+
- Floor space: 10,000,000 square feet
- Parking spaces: 2,000
- It takes 99 days to put out the fire at "Ground Zero."
- Eighteen people are pulled from the rubble of the WTC still alive.
- The city of New York loses 13,000,000 square feet of office space; more than all the office space in Miami, and more than the entire space of downtown Houston.
- 83,000 people lose their jobs in the ensuing economic turmoil.

1965

June 9: Demolition work begins to make way for the World Trade Centre.

1966

August 5: Groundbreaking.

1970

December: The first tower (WTC 1) is completed.

1971

February 19: Fire breaks out in the WTC 1.

Trade Center Fire Brings Complaints From City Firemen

The 30th blaze in 14 months at the Port Authority's World Trade Center broke out early yesterday and brought sharp criticism from the heads of two firemen's associations.

The fire raged out of control for nearly 40 minutes in construction materials in the second through the fifth subbasements of the 110-story north tower of the twin-towered center.

A fire official said that firemen were hampered by a lack of ventilation in getting down to the seat of the fire in the subbasements, which go to a depth of six stories below street level. The fire was declared under control at 1:13 A.M.

"It was a serious ventilation

problem," the fire official said. "In a case like this there are no windows to break to clear out the smoke, and it just accumulates."

Capt. Raymond W. Gimmier, head of the Uniformed Fire Officers Association, said later:

"In the immediate future, this building complex will be occupied by tens of thousands of people whose lives will be in jeopardy.

"I recommend that a commission be appointed by the Mayor, which would include high-ranking representatives of the Fire Department, to study and make recommendations to protect the public from the inherent hazards of these high rise and underground death traps."

And Michael Maye, head of the Uniformed Firefighters Association charged that in recent construction of office and apartment buildings "there is too much emphasis on beauty and not enough on safety."

The New York Times

Published: February 20, 1971

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July 19: WTC 2 is topped out.

1972

April 8: Fire breaks out in the WTC 2.

2-Alarm Blaze in Trade Center Fills South Tower With Smoke

A two-alarm fire in a sub-basement of the south tower of the World Trade Center sent clouds of black smoke billowing into the lobby, elevator shafts and corridors of the world's tallest building late yesterday afternoon.

No injuries were reported.

The first alarm was sounded at 5:35 P.M. and the second 19 minutes later. The fire was declared under control at 6:50 P.M.

Fifteen pieces of equipment, the superpumper and two fire-boats were sent to the scene. The 80 firemen who fought the stubborn blaze were supervised by Chief John T. O'Hagan, who heads the Fire Department's uniformed force.

The cause of the fire was not known, but fire officials said it had started in a workmen's shanty in the subbasement where cylinders of propane gas were stored.

The fire officials said that

hydrants in the immediate vicinity of the tower on the lower western tip of Manhattan were not working. Water to fight the blaze was pumped from the Hudson River by the two fire-boats. The 110-story building is 125 feet from the river's edge. Still under construction, the building is partially occupied by tenants. A skeleton crew of construction men was working there yesterday.

Fire officials said last night that they did not know why no water could be obtained from the hydrants, but were investigating.

Because it was a Saturday, there were few people in the area and traffic was not seriously dislocated. Some of the dense smoke seeped into a station of the PATH Railroad that connects Manhattan and New Jersey, but the commuter service was not disrupted.

The New York Times

Published: April 9, 1972


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1973

January 12: Fire breaks out in the WTC 2.

'Smoke-Purge' System at World Trade Center Passes Test of Fire



Firemen at ground level and in a cherry picker battling the blaze at the World Trade Center

A small fire at the World Trade Center put the downtown complex's special "smoke purge system" to the test yesterday afternoon, and it worked, belching smoke out of the South Tower of the 110-story building and caus-

ing alarm in the neighborhood.

Actually, the fire was confined to construction materials outside the tower and in three underground levels between the tower and the West Side Highway. There were no injuries.

The blaze broke out about 4:45 P.M. and was quickly contained by firemen, who threaded their way through a maze of forms for pouring concrete and what one fireman described as "an underground lumberyard."

Within 10 minutes of the

fire's discovery, engineers activated the special purge system, which uses the center's ventilating system to draw in fresh air and blow smoke through ducts on the mechanical-equipment floors at the seventh-story and 41st-story levels.

The New York Times

Published: January 13, 1973
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April 4: A ribbon cutting ceremony is held to open the twin towers.

May 24: Fire breaks out in the WTC 1.

Fire in Trade Center Tower

Firemen yesterday quickly brought under control a fire that started in an elevator shaft of the 110-story North Tower at the World Trade Center just after 3 A.M. when grease on the cables ignited. The cause of the fire was undetermined and there were no injuries.

The New York Times

Published: May 25, 1973
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1974

Construction is completed.

1975

February 13: Fire breaks out in the WTC 1.

February 15: Fire breaks out in the WTC 1.

TRADE CENTER HIT BY 6-FLOOR FIRE

Blaze Starts on the 11th
—16 Men Are Injured

A three-alarm fire broke out in the 11th-floor offices of the B. F. Goodrich Company in the north tower of the World Trade Center just before midnight last night, and spread through an inner-service core to the ninth and 14th floors.

"It was like fighting a blow torch," according to Capt. Harold Kull of Engine Co. 6, who said all of his men "got their necks and ears burned" trying to get into the 11th Floor hall from a stairwell. None of the firemen were seriously injured.

Mainly on One Floor

The fire appeared to be confined primarily to 11th-floor office equipment, according to Deputy Assistant Fire Chief Homer Eishop. The damage to the service core was apparently confined to electrical wiring in and near the core.

The building is not equipped with a fire sprinkler system.

A total of 24 pieces of fire-fighting apparatus and 132 firemen fought the fire. Sixteen firemen were treated at the scene for smoke inhalation.

New York Times

Feb. 14 1975 p 41

To reach the fire, the men boarded a freight elevator to the ninth floor, attached hoses to standpipes in stairwells on the 10th floor then advance on the fire. Flames could be seen pouring out of 11th-floor windows on the east side of the building.

Fifty people, mostly maintenance men, were evacuated.

New York City's new fire code for office towers requires that floors lacking sprinkler systems be divided into units no larger than 7,500 square feet unless buildings possess special fire detection devices.

The new fire laws also requires smoke-detection systems that in the event of fire will shut down the air-conditioning system, which can spread smoke and gases through the building, and return all elevators to the lobby floor.

The elevator provision is intended to override heat-sensitive elevator call-buttons which can summon elevators to fire floors as happened in 1970 at One New York Plaza and 919 Third Avenue, where a total of five deaths in two buildings were elevator-related. It was after those fires that the new fire law was enacted.

Fire Commissioner John T. O'Hagan has stated that he considers sprinkler systems, which are activated by high temperatures, to be the most effective means of fire-fighting in high-rise buildings.

"I'd sleep a lot better at night if the World Trade Center had sprinklers," he commented recently while discussing the plausibility of skyscraper fire such as that depicted in the current film, "The Towering Inferno."

Smothering a Fire Code

Only by the greatest good fortune were no lives lost in the devastating series of New York Telephone Company fires and the recent blaze in the World Trade Center. Property damage and interruption of the city's vital life processes were bad enough, but both fires point up the critical need for the newly revised fire code.

The high-rise building has turned out to have unique vulnerabilities: conduits that make raceways for fires, the extraordinary stack action of a tall structure, automatic elevators attracted by heat, highly combustible plastic equipment and furnishings that burn with noxious fumes. The potential for catastrophe has become horribly clear.

The new law calls for sophisticated signal systems, tenant evacuation teams, and a choice of sprinkler installation or pressurized stairs, in both new and old buildings. It requires compliance by January 1976; but beyond the filing of plans, virtually nothing has been done.

The building owners and the city are currently involved in bitter controversy about cost and practicality. Many owners, already in financial trouble, are reluctant to make the necessary massive investments and they are indulging in calculated foot-dragging.

Compliance is not even required at the World Trade Center, which is exempt from city codes as a creature of the autonomous Port Authority. To add insult to injury, New York State is about to use \$5 million of taxpayers' money to put sprinklers on all of the Trade Center's state office floors.

The city is willing to be flexible in such things as the staging of expensive installations. Admittedly, the costs of the new regulations are high. But the risks are even higher, in terms of holocaust and human life. Fiddling may be a classic evasion, but it is no substitute for compliance with the law.

The New York Times

Published: March 10, 1975

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May 20: Suspected fire starter arrested.

Suspect, 19, Is Charged With Trade Center Fires

By JOSEPH B. TREASTER

A 19-year-old cleaning man was charged last night with setting six fires in the twin 110-story towers of the World Trade Center Monday night and one in February that caused \$2-million in damage.

The youth, Oswald Adorno of 1013 East 180th Street in the Bronx, calmly ignored newsmen's questions as he was escorted by fire marshals to the First Police Precinct Station for booking on seven charges of arson in the second degree—setting a fire in an occupied building.

Motive for Fire

Acting Fire Commissioner Stephen J. Murphy said Mr. Adorno, a tall, slightly chubby youth with a small moustache and two little patches of chin whiskers, told fire marshals he started the fires because he was "disgruntled with his employer."

"He said he wasn't being given proper recognition," Mr. Murphy said.

"He said his boss made him work too hard, made him cover too many floors," Deputy Chief Fire Marshal Michael O'Connor added.

The Fire Department officials said Mr. Adorno, whose wife is expecting their first child in August, had been employed by the Tempco Maintenance Company at the World Trade Center for about a year, washing walls and ceilings.

All the fires in the Trade Center towers—the highest for smoke inhalation and minor injuries. However, in the first fire, which erupted four minutes before midnight on February 13, 36 firemen were treated for smoke inhalation and minor injuries. Twenty firemen set at night when Mr. Adorno and eight members of the cleaning crew were treated for exposure to smoke and minor cuts and bruises after the rash.



The New York Times

Oswald Adorno, charged in World Trade Center fires, in custody of fire marshals

present. There were no serious of fires Monday night.

Mr. O'Connor said two undercover fire marshals—Ralph Graniela and Thomas Flanagan—had been posing as night cleaning men at the Trade Center since the February fire, but it was not until the fires Monday that they began to suspect Mr. Adorno.

The marshals would not discuss in detail how they had broken the case.

There were seven fires in the Trade Center Monday night, including one on the 32d floor of the South Tower, which Mr. Murphy said had caused more than \$100,000 in damage. The six others were small, the marshals said, and one was of such little consequence that they decided to disregard it in dealing with Mr. Adorno.

The New York Times

Published: May 21, 1975

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December 15: The observatory opens to the public.

1976

January 15: Port Authority Chairman, Dr. Ronan, "There's little chance of having a towering inferno here."

Trade Center to Improve Precautions Against Fire

By EDWARD C. BURKS

The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey announced yesterday a \$14 million program of improved fire protection at the World Trade Center, including more automatic sprinklers and more walls to seal off potential blazes.

Many of the floors in the 110-story twin towers now have extensive open spaces unbroken by walls. The program provides for dividing floors into 7,500-square-foot areas.

The authority's chairman, Dr. William J. Ronan, speaking at a news conference at the Trade Center, said the work would take three to five years. He added in response to a query: "There's little chance of having a towering inferno here."

A midnight blaze that burned for several hours in the North Tower last February led to criticism of the building's fire-safety features, especially the lack of a complete system of automatic sprinklers.

There are now automatic sprinklers in the four under-

ground floors and in scattered public-assembly areas and computer centers. The new program calls for extending the sprinklers into other "high-hazard" areas such as mail rooms, storage rooms, file rooms and janitor closets in the central cores of both towers.

There will be an increase in water-pipe capacity and provision for further extensions of the sprinkler system if necessary, Dr. Ronan said. But he added that a complete sprinkler system would cost \$43 million, "a figure that at this time is not feasible."

Other elements of the new program include: installing walls from concrete floor to concrete ceiling (rather than just to the false ceiling); expanding fire alarm and communications systems, installing more smoke detectors, especially in elevator lobbies, using doors that close off areas on the detection of smoke, and designing of an air-pressurization system to keep smoke out of stairwells.

The New York Times

Published: January 16, 1976

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1977

June 24: Fire breaks out in the WTC 1.

A Smoky Fire Routs Trade Center Diners

A smoky fire broke out on the 46th floor of the World Trade Center's Tower No. 1 last night interrupting the dinners of 1,000 patrons at the Windows on the World restaurant on the 107th floor. A police officer who battled the fire and two cleaning women were admitted to Beekman Downtown Hospital for treatment for smoke inhalation.

According to the police, the fire occurred in the foyer in front of a recessed freight elevator, causing little damage.

The alarm was sounded at 10:02 P.M. and the fire was extinguished by 10:20. The diners were directed into the kitchen and onto the back stairs.

According to one restaurant patron: "The waiters did everything in a very orderly manner. Someone behind me mumbled about another 'Towering Inferno,' and a few dipped their napkins into their water glasses, but there was no general alarm."

The New York Times

Published: June 25, 1977
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1980

January 15: Fire breaks out in the WTC 4.

Fire in World Trade Center

By United Press International

A small fire broke out yesterday in a seventh-floor mail room at 4 World Trade Center in lower Manhattan, but firefighters quickly put it out. Little damage was reported.

The New York Times

Published: January 16, 1980
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April 19: Fire breaks out in the WTC 1.

106th-Floor Fire Routs 200 at Trade Center Lunch

Two hundred luncheon patrons were forced to leave the Windows on the World restaurant on the 107th floor of the north tower of the World Trade Center yesterday because of a small but smoky electrical fire on the floor below.

Within minutes of the alarm, the matrons d'hôtel, waiters, bartenders and even the cooks and busboys were ushering guests to the stairs. There were no injuries.

The most excited group seemed to be some young boys from a bar mitzvah celebration who were flipping coins to see

whether "they would live or die," an observer said.

Jeanette Way, one of a group of 28 travel agents from San Diego who were having lunch when the fire broke out at 2:08 P.M., said she first heard a small voice coming from what sounded like a walkie-talkie.

A Polite Request

"It said, 'There's a fire on 106, evacuate 107 immediately,'" she recalled. "I thought, 'My God, that can't be true. People will panic.'"

"I whispered it to the woman next to

me, and she said, 'Shhh, don't let people hear.' Then a voice came over the loud-speaker, saying, 'Would everyone please evacuate the restaurant?'

"The voice was very calm. They never said the word 'fire.' That was good, because if they had, it would have been like at a soccer game when someone yells 'fire.'"

"The only time I worried was when we were going down the stairs," she continued. "There were so many elderly people who were walking very slowly. I thought, if this was a severe fire, would we really get out in time?"

The New York Times

Published: April 20, 1980
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1993

February 26: A truck bomb is detonated in the garage beneath WTC 1. Six people are killed and more than one thousand injured.

As seen, just from one media outlet, the towers had suffered many fire breaks during its lifetime. “A multifunction fire alarm system was intended to alert staff at the Fire Command Station within the building and provide voice and strobe alerts throughout. When turned on after the building had been cleared of people, a smoke purge system was intended to purge the hot, opaque fire gases from the building.” [NIST NCSTAR 1, SEPT. 2005.]

In 2005, NIST’s report further stated: “Buildings were not (and still are not) required by the building codes or designed to withstand the impact of a fuel-laden jetliner. Although the impact of a Boeing 707 was stated by the Port Authority to have been considered in the original design of the towers, only one three-page document, in a format typically used for talking points was found that addressed the issue. This document stated that such a collision would result in only local damage and could not cause collapse or substantial damage to the building.”

This document has not been specifically referenced as to where it was found, or what its particular date was. All original WTC documents and materials were destroyed on September 11 in 2001, and this fact is corroborated by the NIST investigators: “The reader should keep in mind that the building and the records kept within it were destroyed, and the remains of the towers were disposed of before congressional action and funding was available for this Investigation to begin. As a result, there are some facts that

could not be discerned, and thus there are uncertainties in this accounting.”
[NIST NCSTAR 1, SEPT. 2005.]

The report concludes on the matter: “NIST was unable to locate any evidence to indicate consideration of the extent of impact induced structural damage or the size of a fire that could be created by thousands of gallons of jet fuel,” meaning the remaining JET-A fuel onboard American 11 and United 175 when they impacted.

American 11 fueled a total of 76,000 lb (pound) of JET-A fuel before takeoff comprised of 36,000 lb in each wing tank. The aircraft’s center (“belly” tank) was not filled. [FBI INTERVIEW: SHAWN TROTMAN, AMERICAN AIR LINES “FUELER.” SEPT. 16, 2001.] NIST investigators probably took this into consideration. “When it [American 11] hit the north tower, [WTC 1,] it likely contained about 10,000 gal (66,000 lb), evenly distributed between the right and left wing tanks.” According to NIST investigators, the aircraft consumed a total of 66,000 lb of JET-A fuel before impact. “Because of the tight maneuvers as the plane approached the tower, the baffles in both tanks had directed the fuel toward the inboard side of each wing.” [NIST NCSTAR 1, SEPT. 2005.]

Impact floors: Flight American 11 (total weight of 283,600 lb and speed at about 440 mph ¹²⁸) impacted the WTC 1 into the 96th floor and created a gash between floors 93 to 99. This would be a destruction of seven (7) floors from 93 to 99. Tenants occupying these seven floors were two companies: Fred Alger Management, that dealt in investments and occupied floor 93 with a total area of 36,078 square feet; and, Marsh USA (or Marsh & McLennan) that dealt in insurance and occupied floors 93 to 100 with a total area of 361,000

¹²⁸ NIST NCSTAR 1, September 2005.

square feet. One other tenant, Sumitomo Bank, shared part of floor 96 with Marsh.

NIST reports Marsh made modifications to the south side of floor 94 in 1998. That same year, the New York Port Authority helped the company demolish floors 95-98 in order to rebuild the fire alarm and sprinkler systems. Marsh did further modification work on floor 95 in the year 2000. [NIST NCSTAR 1-1H, TABLE 13-1, AND TABLE 13-2.]

The full floor fireproofing upgrades on floors 93 through 100 were accomplished in August through November of 1998, except for floor 94, which was done in December of 1996. In a [Bloomberg Business Week](#) article of November 1, 2004, Marsh & McLennan was considered “notoriously secretive.” The company, “true to its secretive history, became even more cloistered.” On October 14, 2004, Marsh & McLennan was “forced into a harsh public spotlight when New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer charged its insurance brokerage with fraud. In a civil complaint filed in New York State Supreme Court, Spitzer alleges that the company engaged in bid-rigging, price-fixing, and accepting payoffs from insurance companies.”

The article further states how “at least one former executive likened it to working at the CIA. Its ranks have included Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III (former Presidential Envoy to Iraq) who recently ran MMC’s crisis-consulting business; Stephen Friedman who was President George W. Bush’s top economic adviser and former Goldman Sachs & Co. co-chairman, who was an MMC senior principal; Craig Stapleton, the husband of George W. Bush’s cousin Dorothy, who was an MMC president; and, Lord Lang of Monkton, a former British Member of Parliament who still sits on the board.”

Merritt & Harris, Inc. - 2000 Report

(1) There was no existing control method to prevent catastrophic flooding of the subgrade levels up to level B-2 due to the total flooding of the PATH tubes.

(2) Asbestos, hazardous waste, and electromagnetic radiation generated by the roof-mounted communications transmission equipment was present and continuously endangering employees.

(3) Ice forming on and falling from the Towers during early and late winter months. The problem was most severe when the temperature at the upper Tower levels (which is several degrees colder than at the Plaza Level) falls below freezing. During high humidity days, ice balls formed and dislodged from the wall and roof surfaces. Damage to nearby buildings and injury to pedestrians occurred. There did not appear to be an architectural solution to this problem as it was caused by an unusual atmospheric condition.

(4) Incidences of noise generated either by the movement of the Tower corner panels or by the movement of underlying back up deck material during high wind conditions when the Tower movement was significant.

(5) The roof of WTC 4 was “nearing the end of its anticipated service life and replacement should be anticipated.” The warranty of WTC 5’s roof had expired in December 2000.

(6) Many welds exhibited flaws, such as insufficient penetration and cracks in circumferential welds. A report recommended that all welds be examined and that any weld lacking 50% or less penetration be removed and repaired. By 1985, this work had not been done.

(7) Water bellows in the arrestors failed due to repeated expansions and contractions over a 27-year period; all water hammer arrestors in all buildings had to be replaced before failures and flooding occurred.

(8) The electrical systems were not grounded in the switchboard area. As a consequence, should an employee have stepped in a small pool of water, he/she would have been electrocuted.

(9) The stairwells of the tower buildings should have been vented: Because of the height of the stairwells however the installation of venting fans would not be practical and would, most likely, pull smoke into the stairways from the corridors, a condition that was not favourable.

(10) Deficiencies typically noted were rusting conditions in the steel columns in the elevator shafts, missing fireproofing, and occasional floor coring damage.

NIST Investigation

A factual data reference, which comes from the Merritt & Harris, Inc., Report, released on behalf of the Port Authority in 2000, was not taken into account by NIST investigators: Ice forming on and falling from the Towers during early and late winter months. The problem was most severe when the temperature at the upper Tower levels (which is several degrees colder than at the Plaza Level) falls below freezing. During high humidity days, ice balls formed and dislodged from the wall and roof surfaces. Damage to nearby buildings and injury to pedestrians occurred. There did not appear to be an architectural solution to this problem as it was caused by an unusual atmospheric condition. [MERRITT & HARRIS, INC., DEC. 06, 2000.] Even the 360 foot antenna mast had automatic heating from the “building steam system to avoid low temperature brittleness.”

NIST investigators tell us: “At 10:06 a.m., an NYPD aviation unit advised that WTC 1 would come down and that all emergency vehicles should be moved away from it. At 10:20 a.m., observers in NYPD helicopters said that the top of the building was leaning; and at 10:21 a.m., they said that WTC 1 was buckling

on the southwest corner and leaning to the south.” There is no source of reference for this information from the NIST investigators.

Another unsupported statement is how “The WTC towers likely would not have collapsed under the combined effects of aircraft impact damage and the extensive, multi-floor fires that were encountered on September 11, 2001, if the thermal insulation had not been widely dislodged or had been only minimally dislodged by aircraft impact.” Below are two charts from the report by Merritt & Harris, Inc., released on December 06, 2000.

Asbestos-Containing Surfacing And/Or Thermal System Insulation Materials Located In One World Trade Center - Exclusive Of Elevator Shafts			
<u>Full Floor Locations</u>	<u>Random Locations On Floor</u>	<u>Subgrades</u>	<u>Convactor Units</u>
- Lobby Mezzanine	- 43 rd / 44 th Floor PA	- B1 Level:	- 77 th Floor
- 1 st - 6 th Floors: Core	Exhaust Duct	- Core, N/E Quadrant	- 79 th Floor
- 6 th Floor Catwalk	- 82 nd Floor	- B6 Level	- 88 th Floor
- 7 th / 8 th Floor MER	- 104 th Floor		- 101 st Floor
- 41 st / 42 nd Floor MER	- Core Electric Closets		- 103 rd Floor
- 75 th / 76 th Floor MER	On The 1 st - 40 th floors		- 105 th floor
- 108 th / 109 th Floor MER	- Perimeter Electric Closets On The 30 th Floor		-

Asbestos-Containing Surfacing And/Or Thermal System Insulation Materials Located In Two World Trade Center - Exclusive Of Elevator Shafts			
<u>Full Floor Locations</u>	<u>Random Locations On Floor</u>	<u>Quadrant Location</u>	<u>Convactor Units</u>
- 6 th Floor Catwalk	- Lobby Mezzanine	- S/W, 43rd Floor	- 22 nd Floor
- 10 th - 13 th Floors (Bell Atlantic)	- 7 th / 8 th Floor MER	Kitchen Exhaust Duct	- 24 th Floor
- 41 st / 42 nd Floor MER	- 9 th Floor		- 59 th Floor
	- 19 th Floor		- 72 nd Floor
	- 20 th Floor		- 79 th Floor
	- 26 th Floor		- 81 st Floor
	- 33 rd Floor		- 84 th Floor
	- 71 st Floor		- 86 th Floor
	- 75 th / 76 th Floor MER		- 87 th Floor

►Merritt & Harris, Inc., Dec. 06, 2000.

According to NIST investigators, American 11's nose impact was into floor 96, creating a gash from that floor up to the 99th. The Columbia University Maulman School of Public Health reported in their "WTC Evacuation Study," that American 11's nose impact was into floor 94 creating a gash from that floor up to the 98th. [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR03010863): MEETING, OCT. 21, 2002.]

Taking both mentioned reports into consideration, the Merritt & Harris, Inc., charts (for the WTC 1) asbestos and insulation was not found to exist on floors 96-99 (NIST) nor on floors 94-98 ("WTC Evacuation Study"). This evidence is singular due to the non-reference of this evidence in either of the pre-mentioned reports (NIST and the "WTC Evacuation Study".)

This devastation took 0.7 s. The structural and insulation damage was considerable (Figure 2-4) and was estimated to be:

- 35 exterior columns severed, 2 heavily damaged.
- 6 core columns severed, 3 heavily damaged.
- 43 of 47 core columns stripped of insulation on one or more floors.
- Insulation stripped from trusses covering 60,000 ft² of floor area.

►NIST NCSTAR 1, September 2005.

As for the WTC 2, NIST investigators state United 175's impact "stretched over nine floors, from 77 to 85." The Merritt & Harris, Inc., charts (for the WTC 2) reported asbestos and insulation only on the convector units for floors 79, 81, and 84. Regardless, NIST stated, "The stripping of insulation from the trusses [floors 77-85] continued inward across the tenant space and about two thirds of the way into the core."

The direct impact of the aircraft was over in about 0.6 s. The structural and insulation damage, summed over all floors, was estimated to be:

- 33 exterior columns severed, 1 heavily damaged.
- 10 core columns severed, 1 heavily damaged.
- 39 of 47 core columns stripped of insulation on one or more floors.
- Insulation stripped from trusses covering 80,000 ft² of floor area

The tower swayed more than one foot back and forth in each direction on the impact floors, about one-third the sway under the high winds for which the building was designed. Nonetheless, just like WTC 1 across the Plaza, *WTC 2 absorbed the aircraft strike and remained standing.*

►NIST NCSTAR 1, September 2005.

Unrelated Events

Miniature events that were deemed “unrelated” to the events that took place on September 11 in 2001

Sticking out: In the early morning hours of September 11th in 2001, “Chris Lyons of Brunswick, a newspaper delivery driver, said he saw four or five men he described as Middle Eastern near the entrance to the [Portland] jetport terminal between 03:40 a.m., and 04 a.m., near where he parks his car to drop off papers.” Chris Lyons only noticed the men because “they stuck out;” usually no one is around at that hour. “Four or five men got out of the car. They had a tremendous amount of luggage,” Lyons said. “About 10 bags.” [*PORTLAND PRESS HERALD*, SEPT. 22 AND OCT. 21, 2001.]

The Portland Police Department investigated Chris Lyons’s sayings “and did not think it was connected to the attacks because the behavior varied from the pattern shown by the terrorists.” [*PORTLAND PRESS HERALD*, SEPT. 22, 2001.]

Window washer: Joseph Bureau, a Fleet Service Agent at Portland Jetport Airport, handled “baggage, cargo, freight, mail, and the loading and unloading of planes;” he was also responsible for the preparation of “planes for flight.” Bureau had “heard a female employee for American Air Lines talking” to the administrator of Portland Jetport management. The unknown woman was described as being “22 to 24 years of age, about 5’2’ tall, with long dark hair.” He overheard the unknown woman say, “that she recognized one of the 19 individuals” the FBI released as the suspected hijackers, and that he had been employed “as a window washer at the Jetport earlier in the summer of 2001.”

The unknown American Air Line employee was located; she pointed to the FBI a specific individual depicted in the images of the 19 suspected hijackers and indicated that it was the man who had been a window washer at the airport. It is unknown which suspected hijacker this woman identified.

Flying Cessna:

SECRET	- 1 -	ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION		
Date of transcription 9/17/01		
<p>[redacted] home telephone [redacted] work telephone [redacted] cellular telephone [redacted] was telephonically interviewed regarding his actions while flying WCBS' helicopter on 9/11/01. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature and purpose of the interview, he provided the following:</p> <p>[redacted] works for HELICOPTERS INC., based at LINDEN AIRPORT and having their headquarters in St. Louis. [redacted] is his manager, telephone [redacted]. The company supplies pilots for news programs. On 9/11/01, he was flying a helicopter that was covering traffic for 880 A.M. radio. He was south of the George Washington Bridge (GWB) when he saw the first airplane crash into the World Trade Center (WTC). The helicopter was in LaGuardia Airport's airspace at this time, and he estimated that the helicopter was at approximately 1,500 feet altitude.</p> <p>After seeing the first crash, he flew the helicopter toward WTC. He estimated that it only took a couple minutes to reach that area. He hovered over the Hudson River in the area of the Holland Tunnel at approximately 1,100 feet altitude. He remained there for the second crash. Within a couple of minutes, the New York Police Department ordered him to leave the airspace. He landed the helicopter in New Jersey and did not return. He recalled that there was a Cessna flying in the lower bay off the Southern tip of Manhattan.</p>		

The above account of a Cessna aircraft seen by a helicopter pilot after both twin towers had been hit is to be taken with some precaution, because the FAA had shut down all airspace by this time.

No authorization: Within the FAA's Report "ATC System Assessment, Shutdown, & Restoration," published on March 21, 2002, is an event that happened at 10:20 a.m., after all suspected hijacked aircraft was no longer a threat.

An unidentified airplane, tail number N84048, departed from Orange County, New York, without authorization.¹²⁹ The FAA never reported tracking the plane and never report on its aftermath.

Dr. Atta: The *New York Post* on May 28, 2002, ran a bizarre story pertaining to the dates September 7 to 9 in 2001: "Dr. Mohamed Atta and his new wife Sophie spent the weekend before the terror attacks in New York City, arriving on Friday, September 7 and staying until Sunday, September 9, when they returned to Maryland. But this Mohamed Atta was not the hijacker who crashed a jumbo jet into the World Trade Centre. The New York City visitor was a soft-spoken kidney specialist from Portland, Maryland whose horrible case of mistaken identity has led to months of harassment."

Johns Hopkins Medicine Website notes among Dr. Atta's research: "My research interests included: (1) Genetic cloning of the human gene that encodes the sodium myo-inositol cotransporter (SMIT). This transporter is essential for cell volume regulation in response to hypertonicity.¹ (2) Studying the transcriptional regulation of the human SMITgene.² (3) Subsequently my focus was to explore the potential role of protein phosphorylation in regulating the activity of osmolyte transporters in response to hypertonic stress.³ (4) At present, I am conducting a prospective cohort study to determine the prevalence of vancomycin resistant enterococci (VRE) in outpatient dialysis patients."¹³⁰

¹²⁹ http://www.911myths.com/images/c/c7/Team8_Box8_MilesKaraDocs3-Timelines_Various.pdf

¹³⁰ Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine. Accessed 2010.
<http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/nephrology/Atta.html>

The *Portland Press Herald* on September 23, 2001, reported: “Just before the suicide mission, *Newsweek* reports that Atta returned a rental car in Pompano Beach, Florida, on September 9, [2001,] and even took the time to remind the dealer that the car needed to be serviced.” This report from *Newsweek* having Atta in Pompano Beach two days prior the attacks had FBI investigators interview a manager of Alamo Rent A Car at the jetport, where a search of the company’s computer records showed someone called Atta had rented a blue Nissan Altima (Massachusetts license 3335VI) on September 9th in Boston and that it was due back September 11th, by 6 p.m. Rental records had the car listed as overdue.

It is unknown if Dr. Mohamed Atta was actually questioned upon this matter, but investigative blood hounds may not have missed the opportunity to do so.

Two Pipers: On September 11, 2000, exactly 1 year prior the New York attacks, at 12:46 p.m., Eastern, a PA-28161 (Piper Cherokee) with tail number N9208N, and a PA-23250 (Piper Aztec), with tail number N54235, collided on final approach to land on runway 9 at the Saint Lucie International Airport in Fort Pierce, Florida.

The Piper Cherokee was operated by Flight Safety International and the Piper Aztec was operated by the Air Line transport pilot under the provisions of Title 14 CFR Part 91 with no flight plans filed. Visual weather conditions prevailed at the time of the collision. The air transport pilot onboard the Piper Aztec, and the private pilot, a Saudi Arabian citizen, onboard the Piper Cherokee, both received fatal injuries. Both airplanes were destroyed. [NTSB IDENTIFICATION ATLO0FA091A REPORT.]

The pilot of the PA-28161 (Piper Cherokee) was Ameer Bukhari who held a student pilot certificate. His total flight time in the aircraft was 17.6 hours, but

his total flight time in all aircraft was undetermined. Bukhari also had a foreign based private pilot license from the Philippines and held at the time a first class medical certificate, dated May 16, 2000, with no limitations or waivers.

The pilot of the PA-23250 (Piper Aztec) was Roger Boromei who held an airline transport pilot multi-engine land, a type rating in EMB-120, commercial pilot single-engine land, and instrument ratings. Included also were certified flight instructor single and multi-engine instrument airplane ratings. His total flight time was 7,438 hours and the approximate flying time in the PA-23250 was not determined. Boromei held a current second-class medical certificate, dated September 14, 1999, with no limitations or waivers.

The airplane wreckage for the Piper Aztec was released on June 12, 2001, to Mr. Deen, an insurance adjuster, in Atlanta, Georgia. The airplane wreckage, for the Piper Cherokee, was released on June 18, 2001, to Mr. Don Doohen, Director of Maintenance at Flight Safety Academy, in Vero Beach, Florida. All this information is publicly released by the NTSB.

Ameer Bukhari, pilot of the Piper Cherokee, had his identity confirmed by the family attorney, according to a *CNN* report that can be found [here](#), and followed up by a Wikipedia article that can be found [here](#).

On September 13, 2001, the *People Daily* reported on a *CNN* report, which is no longer available, that “police and law enforcement sources” were saying how “two brothers suspected in the Boston hijackings were Adnan Bukhari and Ameer Abbas Bukhari, who up until recent days had lived in Vero Beach, Florida. Both of their homes have been searched, the sources said. The two rented a car, a silver-blue Nissan Altima, from an Alamo car rental at Boston-Logan Airport and drove to an airport in Portland, Maine, where they got on [Colgan] U.S. Airways Flight 5930 at 6 a.m., Tuesday headed back to Boston,

the sources said. Investigators are analyzing videotapes at the car rental facility and at the Maine airport.”

People Daily’s report corresponds to events that the Commission reported was acted out by Mohamed Atta and Abdul al-Omari, suspected hijackers of American 11, when they were suspected to have boarded shuttle Colgan flight 5930 from Jetport Airport on September 10, 2001. The report then states: “Before *CNN* learned the identities of the two brothers, [the Bukharis,] Portland Police Chief Mike Chitwood said, ‘I can tell you those two individuals did get on a plane and fly to Boston early yesterday morning. I can tell you that they are the focus of a federal investigation.’ Law enforcement sources said investigators searched for documents pertaining to the Bukharis and other students at Flight Safety International, a Vero Beach aviation school. The landlord of Adnan Bukhari said Bukhari and another man who lived next door described themselves as Saudi pilots and lived with their wives and children. The landlord, Paul Stimeling, said the wife and the children of the next-door neighbor of Adnan Bukhari moved out over the weekend. The Bukhari family, the landlord said, moved out at the end of August.” ¹³¹

Next to the Bukharis lived AbdulRahman al-Omari “with his wife and four children.” ¹³² Which al-Omari this turned out to be is very difficult to substantiate. The individual who initially connected and brought forward confirmation that Bukhari was somehow involved with the suspected hijackers, was Lieutenant Commander James P. Hopkins IV, a Naval Officer and FAA Specialist. Unfortunately, Lieutenant Hopkins is no longer amongst us; he died

¹³¹ *People Daily*, “Two Brothers among Hijackers: CNN Report,” September 13, 2001. Accessed 2010.

http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200109/13/eng20010913_80131.html

¹³² *Associated Press*, “FBI Investigates Possible Fla. Links,” by Brendan Farrington. September 14, 2001. Accessed 2014.

<https://web.archive.org/web/20020626183605/http://www.poconorecord.com/report/wtc/39.htm>

at Inova Fairfax Hospital on November 28, 2006, after being run over on Old Keene Mill Road and Tiverton Drive in Springfield. ^{133,134}

Should our readers be interested in more information on the Bukhari 9/11 incident, we divert them to read Jay Kolar's abstract, entitled "What we now know about the alleged 9-11 hijackers," in section 3.3 "FBI replaces two Bukharis with Atta and al-Omari: Two abandoned rental cars," published in *The Hidden History of 9-11-2001*, printed by Elsevier in 2006.

Abandoning Piper:

Subject: Mohamed Atta Incident at Miami International Airport (MIA)

Background: December 26, 2000, a PA28-151 (N554 HA) was abandoned on a taxi way at MIA due to a stalled engine that would not restart. From Signature Aircraft (FBO) the pilot notified the company that rented him the aircraft, Huffman Aviation (H32S) in Venice, Florida that the aircraft was inoperative. He and a passenger then rented a car and drove back to Venice. The aircraft was towed to Signature and repaired.

►FOIA request: Control No. 02-6789

On December 26, 2000, just three months after the accident of Ameer Bukhari, the official claimed "ringleader" Mohamed Atta abandoned a PA-28151 (Piper Cherokee) aircraft with tail number N554HA on the airport strip of Miami's International Airport. The engine of the aircraft apparently "stalled" and would "not restart."

Atta notified Huffman Aviation that rented him the aircraft, and later Signature Aircraft towed the plane and repaired it. The incident was covered by *The New York Times* on October 17, 2001.

¹³³ *Washington Post* Obituaries. Accessed 2010.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/07/AR2006120701838_pf.html

¹³⁴ Sunrise in Springfield in December 2006: 07:05 a.m. Sunset in Springfield in December 2006: 16:49 p.m.

<http://www.almanac.com/sun/rise/NH/Dublin/2014-08-22>

www.nytimes.com

The New York Times
ON THE WEB

October 17, 2001

Mohamed Atta in Close Call in Incident at Miami Airport

By JIM YARDLEY

MIAMI, Oct. 16 — For Mohamed Atta, the meticulous and intensely disciplined figure who is believed to have helped organize the Sept. 11 attacks, mistakes did happen, or at least nearly did. One of them came on Dec. 26 at Miami International Airport.

There, Mr. Atta and Marwan al-Shehhi, another man the F.B.I. identifies as one of the 19 hijackers, taxied a small private plane toward a runway when, unexpectedly, it stalled.

Unable to restart the engine, the two men shut the plane down, flipped off the lights and, by one account, walked off. Flight controllers, according to airport records, guided the waiting passenger airliners around the stalled aircraft until it was towed away 35 minutes later.

►FOIA request: Control No. 02-6789

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Firing up Piper:

On October 29, 2001 the Tampa FSDO (Charles Nolan) responded to a request to do a records check of N554HA. He reported that the aircraft was involved in a similar engine stoppage occurrence at the Venice, FL airport on June 12, 2001. When attempts were made to restart the engine, a fire started and the aircraft sustained substantial damage.

►FOIA request: Control No. 02-6789

On June 12, 2001, just six months after the abovementioned incident, the same aircraft (tail number N554HA) Atta abandoned on the airport strip of Miami's International Airport was reported to have stopped and was on fire at Venice Florida Airport. There is no reference if Atta was involved in this incident.

Pull a tape: Paul Thumser, the Operations Supervisor of Area B at New York Air Route Centre, "went to pull a tape" when an "alert machine" indicated that one of the ATCs (Area B) "may have committed an error related to the rules governing separation of aircraft." [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR04016818): TEAM 8 INTERVIEW: PAUL THUMSER OPERATIONS SUPERVISOR (AREA B) NEW YORK AIR ROUTE CENTRE, SEPT. 30, 2003.]

Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT): According to the [Langley Flying School](#) an Emergency Locator Transmitter "is a battery-powered transmitter that will detect automatically any unusual deceleration force such as that associated with a crash and subsequently transmit a distress signal on a designated frequency."

It is not widely known, but an emergency locator transmit was received at the FAA New York Air Route Center in Ronkonkoma, on Long Island, "prior to the first impact of the WTC." [TEAM NUMBER 8: FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION (FAA) NEW YORK AIR ROUTE CENTER INTERVIEW MIKE MCCORMICK, AIR TRAFFIC MANAGER, OCT. 01, 2003.]

In particular, at 08:51 a.m., (12:51 UTC) Boston "advises they have lost the track" on American 11; "an ELT is being received." ¹³⁵ Due to receiving this

¹³⁵ Department of Transportation's Office of Inspector General (DoT-OIG) -FI-2012-0005- 2011 FOIA. http://atcsc.faa.gov/Operations/ATCSCC_Logs/wkstnl5.east_log

distress signal, Air Traffic Manager Mike McCormick had the impression that a small aircraft had hit the North Tower that was sending out this distress signal. Even so, “no law authority ever came to New York Center,” McCormick stated, though he “fully expected for some authority to come quickly” and investigate the matter. [TEAM NUMBER 8: FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION (FAA) NEW YORK AIR ROUTE CENTER INTERVIEW MIKE MCCORMICK, AIR TRAFFIC MANAGER, OCT. 01, 2003.]

Feeling comfortable: David Bottiglia, the Air Traffic Controller assigned to United 175 from the New York Air Route Centre, said that a supervisor had taken all aircrafts but United 175 off the Boston frequency which was being isolated for American 11. Why only United 175 was left on the same frequency as American 11 was not explained. At the same time, United 175 “did not want to broadcast on the same frequency as American 11 since then he [the pilot] would be heard by those in control of American 11.”

Apparently, Captain Victor Saracini of United 175, a former fighter pilot of the Vietnam era, delayed in relaying information that a suspicious message was being transmitted from American 11, until he heard Sector Region 42 was searching for the flight. Bottiglia said this was because “the pilot of UAL 175 would feel more comfortable broadcasting what he heard,” whilst ATCs were searching for American 11. [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR04016823): TEAM 8 INTERVIEW: DAVID BOTTIGLIA, AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER AT NEW YORK AIR ROUTE CENTRE, OCT. 01, 2003.]

Switched suitcase: The following extract is from an FBI interview report with Nydia Gonzalez, Supervisor of American Air Line at Southeastern Reservations Center Raleigh, in North Carolina. Interview was taken on September 12, 2001.

On a separate matter, GONZALEZ told the writer about another call on or about 9:30AM, September 11, 2001, by a woman named [REDACTED] from Eugene, Oregon. This call was received by AA Reservation Agent [REDACTED] who also pressed the emergency button to notified GONZALEZ. [REDACTED] reported that [REDACTED] (last name not reported), flew on AA flight number 2076 from Dallas, Texas (DFW) to Portland, Oregon (PDX) on Sunday, September 9, 2001. Upon returning to his home in Eugene, Oregon, he opened his suitcase and found that all of his belonging, with the exception of his toiletries, were missing inside the suitcase. Instead, he found several plastic bags, fuses, and 3 memos written in Arabic. [REDACTED] reported that in the memos, she could only read the English words "Millbroke, CT" and "Winsted, CT", and that the memos were dated in July. [REDACTED] said that her father was certain that the suitcase was his, and that his toiletries were in there. GONZALEZ did not have any additional information regarding the details of the contents of the suitcase or the description of fuses found. On September 11, 2001, she contacted AA Security Managing Director, LARRY [REDACTED] and reported the incident right after the call.

›FBI interview: Nydia Gonzalez

Supervisor of AAL-Southeastern Reservations Center Raleigh, North Carolina
September 12, 2001.

Rumors

Sayings difficult to tie into the events that took place on September 11 in 2001

“It was a war zone. Our skies were turned into a war zone. Everywhere you turn it was military jets and helicopters everywhere. And that’s when the reality sank in. We’re at war.”

Dan D’Agastino

Air Traffic Controller at Newark Tower

Poughkeepsie: David Bottiglia, the Air Traffic Controller assigned to United 175 from the New York Air Route Centre, overheard his Air Traffic Manager at New York TRACON - N90, Mike McCormack, talking about a small twin engine aircraft, which had departed from Poughkeepsie, and had crashed into the WTC 1. Others reported it was a Sikorski helicopter.

Bottiglia’s statement was corroborated at the time by David LaCates, New York Deputy Operations Manager at the New York Air Route Center. LaCates believed the rumor of a small twin engine aircraft from Poughkeepsie heading towards Washington, D.C., got translated to be the first aircraft to hit the tower complex, and also believed this rumor persisted for over an hour. LaCates noted that McCormack was aware of this rumor, but could not say how it began. [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR04016816): TEAM 8 INTERVIEW: DAVID LACATES, NEW YORK DEPUTY OPERATIONS MANAGER AT NEW YORK AIR ROUTE CENTER, OCT. 02, 2003.]

Adoring the Teacher: A pilot instructor in Sarasota Florida under the name of Ivan Chirivella complained of Atta's behavior to the FBI when interviewed on September 16, 2001. Apart from being rude to female employees, Atta would badger Chirivella on "how things should be done."

Still Alive

Suspected hijackers turning up alive after September 2001

“If it’s not true, it’s still well founded.”

Donald H. Rumsfeld

Former Secretary of Defense (2001)

Satam
al-Suqami



Mohamed
Atta



*Suspected
still alive*

Waleed
al-Shehri



*Suspected
still alive*

Wail
al-Shehri



*Suspected
still alive*

Abdul
al-Omari



*Suspected
still alive*

►Images courtesy of the FBI

Mohamed Atta Egyptian National ([Qutbism](#)) was officially named as the “hijack pilot” onboard American Air Line Flight 11. He was reported in a *Washington Post* article on September 16, 2001, as appearing as a graduate of the U.S. International Officers School at Maxwell Air Force Base, and the Aerospace Medical School at Brooks Air Force Base in San Antonio, respectively.

But the only source the public has of Atta suspected to still be alive after September 2001 is his father, Mr. Mohammed el-Amir Atta. “He is hiding in a secret place so as not to be murdered by the U.S. secret services,” Mr. Atta Sr. aged 66 told the German newspaper *Bild am Sonntag*. “As I saw the picture of my son, I knew that he hadn’t done it. My son called me the day after the

attacks on September 12 at around midday. We spoke for two minutes about this and that. He didn't tell me where he was calling from. At that time neither of us knew anything about the attacks." [THE GUARDIAN, "FATHER INSISTS ALLEGED LEADER IS STILL ALIVE," SEPT. 02, 2002, BY KATE CONNOLLY (BERLIN, GERMANY).]

If Mr. Atta Sr's telephone records were checked, to verify this call was actually made, is unknown and probably will never be known. But out of pure curiosity, it would have been a delight to those concerned to have checked those telephone records.

Abdul al-Omari Saudi National (Muslim) was officially named as a "muscle hijacker" onboard American Air Line Flight 11. He was reported in a *Washington Post* article on September 16, 2001, as appearing as a graduate of the U.S. International Officers School at Maxwell Air Force Base, and the Aerospace Medical School at Brooks Air Force Base in San Antonio, respectively.

According to a Wikipedia article, Abdul al-Omari is alive and working as a pilot for Saudi Arabian Air Lines. He claimed that his passport had been stolen when he was living in Denver in 1995. "They gave my name and my date of birth, but I am not a suicide bomber. I am here. I am alive." [Wikipedia "[Abdul al-Omari](#)."]]

Other media outlets proclaiming al-Omari's innocence is *The New York Times* on September 16, 2001; *The Independent* on September 17, 2001; *BBC* on September 23, 2001; *The Los Angeles Times* on September 21, 2001; and the *Telegraph* on September 23, 2001. Also see *September 10th-Portland, Maine*

Waleed M. al-Shehri Saudi National (Muslim) was officially named as a "muscle hijacker" onboard American Air Line Flight 11. Media outlets proclaiming

Waleed al-Shehri's innocence are *The Los Angeles Times* on September 21, 2001; *Associated Press* on September 22, 2001; *BBC* on September 23, 2001; and the *Daily Trust* on September 24, 2001.

These media outlets all printed that Waleed al-Shehri came forward shortly after the attacks and professed his still alive status, not only to the press (domestically and internationally) but also to the FBI.

The FBI's particulars on Waleed M. al-Shehri are curious; specifically, his various birth dates given in a chronological order, making him younger with each entry, until he's listed as a 10-year-old boy. A further particular is that he was at the time "believed to be a pilot" by the FBI's Press Release. See *American 11-Aircraft Calls*

September 13, 1974 (Age 27)

January 1, 1976 (Age 25)

March 3, 1976 (Age 25)

July 8, 1977 (Age 24)

December 20, 1978 (Age 23) *

May 11, 1979 (Age 22)

November 5, 1979 (Age 22)

October 2, 1991 (Age 10) LATER DELETED

The *BBC* article of September 23, 2001, entitled "Hijack suspects alive and well," came out 11 days after the FBI's Press Release of September 14th. The article states that Waleed al-Shehri "acknowledges that he attended flight training school at Daytona Beach in the United States, and is indeed the same Waleed Al Shehri to whom the FBI has been referring. But, he says, he left the

United States in September last year, [2000,] became a pilot with Saudi Arabian airlines and is currently on a further training course in Morocco.” ¹³⁶

On September 20, 2001, just 3 days before the *BBC* article, and 14 days after the FBI Press Release, a *Wall Street Journal* article clears some of the fog around who exactly Waleed al-Shehri was, who will be reported in the *BBC* article. And this was Waleed **AHMED** al-Shehri, as opposed to the FBI’s Waleed **M.** al-Shehri. ¹³⁷

The following day, flight school Embry-Riddle Aeronautical publishes a Press Release stating: “Embry-Riddle officials have learned that Waleed Al-Shehri talked to U.S. government officials in Morocco earlier this week. An individual with a similar name was identified by the FBI in its September 14 announcement as being aboard American Airlines flight 11, the first plane to strike the World Trade Center. Embry-Riddle records show that a student with the name Waleed **A.** Al-Shehri graduated with a Bachelor of Science degree in aeronautical science.” ¹³⁸

The interview given by Mr. Waleed **AHMED** al-Shehri (or As-Shahri) to reporters was published on October 5, 2001, where he categorically states he doesn’t have a brother called Wa’il. The link can be found [here](#).

ASAA Reporter: What is your relationship with Wa’il As-Shahri, or do you know anybody by that name?

¹³⁶ *BBC* article: “Hijack suspects alive and well.” September 23, 2001. Accessed 2004.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1559151.stm

¹³⁷ *The Wall Street Journal*, “Media Mistook Four Saudi Pilots for Hijackers in U.S. Attacks,” by Chad Terhune, Will Pinkston, and Douglas A. Blackmon, September 20, 2001.
http://whatreallyhappened.com/WRHARTICLES/9-11_pilots.html

¹³⁸ Embry-Riddle Alumnus Cleared Of Reported Hijacker Link: Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University press release, September 21, 2001.
<http://s3.amazonaws.com/911timeline/2001/embryriddle092101.html>

Waleed: I know of nobody by that name and there is no one in my family who has such a name.

The reporter then asks Mr. Waleed **AHMED** As-Shahri his thoughts about his photo being shown on the FBI list. “I said before that I was astonished when I saw my picture on the *CNN* channel,” he said. “I believe the photo was taken from the Flight Safety School when I was being trained there for two months. The photo looks like one taken at that time.” We thank [911MYTHS](#) Website for the image found (see below). But there is another problem; the brother, Wa’il As-Shahri, is shown as an entirely different individual than what the FBI’s photograph showed.




Image from *CNN* as given by [911Myths](#) in their research on Waleed al-Shehri (As-Shahri).

›Image used is in accordance with [Title 17 USC Section 107](#) (“fair use”)



FBI's Wail al-Shehri
Courtesy of the FBI





CNN's Wa'il As-Shahri
Courtesy of [911Myths](#)

Further evidence that the FBI was investigating another Waleed al-Shehri than the one suspected to have boarded American 11, came in 2004 when Phyllis A. Duncan of the FAA was requested to study and clarify any discrepancies in regards to Mr. al-Shehri's forthcoming medical reports released in 2003 where it shows his medical examination for the renewal of his pilot certificate.

Waleed Ahmed Al-Shehri	First Class Medical ID# (b) (6)
	Issued 8/18/2003
	Restriction: Must wear corrective lenses

► January 22, 2004, Report



Terrorists Who Had FAA Certificates

→ Waleed Ahmed Al-Shehri (Citizenship: Saudi Arabia)

- DOB: 01/01/1976
- Approximately 250 total flight hours (based on entries on last airman application dated 02/24/1996)
- Commercial Pilot - Airplane Single and Multiengine Land
- Instrument Airplane
- Flight Instructor – Airplane Single Engine, Instrument Airplane
- First Certificate Issued: 03/01/1995 (Private, Embry Riddle Aeronautical University-ERAU)
- Flight Instructor Certificate Issued: 12/10/1997 (ERAU)⁶
- Last Rating Issued to Commercial certificate: 3/19/1996 (Addition of multiengine rating, ERAU)

⁶No indication that CFI was renewed; should have been renewed 12/99 and 12/01

(Note: This individual was subsequently cleared of being a hijacker by the FBI.)

9/11 Commission Briefing Flight Training: January 13, 2004.
Presented by John Allen, Deputy Director of Flight Standards Service

And should further corroboration be needed, Waleed **Ahmed** al-Shehri (born January 1, 1976-Age 25 in 2001) was reported by the FAA to have been cleared by the FBI of being one of the suspected hijackers onboard American 11. See above

On September 15, 2001, just one day after the FBI Press Release of September 14th, the *Boston Globe* published an article relating to the al-Shehri brothers: “And a Saudi newspaper editor yesterday said two of the hijackers, brothers Waleed and Wail al Shehri, were the sons of a Saudi diplomat, Ahmed al-Shehri. Reached by the *Globe* in New Delhi, where he is third secretary of the Saudi embassy, Ahmed al-Shehri equivocated when asked if the two hijackers were his sons. ‘I have no idea. Maybe,’ said al-Shehri, who worked as an attaché at the Saudi embassy in Washington until 1996. ‘How do I know? We have a half-million Shehris in Saudi Arabia.’” ¹³⁹

A fourth Waleed al-Shehri enters the frame. This al-Shehri comes from the Saudi Information Agency when it described Waleed al-Shehri in their September 11, 2002, release, which was “compiled from articles in Saudi newspapers, and hijacker’s Friends.” ¹⁴⁰

As a note, the Source Watch Website reports that “the Saudi Information Agency, the *dissident* independent news agency based in Washington, D.C., shares the same address as the Saudi Institute. Both are under the direction of Ali Al-Ahmed.” ¹⁴¹

¹³⁹ The *Boston Globe*, “Hijackers may have taken Saudi identities,” By Kevin Cullen and Anthony Shadid. September 15, 2001.

http://www.boston.com/news/packages/underattack/globe_stories/0915/Hijackers_may_have_taken_Saudi_identities+.shtml

¹⁴⁰ Saudi Information Agency: “Profiles of 9/11 Saudi Hijackers Revealed.” (WASHINGTON DC) September 11, 2002. Accessed 2011.

<http://web.archive.org/web/20031026101720/http://www.arabianews.org/english/article.cfm?qid=12&sid=6>

¹⁴¹ Source Watch: “Saudi Information Agency.” Accessed 2014.

http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/Saudi_Information_Agency

3- **Waleed Al-Shehri:** 21, he is the younger brother of Wael. He is from the southern city of Khamis Mushayet. He was the least religious of the two brothers, but joined his older brother in their travel to Afghanistan and USA. He is a college dropout from the teachers college in Abha, where his brother attended. He also frequented Al-Segley mosque. Several of his brothers work in the Saudi military including one who is a military pilot. His uncle Major General Faez Al-Shehri is the director of logistics for Saudi Armed forces. He was on American Airlines #11 that crashed into North Tower of World Trade Center

[Saudi Information Agency](#)

Profiles of 9/11 Saudi Hijackers Revealed
(WASHINGTON DC) September 11, 2002

The above was partially supported by a *Washington Post* article which is no longer available, but used to be linked [here](#). The 911Myths Website has linked the father of the brothers' interview [here](#).


On May 2, 2002, the FBI's PENTTBOMB MAJOR CASE #182 report acknowledges the suspected hijacker onboard American 11 was Waleed **Mohamed** al-Shehri born December 20, 1978. No picture of this individual was released by the FBI.

Details: In response to continuing inquiries, New York is providing information to the field to clear up the misidentification of WALEED AL SHEHRI.

During the course of the PENTTBOM investigation, the identity of suspected hijacker WALEED M. AL SHEHRI, date of birth December 20, 1978, has become confused with the identity of WALEED AL SHEHRI, date of birth [REDACTED]. The correct identifying information is as follows: **PLEASE NOTE: THE TWO ARE NOT IDENTICAL.**

(SUSPECTED HIJACKER)
WALEED M. ALSHEHRI
WALEED MOHAMMED AL SHEHRI
DOB: December 20, 1978
Florida DL#: A426-893-78-460-0
1600 N Ocean Dr #8
Hollywood, FL 33019
SSAN: None

(AIRLINE PILOT)



A comparison of the Florida Driver's license photographs of the two Waleed Al Shehris show them to be not identical.

Wail al-Shehri: The Texas Service Center Enforcement Operations Division, 911 Terrorist Review, reports the following: “When Saudi businessman Mohammed Alshehri opened the local newspaper a week after the September 11 attacks, he was astonished to see two of his sons listed among the 19 suspected hijackers.” The father noted how “it was a huge shock” for him, “for their mother, and for all their brothers and sisters.” Mr. al-Shehri Sr., read “the U.S. authorities believed his sons, Wail, 25 and Waleed 21, were among the hijackers who crashed American Airlines Flight 11 into the north tower of the World Trade Center. Although the two boys had disappeared months earlier without a word to their family, Alshehri could not believe they were among the hijackers. He had never heard them talk of Osama bin Laden or fighting a holy jihad against the U.S., he told ABC News’ Barbara Walters in his first interview since the attacks. Alshehri also said he has yet to see any hard evidence that his sons were involved.”

Mr. al-Shehri Sr., stated, “Even if they were onboard that plane, maybe they were just passengers.” Senior al-Shehri, “a prosperous real estate developer who donated a mosque to the local town, Khamis Mushayt, has a total of 14 sons and 6 daughters, born to 4 wives. He said that Wail, an arts teacher, became depressed and went to the holy city of Medina in December 2000 with his brother to consult a religious teacher. When they came back, said another brother, Saleh, Wail and Waleed did not seem to be any more religious than before, though Wail told the family that seeing the religious teacher had lifted his depression. “They were very normal until the last time I saw them.” Then the 2 brothers disappeared again, and the family did not hear from them until early 2001. “They refused to tell their mother where they were,” Mr. al-Shehri Sr., said. “All they said to her was, ‘We’re on our way back home.’” The phone

call was the last time the family heard of the 2 boys until they saw their photographs in the newspaper in September.


Which of the following photographs “the family” saw of their sons “in the newspaper” is unclear.

Waleed al-Shehri



GOVERNMENT
EXHIBIT
Case 1:05-cv-00036
10-05-05

FBI



CNN



GOVERNMENT
EXHIBIT
Case 1:05-cv-00036
10-05-05

FBI

Wail al-Shehri



GOVERNMENT
EXHIBIT
Case 1:05-cv-00036
10-05-05

FBI



CNN



VIDEO

›CNN images used is in accordance with [Title 17 USC Section 107](#) (“fair use”) distributed without profit.

The report continues: “U.S. investigators believe the brothers left Saudi Arabia and became involved with Osama bin Laden’s terrorist organization, al Qaeda, putting in stints at training camps in Afghanistan. Then, U.S. authorities say, they spent last summer in Florida, and came up to Boston where they

boarded flight 11 on the morning of September 11, Wail in seat 2A, Waleed in 2B. Along with the other suspected hijackers, the 2 are named as unindicted coconspirators in the first indictment handed down in the case, against Zacarias Moussaoui. Alshehri said he had asked Saudi authorities to show him evidence linking his sons to the attack, but said they told him they did not have the evidence. He admitted, however, that it was conceivable his sons could have been led astray. “Considering their young age, it is possible that they could be misled by some other people,” he said. “If that turns out to be true, then I will never, never accept it from them. I’ll never forgive them for that.”

The Park Inn housekeeper knocked on the al-Shehri brothers’ apartment door at 10:00 a.m., on the morning of September 11th in 2001, and was confronted by someone advising her to return because “someone was still asleep.”

3413	9/11/2001	Wail Alshehri	housekeeper at the Park Inn advised she attempted to clean room 433. She was confronted by a male of foreign descent who advised someone was still asleep and for her to come back at 1300.	On Tuesday, September 11, 2001 at approximately 10:00 ?????
------	-----------	---------------	---	---

FBI’s hijackers’ timeline (February 1, 2007)

Regardless of these still alive references, the Commission reported a simpler story:

- Mohamed Atta | *Egyptian national*
“Tactical leader of 9/11 plot; pilot/hijacker (AA 11) (**deceased**)”
- Abdul Aziz al-Omari | *Saudi Arabian national*
“9/11 hijacker (AA 11) (**deceased**)”
- Wail al-Shehri | *Saudi Arabian national*
“9/11 hijacker (AA 11) (**deceased**)”

- Waleed al-Shehri | *Saudi Arabian national*
“9/11 hijacker (AA 11) (**deceased**)”
- Satam al-Suqami | *Saudi Arabian national*
“9/11 hijacker (AA 11) (**deceased**)”

Deoxyribonucleic Acid

Hypothetical ID Load: 6,000 dead

Charles H. Brenner, Ph.D. Consulting in Forensic Mathematics, Visiting Scholar and Senior Research Fellow Human Rights Center of UC Berkeley prepared a DNA hypothetical ID Load of the victims at the tower complex mostly from October 2001 and revised in 2008. This would include victims from: Two airliners, American 11 and United 175; the New York Fire Department firemen; the New York Police Department Officers; employees in WTC1 and WTC2; and the passersby.

Hypothetical ID load

- 6,000 dead
- 5,000 recovered
- 4,000 positively identified through direct references
- 1000 remaining to identify by relatives (“indirect references”)
 - 500 with 2 close relatives (parents, children, and/or siblings)
 - $LR=10^6$ per ID (?)
 - some with 1 only close relative
 - $LR=1000$ per ID
 - LR inadequate unless all data taken into account
 - Offbeat combination of relatives ok
 - DNA-VIEW Kinship Program
 - 15 cases with mutation.

► Brenner, C. H. & Weir, B. S. [Issues and strategies in the DNA identification of World Trade Center victims](#). Theoretical Population Biology, 63, 173-178, (2003).

While the mayor's office considered a rapid cleanup of debris a high priority (the mayor was quoted as saying that he would like the site cleared by the time he left office on December 31, 2001), others were concerned that debris removal was being done at the expense of searching for bodies and remains. One example of this conflict was the well-publicized scuffle that took place between New York City firefighters and police in early November after the mayor's office announced that the number of people searching for human remains would be cut back so that more heavy equipment could be used at the site. [SIMPSON DAVID M. & STEHR STEVEN. VICTIM MANAGEMENT AND IDENTIFICATION AFTER THE WORLD TRADE CENTER COLLAPSE. UNUSUAL ASPECTS OF THE DISASTER IN NEW YORK CITY, CH.4, 111-112, (2002).]

Table 1. Fatalities and casualties after the collapse of the World Trade Center (selected dates).

Date	Total Missing Persons	Confirmed Dead	Missing & Dead	Bodies Identified
Sept 13	4,763	184	4,947	34
Sept 17	4,957	190	5,147	39
Sept 20	6,333	233	6,566	n.a.
Sept 24	6,453	261	6,714	188
Sept 27	5,960	305	6,265	238
Oct 1	5,219	314	5,533	255
Oct 3	5,219	363	5,582	289
Oct 6	4,974	380	5,354	321
Oct 9	4,815	422	5,237	370
Oct 12	4,715	442	5,157	385
Oct 15	4,688	453	5,141	398
Oct 18	4,404	456	4,860	404
Oct 21	4,313	461	4,774	411
Oct 24	4,129	478	4,607	425
Oct 27	3,958	506	4,464	454

Source: *New York Times*
Note: The number of confirmed dead includes 157 passengers aboard the two airliners.

In 2002, forensic analysts reported: “Over 20,000 individual remains have been recovered. Identification has been difficult for a number of reasons. For example, some samples are not testable because they are too pulverized. Other samples are too burned to yield good results. Because untrained forensic personnel were involved in the chain of custody, there were complications from inaccurate labeling, missing data, or similar mistakes.” [SIMPSON DAVID M. & STEHR STEVEN. VICTIM MANAGEMENT AND IDENTIFICATION AFTER THE WORLD TRADE CENTER COLLAPSE. UNUSUAL ASPECTS OF THE DISASTER IN NEW YORK CITY, CH.4, 118, (2002).]

The Medical Examiner’s Office “intends to store the samples indefinitely, with the hope that as technology advances the remaining samples can be identified. [EMLING, SHELLEY. 2002. “WAITING FOR CLOSURE AFTER SEPT. 11.” AUSTIN AMERICAN STATESMAN (AUG. 04): A-7.]

No Explanation

Incidents never explained

“This is something we had never seen before. This is like what you would only see in the movies. And they [aircraft blips] were descending right at the end at 10,000 feet per minute. That is absolutely unheard of for a commercial jet. They’re actually nosing the airplane down doing what I would call a power dive. I think there are some unanswered questions and I’m on the record on that point.”

Dave Bottiglia

Air Traffic Controller assigned to United 175

New York Air Route Centre

FBI notification: Larry Wansley, Director of Security for American Air Lines at Ft. Worth, Texas, called Special Agent Danny Defenbaugh at the FBI’s Dallas Field Office a little after 08:45 a.m., to inform of American 11’s situation. What was not questioned or explained by the Commission Staff, who interviewed Larry Wansley, is the following they relate he said:

“While he [Wansley] was on the call with [Special Agent] Defenbaugh in Baker’s office, he heard the shriek of someone who was in the conference room and saw the footage of the plane going into the WTC[1]. He remembers the commentator said that it was a small airplane. He told [Special Agent] Defenbaugh to turn on the TV to see what was going on. Wansley said [to the

Commission Staff] he did not connect the hijacking with the incident at WTC[1] because the commentator said that it was a small airplane. While they were watching the WTC[1] story on TV, [Special Agent] Defenbaugh told Wansley that he was sending a team of agents to AAL headquarters. As they were talking on the phone and watching the events related to the WTC[1] on TV, they watched the second jet hit the WTC[2].” ¹⁴²

The impact of American 11 into the WTC 1 was never broadcasted live as Wansley said when “he heard the shriek of someone who was in the conference room and saw the footage of the plane going into the WTC[1].” The footage the Naudets captured of American 11’s impact was broadcasted by the U.S. media 13 hours later by “Gamma Agency” as the known distributor.

Since Wansley’s “primary function was to serve as a liaison to the FBI,” he later “received a commendation from the FBI on his efforts.”

Ample time: The Air Line Load Planning Quality Control record shows American 11’s final load of containers was at 07:47 a.m. (below chart) Atta inquired about his luggage at 07:30 a.m., according to Salvatore P. Misuraca, the ramp service manager for AAL.

11 1155 000000				
NO-AAA				
*** LOAD PLANNING QUALITY CONTROL RECORD *** J				
0011 11 BOS	ACFT334	CRY	GMT	LOCAL
ACTUAL OUT TIME	--	--	1140	0740
PLANNED OFF TIME - REVISED	--	--	1156	0756
FINAL PSOR COUNT - RES	--	--	1156	0756
FINAL CONTAINER UPD - CREW CHIEF	BOSX	1147	0747	
RADIO CLOSEOUT - AUTO	--	--	1147	0747

¹⁴² COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR04017173): Team 7 INTERVIEW with Larry Wansley, Director of Security, American Airlines, January 8, 2004.
http://www.911myths.com/index.php/9-11_Commission_Records#Box_DH.1

Analysis of above chart

07:36 a.m.	Final reserved passenger count
07:40 a.m.	Actual time AAL11 pushed back from Gate 32
07:47 a.m.	Final loading of containers
07:56 a.m.	Actual time AAL11 should have took-off; it was revised

The Crew Chief for American 11, Donald Bennett, told the passenger service representative to tell Atta “that both cases had arrived, but would not be put on flight 11, because the baggage compartment had already been locked for departure.” This statement contradicts the above Load Planning Quality Control record which states there was another 17 minutes till the last container would be loaded. No explanation from the Commission on this; neither is there enough information to form an opinion if Atta’s luggage could have been loaded at the time of his inquiry.

That call: Betty Ong’s call is depicted in the FBI flash-card presentation as being made at 08:18:47 a.m., lasting 1,620 seconds, an average of 27 minutes, ending at 08:45:47 a.m. American Air Lines puts the duration of the call at 20 minutes, ending at 08:38:47 a.m. There is no explanation as to why this seven minute difference occurs.

The Captain: We found no specific explanation why Captain John Ogonowski of American 11 requested to takeoff from the right side of Boston-Logan’s Runway 4.

Difference #1: We were unable to find any explanation as to why the Secret Service Report depicts the impact of American 11 into the WTC1 at 09:00 a.m., (Eastern) which is a 14 minute difference from the official account.

Delta vs American: Within the FBI report of Betty Ong's phone call, lead control numbers are added which show "DL267 and CE66." DL pertains to a Delta Flight and CE pertains to "Flight Centre." There is no explanation from the FBI why the transcript lead control numbers were from Delta Air Lines Flight 267 as opposed from American Air Lines Flight 11 where Betty Ong was supposed to be calling from.

Difference #2: Craig Marquis, American Air Lines Manager on duty at Operations Center in Fort Worth, Texas, was interviewed by the FBI on September 16, 2001. He told officials Betty's call ended at 08:49 a.m. A discrepancy to when Betty's call ended can be seen as 3 minutes after impact of the aircraft. There is no explanation for this 3 minute difference.

Atta but not al-Omari: On September 11, 2001, the FBI interviewed Mrs. Kip Hamilton who was employed as the Managing Director of Reservations. She gives to the interviewing FBI Agent various documents; amongst those documents is "a printout on passenger MOHAMED ATTA, seated in Seat 8D who had purchased a one-way ticket on Flight 11. A passenger printout on SATAM AL SUQAMI, who was seated in Seat 10B on Flight 11," and also two passenger lists for American 11.

There is no explanation as to why a passenger printout on Atta was given/requested, since he was not mentioned by name, not even once, by the flight attendants, Betty and Madeleine. We may assume this procedure was

taken to eliminate various passengers with Middle Eastern names. If so, it is unclear why no printout of al-Omari's passenger data was given/requested.



Federal Register

**Tuesday,
September 18, 2001**

Part III

The President

**Proclamation 7463—Declaration of
National Emergency by Reason of Certain
Terrorist Attacks**

**Executive Order 13223—Ordering the
Ready Reserve of the Armed Forces To
Active Duty and Delegating Certain
Authorities to the Secretary of Defense
and the Secretary of Transportation**

Federal Register

Vol. 66, No. 181

Tuesday, September 18, 2001

Presidential Documents

Title 3—

Proclamation 7463 of September 14, 2001

The President

Declaration of National Emergency by Reason of Certain Terrorist Attacks**By the President of the United States of America****A Proclamation**

A national emergency exists by reason of the terrorist attacks at the World Trade Center, New York, New York, and the Pentagon, and the continuing and immediate threat of further attacks on the United States.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GEORGE W. BUSH, President of the United States of America, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, I hereby declare that the national emergency has existed since September 11, 2001, and, pursuant to the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 *et seq.*), I intend to utilize the following statutes: sections 123, 123a, 527, 2201(c), 12006, and 12302 of title 10, United States Code, and sections 331, 359, and 367 of title 14, United States Code.

This proclamation immediately shall be published in the **Federal Register** or disseminated through the Emergency **Federal Register**, and transmitted to the Congress.

This proclamation is not intended to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by a party against the United States, its agencies, its officers, or any person.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this fourteenth day of September, in the year of our Lord two thousand one, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and twenty-sixth.



[FR Doc. 01-23358
Filed 09-17-01; 8:45 am]
Billing code 3195-01-P

Appendix A

USAToday Article, September 10, 2001.

“At reception, Atta asked if he could have 15 copies of *USAToday*, intending perhaps to bulk up his luggage, but had to make do with four copies instead.”

The Evening Standard

October 5, 2001.

USATODAY

Fliers fume over planes treated with pesticides

Chris Woodyard, September 10, 2001.¹

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As the United Airlines jet winged home from Sydney last year, [2000,] Sharon Dorazio’s eyes started to burn and her stomach ached. The pain became unbearable. “I have never been so sick, so quick,” she says. Her two grandsons, ages 13 and 14, complained of burning skin, itching eyes and loss of appetite. Sharon’s husband, Richard, a surgeon, was confounded. Then a flight attendant confided in them. Others were ill on the flight, the attendant said, and the crew believed the cause was the

¹ <http://perrysanderslaw.com/art7.html>

spraying of long-lasting pesticides in the cabin interior before passengers boarded.

A lawsuit filed last week [September 5, 2001,] by the Dorazios is the latest in a series of challenges to the decades-old practice of spraying pesticides in airliners. Australia, New Zealand, India and a few smaller countries, such as Jamaica, are among the dwindling number that requires all airlines flying in from other countries to treat their planes with pesticides to keep out unwanted bugs. Some nations require passenger airplanes arriving from other countries to be sprayed with insecticide to protect plants, animals and people. These countries require spraying of insecticides while passengers are on board:

Grenada

India

Kiribati

Madagascar

Trinidad and Tobago

Uruguay

These countries allow planes to be treated while they are empty; the pesticides used are designed to be effective for up to two months.

Australia

Barbados

Fiji

Jamaica

New Zealand

Panama

These countries require spraying of planes from particular regions where there are contagious or infectious diseases.

Czech Republic

Indonesia

South Africa

Switzerland

United Kingdom

Source: Department of Transportation

The World Health Organization says the pesticides used are safe. But the complaints of some people who have ridden treated airplanes range from dizziness and skin rashes to more serious conditions such as tremors and breathing problems. A flight attendant says she became unable to work at age 32 after six years of flying in planes treated with pesticides. A pilot says his flying ability became impaired after he napped in the pilot bunkroom of a Boeing 747-400 that had been sprayed before his flight. Sharon Dorazio says she developed “headaches and severe nausea” while on the United jet, according to the complaint she and her husband filed in Cook County Circuit Court in Illinois, where United is based. Their lawsuit alleges that United [Air Lines] “carried on a campaign of silence and misinformation” about the potential effects on passengers of cabin spraying. They are seeking class-action status for the case.

United [Air Lines] declined comment on the lawsuit. Its spokeswoman, Chris Nardella, says United [Air Lines] sprays “because we’re required to. As a company, we would prefer not to do this.” Other airline officials say the pesticides might be bothersome to a few people but do not cause long-term health damage. Although all airlines that fly to countries with spraying requirements are affected, United [Air Lines] is getting the most attention. It is the only US carrier that flies to the three largest countries that mandate aircraft spraying: Australia, India and New Zealand. The Association of Flight Attendants, which represents United [Air Lines] employees, says the Dorazios’ flight was one of 214 United [Air Line] flights in the past year in which passengers, pilots or flight attendants complained about pesticide odors. Where spraying is drawing new attention:

The USA’s largest pilots union is considering a campaign against the use of pesticides on aircraft. The Air Line Pilots Association is investigating reports of pilots who say they were affected by pesticides, and its executive board plans to discuss them in October.

One United [Air Line] co-pilot, in an internal report of a December incident, said his flying ability was impaired by pesticide used on a flight from Australia: “My eyes started burning, and I said something to the other pilots and they had the same problem. When I awoke from first break, my head was congested, my eyes were burning, I had a sore throat and I had a rash on both sides of my neck. As the flight progressed, my sinuses swelled worse, I had problems swallowing and I was having problems breathing. I was making mistakes and suffering short-term memory loss and confusion.”

The report says he and another relief pilot in the four-man crew went to the airline's medical office after landing. The Federal Aviation Administration [FAA] says it knows of only one incident of a pilot complaining about the effects of pesticide spray. "It's extremely, extremely rare," says spokeswoman Alison Duquette.

The Dorazios' lawsuit follows another filed against United [Air Lines] last month [August 2001] on behalf of employees. Its lead plaintiff is a flight attendant who says she developed a head-to-toe rash on a May 23 [2001] flight. "I thought I had the German measles," says the flight attendant, Susan 'Sam' Matthews. "It scared the hell out of me." United Airlines had no comment on that lawsuit, either.

California's Department of Health Services is investigating about 100 cases of suspected pesticide illness from United [Air Line] planes. Preliminary findings are expected by Dec. 31. [2001.] "We've known for a long time there are potential hazards from these aerosols," says James Cone, chief of the occupational health branch.

The State Department urged officials of India earlier this year to end the required spraying of airplanes when passengers and crew are aboard. "Spraying when passengers and crew are present should only be done when absolutely essential," says Deputy Assistant Secretary of State John Byerly.

The US halted mandated spraying of planes with passengers aboard in 1979. United [Air Lines] says India will allow it to spray planes when they are empty when United [Air Lines] begins non-stops from Chicago to New Delhi on Oct. 27. [2001.] The issue has echoed in Congress. Thirty congressmen and 11 senators signed letters sent to the Departments of

State and Transportation this summer demanding to know what's being done to protect passengers and air crews.

A Canadian flight attendants union says it has received 15 to 20 reports from cabin crew about symptoms of pesticide exposure in the past year on Air Canada flights to Sydney and has written the airline about it. Air Canada spokesman John Reber says, "We are aware of a limited number of flight attendants who have raised this specific concern. It would be incorrect to describe it as widespread or representative of general concern." The Flight Attendants Association of Australia says it's starting to make inquiries to its major airline, Qantas, about the safety of spraying. Qantas officials say they haven't had any complaints. "This is not just a U.S. problem," says Shane Enright, head of the civil aviation division of the London-based International Transport Workers Federation. "I am aware of cases in Europe and Australia of crews that have been affected." Two spraying methods Aircraft insecticides are applied either from aerosol cans with passengers aboard or, in the case of Australia, New Zealand and some other countries, through 'residual' spraying. In that method, workers in protective gear blanket a solution in an empty aircraft cabin that dries and leaves a residue that lasts up to 56 days.

Up to 2% of all passengers on planes treated or sprayed with pesticides may experience irritation, said Gary Kohn, a United Airlines medical director, in an internal memo last September [2000]. They will experience "bothersome conditions," though they are "not dangerous in the long term," he said. Fliers may not realize the cabin was sprayed or smell insecticide. "A lot of what we call jet lag may actually be pesticide poisoning," says toxicologist Gary Ordog in Santa Clarita, Calif., who

estimates he has treated more than 30 United [Air Lines] employees as well as flight attendants from Alaska and Northwest airlines for illnesses related to pesticides.

Planes that have been treated may carry passengers who did not visit the countries where spraying is required. United [Air Lines] has all 44 of its Boeing 747-400s treated with residual pesticides in Sydney. It then uses them on other flights around the globe. Nardella says the residue poses no danger to passengers. Every plane airs out at least an hour before boarding, she says. Workers make sure that every plane is dry and odor-free before it flies.

Flight attendants who work the Australia-West Coast routes say airplanes' interiors sometimes are still wet from spraying. United [Air Lines] daily Flight 816 from Sydney to Los Angeles accounted for a third of the complaints in the past year, the flight attendants union says.

In August 2000, 13 flight attendants on Flight 816 breathed from oxygen bottles and sought medical treatment after landing in Los Angeles, says Judith Murawski of the Association of Flight Attendants. On another day on the same flight, flight attendants served passengers while wearing oxygen masks and the pilots stuffed a blanket under the cockpit door to keep out the odor.

After years of exposure to pesticides, some flight attendants say their minor symptoms became serious, and eventually career-ending. Flight attendant Diana Brown-Dodson, 37, became unable to work 5 years ago. She spoke to *USA Today* on the condition that her airline not be named. She estimates that she was exposed to pesticides about 150 times over 6 years of international flights. Now, she says six doctors independently have diagnosed exposure to pesticides as a cause. She stays home in

Huntington Beach, Calif., tethered to an oxygen tank most of the day to help her breathe. She also has lost short-term memory and concentration; “couldn’t make the cake off a cake box,” she says. One of her doctors, Man Brautbar in Los Angeles, says Brown-Dodson has a blood-cell disease and below-normal oxygen retention consistent with pesticide and second-hand smoke exposure. Brautbar, who treated patients in the poisoning case featured in the film *Erin Brockovich*, says he’s treated 15 to 20 other United [Air Line] flight attendants for the same conditions.

Another flight attendant says the memory loss, tremors, nosebleeds and other symptoms landed her on disability after 20 years of flying in the Pacific. Gracie Lerno, 62, of Simi Valley, Calif., says the first time she encountered the pesticides in 1979 she thought, “Oh my God. I’m being gassed.” She estimated she was exposed to pesticides 840 times over her career. Like Brown-Dodson, she did not want the airline she works for identified. The insecticides that both women believe are the root of their troubles are as common as a can of Raid. They contain permethrin or phenothrin, synthetic versions of a natural insecticide found in chrysanthemums.

Permethrin is classed by the Environmental Protection Agency as a “moderately to practically non-toxic pesticide” with the potential to cause eye or skin irritation. Products containing it must carry warning labels, even though it didn’t appear to cause any long-term damage in animal tests, the EPA says. But, toxicologist Ordog says, comparing aircraft spraying to household use is like asking how many people would lock themselves in a closed pesticide-sprayed room for half a day. “The

airplane is like an enclosed canister with the air being recycled,” he says. “Anything that’s sprayed in there, stays in there.”

The World Health Organization has long held that the pesticides are safe for aircraft use when the active ingredient in an aerosol makes up no more than 2% of its ingredients. A study released last year [2000] by the British House of Lords found no danger in cabin spraying. Concentrations of the active ingredients sprayed in the cabin are so minuscule that they won’t harm crew or passengers, says Claus Crudt-Christensen, chief of medicine for the International Civil Aviation Organization in Montreal, which helps regulators around the world develop air policies and standards. Crudt-Christensen points out, too, that the complaints have been limited mostly to the USA and Canada. Spokeswomen for Air New Zealand and British Airways report few, if any, complaints about the spraying. The Australians and New Zealanders say spraying has kept their countries free of malaria and other deadly diseases.

“If they were able to prove a direct link between aircraft spraying and a medical condition, there would be a need for the governments and the World Health Organization to reassess; but until such a time that indication of evidence is brought forward, we have the responsibility to protect Australia and its citizens from exotic diseases,” says Carson Creagh, spokesman for the Australia Quarantine and Inspection Service. When airline passengers find out they are going to be present for spraying, they can become rebellious.

About 30 passengers shouted and rushed toward the door of United [Air Lines] Flight 815 arriving in Sydney last November [2000] when an agricultural official informed them that they had to stay on board during

aerosol spraying, according to a witness that *USA Today* interviewed. At least 15 people got off, but the Australian officials told the rest to return to their seats for the procedure. Instead, some passengers sat on the floor close to the exit.

The Dorazios, who live in Camarillo, Calif., say there was no detectable odor when they boarded their United [Air Lines] plane in Sydney in August 2000. But Richard Dorazio, 62, chief of surgery at Kaiser Permanente Medical Centre, says he caught a strong whiff when a flight attendant opened a compartment near where they were seated. Sharon Dorazio, 61, a real estate agent, says her symptoms didn't fully clear up for 3 weeks. Besides damages, the Dorazio's lawsuit asks the court to issue an order banning aircraft treated with residual pesticides from flying routes other than to countries that require the spraying. It also would require airlines to warn passengers about the presence of pesticide residue before they buy their tickets. "People need to be warned. People need to be warned about this," says the Dorazios' attorney, Perry Sanders Jr. of Lake Charles, La. "They need to be able to make a decision whether they want to fly under these circumstances."

Sanders has set up a Website ² for passengers affected by spraying. Giving warnings to passengers isn't a new idea. In 1995, the Department of Transportation proposed a rule that would have required airlines to tell passengers when they were going to be on a flight on which spraying would be required. But officials decided not to follow through because of the progress they made persuading 20 countries to drop their spraying requirements from 1994 through 1998.

² <https://web.archive.org/web/20011031120523/http://www.pesticideplanes.com/>


The lawsuits against United [Air Lines] aren't the first to challenge spraying on aircraft. Houston attorney Linda Laurent still has an active lawsuit against five makers of aerosol insecticides that use permethrin. The lawsuit was filed in 1996 on behalf of Continental Airlines flight attendants. Continental is not a defendant. Airlines say they try to make the required spraying as unobtrusive as possible. United [Air Lines] told its Los Angeles-based flight attendants in a memo last November [2000] that it had changed the method of residual treatment from a drenching to a fogging sprayer. It also was applying a new solution with an odour absorber that has "a more pleasant smell, similar to a freshly shampooed carpet." The memo closes by imploring, "We ask that you remain professional and to demonstrate your leadership by keeping any personal concerns out of earshot of our customers."

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Appendix B

FBI bin Ladens' Flight Charts

Lexington, Kentucky Flights



Providence Flight

Sheik al-Ibrahim




Sheik al-Ibrahim arrives in the US	
<i>A</i>	Sheik al-Ibrahim arrives in the US with the intention of going to school. He arrives with 18 pieces of oversize luggage. He and his companions travel throughout New England from 4 September to 11 September visiting schools.
265A-NY280350-LA serial 4757	
9/4/01	

Sheikh al-Ibrahim departs Providence	
<i>A</i>	Sheik Mashour al-Ibrahim's party departs Providence, RI to Paris, France on a chartered jet. The Sheik's father had instructed him to return to Saudi Arabia. All passengers were interviewed by FBI and INS agents. During the interviews, USCS and Rhode Island State Police searched the group's luggage with negative results.
265A-NY-280350-LA serial 4757	
9/14/01	


Sheik Mashour al-Ibrahim Abdoullah al-Shwran Aly Haffan Soliman Younes ben Brahim Jaballah

Las Vegas Flights

Saudi Royal Family Members in Las Vegas



The "Binladen Family Flight": Ryan Air Flight #441



Appendix C

Washington Spectator Article, February 15, 2005.

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TRIMMING THE BUSHES

Family Business at the Watergate

By Margie Burns | February 15, 2005 (page 1/3)

Not many, if any, news reports have focused on the unpublicized connections of this Bush administration's family members with politically—and financially—sensitive operations. Business Week recently noted that "dads and sons and other relatives reign so widely in this administration that there have never been so many family combos in an administration at the same time." And the British Economist has said that "George Bush's Washington is a study in family influence." End of storyfew details.

But there are a small number of journalists with enough patience, energetic curiosity and research ability to dig for some of those untold details. One of them is our occasional contributor Margie Burns, a scholarly investigator with a Ph.D. who teaches English literature at the University of Maryland in Baltimore when she is not probing Internet sources for her next article.

She has written for us on White House connections with Halliburton (September 15, 2003); the Bush family's profiteering in Iraq (February 1, 2004); and the right-wing Washington "neocons" who promoted the U.S. invasion of Iraq (May 1, 2004).

For more than 20 years the Bush family has had extensive business ties to Middle East geopolitics. Among other connections, during the 1990s certain suites at the Watergate office building in Washington, rented by the embassies of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, were also home to a Bush-linked private investment firm.

The investment company, called the Kuwait-American Corporation (KuWAm), backed and largely controlled a security company named Stratesec and an aircraft company named Aviation General. Both Stratesec and Aviation General convened their annual shareholders' meetings from 1999 through 2001 in Suite 900 at the Watergate, then rented by the Saudi embassy.

Marvin P. Bush, the youngest brother of George W. Bush and a director of Stratesec, was reelected annually to his directorship there, near the Saudi Arabian Airlines offices. In 2002, the companies moved their shareholders meetings to the Watergate's Suite 500, held by the Kuwaiti embassy.

Aviation General was founded in the early 1980s as Commander Aircraft. It manufactured and sold private planes to international clients. Stratesec was founded as Securacom (formerly the engineering firm Burns and Roe Securacom). It was reinvented shortly after the first Gulf War, and thereafter marketed large security contracts to big clients, including the World Trade Center, Washington's Reagan National Airport and Dulles International Airport, various municipalities and airlines.

Stratesec and Aviation General shared top executives, including Wirt D. Walker III, a distant relative "in the Walker branch of the Bush family," according to a former colleague, and Mishal Yousef Saud Al Sabah of the Kuwaiti ruling family. Walker and Al Sabah also headed KuWAm, the backer of Stratesec and Aviation General.

TIGHT LINKS—The boards and shareholders of the three companies—the investment firm KuWAm, the security company Stratesec, and the aircraft company Aviation General—were tightly connected. Walker, a director at all three companies, was at various times CEO and chairman of the board at Stratesec while at the same time managing director at KuWAm, including when Stratesec hired KuWAm for corporate secretarial services at \$2,500 a month. Stratesec, which was de-listed on the American Stock Exchange in the fall of 2002 and went bankrupt, also paid Walker \$130,500 annually for consulting, according to its quarterly filings. Both Stratesec and Aviation General are bankrupt now, and KuWAm has relocated its headquarters from the Watergate to Walker's home in McLean, Virginia, a Washington suburb.

Mishal Al Sabah, son of the former Emir of Kuwait and ex-son-in-law of the current Emir, also served on the boards of both KuWAm and Stratesec and sometimes as chairman of KuWAm. Walker and Al Sabah were major shareholders in both companies. According to interviews Walker has given, their close relationship began when Al Sabah came to America at age 15. When Al Sabah turned 21, he invested in Walker's companies, including KuWAm, where another Al Sabah relative also served on the board.

Family Business at the Watergate

By Margie Burns | February 15, 2005 (page 2/3)

Investors in the bankrupt Stratesec are now suing the company's partners, including Walker and Al Sabah, in federal court in Washington. Al Sabah, under contempt-of-court charges, faces arrest if he returns to this country, according to an individual close to the case. He is thought to be in Kuwait, but recently traveled to the United Arab Emirates to conduct the sale of an airplane by Commander Aircraft, now a subsidiary of Aviation General, Walker's other company.

KuwAm was by far the biggest long-term backer for both Stratesec and Aviation General, acting much like a swinging door for Kuwaiti money to pass through. In 1996, KuwAm owned 90 percent of Securacom, directly or through partnerships with names like "Special Situations Investment Holdings" and "Fifth Floor Company for General Trading and Contracting." KuwAm owned 31 percent of Securacom in 1998 and 47 percent of Stratesec in 1999.

Marvin Bush was reelected to the Stratesec board of directors annually from 1993 through 1999. His last reelection was on May 25, 1999, for July 1999 to June 2000.

The company described itself this way: "Stratesec, Incorporated, is a fully integrated single source security systems company. The company provides consulting and planning, engineering and design, systems integration, and maintenance and technical support services to commercial and government clients worldwide. Stratesec has completed security projects for airports, corporations, utilities, prisons, universities, and federal, state and local governments."

When Securacom went public on September 11, 1997, its prospectus for the Initial Public Offering prominently featured photographs of its clients the World Trade Center and Dulles airport, with a client list that included United Airlines and Los Alamos National Laboratories.

While on the board, Marvin Bush served on the company's Audit Committee and Compensation Committee. He acquired 53,000 shares of stock in the company at 52 cents a share, partly through his private company, Andrews-Bush, located in northern Virginia. Shares in the 1997 initial offering sold at \$8.50.

Company stock became worthless after the company's de-listing. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings ceased showing Marvin Bush as a shareholder after 2000, but there are no filings indicating when his stock was sold. Bush, whose investment firm still backs other contractors at the Dulles and Reagan airports, has not responded to requests for comment.

One of Stratesec's biggest security contracts was with the Metropolitan Washington Airport Authority, to provide electronic security for Dulles and Reagan airports. The company got its first preventive-maintenance contract with Dulles airport in 1995 and received about \$6.3 million in revenue from the Dulles project between 1995 and 1998.

Stratesec did not handle passenger screening at Dulles, where one of the 9/11 jets was hijacked. According to Dave Swennes, a contracting official for the Metropolitan Washington Airport Authority, its three-year contract was for maintenance of security systems. The company maintained the airfield access system, the closed circuit television system and electronic badging.

Given the security sensitivities of Dulles airport, there are ironies in having some of its electronic security handled by a company with Middle East ties. After completing its three-year contract with Dulles, the company bid on a new contract but lost out in spite of being the lowest bidder.

TIES TO THE TWIN TOWERS—Securacom, beginning with its previous incarnation, Stratesec, unlike many other security firms, did not separate security consulting from providing security services. As a single-source provider of end-to-end security services, it offered everything from a diagnosis of existing systems, to hiring subcontractors, and to installing video and electronic equipment. It also offered armored vehicles and security guards.

The company emphasized continuing relationships with a few big long-term clients, including the World Trade Center, home to the Twin Towers. According to SEC filings, the World Trade Center and the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority, were two of the company's three biggest clients in 1996 and 1997.

After the first attack on the World Trade Center, in 1993, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey began a multimillion-dollar, multiyear revamping of security in and around the Twin

Towers. As Burns and Roe Securacom, the company had previously done security studies on the World Trade Center. Securacom was hired along with many other contractors for the upgrade and was praised in security industry publications, although the board membership of former President Bush's son Marvin went unnoticed.

NO COMMENT—Marvin Bush had joined Securacom's board of directors in 1993, part of a new management team hired when Securacom separated from Burns and Roe, and he remained on the board through 1999.

The White House has not responded to repeated questions and requests for comment about Marvin Bush's relationship with Securacom. (Wirt Walker and other former management figures were interviewed by phone.)

Family Business at the Watergate

By Margie Burns | February 15, 2005 (page 3/3)

Securacom got the \$8.3 million World Trade Center security contract in October 1996 and received about \$9.2 million from the WTC job from 1996 (a quarter of its revenues that year) to 1998. But in 1998, the company was "excused from the project" because it could not fulfill the work, according to former manager Al Weinstein, and the electronic security work at the WTC was taken over by EJ Electric, a larger contractor.

Aviation General boasted of its international clientele. A 1996 press release announced its sale of airplanes to the National Civil Aviation Training Organization (NCATO) of Giza, Egypt, "the sole civilian pilot training organization in Egypt." The announcement mentioned "Sheik Mishal Yousef Saud Al Sabah" as "Chairman of KuwAm Corporation and board member of Commander Aircraft Company." NCATO also had contractual partnerships with several U.S. flight schools, including Embry-Riddle University in Florida. Embry-Riddle has not responded to questions about the partnership.

Aviation General was de-listed on the Nasdaq exchange in October 2002 after filing for bankruptcy protection.

Although, Stratesec and Aviation General were both troubled companies, with blatant managerial problems including litigation, tax arrears, and trouble paying vendors, both companies received substantial funding throughout the 1990s. On top of the massive capital infusion from the Kuwaitis, millions were generated through its Initial Public Offering statement in 1997, and revenues from large contracts. Stratesec also obtained capital from numerous investors. Why was that, if the companies were so troubled?

Former managers speculate that the Bush connection was helpful. A partial list of companies investing in Stratesec while Marvin Bush was on the board of directors includes several well-known investment management companies, including Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Munder, Fidelity, Putnam, and John Hancock.

According to Jeff Gallup, a former Stratesec manager who left the company for a position at Landtek, Inc., Stratesec installed the initial security-description plan—the layout of the electronic security system—at the World Trade Center. Gallup knows the WTC site well, since Landtek, like EJ Electric, was a prime contractor at the trade center. He was "intimately involved" with WTC security, he said in a phone interview last year, up to September 12, 2001, when "the F.B.I. left my office with all the contents of the WTC visitors database," by then three-quarters of a million visitors' badges. It is regrettable that the F.B.I. has not been equipped with an adequate computer system to analyze this information.

ENLARGING MARVIN—Among his other business interests, Marvin Bush also served on the board of directors of HCC Insurance (formerly Houston Casualty Company), one of the main insurance carriers for the World Trade Center. Thus Bush, paradoxically, was connected to two companies with a significant interest in security at the trade center. In spring 1999, Bush was simultaneously a nominee for the boards of both Stratesec and HCC Insurance.

Bush's directorship at Stratesec was not included on the proxy statement for HCC that year, and his connections with HCC were not included on the proxy statement for Stratesec. SEC regulations require directors and officers of public companies to list their other directorships and business connections. In addition to Bush's violations of the SEC regulations in these instances, his directorship at Fresh Del Monte, where he and a longtime friend who brought him into HCC were also on the Audit and Compensation committees, was also omitted in the Stratesec proxy filing.

Bush's HCC proxy information did disclose his positions at his own firm, Andrews-Bush, and at Fresh Del Monte, but in addition to not disclosing his Stratesec connection, he omitted yet another association, with Kerrco, an oil company in Houston.

Bush left Stratesec after 1999 but currently remains an adviser to HCC Insurance. HCC lost \$29 million at 9/11, largely from World Trade Center property losses, medical payouts in New York City, and workers' compensation reinsurance losses.

The chairman and CEO of HCC Insurance, Stephen Way, brought Bush onto the boards of both HCC and Del Monte. L. Byron Way, HCC vice president, explained in a telephone interview that HCC "handled easily maybe a dozen or so coverages for the World Trade Center," mainly

property and workers' compensation, going back through the 1990s. Way could not say when HCC became a carrier for the center or how much its WTC exposure totaled. "With stakes that big, premiums can vary," he said, adding that property coverage was handled through the London office. The company has not responded to questions about Bush's proxy statements.

The security industry is an extraordinary combination of hush-hush secrecy and wild openness. When you hire a security contractor, one specialist said, "What's on your computer is on their computer." This is particularly a concern when the contractor services both government and private clients, or both domestic and foreign customers, as Marvin Bush's companies did. Why has the White House been so silent on this concern, particularly when enormous federal contracts have been involved?

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Appendix D

Press Release

Port Authority of New York and New Jersey Press Release

Number: 101-2001 (July 24, 2001)



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Press Release

GOVERNOR PATAKI, ACTING GOVERNOR DiFRANCESCO LAUD HISTORIC PORT AUTHORITY AGREEMENT TO PRIVATIZE WORLD TRADE CENTER

Date: July 24, 2001

Press Release Number: 101-2001

New York Governor George E. Pataki and New Jersey Acting Governor Donald T. DiFrancesco today hailed the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey's decision to privatize the management and operation of the World Trade Center, a world-renowned icon that for three decades has been New York City's most famous landmark.

Silverstein Properties, Inc., and Westfield America, Inc. will lease the Twin Towers and other portions of the complex in a deal worth approximately \$3.2 billion – the city's richest real estate deal ever and one of the largest privatization initiatives in history.

"From my first days in office, I have pushed hard to privatize the management and operation of the World Trade Center because I believe that government is at its best when it focuses on its core mission. Today, as we make history, we can say: Mission accomplished," Governor Pataki said. "By sharpening the agency's focus on our airports, seaports, bridges and tunnels, the Port Authority can improve services to all its customers and become a stronger economic engine for the entire region, helping the private sector create good jobs and opportunities for our citizens."

Acting Governor DiFrancesco said, "This lease is a victory for the people of our region who depend on the Port Authority to keep transportation strong and trade moving through the metropolitan area. We can all be proud of the Port Authority's role in building the World Trade Center and making it such a success. But now the Port Authority will be able to focus on its primary mission of economic development, and concentrate on such projects as extending the Newark Airport monorail to the Northeast Corridor rail line, purchasing new PATH cars and improving the maritime ports and bridges and tunnels. Now is the right time to privatize and make this region an even stronger center for commerce, transportation and trade." While the Port Authority's 99-year net lease with Silverstein Properties, Inc., and Westfield America, Inc. is worth approximately \$3.2 billion to the Port Authority on a present-value basis, the complex's value to the economy of the region is incalculable. As the site of 40,000 jobs and a stopping point for 150,000 daily visitors, the World Trade Center has an economic and emotional impact that is felt far beyond the complex's 16 acres.

Port Authority Chairman Lewis M. Eisenberg said, "No private developer would have built the World Trade Center when it was proposed nearly four decades ago. It was

simply too vast and risky an undertaking, and even the Port Authority with all its resources faced great opposition. But the agency persevered and constructed a first-class complex, which succeeded in revitalizing Manhattan's downtown real estate market.

"Today marks a new chapter in the World Trade Center's vibrant life, one in which it gains the benefits of private expertise and capital while continuing the public purposes for which it was built. We fully expect that, with this new lease, the World Trade Center will continue to be the most desirable commercial property in New York." Port Authority Vice Chairman Charles A. Gargano said, "The World Trade Center and its Twin Towers are among the handful of instantly recognizable structures on the entire planet, like the Pyramids at Giza or the Great Wall of China. And now this property will be notable not only for its appearance, but also for this unique public-private partnership that has been struck between the Port Authority, Silverstein Properties and Westfield America."

Port Authority Executive Director Neil D. Levin said, "As the Port Authority enters into this historic agreement, it is important to note that the agency will continue to play a significant role in the management of the World Trade Center. For instance, the agency will retain its oversight of the complex's building, fire, environmental and health codes and the integrity of its physical plant. We will continue to protect this outstanding public asset so that it can continue to flourish.

"Under the Port Authority's leadership, the World Trade Center reached near-capacity occupancy rates even as asking rents doubled over the last five years. Meanwhile, dozens of new shops thrived in the complex's transformed retail space – one of the most successful malls in the country. The Port Authority looks forward to sharing in the successes of the Silverstein and Westfield companies as they build upon these accomplishments."

New York State Research Council on Privatization Chairman Ronald S. Lauder said, "By moving the World Trade Center off the state inventory and into the free market, off the State inventory and into the free market, Governor Pataki is once again putting taxpayers first. Across his time in office, Governor Pataki has consistently used the power of private enterprise to deliver better services for taxpayers faster and at a lower price. Today's success is the latest and the highest profile example of Governor Pataki's focusing government on what it should be doing and avoiding areas it has no business meddling in, and avoiding areas it has no business meddling in. And today, with this multi-billion dollar deal done, hard-working New York taxpayers have 3.2 billion reasons to appreciate Governor Pataki's leadership."

Larry Silverstein, Chief Executive Officer of Silverstein Properties, Inc. said, "I am proud to assume the stewardship of the World Trade Center, one of New York's greatest jewels. We are committed to maintaining the World Trade Center's high standards and building on the fine record established by the Port Authority in operating the property as a first-class office and retail complex." in operating the property as a first-class office and retail complex."

Peter S. Lowy, Chief Executive Officer of Westfield America, Inc. said, "Under the Port Authority's direction, the retail space at the World Trade Center has undergone a renaissance and is now one of the most sought-after retail locations anywhere. Westfield America intends to capitalize on this great opportunity to make the World Trade Center an even more popular destination for employees, residents, shoppers and tourists."

Today's agreement covers One and Two World Center (the Twin Towers), Four and Five World Trade Center (two nine-story office buildings), and approximately 425,000 square feet of retail space. JP Morgan/Chase, Cushman & Wakefield and Milstein

Realty Advisors acted as advisors to the Port Authority.

Three World Trade Center (the WTC Marriott Hotel), Six World Trade Center (the U.S. Customshouse) and Seven World Trade Center (a 47-story office building) are already under long-term leases.

The World Trade Center welcomed its first tenant in December 1970. More than 430 companies from 28 countries lease space in the complex. They are engaged in a wide variety of commercial activities, including banking and finance, insurance, transportation, import, export, freight forwarding, customs brokerage, trade associations and representatives of foreign governments.

end

Appendix E

Errors in the 9/11 Commission Report

9/11 CR-Page 18: We have some planes, American Airlines Flight 11-FAA Awareness: “At 8:21, American 11 turned off its transponder, immediately degrading the information available about the aircraft.” [Peter Zalewski INTERVIEW: Sept. 22, 2003.]

The Error

At 08:20 a.m., Boston ATC Pete Zalewski (radar sector 46) sees transponder “shut off.” [\[NBC News - September 9, 2006.\]](#)

9/11 CR-Page 19: We have some planes, American Airlines Flight 11-FAA Awareness: “At 8:24:38, the following transmission came from American 11: *We have some planes. Just stay quiet, and you’ll be okay. We are returning to the airport.* The controller only heard something unintelligible; he did not hear the specific words ‘we have some planes.’”

9/11 CR-Page 10: We have some planes, American Airlines Flight 11-FAA Awareness: “Boston Center realized that a message transmitted just before 8:25 by the hijacker pilot of American 11 included the phrase, ‘We have some planes.’”

The Errors

All radio transmissions heard at Boston Central came from an “unknown origin” due to American 11’s transponder which was turned off. ATCs had no information on the flight’s number, company, altitude, and flight plan to distinguish the transmissions were coming from that particular aircraft.

ATC Zalewski had put the transmission to air for other colleagues, which was seen as a negative act. Regardless, he and his colleagues heard the statement, “we have some planes”.

9/11 CR-Page 19: We have some planes, American Airlines Flight 11-FAA Awareness: “The next transmission came seconds later: **American 11:** *Nobody move. Everything will be okay. If you try to make any moves, you’ll endanger yourself and the airplane. Just stay quiet.*”

The Error

The above transmission came through at 08:24:57 a.m., according to the FAA Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events Report of September 17, 2001, and released under a FOIA act in 2005. The original voice tapes were uploaded on Rutgers Law Review giving the identical time of transmission.

9/11 CR-Page 19: We have some planes, American Airlines Flight 11-FAA Awareness: “At 8:34, the Boston Center controller received a third transmission from American 11: **American 11:** *Nobody move please. We are going back to the airport. Don’t try to make any stupid moves.*”

The Error

The FAA Accident Report of November 13, 2001, places this transmission at 08:33 a.m. The FAA Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events Report of September 17, 2001, and released under a FOIA act in 2005, including the original voice tapes uploaded on Rutgers Law Review, coincide the transmission was heard at 08:33:59 a.m.

9/11 CR-Page 11: Several FAA air traffic control officials told us it was the air carriers' responsibility to notify their planes of security problems. One senior FAA air traffic control manager said that it was simply not the FAA's place to order the airlines what to tell their pilots.

[Footnote 68: "Ellen King interview (Apr. 5, 2004). FAA air traffic control tapes indicate that at 9:19 the FAA Air Traffic Control System Command Center in Herndon ordered controllers to send a cockpit warning to Delta 1989 because, like American 11 and United 175, it was a transcontinental flight departing Boston's Logan Airport."]

We believe such statements do not reflect an adequate appreciation of the FAA's responsibility for the safety and security of civil aviation. The airlines bore responsibility, too. They were facing an escalating number of conflicting and, for the most part, erroneous reports about other flights, as well as a continuing lack of vital information from the FAA about the hijacked flights. We found no evidence, however, that American Airlines sent any cockpit warnings to its aircraft on 9/11. United's first decisive action to notify its airborne aircraft to take defensive action did not come until 9:19, when a United flight dispatcher, Ed Ballinger, took the initiative to begin transmitting warnings to his 16

transcontinental flights: *Beware any cockpit intrusion—Two a/c [aircraft] hit World Trade Center*. One of the flights that received the warning was United 93. Because Ballinger was still responsible for his other flights as well as Flight 175, his warning message was not transmitted to Flight 93 until 9:23.69. ¹

[Footnote 69: “For American Airlines’ response, see AAL briefing (Apr. 26, 2004). For Ballinger’s warnings, see Ed Ballinger interview (Apr. 14, 2004). A companywide order for dispatchers to warn cockpits was not issued until 9:21. See UAL report, “Timeline: Dispatch/SMFDO Activities—Terrorist Crisis,” undated. While one of Ballinger’s colleagues assisted him, Ballinger remained responsible for multiple flights. See Ed Ballinger interview (Apr. 14, 2004). American Airlines’ policy called for the flight dispatcher to manage only the hijacked flight, relieving him of responsibilities for all other flights. On American Airlines’ policy, see Craig Marquis, Craig Parfitt, Joe Bertapelle, and Mike Mulcahy interview (Nov. 19, 2003). United Airlines had no such isolation policy. UAL System Operations Control briefing (Nov. 20, 2003).]

The Error

On August 9, 2004, Condon & Forsyth LLP, official attorneys to American Airlines, forwarded a letter to Mr. John Raidt c/o the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, describing an inaccurate statement made in the 9/11 Commission Report on page 11: “The ‘9/11 Commission Report’ states that it ‘...found no evidence...that American Airlines sent any cockpit warnings to its aircraft on 9/11.’”

¹ At 09:27 a.m. United 93 acknowledged its final transmission from the Cleveland Centre Controller.

Condon & Forsyth then wrote: “This statement is not accurate. After American learned that multiple aircraft had been hijacked, American’s SOC dispatchers sent numerous warnings to the flight crews.”

“HAVE NO DETAILS. 2 ACFT – PSBL AMERICAN AIRLINES – HAVE HIT THE WORLD TRADE CENTER. THAT IS ALL WE HAVE HERE.” FD15 – RON PENCEK “PLZ ACK MSG.”

09:34 a.m. (Eastern) SOC dispatcher Ron Pencek
ACARS message to American Air Line Flight 41
Condon & Forsyth LLP, August 9, 2004

“TO ALL CAPTAINS AND CREW. SECURITY MUST BE AT TOP OF THE LIST. ALL NEW YORK AIR SPACE IS CLOSED. AAL AIRCRAFT HAVE BE HI-JACKED THIS MORNING AND MAY HAVE BEEN FORCED DOWN. WE HAVE UNCONFIRMED REPORTS THAT UAL IS HAVING THE SAME PROBLEM. WE ARE STOPPING ALL TRAFFIC TO THE NEW YORK AREA. CNN SAYS THEY HAVE REPORTS FROM AIR CANADA ALSO HAS A PROBLEM. 2 ACFT HAVE BEEN FLOWN INTO THE WORLD TRADE CENTER . . . PLEASE ALL OF YOU BE ON HI ALERT . . . KEEP US POSTED ON YOUR SITUATION . . . AND GOD BLESS YOU. THERE IS WORD THAT THE ENTIRE ATC SYSTEM MAY BE SHUT DOWN.”

09:36 a.m. (Eastern) SOC dispatcher Mick Hovsepian
ACARS message to American Air Line Flight 541
Condon & Forsyth LLP, August 9, 2004

Commission Staff Request No. 1 dated July 18, 2003: Request-All documents possessed by the company, including e-mails, memos, recordings, records, radar tracks and transcripts, with respect to the 9/11 hijacked flights.


The Error

On August 19, 2003, Condon & Forsyth LLP, official attorneys to American Air Lines, forwarded a letter to Mr. C.S. Brinkley c/o the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United State, describing an inaccurate description made in their request:-

Commission Clarification: The word “hijacked” was not intended to be part of this request and should be deleted. This request seeks communications American had on September 11, 2001, with any of its other flights, GSCs or other American personnel regarding the actual hijacked flights or any other “suspected” hijacked flights and what was done as a consequence, including what information was provided to passengers on other American flights.

Appendix F

Charts of Accident Aircraft

DATE/AIRCRAFT	CRASH AREA	WAR-GAME/DRILL/EXERCISE	Note
 <p>Fair use of image Public Domain</p> <p>1996: July 17 TWA 800</p> <p><u>230 souls onboard</u> (TWA Manifest)</p>	<p>Atlantic Ocean East Moriches New York</p>	<p>1. Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) Several AEGIS class Navy cruisers, including the USS Normandy, several small recovery-type crafts and two Lockheed-Martin P3C-Orion radar patrol air crafts involved in the training exercise.</p> <p>Chris Fidis, computer programmer of West Hempstead “discovered the Navy had been testing electromagnetic field technology in its Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) radar (microwave) system, which violates a 25-year-old anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty between the U.S. and Russia (the former Soviet Union).” ¹</p> <p>October 1, 1997 Report to the Congress: Summary of the Cruise Missile Defense (CMD) program’s Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) ²</p> <p>Since early-1996, following the Defense Department’s BMD Program Review, BMDO has been executing a TMD program plan which includes:</p> <p>–Improving the capability of lower-tier systems, including both land-and sea-based defenses to protect critical assets and U.S. and friendly forces in inland and littoral (coastal) areas.</p>	<p>Mossad Officer: “The threat of sabotage or a hijacking against an American plane was analyzed and considered serious enough for us to pass on to the Americans. It was then up to the Americans to assess the dangers and decide whether to pass it on to their airlines.”</p> <p>The London Times July 23, 1996 </p> <p>Weather Condition</p> <p>Hurricane Bertha</p> <p>–Peak intensity –Formed: July 5, 1996 –Dissipated: July 14, 1996</p> <p>Notable passenger victims</p> <p>Charles Beatty Senior systems engineer with the Naval Surface Warfare Center in Dahlgren, Va.; of Spotsylvania, Va.</p> <p><u>The Dahlgren Division</u> A Navy Research & Development Center located 50 miles east of</p>

¹ TWA FLIGHT 800: Exploded on July 17th 1996. “Was The Bogie A Drone? Documents Show Navy Tested Microwave Technology On Commercial Airlines.” By Joey Mac Lellan July 21, 1999. Accessed 2010.

<http://pegabytes.syntelsys.com/Flight800.htm>

² <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA338606>

–Proceeding to add, albeit at a slower pace than previously envisioned, upper-tier (wide area) defenses and defenses against longer-range theater missiles, including Boost Phase Intercept (BPI) systems with the Air Force’s Airborne Laser (ABL) Program as the primary BPI solution, as that threat emerges.

–Continuing the development of upgraded Battle Management/Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (BM/C4I) to improve early warning and dissemination, communications interoperability, and command and control centers for the “family” of TMD systems.

These added capabilities also provide improved lethality and probability of kill through the use of interceptors which employ advanced concepts such as directed energy hit-to-kill or improved guidance techniques combined with fragmentation warheads.

2. Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)

–April 21, 1995 - Successful exercise
–July 31, 1995 - Successful exercise
–Unknown date - Successful exercise
–December 13, 1995 - Unsuccessful exercise
–March 22, 1996 - Unsuccessful exercise
–July 15, 1996 - Unsuccessful exercise
–March 6, 1997- Unsuccessful exercise

3. Bomb Training Exercise

A training exercise was ongoing at New York’s JFK Airport, for bomb-sniffing dogs.³

Washington. The work mainly involved the development of requirements and software to support the AEGIS US Naval ships. The Weapon System computer program generates commands for the control of Standard Missiles, Harpoon missiles, 5’ guns, interceptor aircraft, ASW aircraft, and helicopters and to furnish designation data for the 20mm Phalanx and 5’ gun weapon systems. The FCS directs illumination on the target for missile homing.

Rodolphe Merieux

Son of the president of the pharmaceutical company Merieux Laboratories in Lyons, France.

Merieux Laboratories

Primary researcher in AIDS vaccines, utilizing the method of genetic engineering variations. Several people have contracted AIDS after taking their vaccines. It was reported earlier in 1996 that the company’s desire was “to test on non-consensual human subjects in the military.”

Leonard Johnson

Engineer at Fort Belvoir United States Army installation and Census-Designated place (CDP) in Fairfax County, Virginia.

Only one (1) passenger onboard was

³ Ronald W. Lewis, *Air Forces Monthly*, No. 104, November 1996.

4. Basic Engineering Casualty and Control (BECKY)

Rear Admiral Edward Kristensen, North Atlantic Fleet: "The USS Normandy was conducting basic engineering control exercises that could cause a fluctuation in the ship's electrical plant."

Purpose of BECKY is to test whether the ship can survive even if its own radars are jammed or if it has suddenly lost electrical power. Its ability to get critical information from other craft and to carry out self-protective actions on the basis of that information is often what is being tested. ⁴

Additional exercises (1996)

- Flights in the Airborne Surveillance Testbed (AST) program, a revision of the Airborne Optical Adjunct (AOA) project
- High Altitude Balloon Experiments (HABE)
- The Midcourse Space Experiment (MSX)
- AEGIS SPY-1 radar and Standard Missile (SM-2 Block IV) modifications (Navy Area Defense Program)
- HAWK and TPS-59 radar upgrades
- Miniature Sensor Technology Integration (MSTI) Satellite Development Program MSTI-3
- PATRIOT PAC-3/ERTNT system EMD flight tests
- Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptor Program Definition/Risk Reduction (PD/RR) flight tests 7-11
- Endoatmospheric Aerothermal Mechanics Flight Test Experiments (EFEX)
- Resident Space Objects Rehearsal
- Space Technology Research Vehicle 2 Mission

⁴ Prof. Elaine Scarry, "Swissair 111, TWA 800, and Electromagnetic Interference," September 21, 2000. Accessed 2004.
<http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2000/sep/21/swissair-111-twa-800-electromagnetic-interference/?pagination=false>

(STRV-2) (FY 1998)
–Stinger With Optimized Radar Distribution (SWORD) program
–Space and Missile Tracking System (SMTS) (formerly *Brilliant Eyes*) Flight Demonstration System (FDS) (FY 1995-99) and THAAD User Operational Evaluation System (UOES) System and Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) program (includes interceptor and Theater Missile Defense-Ground Based Radar (TMD-GBR))
–Cape Cod PAVE PAWS Doppler Discrimination Experiment
–National Missile Defense (NMD) Development Readiness Program Integrated Flight Tests 1-2 (Involving Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) Sensor Flight Tests)


“Compliance guidance has been provided for the Israeli Arrow interceptor development program known as the Arrow Continuation Experiments (ACES).” ⁵

5. Cooperative Osprey '96 ⁶

This prolonged NATO exercise can be found in the footnote link (6).

⁵ <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA338606>

⁶ (a) <http://osd.dtic.mil/photos/Operations/>; (b) <http://web.archive.org/web/20030805061225/http://www.act.nato.int/>; (c) <http://www.navy.mil/navydata/policy/fromsea/pos97/pos-pg03.html>

DATE/AIRCRAFT	CRASH AREA	WAR-GAME/DRILL/EXERCISE	Note
 <p>Fair use of image Public Domain</p> <p>1998: September 2 SWISSAIR 111</p> <p><u>229 souls onboard</u> (Swiss Air Manifest)</p>	<p>Atlantic Ocean St. Margaret's Bay, Nova Scotia, Canada</p>	<p>1. Natural Fire 98 “The exercise aims to develop the capacity of EAC Defense Forces to respond quickly and efficiently to complex security challenges, harmonize the working relationship among them and foster cooperation between these Forces and the United States of America.” ⁷</p> <p>2. Bright Star '98 The exercise focused on naval and amphibious warfare. It included the USS George Washington, USS John F. Kennedy Battle Groups and the Guam Amphibious Ready Group.</p> <p>3. Peace Shield/Rapid Trident ⁸ Multinational exercise with computer-assisted CPX, Brigade-level HQ with troops organized from Ukraine. An additional 232 Combined Arms Training Range, Western Operational Command, Yavoriv.</p> <p><u>Total participation: 1,050</u> 350 = Ukraine 700 = United States, Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania, Georgia, Belarus, United Kingdom, The Netherlands, Greece, Denmark, Canada,</p>	<p>Weather Condition</p> <p>Hurricane Danielle ⁹</p> <p>--Peak intensity: Category 2 --Formed: August 21, 1998 --Dissipated: September 6, 1998</p> <p>Hurricane Earl ¹⁰</p> <p>--Peak intensity: Category 2 --Formed: August 31, 1998 --Dissipated: September 3, 1998</p> <p>Notable passenger victims</p> <p>Pierce J. Gerety, Jr. UNHCR Director of Operations for the Great Lakes Region of Africa, who was on a special mission for U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan to the Democratic Republic of the Congo to attempt to negotiate a peace accord with Laurent Kabila in an erupting regional war.</p>

⁷ http://federation.eac.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=165:preparations-in-gear-for-eac-military-exercise-natural-fire-11-&catid=40:news&Itemid=147

⁸ http://www.mil.gov.ua/index.php?part=international_exercises&lang=en

⁹ <http://www.hurricaneville.com/almanac.html>

¹⁰ <http://www.hurricaneville.com/almanac.html>

Latvia, Lithuania, Germany, Poland, Russia, Turkey, and Hungary.

4. Sea Breeze

US-Ukraine (Naval) Exercise - Naval Tactical

The Exercise aims to train and increase the combat efficiency of Ukrainian Navy at the bilateral level, and NATO and PFP nations may participate.

Co-ordinate: Ukraine Western Naval Base, Odessa

Total participation: 1,700

11 nations (NATO 4); ships 9; Russian Black Sea Fleet 2.

5. Cossack Steppe

Ukraine-UK-Poland (Airmobile Units) Exercise (Tactical Airmobile)

To train Ukrainian airmobile units to participate in joint peacekeeping operations.

Co-ordinate: United Kingdom

Total participation: 350

Ukraine 100

Poland 100

United Kingdom 150

Jonathan Mann

Former head of the WHO's AIDS program, and his wife, AIDS researcher Mary Lou Clements-Mann

Per Spanne

European Synchrotron Radiation Facility (ESRF) physicist, who had been working at Brookhaven National Laboratory since 1996


Dr. Roger Williams

Top cardiovascular genetics expert and professor of internal medicine at the University of Utah.

Prof. Victor Rizza

Professor of Pharmacology, University of Catania, Italy.

Only one (1) passenger onboard was from Israel.

DATE/AIRCRAFT	CRASH AREA	WAR-GAME/DRILL/EXERCISE	Note
 <p>Fair use of image Public Domain</p> <p>1999: October 31 EGYPTAIR 990</p> <p><u>217 souls onboard</u> (Egypt Air Manifest)</p>	<p>Atlantic Ocean 100 km (62 miles) South of Nantucket Island</p>	<p>1. Peace Shield/Rapid Trident ¹¹ Multinational exercise with computer-assisted CPX, Brigade-level HQ with troops organized from Ukraine.</p> <p><u>Total participation: 1,863</u> 525 Ukraine 1,338: Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bulgaria, United Kingdom, Greece, Georgia, Denmark, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Canada, Lithuania, Latvia, Moldova, Norway, Poland, Romania, United States, Turkey, Italy, France.</p> <p>2. Sea Breeze US-Ukraine (Naval) Exercise - Naval Tactical (Naval CPX)</p> <p>The Exercise aims to train and increase the combat efficiency of Ukrainian Navy at the bilateral level, and NATO and PFP nations may participate.</p> <p><u>Co-ordinate:</u> Ukraine Western Naval Base, Odessa</p> <p><u>Total participation: 1,700</u> 9 nations (NATO 5)</p> <p>3. Cossack Steppe Ukraine-UK-Poland (Airmobile Units) Exercise (Tactical Airmobile)</p> <p>To train Ukrainian airmobile units to participate</p>	<p>Weather Condition</p> <p>Tropical Storm Katrina</p> <p>–Peak intensity: Tropical storm –Formed: October 28, 1999 –Dissipated: November 1, 1999</p> <p>Notable passenger victims</p> <p>Over 30 Egyptian military officers: –Brigadiers-Generals –Colonel –Major –Air Force Officers</p> <p>The Egyptian Government preferred not to report military personnel on the aircraft; international media have abided and have never reported who the 30 Egyptian military officers were.</p>

¹¹ http://www.mil.gov.ua/index.php?part=international_exercises&lang=en

in joint peacekeeping operations.

Co-ordinate: United Kingdom

Total participation: 350

Ukraine 100

Poland 150

United Kingdom 100

4. Foal Eagle 1999

Nearly 530,000 U.S. and South Korean troops participated in Foal Eagle 99, one of the world's largest annual military training exercises. ¹²

5. Bright Star

The exercise involved 11 nations and 70,000 personnel. An additional 33 nations sent observers to monitor the exercise: Algeria, Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Burundi, Canada, China, Congo, Greece, India, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Morocco, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Spain, Syria, Tanzania, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.

The exercise scenario involved a fictional hostile nation named "Orangeland" invading Egypt and trying to take control of the Nile River. The exercise coalition worked together, practicing fighting in the air, land, and sea domains, to defend the Nile and expel "Orangeland."

6. China-Russia military drill


The joint exercise by the key players in the region highlights the commitment of the countries for

¹² <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/foal-eagle-1999.htm>


taking steps that will increase mutual trust and understanding and will enhance mutually beneficial and broad-based co-operation in the military field.”¹³

7. Millstone Nuclear Power Station

The purpose of this drill was to assess the capability of the East Hartford, Connecticut Emergency Management Personnel to respond to a radiological incident involving the Millstone Nuclear Power Station. This drill was held in accordance with FEMA's policies and guidance concerning the exercise of State and local radiological emergency response plans (RERP) and procedures.



¹³ Rear Admiral Yang Yi, Director of the Institute for Strategic Studies of the National Defense University.
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-07/08/content_346370.htm

DATE/AIRCRAFT	CRASH AREA	WAR-GAME/DRILL/EXERCISE	Note
 <p>Fair use of image Public Domain</p> <p>2001: September 11 AA 11</p> <p><u>92 souls onboard</u> AirDisaster.com; ¹⁴ FBI; NTSB; American Airline Manifest</p> <p><u>81 souls onboard</u> Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)</p>	<p>New York WTC 1</p>	<p>1. DOT high-jacked plane cell phone calls The tabletop exercise “involved a potentially high jacked plane and someone calling on a cell phone, among other aspects of the scenario.” ¹⁵</p> <p>2. Unified Vision 2001 Designed to prepare for “global deployment into a landlocked country with hostile terrain and a lack of basing and agreements with neighbouring countries for U.S. access.” ¹⁶</p> <p>3. Office of Emergency Management (OEM) Tripod Bioterrorism The exercise took place on New York Pier 92 and was intended to test how well New York’s OEM can administer treatment in response to a biological-terrorism attack.</p> <p>4. Timely Alert II Timely Alert II was a multi-phased multi-level exercised designed by The James Thomas Group for Fort Monmouth. Its objectives were to implement and evaluate the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Incident Management Procedures; implement and evaluate the Fort Monmouth Barrier Plan for Force Protection Condition Levels Alpha</p>	<p>Weather Condition</p> <p>Hurricane Gabrielle ¹⁷</p> <p>–Peak intensity: Category 1 –Formed: September 11, 2001 –Dissipated: September 19, 2001</p> <p>Hurricane Erin ¹⁸</p> <p>–Peak intensity: Category 3 –Formed: September 1, 2001 –Dissipated: September 11, 2001</p> <p>Notable passenger victims</p> <p>Peter Gay VP of Electronic Systems on special assignment at the El Segundo, CA division office where the Global Hawk UAV remote control system is made.</p>

¹⁴ http://www.airdisaster.com/cgi-bin/view_details.cgi?date=09112001®=N334AA&airline=American+Airlines

¹⁵ Ellen Engleman, The Administrator of the Department of Transportation’s Research & Special Projects Administration (RSPA). <http://transweb.sjsu.edu/MTIportal/research/publications/documents/terrorism/Terrorism%20Symposium%202001.htm>

¹⁶ Dave Ozolek Assistant Director.

¹⁷ <http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/2001gabrielle.html>

¹⁸ <http://www.hurricaneville.com/almanac.html>

and Bravo; activate and operate the Garrison Command, Control, and Communication Center (G4C); and implement and evaluate Random Anti-Terrorism Measures (RAMs) of Force Protection Condition Levels Alpha and Bravo.

The terrorist chemical release scenario was built around a disciple of Usama Bin Laden who released a chemical agent in the Post Theater during an awards ceremony.

5. Operation RED Ex

The drill evaluated:

New York City's public health syndromic [sic] (pattern of symptoms) surveillance system

Response of high-level decision makers to data from this surveillance system

High-level communication, coordination and notification procedures

Issues that pertained to regional cooperation and response during a bio-terrorism event

6. National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

In the exercise scenario, a Learjet 35A with two pilots and four passengers takes off from Dulles Airport at 09:30; about a minute later, an explosion is heard, and the pilot complains that one of the engines is on fire and he is losing altitude. Around 09:32, the plane crashes into tower 4 at the NRO headquarters.

Kenneth Waldie

Senior Quality Control Engineer for Electronic Systems.


David Kovalcin

Senior Mechanical Engineer for Electronic Systems.

Daniel C. Lewin

Member of the Israel Defense Force Sayeret Matkal, Israel's most successful Special Operations unit and founder of Akamai computers.

Only one (1) passenger onboard was from Israel.

DATE/AIRCRAFT	CRASH AREA	WAR-GAME/DRILL/EXERCISE	Note
 <p>Fair use of image Public Domain</p> <p>2001: September 11 UA 175</p> <p><u>65 souls onboard</u> (FBI)</p> <p><u>51 souls onboard</u> (United Airlines Manifest)</p>	<p>New York WTC 2</p>	<p>1. DOT high-jacked plane cell phone calls The tabletop exercise “involved a potentially high jacked plane and someone calling on a cell phone, among other aspects of the scenario.” ¹⁹</p> <p>2. Unified Vision 2001 Designed to prepare for “global deployment into a landlocked country with hostile terrain and a lack of basing and agreements with neighbouring countries for U.S. access.” ²⁰</p> <p>3. Office of Emergency Management (OEM) Tripod Bioterrorism The exercise took place on New York Pier 92 and was intended to test how well New York’s OEM can administer treatment in response to a biological-terrorism attack.</p> <p>4. Timely Alert II Timely Alert II was a multi-phased multi-level exercised designed by The James Thomas Group for Fort Monmouth. Its objectives were to implement and evaluate the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Incident Management Procedures; implement and evaluate the Fort Monmouth Barrier Plan for Force Protection Condition Levels Alpha and Bravo; activate and operate the Garrison Command, Control, and Communication Center (G4C); and implement and evaluate Random Anti-</p>	<p>Weather Condition</p> <p>Hurricane Gabrielle ²¹</p> <p>–Peak intensity: Category 1 –Formed: September 11, 2001 –Dissipated: September 19, 2001</p> <p>Hurricane Erin ²²</p> <p>–Peak intensity: Category 3 –Formed: September 1, 2001 –Dissipated: September 11, 2001</p> <p>Notable passenger victims</p> <p>Herbert Homer Corporate Executive working with the Department of Defense.</p> <p><i>Only one (1) passenger onboard was from Israel.</i></p>

¹⁹ Ellen Engleman, The Administrator of the Department of Transportation’s Research & Special Projects Administration (RSPA). <http://transweb.sjsu.edu/MTIportal/research/publications/documents/terrorism/Terrorism%20Symposium%202001.htm>

²⁰ Dave Ozolek Assistant Director.

²¹ <http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/2001gabrielle.html>

²² <http://www.hurricaneville.com/almanac.html>

Terrorism Measures (RAMs) of Force Protection
Condition Levels Alpha and Bravo.

The terrorist chemical release scenario was built around a disciple of Usama Bin Laden who released a chemical agent in the Post Theater during an awards ceremony.

5. Operation RED Ex

The drill evaluated:

New York City's public health syndromic [*sic*]
(pattern of symptoms) surveillance system


Response of high-level decision makers to data
from this surveillance system

High-level communication, coordination and
notification procedures

Issues that pertained to regional cooperation and
response during a bio-terrorism event

6. National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

In the exercise scenario, a Learjet 35A with two pilots and four passengers takes off from Dulles Airport at 09:30; about a minute later, an explosion is heard, and the pilot complains that one of the engines is on fire and he is losing altitude. Around 09:32, the plane crashes into tower 4 at the NRO headquarters.



DATE/AIRCRAFT	CRASH AREA	WAR-GAME/DRILL/EXERCISE	Note
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Fair use of image | [Public Domain](#)

2001: September 11
AA 77

58 souls onboard
(American Airline Manifest)

64 souls onboard
(FBI)

Washington, DC
The Pentagon

1. Amalgam Virgo

The exercise scenario was how a commercial airliner was hijacked.

About 1,500 people took part, including the FBI, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Transport Canada, the Transportation Security Administration, the Federal Aviation Administration, the Vancouver Airport Authority, and Delta Airlines. ²³

Weather Condition

Hurricane Gabrielle ²⁴

–Peak intensity: Category 1
–Formed: September 11, 2001
–Dissipated: September 19, 2001

Hurricane Erin ²⁵

–Peak intensity: Category 3
–Formed: September 1, 2001
–Dissipated: September 11, 2001

Notable passenger victims

Stanley Hall

Director of Electronic warfare program management at the Pentagon.

Charles S. Falkenberg

Worked on *EOS Webster* a mapping system which provides Landsat Images, which are part of the mapping system for the Global Hawk technology.

William E. Caswell

²³ http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2002/n06042002_200206043.html

²⁴ <http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/2001gabrielle.html>

²⁵ <http://www.hurricaneville.com/almanac.html>

A Navy scientist whose work was so classified that his family knew very little about what he did each day. Says his mother, “You just learn not to ask questions.”

John D. Yamnicky Sr.

Retired naval aviator for Veridian

Wilson Flagg

U.S. Navy Admiral and pilot with American Airlines before his retirement.

Bryan Jack

Budget analyst/director with the Defense Department.

Chandler Raymond Keller

Project Manager with Boeing Satellite Systems.

Dong Lee

Engineer with Boeing Co.

Ruben Ornedo

Propulsion engineer with Boeing

Robert Penninger

Electrical engineer with BAE Systems.

Robert R. Ploger III

Software architect with Lockheed Martin.

John Sammartino

Technical manager for XonTech Inc.

Leonard Taylor

Technical manager at XonTech Inc.


Vicki Yancey

Former naval electronics
technician.

Barbara Olson

Conservative TV Commentator.



DATE/AIRCRAFT	CRASH AREA	WAR-GAME/DRILL/EXERCISE	Note
 <p>Fair use of image Public Domain</p> <p>2001: September 11 UA 93</p> <p><u>44 souls onboard</u> (FBI)</p> <p><u>38 souls onboard</u> (United Airline Manifest)</p>	<p>Southwestern Pennsylvania Stoney Creek Township</p>	<p>1. DOT high-jacked plane cell phone calls The tabletop exercise “involved a potentially high jacked plane and someone calling on a cell phone, among other aspects of the scenario.” ²⁶</p>	<p>Weather Condition</p> <p>Hurricane Gabrielle ²⁷</p> <p>–Peak intensity: Category 1 –Formed: September 11, 2001 –Dissipated: September 19, 2001</p> <p>Hurricane Erin ²⁸</p> <p>–Peak intensity: Category 3 –Formed: September 1, 2001 –Dissipated: September 11, 2001</p>

²⁶ Ellen Engleman, The Administrator of the Department of Transportation’s Research & Special Projects Administration (RSPA). <http://transweb.sjsu.edu/MTIportal/research/publications/documents/terrorism/Terrorism%20Symposium%202001.htm>

²⁷ <http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/2001gabrielle.html>

²⁸ <http://www.hurricaneville.com/almanac.html>

Appendix G

Comprehensive list of names pertaining to the individuals who were either involved in the events or assisting on September 11, 2001.

Abbreviations used

- American Air Line (AAL)
- Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center (BATCC)
- Boston Airport Traffic Control Tower (BATCT)
- Boston Security Intelligence Centre (BOSIC)
- Cleveland Air Traffic Control Center (CATCC)
- Department of Transportation (DoT)
- Dulles Air Traffic (DAT)
- Dulles Air Traffic Control Tower (DATCT)
- Dulles International Airport (DIA)
- Eastern Region (ER)
- Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
- Headquarters (HQ)
- Indianapolis Air Traffic Control Center (IATCC)
- Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority (MWAA)
- New York Air Route Center (NYARC) Ronkonkomo, New York
- New York TRACON - N90 (NYTRAC-N90)
- Northeast Region (NE)

- Sector Radar (SR)
- Systems Operations Command Center (SOCC)
- United Air Line (UAL)

List of names | Alphabetical order ¹

ABSENT Military Liaison at FAA-HQ Security Operations (Washington)

ABSENT Leonard George, Operations Supervisor Area C (NYARC)

ABSENT Marty Fournier, Quality Assurance Officer (NYARC)

ABSENT Tom Kerinko, Military Operations Specialist (CATCC)

A

Adams Theresa, Air Traffic Controller-Area 7 (IATCC)

Ahem Timothy, Vice-President of Safety, Security & Environmental (AAL)

Alfaro Charles, Operations Supervisor (NYARC)

Allen Jane, Vice-President Flight Services (AAL)

Allen John, FAA Deputy Director Flight Standards Service

Anderson Penny, FAA Civil Aviation Security Official

Antolovic Tim, Manager of Systems Operations Control Technology

Procedure & Arpey Gerard, President & CEO (AAL)

Arroyo Marcus, FAA Security Division Manager Eastern Region ²

Atkins Sharon, FAA Liaison

Aurora Marcus, Eastern Region Security Representative Division

Avery Mae, Manager of Operation Center

B

Baer Susan, Newark General Manager

Baker Robert, Executive Vice-President of Operations (AAL)

Barnik Mark, Operations Supervisor-Area 4 (CATCC)

Barrett Bruce, Supervisor (NYARC)

Barrett Lorraine, Air Traffic Controller-Area B Yardley Sector-Position

¹ Absent employees on the day of are given thus: "**ABSENT**".

² Marcus Arroyo's civil aviation security incidents he has responded to include the crashes of TWA 800, Swiss Air, and Egypt Air.

RA55 (NYARC)

Barry Desmond, Counsel Condon & Forsyth, LLP (AAL)

Batts Richard, FAA Manager Civil Aviation Security Div. Northwest Region

Belger Monte, FAA Deputy Administrator

Belinger Arthur J., Director of Airport Systems

Beringer Richard, Air Traffic Control Specialist Associate SR47 ³ (BATCC)

Bertapelle Joseph, AAL Manager System Operations Control Coordination Air Traffic Systems

Bidwell Chris, Security Personnel (AAL)

Biggio Terry, Operations Supervisor ⁴ (BATCC)

Birch Robert, Operations Manager in Charge (NYTRAC-N90)

Boivin Leo, Special Assessments Unit

Boone Dave, Air Traffic Manager (IATCC)

Bottiglia David, Air Traffic Controller (NYARC)

Bouliber Jimmy, Air Traffic Controller R68 (NYARC)

Brown Frank, Air Traffic Control Sector 20R Associate position ⁵ (BATCC)

Brown Laura, FAA HQ Deputy in Public Affairs

Brown Terry, Tower Supervisor (DATCT)

Bruno Larry, FAA Security Regulatory Manager

Buck Brad, Technology Support Specialist (SOCC)

Bueno Daniel, Operations Supervisor Traffic Management ⁶ (BATCC)

Burke Chuck, Security Directive Working Room

BussBurg Bob, Facility Manager (Cape TRACON) ⁷

Butterworth Bruce, FAA Director for Policy & Planning ACS-1

Byard Richard, Air Traffic Controller-Area 3 (IATCC)

C

Campbell Tara M., UAL Flight Operations Service Representative

Canavan Mike, Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security (ACS-1)

³ Beringer was at the BoSox Sector RA position. This position covered the airspace above 10,000 feet including FL 230. He handled data from 11:36 a.m. till 12:28 p.m. regarding American 11 and United 175.

⁴ Handled data from 10:30 a.m. till 18:14 p.m. regarding American 11 and United 175.

⁵ Handled data from 11:51 a.m. till 12:33 p.m. regarding American 11 and United 175.

⁶ Handled data from 09:30 a.m. till 18:00 p.m. regarding American 11 and United 175.

⁷ Cape TRACON: Falmouth, MA, near Otis Air Force Base. Bradley TRACON: Bradley International is the Hartford CT airport.

Canoles David J., Air Traffic Controller Investigator
Caper Sherelle, Assistant Air Traffic Manager (DATCT)
Caron Susan, FAA HQ Office of the Chief Counsel (Washington)
Carson Patty, Employee (AAL)
Casson William, Peninsula Radar Controller (Norfolk TRACON)
Christensen Christopher, Counsel AAL Condon & Forsyth, LLP
Ciampa Kevin, part-time crew chief (AAL)
Clark Bob, Duty Officer FAA HQ Security Operations
Clark Suzanne, Employee (AAL)
Clarke Jeffrey, Traffic Management Unit Supervisor (NYTRAC-N90)
Coda Robert, Security Director (Newark Liberty International)
Cody Bob, Newark Security Manager
Cooper Joseph, Air Traffic Control Specialist Traffic Management Unit Severe Weather
Coronite Thomas, Air Traffic Control Specialist (BATCC)
Coschignano Jimmy, Air Space Detail (NYTRAC-N90)
Cotton Douglas, Senior Attorney (AAL)
Cox Edward T., Airport Operations Officer (Airport Sec. Coordinator DIA)
Crittter Dave, Supervisor Area 7 (IATCC)
Cruz Santa, AAL Aircraft Mechanic

D

D'Alo Bill, NATCA Representative (NYTRAC-N90)
Dean William, Air Traffic Control Specialist ⁸ (BATCC)
DeLacy Ed, Operations Manager
Delaney Kevin, Supervisor (NYARC)
DePalma Mark, Support Manager (NYARC)
DePasquale Philip A., Baggage handler "Expediter" for AAL
Dillman Don, Managing Director of Flight Operations Technical (AAL)
Dillon Mike, General Duties (AAL)
Dion Richard, FAA Regional Operations Officer (Comm. Information Security)
Donahue Jennifer, FAA Regional Exec. Manager (Comm. Information Security)
Donnelly John R., FAA Senior Attorney

⁸ Handled data from 12:08 p.m. till 13:13 p.m. regarding American 11 and United 175.

Dowis Ivonna, Controller in Charge-Area B (NYARC)
Ducharme Richard J., FAA Assistant Air Traffic Division Manager (ER)
Dukeman Greg, Air Traffic Controller (CATCC) ⁹

E

Evans Mark, Supervisor (CATCC)

F

Faggen Edward S., Vice-President and General Counsel for Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority (DIA)
Falcone Rich, Manager of Systems Operations Technology (OSCC)
Fanno Steven R., Air Traffic Controller LaGuardia Sector position 10 (NYTRAC-N90)
Feldman Arlene, Regional Administrator
Felser Bob, Military Operations Specialist (NYARC)
Ferrante Anthony, Air Traffic Controller Investigator
Ferrany Tony, AAT20 Investigations & Allegations
Festa Dominic, ER-Security Manager
Field Dawn, Quality Assurance (Cape TRACON)
Flaherty John, Chief of Staff (DoT)
Flynn Cathal, FAA Associate Administrator of Civil Aviation Security
Fournier Martin, Operations Supervisor-Area C (NYARC) ¹⁰

G

Gallagher Diane, AAL employee, Boston-Logan
Garvey Jane, FAA Administrator
Gayde Rudolph, Air Traffic Controller-Area 3 (IATCC)

⁹ On September 11, 2001, Greg Dukeman was on duty as Military Operations Specialist in the Traffic Management Unit.

¹⁰ The Commission Staff said in regards to Martin Fournier: "As he watched *CNN*, he saw a second aircraft [UAL175] go behind the towers. 'It looked fake for some reason.' The speed of the aircraft was 500 or 600 mph, and he noted that the reason it looked distorted may have been because aircraft 'just don't fly that fast under 10,000 ft.' [COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFRO4016827): Team 8 INTERVIEW Fournier Martin Operations Supervisor Area C (New York Air Route Centre), September 30, 2003.]

Gonzalez Nydia, Supervisor of AAL (Southeastern Reservations Center Raleigh, North Carolina)
Goudreau Katherine, Director of Airport Systems
Gould Doug, FAA Lab/Radar Interpretation Technician
Gregory Jack, Head of Aviation Security Intelligence
Griffith Jeff, Deputy Director of Air Traffic Services
Griffith Scott, Director of Safety (AAL)
Gripper Willie, FAA Civil Aviation Security Division Manager (NE)

H

Halleck Bill, Air Traffic Advisor (BATCT)
Hannon Charles, Air Traffic Controller Supervisor LaGuardia Sector position 10 (NYTRAC-N90)
Happle Charlotte, Assistant Manager (DATCT)
Harter John, Operations Supervisor (Norfolk TRACON)
Hartling John, Air Traffic Control Specialist ¹¹ (BARTCC)
Hatfield Frank, Air Traffic Division Manager
Hawrysko Michael, Operations Manager (DATCT)
Hendershot John, Operations Supervisor ¹² (DATC)
Herak Bob, Quality Assurance Manager (Cleveland Center)
Hilliard Michael, Operations Supervisor (BATCT)
Hinson David, FAA Administrator
Hopsin Suzanne, Supervisor Weight and Balance Planning (SOCC)
Houck Peggy, Dispatcher (AAL)
Howland Ray, Personnel of AAL at System Operations Control
Huffman Don, AAL Head of Maintenance & Engineering International Airport, East Boston, Massachusetts

J

Jackson Jack, Operations Supervisor Area E (NYTRAC-N90)
James Ampey, Air Traffic Controller
Jiricek Karl, Air Traffic Controller Supervisor (NYTRAC-N90)

¹¹ Handled data from 12:33 p.m. till 13:03 p.m. regarding American 11 and United 175.

¹² John Hendershot at Dulles Tower had a line open to Washington National Airport and to the Secret Service.

Johnson Scott, Air Traffic Control Specialist Associate to SR36 ¹³ (BARTC)
Jones Jeannie, Director of Environmental (AAL)
Jones Robert, General Duties (AAL)
Jones Robert, Quality Assurance Officer (BATCT)
Joyce Thomas E., Air Traffic Control Specialist (BATCT)
Justice Linda, Air Traffic Controller-Area 6 (CATCC)

K

Kath Randy, Quality Assurance (IATCC)
Kettel Richard, Air Traffic Manager (CATCC)
Kies ? Air Traffic Tactical Operations Manager
Klaus Naomi C., Associate General Counsel (MWWA)
Knapp Lindy, Dep. Gen. Counsel & FAA/DoT Liaison to Commission
Knerr David, Manager, Dispatch Automation (UAL) Illinois HQ
Korn David, Director of Security Compliance (AAL)
Kula Shirley, Air Traffic Control Specialist & Operations Supervisor Associate to SR38 (BARTCC)
Kurz James, Traffic Management Unit Coordinator (NYARC)

L

LaCates David, Deputy Operations Manager (NYARC)
Larson Donald, Air Traffic Control Specialist SR10 ¹⁴ (BARTCC)
Lazar Bob, Senior Manager on Duty (National Airport) ¹⁵
Llana Jaime, Operations Manager (DATCT)
Lofaso Mike, Traffic Management Unit Supervisor (NYTRAC-N90)
Longmire Lee, Head of FAA HQ Security Operations (Washington) ¹⁶
Lozito Fran, FAA Representative to one of the air carriers
Luongo Steve, Federal Security Manager at Boston-Logan (AAL)
Lutomski Steve, Traffic Management Unit Supervisor Areas 2/3 (IATCC)
Lynch Peter, FAA Counsel

¹³ Handled data from 12:19 p.m. till 13:02 p.m. regarding American 11.

¹⁴ Handled data from 11:31 a.m. till 12:36 p.m. regarding American 11.

¹⁵ The NTSB and FBI did not conduct any interviews of the staff in the National Airport ATC.

¹⁶ Lee Longmire was also FAA's Hijack Coordinator on September 11, 2001.

M

Manno Claudio, ACI Watch (3rd floor)
Marquis Craig, AAL System Operations Control Manager
Marra Steve, FAA Air Traffic Controller Supervisor
Martens Brazilino, Air Traffic Control Specialist SR38 ¹⁷ (BARTCC)
Masaitas Mark, Traffic Management Coordinator (DAT)
May James, President of Air Transport Association of America (FAA)
McCarthy Mary M., Office of Regional Counsel (NYTRAC-N90)
McCartney John, FAA Eastern Region
McCloskey Peter, Air Traffic Controller-Area B (NYARC)
McCormick Mike, Air Traffic Manager (NYTRAC-N90)
McDonald Buddy, Operations Manager (Cape TRACON)
McDonnell Pat, Head of Aviation Security Intelligence
McEwen Ronald, OS Area (BOSIC)
McGlaufflin David, Air Traffic Control Specialist SR09 ¹⁸ (BARTCC)
McKenna Ed, Manager of Syracuse Tower
McLain Stan, Air Traffic Manager (DATCT)
McLaughlin Robert, FAA HQ Security Operations
Mead Kenneth, Inspector General (DoT)
Mello Tony, AAT20 Investigations & Allegations
Merced Mark, Air Traffic Controller-Area B (NYARC)
Meyers Jeff, FAA Litigation Department
Miller Alan, Air Traffic Control Specialist ¹⁹ (BARTCC)
Miller Arnie, Accident Package Specialist (IATCC)
Miller Shirley, Deputy Administrator Assistant (FAA)
Miller Toby, General Duties Traffic Manager Area C (BARTCC)
Mills Steven, Traffic Management Unit Severe Weather Position (DSP1)
Mineta Norman, Secretary (DoT)
Moore Greg, AAL Aircraft Mechanic
Moran Maria, Air Traffic Control Specialist Associate SR10 ²⁰ (BARTCC)
Morgan Ron, Director of Air Traffic Services

¹⁷ Handled data from 11:58 a.m. till 12:49 p.m. regarding American 11.

¹⁸ Handled data from 12:18 p.m. till 13:24 p.m. regarding American 11.

¹⁹ Handled data from 12:27 p.m. till 12:29 p.m. regarding American 11 and United 175.

²⁰ Handled data from 12:05 p.m. till 13:17 p.m. regarding American 11.

Morse Mike, FAA HQ National Security Coordination Staffer (Washington)
Mulcahy Michael, Manager of Systems Operations Control Policy & Procedure (SOCC)
Mulligan Pete, Supervisory Traffic Management Coordinator (NYARC)

N

Naused Debi, Technology Support Specialist (SOCC)

O

O'Neil Mark, Air Traffic Control Specialist ²¹ (BARTCC)
Oliver Shirley, Operation System SR38 Associate ²² (BATCT)
Orr Bill, Quality Assurance Manager (IATCC)
Osmus Lynne, Employee
Ott Bob, Support Manager (NYARC)

P

Padgett James, FAA-Manager Global Issues Div. Civil Aviation Security Intelligence ²³
Palmieri Anthony, Air Traffic Controller SR43 (NYTRAC-N90)
Parfitt Craig, AAL Managing Director of Flight Dispatch (SOCC)
Pasquale Peter, Operation System Area (BOSIC)
Peacock Bill, Director of Air Traffic Services
Peter Lynch, Employee
Phelps Kyle, Manager of Systems Operations Control Administration
Philips Jeffery, Air Traffic Controller-Area 7 (IATCC)
Pitts Dana A., Airport Operations Manager (MWAA)
Poncet Glen, Air Traffic Control Specialist Associate to SR09 ²⁴ (BARTCC)
Position-DSP2 ²⁵ (BATCC)
Povinelli Linda, Air Traffic Control-Area 3 Supervisor (IATCC)

²¹ Handled data from 12:28 p.m. till 12:37 p.m. regarding United 175.

²² Handled data from 11:36 a.m. till 12:51 p.m. regarding American 11.

²³ James Padgett was an FAA expert on the architecture of CAPPS I.

²⁴ Handled data from 12:16 p.m. till 13:22 p.m. regarding American 11.

²⁵ Handled data from 12:04 p.m. till 13:15 p.m. regarding American 11.

Q

Qualley Warren, Manager Weather Services (SOCC)

Quezada Rich, Senior Analyst Administration (SOCC)

R

Riffe Janet, FAA Principal Security Inspector for American Airlines

Riley Carrie, FAA HQ Security Operations Supervisor

Ritter Jim, Chief Vehicle Performance Division, Office of Research Engineering (NTSB)

Rizzuto Thereza Anne, UAL Station Manager Newark Airport

Roberts Thomas, Air Traffic Control Specialist SR39 ²⁶ (BARTCC)

Roebuck Stephen, Air Traffic Control Specialist SR47 ²⁷ (BARTCC)

Rogers Alessandro, Air Traffic Controller

Rosenberg, Supervisor Traffic Management Unit (NYARC)

Royer Michael, Air Traffic Control Specialist SR10 ²⁸ (BARTCC)

Ruggeri Ron, Eastern Region Quality Assurance Staff Manager (FAA)

S

Sacserson Douglas, Air Traffic Control Specialist (BATCT)

Saul Steve, Air Traffic Controller Supervisor Liberty Sector (NYTRAC-N90)

Schiappani Jonathan, Operations Supervisor Area C ²⁹ (BARTCC)

Schiavo Mary, Inspector General (DoT)

Schifano Anthony, Air Traffic Controller-Area 3 (IATCC)

Schmalz Stephen, Air Traffic Control Specialist ³⁰ (BARTCC)

Schott Kevin, Air Traffic Controller-Area 1 (IATCC)

Schuessler Linda, Herndon Center in Virginia

Schurott Peter, Supervisor of the Newark Civil Aviation Security Field Unit

Scoggins Colin, Military Operations Specialist (BARTCC)

Scott Ray, Supervisor on Duty of AAL (Southeastern Reservations Center)

²⁶ Handled data from 11:47 a.m. till 12:33 p.m. regarding American 11.

²⁷ Roebuck was working BoSox 47R, then worked on Hampton the area where F15s flew through after the attacks. He handled data from 11:35 a.m. till 12:07 p.m. regarding American 11.

²⁸ Handled data from 12:36 p.m. till 13:31 p.m. regarding American 11.

²⁹ Handled data from 12:16 p.m. till 13:59 p.m. regarding American 11 and United 175.

³⁰ Handled data till 12:07 p.m. regarding American 11.

Siddiqui W.U., Security Checkpoint Supervisor Argenbright Security (Dulles Airport)
Simons Donny, Airport Manager (Baltimore-Washington International Airport)
Smith Myron, Air Traffic Control Specialist ³¹ (BARTCC)
Smith William, Air Traffic Control Specialist SR36 ³² (BARTCC)
Spence Tim, Operational Supervisor (Cape TRACON)
Steele MGen, Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security (FAA)
Steinberg Andrew, FAA Chief Counsel
Stevens Rich, FAA Security Division Manager for the Northeast Region ³³
Strother Michael, East Feeder Radar Controller (Norfolk TRACON)
Suchcicki Albert W., Air Traffic Control Specialist (BATCT)

T

Taccini Gregory, Air Traffic Control Specialist ³⁴ (BARTCC)
Thomas John, Operations Manager (IATCCT)
Thumser Paul, Operations Supervisor Area B (NYARC)
Tracy George, Quality Assurance (NYARC)
Trotman Shawn, Employee (AAL)
Tucker Christopher, Air Traffic Controller-Area B (NYARC)
Turano Mary Carol, CASFO Manager

V

Vollaro Steve, FAA employee (NYTRAC-N90)

W

Waggoner Karan, Air Traffic Control Specialist ³⁵ (BARTCC)
Walsh Steven, Air Traffic Controller (Cape TRACON)
Wansley Larry, Managing Director of Corporate Security (AAL) Dallas HQ
Weed Sally, Support Manager for ATC Operations (IATCC)
Weichert Mike, FAA HQ Duty Officer Security Operations

³¹ Handled data from 11:42 a.m. till 13:05 p.m. regarding American 11.

³² Handled data from 11:44 a.m. till 12:25 p.m. regarding American 11.

³³ This division oversaw security operations at Boston-Logan Airport.

³⁴ Handled data from 12:07 p.m. till 12:55 p.m. regarding American 11 and United 175.

³⁵ Handled data from 12:22 p.m. till 12:57 p.m. regarding American 11.

Weigand David, FAA General Counsel's Office
Wernica Kim, Operations Manager (CATCC)
Werth John, Air Traffic Controller Area 4 (CATCC)
White Henry, Air Traffic Control Specialist ³⁶ (BARTCC)
White John, Air Traffic Tactical Operations Manager System Efficiency
Willey George, Air Traffic Controller (NYTRAC-N90)
Williamson Penny, Senior Analyst (SOCC)
Wilson Everett, Technology Support Specialist (SOCC)
Winter Michael J., UAL HQ
Wishart Dennis, General Duties
Wolbers Leo, Operations Manager (CATCC)

Z

Zaba Nora, Supervisor of the Newark Civil Aviation Security Field Unit
Zalewski Peter, Air Traffic Control Specialist SR46 ³⁷ (BARTCC)

Operating Centers

- 9 Regional Office Operations Centers
- ACS Security Operations (3rd floor)
- ATC Communications Hub
- Aviation Control Center (ACC)
- Boston Center (Nashua, NH)
- Cape TRACON Otis Air National Guard Base at Cape Cod, MS
- Central Alternate Reservations Facility (CARP) ³⁸
- Command Center in Herndon facility, Virginia
- Department of Transportation (DoT) Crisis Management Center ER ³⁹
- FAA Operations Center

³⁶ Handled data from 12:09 p.m. till 13:17 p.m. regarding American 11.

³⁷ Handled data from 11:47 a.m. till 12:29 p.m. regarding American 11 and United 175.

³⁸ Operated by FAA Officials with security clearances to conduct military aircraft exercises.

³⁹ Includes New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware, Virginia and West Virginia. This also includes Washington, D.C. The airspace itself overlays state boundaries, dictated by radar coverage.

- Military Operations Specialist Position (MOS)
- National Airspace System (NAS)
- New York Air Route Control Center (ZNY)
- Office of the Administrator/Deputy Administrator
- Regional Operations Center (ROC)
- Regional Telecom ⁴⁰
- Security Directive Working Room (3rd floor)
- Severe Weather Coordinator Position (SVWC)
- Traffic Management Unit (TMU) ⁴¹
- Washington Operations Center (WOC)

⁴⁰ Served the purpose of gathering information from the facilities, and communicating back to the facilities the need to remain calm.

⁴¹ The TMU oversees the entire airspace for the Indianapolis Centre.

Appendix H

Passenger List ¹

No.	Seat	Name	Notes
1	34C	Allison Anna Williams	Age 48, of Stoneham, Massachusetts. Founder of A2 Software Solutions.
2	8A	Angell David	Age 54, of Pasadena, California. <i>NBC</i> Executive producer.
3	8B	Angell Lynn Edwards	Age 45, of Pasadena, California. Spouse to David Angell in 8A.
4	29C	Aoyama David Seima	Age 48, from Hokkaido, Japan. An accountant living in Culver City, California.
5	28C	Aronson Myra	Age 52, of Charlestown, Massachusetts. Analyst at Compuware Corp.
6	25C	Barbuto Christine	Age 32, of Brookline, Massachusetts. Employee at TJX Cos.
7	11D	Beug Carolyn	Age 48, of LA, California. Daughter to Mary Wahlstrom in 10H.
8	26G	Booms Kelly Ann	Age 24, of Denver, Colorado. Worked for PriceWaterhouse in 1999.
9	3B	Bouchard Carol	Age 43, of Warwick, Rhode Island. Emergency Room secretary, Kent County Hospital.

¹ 9/11 Memorial: Passenger names and photographs.
http://names.911memorial.org/#lang=en_US

			A non-revenue stand-by traveler listed in First Class.
10	33H	Casey Neillie	Age 32, of Wellesley, Massachusetts. Employee at TJX Cos.
11	20H	Coombs Jeffrey	Age 42, of Abington, Massachusetts. Security Analyst at Compaq Computer.
12	33J	Creamer Tara	Age 30, of Worcester, Massachusetts. Employee at TJX Cos.
13	27J	Cuccinello Thelma	Age 71, of Wilmot, New Hampshire. Housewife.
14	10J	Currian Patrick J.	Age 53, from Dublin, Ireland. Vice- President at Atos-Euronext.
15	11A	Curry Green Andrew	Age 34, of Chelmsford, Massachusetts. Director of business development for eLogic.
16	25J	Dale Brian	Age 43, of Warren, New Jersey. Accountant and attorney at Blue Capital.
17	27A	DiMeglio David	Age 22, of Wakefield, Massachusetts. Apprentice electrician.
18	23B	Ditullio Donald	Age 49, of Peabody, Massachusetts. Employee at Smith & Nephew, a medical device manufacturer in Andover, Massachusetts.
19	11J	Dominguez Albert	Age 66, from Sydney, Australia. Baggage handler for Qantas.
20	22J	Filipov Alex	Age 70, from Regina, Saskatchewan; became a U.S. citizen in 1962.

			<p>Mr. Filipov was “the father of Boston Globe Moscow bureau chief David Filipov, originally held a ticket for a Delta flight but switched at the last minute to American Flight 11.”</p> <p>–D. Heinzmann (<i>Chicago Tribune</i>) Sept. 13, 2001</p>
21	3H	Flyzik Carol	<p>Age 40, of Plaistow, New Hampshire. Computer software sales to hospitals and medical companies.</p> <p>Passenger was upgraded at Boston-Logan on the morning of, from seat 31H in Coach, to seat 3H in First Class by using an AAdvantage sticker. American’s agent at Boston-Logan upgraded the passenger at 06:43 a.m.</p>
22	25H	Friedman Paul	<p>Age 45, of Belmont, Massachusetts. Consultant at Emergence Consulting.</p>
23	20J	Fyfe D.B. Karleton	<p>Age 31, of Brookline, Massachusetts. Senior investment analyst.</p>
24	9H	Gay Peter	<p>Age 54, of Taunton, Massachusetts. Vice-President of operations for electronic systems at Raytheon Co.</p>
25	28J	George Linda	<p>Age 27, of Westboro, Massachusetts. Employee at TJX Cos.</p>
26	9A	Glazer Edmund	<p>Age 41, of Los Angeles, California. Chief financial officer and Vice-President at MRV Communications.</p>
27	32H	Gordenstein L. Fenn	<p>Age 41, of Needham, Massachusetts. Employee at TJX Cos.</p>

28	7A	Hackel Farley Paige	Age 46, of Newton, Massachusetts. Spiritual adviser.
29	20A	Hashem Peter	Age 40, of Tewksbury, Massachusetts. Engineer.
30	9J	Hayes Robert	Age 37, of Amesbury, Massachusetts. Sales engineer with Netstal.
31	10A	Hennessy Ted	Age 35, of Belmont, Massachusetts. Consultant for Emergence Consulting.
32	24J	Hofer John	Age 45, of Bellflower, California. Owner of a small business.
33	27H	Holland Cora	Age 52, of Sudbury, Massachusetts. Employee of Sudbury Food Pantry, an Interdenominational program that assisted needy families, at Our Lady of Fatima Church.
34	22A	Humber Nicholas, Jr	Age 60, of Newton, Massachusetts, Owner of Brae Burn Management.
35	31A	Iskandar Waleed	Age 34, from Beirut, Lebanon. ² Passenger was investigated thoroughly by the FBI as a possible participant in the “hijack” of American 11. Negative results came back.
36	30J	Jenkins John Ch.	Age 45, of Erlanger, Kentucky. Operations Manager for Charles River Associates.
37	31G	Jones Charles	Age 48, of Bedford, Massachusetts.

² Remember September 11, 2001.

<http://www.legacy.com/Sept11/Story.aspx?PersonID=95993&location=3>

			Computer programmer.
38	22H	Kaplan Robin <i>CNN list "Caplan"</i>	Age 33, of Natick, Massachusetts. Employee at TJX Cos.
39	19B	Keating Barbara	Age 72, of Palm Springs, California. Executive Director of the Big Brothers Big Sisters of South Middlesex, outside Boston.
40	20B	Kovalcin David	Age 42, of Hudson, New Hampshire. Senior mechanical engineer at Raytheon Co.
41	26J	Larocque Judy	Age 50, of Framingham, Massachusetts. Founder of Marketing Prospectives
42	23A	Lasden N. Janis	Age 46, of Peabody, Massachusetts. General Electric employee.
43	31J	Lee Daniel John	Age 34, of Los Angeles, California. A Van Nuys man; a roadie for acts including Yanni, 'N Sync and Streisand.
44	9B	Lewin Daniel C.	Age 31. Co-founder Akamai Technologies Inc. Passenger was a former Israeli Commando and was "stabbed" or "shot" on flight.
45	32J	Mackay Susan	Age 44, of Westford, Massachusetts. Employee at TJX Cos.
46	11B	Mello Chris	Age 25. Alta Communications Financial analyst.
47	11H	Mladenik Jeff	Age 43, of Hinsdale, Illinois. President of E-Logic.
48	23H	Montoya Carlos A.	Age 36, from Bogotá, Colombia.

			Spouse interviewed by FBI on September 12, 2001, at 11:00 a.m. The reason for this interview was that Carlos Montoya's name was also found on the passenger list for United 175 involved in the demise of the WTC2.
49	2D	Morabito Laura Lee	Age 34, of Framingham, Massachusetts. Qantas area sales manager in Boston. Passenger was a non-revenue Qantas employee (through the Oneworld Alliance) traveling on company business. Ms. Morabito was confirmed in Coach inventory as a business traveler and upgraded at the gate to First Class. She never had a pre-reserved seat in Coach because non-revenue travelers are not allowed advance seating.
50	24B	Naiman Mildred	Age 81, of Andover, Massachusetts. Housewife.
51	28B	Neira Laurie Ann	Age 49, of Amesbury, Massachusetts. Transcriber with "Your Office Genie".
52	3A	Newell Renee	Age 37, of Cranston, Rhode Island. Customer service agent with American Air Lines. A non-revenue American employee traveling on company business. Ms. Newell was confirmed in Coach inventory as a business traveler and upgraded at the gate to First Class. She never had a pre-reserved seat in Coach because non-revenue travelers are not allowed advance seating.
53	27B	Norton Jacqueline	Age 60, of Lubec, Maine. Spouse of Robert

			Norton in 27C.
54	27C	Norton Robert	Age 82, of Lubec, Maine. Spouse of Jacqueline Norton in 27B.
55	31B	Orth Jane	Age 49, of Haverhill, Massachusetts. Employee at Lucent Technology.
56	29J	Pecorelli Thomas	Age 31, of Los Angeles, California. Cameraman for Fox Sports and El Entertainment Television.
57	19A	Perkins Berry Berenson (Berinthia)	Age 53, of Manhattan, New York. Photographer.
58	3J	Puopolo Morales Sonia	Age 58, of Dover, Massachusetts. Retired ballet dancer. Originally booked in Coach Class in seat 25J but requested an upgrade to Business Class on August 19, 2001. Ms. Puopolo was an AAdvantage Platinum member with sticker upgrades available and was upgraded to seat 11J in Business Class by American's automated system on September 8, 2001. American's agent at Boston-Logan upgraded Ms. Puopolo to seat 3J in First Class at 06:39 a.m.
59	2H	Retik David	Age 33, of Needham, Massachusetts. General partner and founding member of Alta Communications, a Boston-based investment firm specializing in communication industries. Originally booked in Coach and assigned seat 29H. At 08:19 a.m. Central on September 10, 2001, his travel agent changed his Coach inventory, which

			removed his seat 29H. At 11:53 a.m. Central on September 10th, the travel agent requested seat 31C. At 06:58 a.m. Eastern on September 11th, American's gate agent at Boston-Logan upgraded Mr. Retik to First Class using a one-way upgrade certificate from Mr. Retik's AAdvantage account. At about that same time he was assigned to seat 2H.
60	11G	Rosenzweig Philip	Age 47, of Acton, Massachusetts. Executive at Sun Microsystems.
61	2J	Ross Richard	Age 58, of Newton, Massachusetts. Own consulting company: "The Ross Group." Passenger was given a TAC ticket (travel authorization certificate) which is used by American's sales department and corporate HQ to authorize someone to travel on American flights for either travel agency recognition or to handle company business. He was booked by American's sales department on August 30, 2001. Mr. Ross's travel agent booked another record on August 31, 2001, printed a receipt for him in Business Class, and then cancelled the reservation. American's agent at Boston-Logan upgraded him to First Class and reissued the ticket at 07:31 a.m. on the day of.
62	22B	Sachs Jessica	Age 22, of Billerica, Massachusetts. Pricewaterhouse Accountant.
63	35G	Salie Rahma	Age 28, from Tokyo, Japan. Spouse to Michael Theodoridis in 35C.

64	26B	Smith Heather	Age 30, of Boston, NY. Employee at Beacon Capital Partners.
65	25B	Stone Douglas	Age 54, of Dover, New Hampshire. Owner of <i>Odyssey Press</i> , in Dover.
66	34J	Suarez Xavier Dino	Age 41, from Guayaquil, Ecuador. Civil engineer.
67	35C	Theodoridis Michael	Age 32, from Switzerland. Spouse to Rahma Sali in 35G. Passenger was listed on the Security Directive Watch List as a suspect. -- <i>PENTTBOMB Case ID: 315N-NY-280350-BS, September 18, 2001.</i> Unknown why he was listed as a suspect.
68	30A	Trentini James	Age 65, of Everett, Massachusetts. Retired teacher and assistant principal at Everett.
69	30B	Trentini Mary	Age 67, of Everett, Massachusetts. Retired secretary at Everett.
70	23J	Valdes A. Montoyia	No passenger information
71	36J	Vamsikrishna Pendyala	Age 30, from India. Software Engineer for DTI Technologies.
72	10H	Wahlstrom Mary	Age 75, of Kaysville, Utah. Mother to Carolyn Beug in 11D.
73	37G	Waldie Kenneth	Age 46, of Methuen, Massachusetts. Senior quality engineer for electronic systems at Raytheon Co.
74	24H	Wenckus John	Age 46, of Torrance, California. Tax consultant.

75	24A	Williams L. Candace	Age 20, of Danbury, Connecticut. Student.
76	29A	Zarba Christopher, Jr.	Age 47, of Hopkinton, Massachusetts. Software Engineer.

Appendix I

Duplicates

“We must stop killing each other based on a story that we have not even understood.”

Prof. Daniele Ganser

Swiss Historian, Peace & Energy Researcher ¹

Two histrionic events: Most authors, researchers, mainstream media commentators, and high level officials have labeled the events that took place on Warrior Tuesday, September 11, 2001, as being similar (even identical) to what took place on Sunday, December 7, 1941. The former event labeled “new Pearl Harbor;” the latter simply named as the place it occurred. As yet, historians have remained neutral to this term. But they have also remained neutral to the use of information, which depends entirely on the motive for writing from it; and motive is rarely unselfish.

The historian would have difficulty rummaging through any discredited information. If influenced by outside motives, then there is no saying how the historian will use it, if used at all. On the other hand, the theorist will snatch the information as a prime goal to cast shadows and doubts on procedures that took place, whereas the media would be influenced either to suppress or bring forth the information.

Anything goes.

¹ <http://www.danieleganser.ch/>

And one may ask about the evidence, and if it can be used as such. Doubtful; yet, probable. Any information discredited from higher levels, in order to use it as evidence, official investigating bodies would need to discredit the discreditors, if you will. It is probable, and many times accomplished with success, but in regards to what subject the discreditors are discredited is the crucial element of success and will be tackled like something former Secretary of Defense once noted:-

“Reports that say something hasn’t happened are always interesting to me because as we know, there are known knowns: There are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things [we know] we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns -the ones we don’t know we don’t know. And if one looks throughout the history of our country and other free countries, it is the latter category that tends to be the difficult one.” [Donald H. Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown: A Memoir* (New York: Sentinel Penguin Group, 2011).]

Two radio transmissions: To take this a little further down the line, two Air Traffic Control Towers (Boston and Cleveland) heard two different broadcasted radio transmissions on the morning of September 11 in 2001. The first -“we have some planes”- was later reported to be coming from the cabin crew area (cockpit) of American Air Line Flight 11 that caused the demise of the North Tower (WTC1). The Commission state the message was articulated by Mohamed Atta, one of the suspected hijackers of the aircraft; he was later termed the “ringleader” of 19

suspected hijackers. This was an “unknown unknowns” category for the public.

American Airlines Flight #11
BOEING 767

SEAT 8D
PASSENGER Atta, Mohamed

Mohamed Atta

8:24:38 AM
SOURCE: RADIO TRANSMISSION
DURATION: 00:00:37

8:33:59 AM
SOURCE: RADIO TRANSMISSION
DURATION: 00:00:09

COCKPIT AREA MICROPHONE

SEAT ASSIGNMENT: 8D

8:24 AM

WE HAVE SOME PLANES.
JUST STAY QUIET AND YOU'LL
BE OKAY.
WE ARE RETURNING TO THE
AIRPORT.

BALANCE

VOLUME

›Courtesy of the [Federal Bureau of Investigation \(F.B.I.\)](#)

The second radio transmission on Cleveland frequency -“we have a bomb onboard”- was later reported to be coming from the cabin crew area (cockpit) of United Air Line Flight 93 that crashed into a field near the Diamond T. Mine that was then owned by “PBS Coals” situated in Stonycreek Township, Pennsylvania, near the Indian Lake and Shanksville. The message articulated was later reported to have been by Ziad Jarrah, one of the suspected hijackers on the aircraft. This was also a “known unknowns” category for the public.



›Courtesy of the [Federal Bureau of Investigation \(F.B.I.\)](#)

Evidence from the Air Traffic Control, released to the Commission and the FBI, support no radio transmissions came from Marwan al-Shehhi who piloted United 175 into the South Tower (WTC2) and no evidence shows radio transmissions came from Hani Hanjour who piloted American 77 into the Pentagon facility.

There's no explanation as to why 2 out of 4 would only transmit messages. But, for those two transmissions, with very important messages, to jump the line that separates air from ground, and consequently parachute onto the public platform, there was a desperate need they be heard by each of the aircrafts' Air Traffic Control Tower, which could be done in two ways.

The first way, which was the typical way, would be that the hijackers could outright announce to the Air Traffic Controller (ATC) that the aircraft was hijacked. As a consequence, the need for the hijacker pilot and the ATC to start conversing would be necessary to some effect as towards

the demands and if the hostage-passengers were okay. This would then spiral a variable: Notifying the FBI as is usually done in typical hijackings. If the first way was chosen, there would be:-

>An early stage of FBI involvement.

>No search and secure “left behind luggage” which would “identify” all 19 “unknown unknowns.”

>No specific need to turn off any aircraft transponder, because there would be direct contact with the cockpit and law enforcement agencies would begin negotiating and/or learn where the hijacked aircraft would be landing and therefore monitor its location on ATC radar screens.

>The message would not get across to the public.

Too many no needs of unknown unknowns. So Atta chooses to take another course, which not only has some extraordinary elements, but very “stupid moves.”

At 08:13:30 a.m., Atta “turned [American 11’s] transponder off.” [Air Traffic Operations Manager Terry Biggio, Boston Air Traffic Control Center Regional Operations Center Report. Sept. 11, 2001.] Once Atta did this, three major variables came into effect. First, all Atta’s radio transmissions, that he wants to parachute from the aircraft, will be non-detectable. In other words, his messages will be heard as coming from an unknown origin:-

08:24:38: A radio transmission partially unintelligible stated “we have some planes just stay quiet and you’ll be ok we are returning to the airport” **from an unknown origin** was heard over the ZBW [Boston Air

Traffic] radio. [FAA Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events, released 2005 FOIA.]

08:24:57: A second radio transmission partially unintelligible stated “nobody move everything will be ok; if you try to make any moves you endanger yourself and the airplane just stay quiet” **from an unknown origin** was heard over the ZBW [Boston Air Traffic] radio. [FAA Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events, released 2005 FOIA.]

08:33:59: A third radio transmission partially unintelligible stated “nobody move please we are going back to the airport don’t try to make any stupid moves,” **from an unknown origin** was heard over the ZBW [Boston Air Traffic] radio. [FAA Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events, released 2005 FOIA.]

Second, Atta commandeers American 11 into a near midair collision, nearly crashing into United 175 that caused the demise of the WTC2.²

Third, American 11 automatically turns into a blip on (1) ATC radar screen; (2) U.S. Military radars; (3) Secret Service system. We explain.


1. ATC radar screens

Traffic Controllers see (when a transponder is turned off) a blip representing the aircraft; its altitude; and, its longitude. No longer seen is the Airline Company which the aircraft belongs to; its flight number (hence all Atta’s transmission were reported as of “unknown origin”); its

² *USAToday*: Published September 14, 2001, “FAA employee: Hijacked jets almost collided.” Accessed: 2012.
<http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2001/09/13/investigate-collide.htm>

pre-flight planned destination; and, the aircraft needs to be given special attention by clearing its path from other aircraft because there is no direct radio contact with the cockpit.

In as few words as possible to describe this, Atta would need very experienced ATCs on his side to avoid, at least, midair collision. It is speculative that he either forgot and/or planned to jeopardize the mission with a midair collision. It would have been extraordinary when one considers this, but this is a different subject.



›National Transportation
Safety Board
(NTSB)

Office of Research and
Engineering, recorded
radar data study by Daniel
R. Bower, Ph.D.
February 15, 2002.

2. U.S. Military screens

The Military would be able to distinguish this blip from their other blips, or “injects” as they are called, because they know which blips they injected into their drills and exercises that particular morning, allowing them to recognize outsider blips, if you will. At what time these injects

were removed from Military monitors is for another section to be discussed.

3. The Secret Service system

What type of system the Intelligence Community had and were “allowed” on September 11th “to see what FAA’s radar was seeing,” as former National Coordinator for Security Richard Clarke put it, is unknown. [Richard Clarke, *Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror* (Free Press, 2004.)] Neither do we know at what particular time this comment was made and in regards to what subject. Speculating on an excerpt has no meaning.


As the *Boston Globe* reported, “any significant delay would foil [Atta’s] big plans for the day,” ³ so a grave error was for the ringleader to turn off the transponder on his weapon of mass destruction. But this is what he did. It could be argued that since Atta knew by turning off the transponder he’d put the entire operation at jeopardy, there were three other “hijacked” airplanes that would have carried out the mission, and this is true. But then, two of the other three aircrafts also turned off their transponders, and they were United 93 and American 77. This left only one airplane that would have carried out the mission, United 175, and would have been the guarantee of at least some destruction. As we see it, the entire operation revolved around one out of four weapons hitting

³ The *Boston Globe*: “Reliving the morning of death,” by Mitchell Zuckoff. September 16, 2001. Accessed 2014.
http://www.boston.com/news/packages/underattack/globe_stories/0916/Reliving_the_morning_of_death+.shtml

its target, and this is supported from the Air Traffic Control evidence, which was released to the Commission and the FBI.

But the evidence causes an anomaly towards the opposite.

When United 93 turned off its transponder, it jeopardized the only aircraft guaranteed to complete the mission, which was United 175, because United 93 had a near midair collision with United 175; ⁴ not only that, but the latter aircraft had at least two more near midair collisions with other aircraft. ⁵



►National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
Office of Research and Engineering
Recorded radar data study by Daniel R. Bower, Ph.D.
February 15, 2002

We can now brush aside United 175 and 93 and American 11 as jeopardizing the mission with their near midair collisions. Only one

⁴ 9/11 Revisited "UA 175." Accessed 2010.
<http://www.oredigger61.org/?cat=47>

⁵ Live Leak "Midwest Pilot Almost Hit Plane On 9/11." Accessed 2014.
http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=594_1214449302

aircraft is left; the operation is put into the hands of Hani Hanjour piloting American 77. Allowing this Saudi National, who was living in Arizona, to commandeer a Boeing 757-223 into the Pentagon is a curious factor, to which the Commissioners' point of view was important. But, it is nowhere to be found.

A Boeing 737 Captain named Hank Krakowski had stated: "If the guy [Hanjour] was a professional pilot flying all the time, it would have been possible. If he was an occasional pilot, it would have been a pretty big challenge. You can get a boat into a dock, but it's a lot harder getting a cruise ship into a dock. The problem is the mass of the machine, the energy, the feel. It doesn't have the response of a smaller plane. It has much more kinetic energy. It takes training to get a feel for that." [Jere Longman, *Among the Heroes: United Flight 93 and the Passengers and Crew Who Fought Back* (Harper Perennial, 2003).]

Even though Atta keyed his microphone so his transmissions be heard by Boston ATCs and consequently by the public, he relied on the reaction of his action: His messages were reported as coming from "an unknown origin" due to the transponder's shut down; but the content of his messages were troublesome. Anyone would be able to put these two elements together and conclude the messages were coming from the flight that went against American Aviation safety guidelines. But we are talking about monstrous variables here.

- From the ATCs who cannot distinguish the words being said, to momentary mechanical failure where all transmissions go lost during their descent.

- From the United States Air Force who can intercept and even shoot Atta down, to the American Air Line security employees that can stop him from flying in a blink of an eye.
- From law enforcement agencies who can stop Atta's car for a routine check and delay his boarding, to American Air Lines cancelling his flight because of hurricane ERIN's gnarling claws attacking New York.
- From the United States Military's 45+ drills and exercises having them on an alert status and detecting American 11 with their AWACS, to a tiny bee creeping behind Atta's collar and stinging him, putting him into an allergic shock.

Atta, including any others who were on this mission, were cloaked into The Incredibles; not only because they managed to infiltrate the way spies do, and be brushed off, but because they had a path opened to them that under natural circumstances does not happen; not to any individual, and these people were not special. They certainly were not immune to allergies or injuries, and certainly were not immortal. They were not structured with Artificial Intelligence, nor did they have robotic super-duper x-ray eyes or strength.

We may now understand how historians are extremely hesitant to begin writing their chapters of the day of. As a consequence, the events of September 11th are hardly understandable to be boxed into volumes for historical reference, and barely understood to be implemented in an official 9/11 Commission Report that came out in the summer of 2004.

The reason is one: The 2001 events took place on American soil that was protected at the time by a United States Military, Air Force, Navy, and President abiding by Democracy, Freedom, and the Constitution of

the Nation. It did not happen at a lagoon on the island of Oahu in Hawaii, west of Honolulu.

Two travel bags: Jeffrey Collman, Flight Attendant Position 6 on American 11 was 42-years-old, born in Yorkville, Illinois, who lived in Novato, California. Jeffrey would be assigned to the middle left jump seat (2L) located in the middle galley within the main cabin. His responsibilities included relieving flight attendant number three during boarding position, cabin check of Zone A at departure, and during a video safety demonstration monitor Zone A relieving flight attendant number four in Zone A on the right hand side during a manual safety demonstration. Jeffrey's service area included the main cabin and first class. When deplaning he would be located in Zones B and C.

The FBI reported Jeffrey had a domestic partner, Keith Alan Bradkowski; their relationship had been from 1999. Jeffrey's partner informed the FBI that his partner used to carry a "black carry-on bag by Travelpro and a standard issued black flight crew bag, which 'looks like a large lunch box.'" [FBI INTERVIEW KEITH ALAN BRADKOWSKI, SEPT. 22, 2001.]

One of Jeffrey Collman's bags was identical to one of Atta's "left behind luggage," which was "a brand name Travelpro pull-along suitcase, black in color." [9/11 COMMISSION MEMORANDUM (MFR04016228).]

Two flight attendant replacements: Jean Roger, Flight Attendant Position 8 on American 11 was 24-years-old, born in San Diego, California who lived in Longmeadow, Massachusetts. Jean was assigned to the forward left jump seat (1L Center) in the forward galley. Her responsibilities included a boarding position of Zone B on the right hand side, cabin

check of Zone B on the right hand side at departure. During the video safety demonstration she would relieve flight attendant number three, and monitor Zone C; during a manual safety demonstration she would relieve flight attendant number 2 and be in Zone C on the left hand side. Jean's service area was the main cabin, so when deplaning she would be located at the middle of Zone C.

Jean Roger was a replacement for Halle Cameron.

There was another Flight Crew replacement for American 11 on the morning of, and this was Ann Moreland, a purser for American Air Lines. She was interviewed by the FBI on September 22, 2001, due to her contact with the Bureau about a "suspicious message" she found on her answering machine when she returned home on September 11th. Prior to this day, she was supposed to be scheduled for duty on American 11, but was replaced by another purser. We have not been able to identify the replacement.

From Ann Moreland's phone records, it was found that the message was left on her answering machine around 09:51 a.m., after both towers had been hit.

When MORELAND returned to her residence on September 11, 2001, she discovered a suspicious message on her answering machine. MORELAND played the message to the reporting agents. The call was received consecutive to a message left by [REDACTED]. In this suspicious message, a women with a heavy foreign accent could be heard in the background. A man was also heard in the background in an apparent discussion stating the name BIN-LADEN twice. Another male then left a message that stated the following: "If this had to do with Israel, there's gonna be a backlash against the Jews." The males had no apparent distinguishable accent. MORELAND did not recognize any of the individuals in the telephone message and did not know why anyone would leave such a message on her recorder.

>FBI Interview with Ann Moreland
September 22, 2001

Two stabbings onboard: Nydia Gonzalez, Manager of American Air Lines at Raleigh Reservation Center, had a phone interview with Larry Wansley the Director of Security for American Air Lines at Ft. Worth, Texas, on the day of. [FBI CASE #265D-NY-280350. SEPT. 11, 2001.] Mrs. Gonzalez told Larry Wansley that Betty's flight call was received by one of their employees "at approximately 08:20 a.m." Give or take 1 or 2 minutes, Betty's call is made. According to Mrs. Gonzalez, the information relayed by Betty, amongst other things, was the condition of two other colleagues who had been "stabbed." They were Flight Attendants (Position 1) Karen Martin, and (Position 5) Barbara Arestegui.

Two boarding gates?: The following table depicts the actual American Air Line data, which was used by the Commission to substantiate the actual time American 11 tookoff:-

11 1155 000000				
NO-AAA				
*** LOAD PLANNING QUALITY CONTROL RECORD ***	J			
0011 11 BOS	ACFT334	CRY	ONT	LOCAL
ACTUAL OUT TIME	--	1140	0740	
PLANNED OFF TIME - REVISED	--	1156	0756	
FINAL PSOR COUNT - RES	--	1136	0736	
FINAL CONTAINER UPD - CREW CHIEF	BOSX	1147	0747	
RADIO CLOSEOUT - AUTO	--	1147	0747	

American Air Line Load Planning Quality Control Record
American Air Line Flight 11, September 11, 2001.

Analysis of above chart

- 07:36 a.m. Final reserved passenger count
- 07:40 a.m. Actual time American 11 pushed back from Gate 32
- 07:47 a.m. Final loading of containers

07:56 a.m. Actual time of takeoff revised

The American Air Line Load Planning Quality Control Record shows the aircraft should have pushed back from Gate 32 at 07:40 a.m.; it also depicts a final loading of containers done 7 minutes later, at 07:47 a.m.

Two security checkpoints: Boston-Logan had a passenger checkpoint in the North Main B5 area, and a passenger checkpoint 2 in the Middle B4 area which opened at 07:15 a.m., on the day of.

Two flight attendants call from the aircraft: Betty Ong and Madeleine Sweeney were the only aircraft personnel (officially stated) as having called from American 11.

Two rental cars: Al-Suqami's squabble with a civilian and Atta/al-Omari arriving at the airport.

Two "hijackers" on stilled images from a security tape: Portland Jetport Airport was where the FBI located and confiscated airport closed-circuit television (CCTV) footage of two men officially claimed as being Mohamed Atta and Abdul al-Omari. This particular tape has not been released to the public except for still images created from the footage. A Commission Staff Report of August 26, 2004, however, informs that the security tapes from Portland Jetport Airport were "reviewed by the Commission." [FBI Report of Investigation, "Copy of Surveillance Video ATTA/ALOMARI in Portland, Maine," Sept. 11, 2001.] There is no explanation why the tape was not released into the public domain.

The still images show two men pass security point to board a flight; the flight is officially reported as being a shuttle Colgan Flight with number 5930. This shuttle is supposed to have taken Atta and al-Omari to Boston-Logan International Airport whose security tapes were not released; not even still images of these two men either waiting in the boarding area and/or passing through airport security points.

Two times depicted on stilled images from a security tape: Paul Thompson, in his timeline of the above event, states the obvious. “Some reports say the pair [Atta and al-Omari] passes through at 5:53 a.m.,” and references these reports to be from September 14, 2001. “Other reports put it earlier, at 5:45 a.m.,” and references these reports to be from October 5, 2001. Thompson concludes: “Strangely, when stills from the surveillance camera are later publicly released, they show two time stamps, one of 5:45 and another of 5:53.” [*Portland Press Herald*, Oct. 05, 2001; FBI, Oct. 05, 2001; 9/11 CR, p.3.] These still images mentioned were released on September 19, 2001, as reported by [Reuters](#). The FBI released the timeline of the pair in Portland on October 4, 2001, as reported by the [Portland Press Herald](#).



Still image with two time stamps from Maine's Portland Jetport Airport
Security video: Al-Omari wears a white shirt; Atta a blue one.
September 11, 2001.

›Image released by the FBI now in the [Creative Commons](#)



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Still image with two time stamps from Maine's Portland Jetport Airport
Security video: Al-Omari wears a white shirt; Atta a blue one.
September 11, 2001.

►Image Courtesy of the [National 9/11 Memorial and Museum](#) and the [FBI](#)

Two in total bags belonging to Atta and al-Omari miss the flight: Only two hand luggage were confiscated by the FBI at Boston-Logan, and officially referred to have been “left behind” by Atta and al-Omari.

Two versions on the “hijacking”: Two versions circulate on how exactly the FAA confirmed American 11 a hijack. One version, corroborated by ATC employees, is that Captain John Ogonowski keyed the microphone

as an intrusion in the cockpit was in progress. This was denied by the Commission.

The other version is what the FBI declared to have happened and subsequently reported by the Commission. And that is, that Atta turned off the transponder then radioed 2 threatening transmissions heard by Boston Air Traffic Control. There is no further information to substantiate either version was the correct version. This again is a difficulty for the historian to actually pinpoint which version is the correct one.

Two Checkouts: Though the FBI record al-Omari checking out of the Park Inn Hotel on September 9th, they then add another date as to when he checked out and this is for September 10th. On this latter check-out, al-Omari is seen in the company of Atta.

3275	9/10/2001	H/R	Abdul Alomari	Check out of Park Inn Room 225, 160 Boylston St., Newton, MA	Express Check-out Time 12:22 pm	Mohamed Atta	Boston FD-302, dated 9/13/2001, 1A11946
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FBI Redacted Timeline of Abdul al-Omari
Released: February 01, 2007.

If 2 check-outs were conducted by the same individual in the same hotel, a day apart, and this action did not seem peculiar or raise suspicions, then some type of incompetence was present. This is simple logic and there is no evidence to support otherwise.